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1. PURPOSE 
The primary purpose of this report is to develop abstractions for the mechanical response of 
engineered barrier system (EBS) components to seismic hazards at a geologic repository at 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and to define the methodology for using these abstractions in a 
seismic scenario class for the total system performance assessment for the license application 
(TSPA-LA).  A secondary purpose of this report is to provide additional information for 
criticality studies that required definition of waste package failures from fault displacement at a 
finer level of detail than is retained in TSPA.   
The seismic hazards addressed herein are vibratory ground motion, fault displacement, and 
rockfall due to ground motion.  The major EBS components addressed in this report are the drip 
shield, the waste package, and the fuel rod cladding because failure of these components has the 
potential to directly release radionuclides or to form diffusive or advective transport pathways.  
The drift invert and pallet are included in the kinematic and structural response calculations for 
the EBS; however, it is not necessary to develop damage abstractions for the invert and pallet 
because they retain their functionality and do not form new pathways for transport and release of 
radionuclides after strong vibratory ground motion events (Section 6.1.1).  The waste package 
internals and the waste form are also considered in structural response calculations, but separate 
damage abstractions are not needed because the failure of fuel rod cladding at relatively low 
PGV levels negates the mechanical response of the internals and waste form (Sections 6.5.6.3 
and 6.1.1).  The requirements for development of the abstractions and the associated algorithms 
for the seismic scenario class are defined in Technical Work Plan For:  Analysis of Waste 
Package and Drip Shield Response to Vibratory Ground Motion and Revision of the Seismic 
Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173171]). 
The development of these abstractions will provide a more complete representation of flow into 
and transport from the EBS under seismic events.  The results from this development will also 
address portions of integrated subissue ENG2, Mechanical Disruption of Engineered Barriers, 
including the acceptance criteria for this subissue defined in Section 2.2.1.3.2.3 of Yucca 
Mountain Review Plan, Final Report (NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274]). 
1.1 SCOPE 
The scope of this report is limited to abstracting the mechanical response of EBS components to 
seismic hazards during the postclosure period and defining algorithms for the seismic scenario 
class.  The abstractions are based on the results from kinematic and structural response 
calculations for the response of EBS components to vibratory ground motion1 and from analyses 
                                                 
1 Vibratory ground motion is the time-dependent, three-dimensional motion of the earth during a seismic event.  Each ground 
motion time history defines the displacement, velocity, and acceleration in three component directions as a function of time at 
a specific repository location.  The three components of each ground motion time history are applied simultaneously to 
determine structural response of EBS components.  Ground motion amplitude is identified by a horizontal component of the 
peak ground velocity (PGV), usually referred to as horizontal PGV or simply PGV in this document.  This horizontal 
component may be oriented in the longitudinal direction (along the axis of the emplacement drift) or in the transverse direction 
(in the horizontal plane and perpendicular to the axis of the emplacement drift) for the structural response calculations.  Note 
that the peak velocities for the second horizontal and vertical components of ground motion are not fixed, but will vary 
substantially even when the PGV for the first horizontal component is at a fixed value.  The process to generate the ground 
motion time histories is summarized in Section 6.4.2. 
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for fault displacement.  The kinematic and structural response calculations are not documented in 
this report; rather, the results from these design calculations provide the input data on which the 
abstractions are based.  The major design calculations and model report that provide input 
information for the abstractions are identified in Table 1-1 and Section 6.1.2.  The sources for 
direct input data and corroborating input data are identified in Tables 4-1 and 6.1-1, respectively.  
The outputs from this document are identified in Section 8.1. 
Table 1-1.  Major References for Seismic Damage Abstractions 
Damage Process Summary Report 
Summary of kinematic calculations for the response 
of multiple waste packages to vibratory ground 
motion and of structural calculations for the response 
of a single waste package to seismic hazards 
Mechanical Assessment of the Waste Package Subject to 
Vibratory Ground Motion CAL-WIS-AC-000001 REV 0B 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172]) 
Summary of kinematic and structural calculations for 
the response of the drip shield to seismic hazards 
Mechanical Assessment of the Drip Shield Subject to 
Vibratory Motion and Static and Dynamic Rock Loading 
CAL-WIS-AC-000002 REV 00A (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 169753]) 
Damage Process Calculation Report 
Damage to the waste package from vibratory ground 
motion. 
Structural Calculations of Waste Package Exposed to 
Vibratory Ground Motion 000-00C-WIS0-01400-000-00A 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083]). 
Calculation of damaged area caused by end-to-end 
impacts of adjacent waste packages for a predefined 
set of impact velocities and impact angles. 
21-PWR Waste Package End Impacts – A Mesh Study 
000-00C-WIS0-02100-00B (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178]) 
Acceleration of the fuel assemblies from end-to-end 
waste package impacts. 
Maximum Accelerations on the Fuel Assemblies of a 
21-PWR Waste Package During End Impacts 
000-0C-SU0-1100-000-00A (BSC 2003 [DIRS 162602]). 
Damage to the drip shield from vibratory ground 
motion. 
Structural Calculations of Drip Shield Exposed to 
Vibratory Ground Motion 000-00C-WIS0-02500-000-00A  
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 172448]). 
Damage to the drip shield from impact of large rock 
blocks. 
Drip Shield Structural Response to Rock Fall 
000-0C-SE0-00300-000-00A (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168993]). 
Damage Process Model Report 
Rockfall induced by vibratory ground motion. Drift Degradation Analysis ANL-EBS-MD-000027 REV 03 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107]). 
Limitation of peak ground velocity by the dynamic 
load bearing capability of the rock at Yucca Mountain 
Peak Ground Velocities for Seismic Events at Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada ANL-MGR-GS-000004 REV 00 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 170137]) 
 
The damage abstractions for EBS components include both model abstractions and scientific 
analyses.  The abstractions for damage to the waste package in response to vibratory ground 
motion are treated as models because they rely on analyses of structural response over a range of 
ground motions that is wider than typically covered by seismic designs for buildings or nuclear 
power plants.  These model abstractions have been validated to the requirements in 
LP-SIII.10Q-BSC, Models, through an independent technical review and through a comparison 
of the abstraction to computational data.  The abstractions for damage to the fuel rod cladding 
and for damage from fault displacement are considered scientific analyses because the cladding 
abstraction uses a simple, bounding approach and because the damage abstraction for fault 
displacement is based on design clearances between EBS components.  Although scientific 
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analyses are not validated to the requirements in LP-SIII.10Q-BSC, Models, Section 6.10 
provides a discussion of verification for these abstractions.  
The technical work plan (TWP) for this report identifies requirements for two revisions of this 
report during calendar year 2005 (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173171], Section 2.2.2.1).  However, this 
revision (REV 02) incorporates information on damage assessments for a collapsed emplacement 
drift from Mechanical Assessment of the Waste Package Subject to Vibratory Ground Motion 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172]), as required by the TWP for a future revision (REV 03).  
Consequently, that future revision of this report is not necessary and is no longer planned for 
calendar year 2005.  
This report does not address the performance of naval spent nuclear fuel during seismic events.  
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Technical Support Document for the License 
Application will provide the seismic analysis for naval spent nuclear fuel. 
1.2 LIMITATIONS 
The major limitations of the postclosure abstractions for the seismic scenario class are as 
follows: 
• The structural response calculations include corrosion of the waste package and drip 
shield over a 20,000-year time frame, which includes the initial 10,000 years following 
repository closure (Assumption 5.3).  The 20,000-year duration for the seismic analyses 
is designed to demonstrate that repository performance remains robust well after the 
initial 10,000 years after repository closure has ended.  Calculations of the seismic 
scenario class beyond 20,000 years may require new structural response calculations 
with higher levels of structural corrosion. 
• The computational algorithm for the seismic scenario class assumes that a single seismic 
event occurs in each realization of TSPA.  Coupled effects from multiple seismic events, 
whereby the first event changes the in-drift conditions and damage associated with a 
second event, are not considered because seismic hazards with the potential to have a 
significant impact on engineered barriers are anticipated to occur very rarely during the 
10,000 years following repository closure.  More specifically, seismic hazards with the 
greatest potential to damage the engineered barriers correspond to very large disruptive 
events with annual exceedance frequencies much less than 10-4 per year (Section 6.5 in 
this report), so there is only a very small probability that multiple events with the 
potential to induce significant damage will occur over a 10,000 year or 20,000-year 
period following repository closure. 
• Spatial variability has not been represented in the damage abstractions for EBS 
components under ground motion (Sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.6.3).  In other words, damage 
to the waste package and fuel rod cladding from vibratory ground motion is constant 
throughout the repository for TSPA.  Although spatial variability is not included within 
TSPA, it has been included in the kinematic calculations through the variability of 
friction factors on a package-by-package basis and in the abstraction of damaged areas 
for the three central waste packages in the kinematic calculations.   
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Lack of spatial variability is reasonable for estimating the mean dose from the seismic 
scenario class but overestimates the coefficient of variation for the dose.  The mean dose 
is accurately estimated because the sum of the mean doses from groups of waste 
packages with different damage levels is equal to mean of the sum of the doses from the 
individual groups.  In other words, using a constant mean value for the damage is an 
accurate approach for calculating the mean total dose.  On the other hand, the coefficient 
of variation (i.e., the variability about the mean) of the total dose over all realizations is 
overestimated without spatial variability.  If the waste package damage is constant and 
perfectly correlated everywhere in the repository, realizations with very high or very low 
damage produce a more extreme response for the dose than a realization with damage 
that varies spatially between the high and low values.  
• Structural response calculations are based on the 21-pressurized water reactor (PWR) 
waste package (Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2).  The 21-PWR waste package is the most 
common package type in the repository (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 13).  The 
design for the 21-PWR package is very similar to the design of the 44-boiling water 
reactor (BWR) package, and these two package types account for almost 65 percent of 
the packages in the inventory for TSPA-LA (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 13, for 
the 21-PWR absorber plate (AP), 21-PWR control rod (CR), and 44-BWR AP).  It is 
reasonable to base damage estimates on the 21-PWR waste package because it is the 
dominant package design in the repository.  Note that the LS-DYNA kinematic 
calculations discussed in Section 6.5 represent both 21-PWR and defense high level 
waste-long (DHLW-Long) types of waste packages, although only the kinematic 
information for the central 21-PWR package type is abstracted for the seismic scenario 
class.  
.
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2. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
Preparation of this model report and its supporting technical activities has been performed in 
accordance with the appropriate requirements of the quality assurance program.  This document 
is also prepared in accordance with the applicable technical work plan (TWP) (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 173171]), which directs the work identified in work package ADEM21, Post Closure 
Seismic Modeling.  Analysis and modeling activities performed under this TWP are subject to 
the requirements of Quality Assurance Requirements and Description (DOE 2004 
[DIRS 171539]) because they are associated with the characterization of the waste form and 
waste package in support of performance assessment (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173171], Section 8).  
The technical work plan was prepared in accordance with LP-2.29Q-BSC, Planning for Science 
Activities.  Input information for this model report are identified and tracked in accordance with 
LP-3.15Q-BSC, Managing Technical Product Inputs.  No qualified software was used to 
develop the abstractions documented in this report, so LP-SI.11Q-BSC, Software Management, 
is not applicable.  The methods used to control the electronic management of data, as required by 
AP-SV.1Q, Control of the Electronic Management of Information, are identified in Section 8 of 
the TWP. 
This model report presents information on the mechanical response of EBS components that are 
important to waste isolation performance for the seismic scenario class.  The following 
systems/subsystems are relevant to seismic damage abstractions, have been identified as 
important to waste isolation, and are classified as safety category (SC) in the Q-List (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 174269], entries on p. A-6 under Engineered Barrier System and on p. A-9 under 
Subsurface Facility/Emplacement): 
• Drip shield 
• Waste package (including internals) 
• Waste package emplacement pallet 
• Waste form 
• Cladding 
• Drift invert (ballast). 
The mechanical response of the drip shield, waste package, and Zircalloy cladding to vibratory 
ground motion, fault displacement, and rockfall induced by vibratory ground motion are the 
central focus of this report.  The drift invert and the waste package internals are considered in 
structural response calculations, but are not represented as separate damage abstractions because 
they do not directly control the release radionuclides or the formation of advective flow 
pathways.  The mass of the waste form is included in the structural response calculations, but the 
mechanical strength of a stack of uranium oxide pellets or of a vitrified waste form is not 
significant in comparison to the mechanical strength of the inner stainless steel shell and outer 
Alloy 22 shell of the waste package.  Finally, non-Zircalloy cladding is not considered here 
because it has no contribution to barrier capability. 
This document is prepared in accordance with LP-SIII.10Q-BSC, Models, and reviewed in 
accordance with LP-2.14Q-BSC, Document Review, as directed in the TWP. 
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3. USE OF SOFTWARE 
3.1 QUALIFIED SOFTWARE 
No qualified software is used to develop the seismic consequence abstractions.  These 
abstractions are based on the results of structural response calculations that are performed with 
qualified software and that are documented in separate design calculation reports identified in 
Table 1-1.  The qualified software programs for the structural response calculations, LS-DYNA 
and UDEC, are not directly used in the abstraction process and are therefore not listed here.  
These abstractions are also based on the results of:  (1) rockfall analyses that are performed with 
qualified software (Table 1-1), and (2) thermohydraulic analyses and seepage analyses that are 
performed with qualified software and that are documented in separate model reports identified 
in Sections 6.8.1 and 6.8.3.  The qualified software packages for rockfall analyses and 
thermohydraulic analyses are not directly used in the abstraction process and hence are not listed 
here. 
3.2 OTHER SOFTWARE 
Microsoft Excel for Windows, Version Excel 97 SR-2, running under the Microsoft 
Windows 2000 Professional operating system on an IBM-compatible personal computer, has 
been used to develop the abstractions for damage from seismic hazards.  The standard functions 
in Microsoft Excel, including its statistical package, are sufficient for these analyses.  No macros, 
codes, or software routines are required for or developed during this work.  Relevant Microsoft 
Excel files are included as appendices to this report.  As used to develop abstractions, Microsoft 
Excel 97 SR-2 is not required to be qualified or documented in accordance with LP-SI.11Q-BSC, 
Software Management.  The formulas, inputs to the formulas, and outputs from the formulas are 
identified in Appendices A, B and E, as required by LP-SIII.10Q-BSC, Models, Attachment 2. 
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4. INPUTS 
4.1 DIRECT INPUT 
Table 4-1 presents the direct input information for abstraction of damage to EBS components 
from seismic hazards.  The information in Table 4-1 has been categorized into seven areas that 
are relevant to the abstractions in this report:  (1) seismic failure criterion; (2) effective transport 
area for a network of stress corrosion cracks (SCCs)2; (3) damage to the waste package from 
vibratory ground motion; (4) damage to the fuel rod cladding from vibratory ground motion; 
(5) damage to the drip shield from rockfall and from vibratory ground motion; (6) damage to the 
waste package, drip shield, and cladding from fault displacement; and (7) parameters for the 
seismic scenario class.  The numerical values in Table 4-1 are presented with the same number 
of significant figures as presented in the source.  For consistency, the data in Table 4-1 preserve 
the same units as the source documents, even when the use of millimeters results in large values 
with five or six significant figures for waste package lengths and waste package diameters. 
The technical product inputs identified in Table 4-1 are appropriate for the development of 
model abstractions and scientific analyses for the seismic scenario class.  Table 4-1 includes the 
direct input information for the development of the new waste package damage abstraction 
documented in Sections 6.5.1 through 6.5.3 of this report.  This new damage abstraction 
completely replaces and supersedes the waste package damage abstraction documented in 
previous versions of this report. 
For project-historical reasons, the sources in Table 4-1 generally identify ground motion levels 
by the value of the annual exceedance frequency.  This report identifies ground motion level by 
the value of horizontal peak ground velocity (PGV), rather than exceedance frequency.  PGV is a 
unique and unambiguous measure of the amplitude of the ground motions.  The rationale for 
using PGV, rather than exceedance frequency, is explained further in Section 6.1.3.  For the 
reader’s convenience, the following list identifies the correspondence between PGV and the 
values of annual exceedance frequency in the sources for Table 4-1: 
• PGV of 0.19 m/s corresponds to the 5 × 10-4 per year exceedance frequency in the 
sources in Table 4-1. 
• PGV of 0.384 m/s corresponds to the 10-4 per year exceedance frequency in the sources 
in Table 4-1.3. 
• PGV of 1.05 m/s corresponds to the 10-5 per year exceedance frequency in the sources in 
Table 4-1. 
                                                 
2 Effective transport area is defined as the ratio of the crack area to the “damaged area”. The area of material that exceeds the 
residual stress threshold for accelerated stress corrosion cracking is referred to as the “damaged area” throughout this report.  
The basis for this damage mechanism is explained in Section 6.3.1. 
3 This single ground motion was developed for design purposes and matches the target design spectrum.  The PGV value of 
0.384 m/s differs slightly from the PGV value on the hazard curve at Point B for an annual exceedance frequency of 10-4 per 
year, which is 0.4019 m/s. 
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• PGV of 2.44 m/s corresponds to the 10-6 per year exceedance frequency in the sources in 
Table 4-1. 
• PGV of 5.35 m/s corresponds to the 10-7 per year exceedance frequency in the sources in 
Table 4-1. 
These PGV values are based on the unbounded PGV hazard curve at the emplacement drifts, 
which was the only PGV hazard curve available when many of the sources in Table 4-1 were 
completed.  This original hazard curve is unbounded in the sense that PGV continues to increase 
with decreasing values of the exceedance frequency.  A second hazard curve was subsequently 
developed that incorporates limits for the maximum shear strain in the lithophysal rock, as 
discussed in Section 6.4.3.  The maximum shear strain can be related to the in situ response by 
using the site response model, resulting in a bounded hazard curve for PGV at the repository 
horizon (DTN:  MO0501BPVELEMP.001 [DIRS 172682]).  The differences between the PGV 
values on the unbounded and bounded hazard curves are illustrated in Figure 6.4-2 in 
Section 6.4.3.  The difference in the hazard curves illustrates the rationale for identifying ground 
motion level by PGV, which is uniquely associated with each ground motion, rather than by the 
annual exceedance frequency that can change with the hazard curve. 
Section 8.2 identifies the uncertainties in input information and parameters for the damage 
analyses of EBS components and explains how these uncertainties are propagated into the 
abstractions for the seismic scenario class. 
Table 4-1.  Direct Input Information for Seismic Consequence Abstractions 
Input Information Value Source 
Seismic Failure Criterion: 
Residual stress threshold for initiation of stress 
corrosion cracking on a smooth surface of Alloy 22 
90 percent of the 
yield strength of 
Alloy 22 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], 
Section 6.2.1, 2nd paragraph on 
page 6-7 
Effective Transport Area for a Network of Stress Corrosion Cracks: 
Ratio of crack area to damaged area) for a densely 
packed network of stress corrosion cracks in Alloy 22 
at room temperature 
0.00328 to 
0.0131 
DTN:  MO0403SPASCRKD.000 
[DIRS 168105]; see values under 
Crack Area Density at room 
temperature 
Damage to the Waste Package from Vibratory Ground Motion: 
Damage statistics for waste package-pallet impacts, 
based on a sampling of vibratory ground motions at the 
2.44 m/s (10-6 per year exceedance frequency) PGV 
level 
See Table 1 
in source; 
numerical values 
identified in 
Table 6.5-9  
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173500], Table 1 
Damage statistics for waste package-pallet impacts, 
based on a sampling of vibratory ground motions at the 
5.35 m/s (10-7 per year exceedance frequency) PGV 
level 
See Table 2 
in first source;  
see BSC 2004 
[DIRS 171717] 
for Realization 
11; numerical 
values identified 
in Table 6.5-9  
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173500], Table 2; 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717], 
Table 6.1-4  for Realization 11 
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Table 4-1.  Direct Input Information for Seismic Consequence Abstractions (Continued) 
Input Information Value Source 
Damage to the Waste Package from Vibratory Ground Motion (Continued): 
Damage statistics for waste package-pallet impacts, 
based on supplemental calculations for vibratory 
ground motions at the 5.35 m/s, 2.44 m/s, and 
1.05 m/s PGV levels 
See Table 6.1-4 
in source for data 
at 5.35 m/s; 
See Table 6.2-7 
in source for data 
at 2.44 m/s; 
See Table 6.3-6 
in source for data 
at 1.05 m/s; 
numerical values 
identified in 
Table 6.5-9 of 
this report 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717], 
Tables 6.1-4, 6.2-7, and 6.3-6 
Surface area of the 21-PWR waste package design for 
the single waste package calculations 
28.2 m2 BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], 
Section 6.1.1 
Catalog of damaged areas from end-on impacts of a 
waste package on an elastic surface with a residual 
stress threshold of 80 percent of the yield strength of 
Alloy 22 
See Table 2 in 
source; numerical 
values identified 
in Table 6.5-3 of 
this report 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178], Table 2 
Catalog of damaged areas from end-on impacts of a 
waste package on an elastic surface with a residual 
stress threshold of 90 percent of the yield strength of 
Alloy 22 
See Table 3 in 
source; numerical 
values identified 
in Table 6.5-3 of 
this report 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178], Table 3 
Kinematic parameters from UDEC calculations of 
end-to-end impacts of multiple waste packages in 
response to ground motions at the 1.05 m/s, 2.44 m/s, 
and 5.35 m/s PGV levels  
See files in DTN; 
numerical values 
are documented 
in the Excel files 
identified in 
Table A-3 and 
provided 
electronically in 
Appendix G of 
this report 
DTN:  MO0503SPAUDECW.000 
[DIRS 173337]  
Kinematic parameters from LS-DYNA calculations of 
end-to-end impacts of multiple waste packages in 
response to ground motions at the 1.05 m/s, 2.44 m/s, 
and 5.35 m/s PGV levels 
See files in DTN; 
numerical values 
are documented 
in the Excel files 
identified in 
Table A-3 and 
provided 
electronically in 
Appendix G of 
this report 
DTN:  MO0504SPALSDYN.000 
[DIRS 173338] 
PGV for the second horizontal ground motion 
component (PGV-Longitudinal) when the first 
horizontal component is scaled to 1.05 m/s 
See Table X-2 in 
source; numerical 
values identified 
in Table 6.5-9 of 
this report 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], 
Appendix X, Table X-2 
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Table 4-1.  Direct Input Information for Seismic Consequence Abstractions (Continued) 
Input Information Value Source 
PGV for the second horizontal ground motion 
component (PGV-Longitudinal) when the first 
horizontal component is scaled to 2.44 m/s 
See Table X-3 in 
source for the  
revised set of 
ground motions; 
See Table X-4 in 
source for the 
original set of 
ground motions; 
numerical values 
identified in 
Table 6.5-9 of 
this report 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], 
Appendix X, Tables X-3 and X-4 
PGV for the second horizontal ground motion 
component (PGV-Longitudinal) when the first 
horizontal component is scaled to 5.35 m/s 
See Table X-5 in 
source; numerical 
values identified 
in Table 6.5-9 of 
this report 
BSC 2004 DIRS 166107], 
Appendix X, Table X-5 
Damaged areas from end-on and side-on impacts of 
the waste package for impact velocities between 1 and 
10 m/s and impact angles of 1º and 8º for a residual 
stress threshold of 80% of the Alloy 22 yield strength 
Numerical values 
are identified in 
Table 6.5-12 of 
this report 
BSC 2003 [DIRS 162293], Table 4 
Number of lateral impacts and maximum lateral impact 
velocities between waste package and drip shield, 
based on a sampling of vibratory ground motions at the 
2.44 m/s PGV level. 
Numerical values 
are identified in 
Table 6.5-13 of 
this report 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], 
Tables 6.1.3-1 to 6.1.3-5 
Maximum lateral impact velocities between the waste 
package and drip shield, based on two-dimensional 
cross-drift calculations for a waste package and drip 
shield in a rubble-filled drift, based on a sampling of 
vibratory ground motions at the 2.44 m/s PGV level 
ground motions 
Numerical values 
are identified in 
Table 6.5-14 of 
this report 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], 
Attachment V, Table V-5 
Damage to the Fuel Rod Cladding from Vibratory Ground Motion: 
Maximum peak acceleration of fuel assemblies due to 
waste package-to-waste package impacts. 
See Table 3 
in source; 
numerical values 
are identified in 
Table 6.5-15 of 
this report 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173500], Table 3 
Average peak acceleration of fuel assemblies due to 
waste package-to-waste package impacts. 
See Table 4 
in source; 
numerical values 
are identified in 
Table 6.5-15 of 
this report 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173500], Table 4 
Number of impacts and statistics for maximum axial 
impact velocities between adjacent waste packages, 
based on a sampling of vibratory ground motions at the 
2.44 m/s (10-6 per year exceedance frequency) PGV 
level. 
Maximum impact 
velocities vary 
between 1.4 m/s 
and 4.5 m/s  
BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], 
Tables 6.1.2-1 to 6.1.2-15 
Statistics for maximum axial impact velocities between 
adjacent waste packages, based on a sampling of 
vibratory ground motions at the 5.35 m/s (10-7 per year 
exceedance frequency) PGV level. 
Maximum impact 
velocities vary 
between 1.3 m/s 
and 6.5 m/s 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], 
Tables 6.2.2-1 to 6.2.2-15 
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Table 4-1.  Direct Input Information for Seismic Consequence Abstractions (Continued) 
Input Information Value Source 
Axial impact velocity between adjacent waste 
packages for the single vibratory ground motion at the 
0.190 m/s (5×10-4 per year exceedance frequency) 
PGV level. 
Relative 
displacement of 
waste package 
and pallet nodes 
is less than 
±0.01 mm 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], 
Figures 10 and 11 
Axial impact velocity between adjacent waste 
packages for the single vibratory ground motion at the 
0.384 m/s (1×10-4 per year exceedance frequency) 
PGV level. 
Relative 
displacement of 
waste package 
and pallet nodes 
is less than 
±0.07 mm 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], 
Figures 20 and 21 
Damage to the Drip Shield from Rockfall and from Vibratory Ground Motion: 
Damage to the drip shield due to impact by single rock 
blocks from the 2.44 m/s (10-6 per year exceedance 
frequency) PGV level. 
See Table 2 in 
source; numerical 
values are 
identified in 
Table 6.6-2 of 
this report 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], Table 2 
Damage to the drip shield due to impact by maximum 
rock block from the 5.35 m/s (10-7 per year 
exceedance frequency) PGV level. 
See Table 3 in 
source; numerical 
values are 
identified in 
Table 6.6-2 of 
this report 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], Table 3 
Maximum dynamic displacement in the longitudinal 
stiffener during vertical impact of the 11.5 metric ton 
rock block 
25.4 cm; drip 
shield does not 
buckle 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 168993] 
Figure II-5 and Section 6 
Maximum permanent deflection for edge-on and 
corner-on rock block impacts 
0.114 m 
(edge-on) and 
0.129 m 
(corner-on) 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 174052], 
Tables 7-5 and 7-6 
Drip shield configuration after rock block impact Drip shield does 
not buckle or 
collapse 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 174052], 
Figures 7-14 through 7-20 
Damage to the drip shield for the single vibratory 
ground motion at the 0.190 m/s (5×10-4 per year 
exceedance frequency) PGV level. 
No damage BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], 
Calculation Results I 
Damage statistics for the area of the drip shield 
exceeding the residual stress threshold at the 2.44 m/s 
(10-6 per year exceedance frequency) PGV level. 
Mean percent 
damaged area is 
0.70 percent and 
the maximum 
percent damaged 
area is 
2.13 percent; 
there is no 
separation of drip 
shields 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], Table 4 
Damage statistics for the drip shield in an unfilled drift, 
based on a sampling of vibratory ground motions at the 
5.35 m/s (10-7 per year exceedance frequency) PGV 
level. 
Drip shields 
separate for the 
analyzed ground 
motions 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], 
Calculation Results III 
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Table 4-1.  Direct Input Information for Seismic Consequence Abstractions (Continued) 
Input Information Value Source 
Kinematic studies of drip shield motion for an open drift 
and for a drift partly and completely filled with rockfall 
Drip shields do 
not separate for 
an open drift.  
Frictional forces 
from small 
amount of rockfall 
stabilize drip 
shield motion and 
prevent 
separation. 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 169753], 
Section 5.3 
Damage to the Waste Package, Drip Shield and Fuel Rod Cladding from Fault Displacement: 
Emplacement Drift Diameter 5.5 m BSC 2005 [DIRS 173498], Figure 1 
Height of Steel Invert Structure (maximum thickness of 
invert) 
863.6 mm BSC 2004 [DIRS 170074], drawing 
for 21-PWR package  
Drip Shield Nominal Height – Exterior 2,885.62 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], Table 1 
Drip Shield Height – Interior 2,716 mm BSC 2004 [DIRS 168489], Figure 1 
Outside Diameter of 44-BWR Waste Package Outer 
Barrier 
1,675.1 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1, 
to drawing 
000-MW0-DSU0-00502-000-00A 
with source data 
Outside Diameter of 24-BWR Waste Package Outer 
Barrier 
1,294.1 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1, 
to drawing 
000-MW0-DSU0-00602-000-00A 
with source data 
Outside Diameter of 21-PWR Waste Package Outer 
Barrier 
1,637 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1, 
to drawing 
000-MW0-DSU0-00402-000-00B 
with source data 
Outside Diameter of 12-PWR Waste Package Outer 
Barrier 
1,313.2 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1, 
to drawing 
000-MW0-DSU0-00302-000-00A 
with source data 
Outside Diameter of Naval-Long Waste Package Outer 
Barrier 
1,863.7 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1, 
to drawing 
000-MW0-DNF0-00102-000-00A 
with source data 
Outside Diameter of Naval-Short Waste Package 
Outer Barrier 
1,863.7 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1, 
to drawing 
000-MW0-DNF0-00202-000-00A 
with source data 
Outside Diameter of 5-DHLW/DOE Spent Nuclear 
Fuel-Short Waste Package Outer Barrier 
2,044.7 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1, 
to drawing   
000-MW0-DS00-00102-000-00A 
with source data 
Outside Diameter of 5-DHLW/DOE Spent Nuclear 
Fuel-Long Waste Package Outer Barrier 
2,044.7 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1, 
to drawing 
000-MW0-DS00-00202-000-00A 
with source data 
Outside Diameter of 2-multicanister overpack 
(MCO)/2-DHLW Waste Package Outer Barrier 
1,749.4 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1, 
to drawing 
000-MW0-DS00-00302-000-00A 
with source data 
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Table 4-1.  Direct Input Information for Seismic Consequence Abstractions (Continued) 
Input Information Value Source 
44-BWR Waste Package Nominal Length 5,024.4 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 
24-BWR Waste Package Nominal Length 5,024.44 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 
21-PWR Waste Package Nominal Length 5,024.4 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 
12-PWR Waste Package Nominal Length 5,560.4 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 
Naval-Long Waste Package Nominal Length 5,837.4 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 
Naval-Short Waste Package Nominal Length 5,202.2 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 
5-DHLW/ DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel-Short Waste 
Package Nominal Length 
3,452.8 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 
5-DHLW/DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel-Long Waste 
Package Nominal Length 
5,059.4 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 
2-MCO/2-DHLW Waste Package Nominal Length 5,059.4 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 
Clearance between Top of 21-PWR Waste Package 
and Underside of Drip Shield Peripheral Bulkhead 
806.2 mm BSC 2004 [DIRS 170074], drawing 
for 21-PWR package 
Clearance between Top of 12-PWR Waste Package 
and Underside of Drip Shield Peripheral Bulkhead 
1,132.1 mm BSC 2004 [DIRS 170074], drawing 
for 12-PWR package 
Clearance between Top of 44-BWR Waste Package 
and Underside of Drip Shield Peripheral Bulkhead 
765.2 mm BSC 2004 [DIRS 170074], drawing 
for 44-BWR package 
Clearance between Top of Naval Waste Package and 
Underside of Drip Shield Peripheral Bulkhead 
562.1 mm BSC 2004 [DIRS 170074], drawing 
for Naval package 
Clearance between Top of 5-DHLW/DOE Waste 
Package and Underside of Drip Shield Peripheral 
Bulkhead 
367.1 mm BSC 2004 [DIRS 170074], drawing 
for 5-DHLW/DOE package 
Emplacement Drift Numbers and Rock Type 
Intersected by the Sundance fault 
(Rock type or types identified in parentheses) 
1-6 (Tptpll) 
1-7 
(Tptpll/Tptpmn) 
1-8 (Tptpmn) 
2-1 (Tptpmn) 
DTN:  MO0012MWDGFM02.002 
[DIRS 153777],  
File in Earthvision:  Horizon 
from/usr6/restored/ism4/Faults/f00
Sundance.2grd 
Emplacement Drift Numbers and Rock Type 
Intersected by the Drill Hole Wash fault 
(Rock type or types identified in parentheses) 
4-1 (Tptpll) 
4-2 (Tptpll) 
3-4 W (Tptpll) 
3-5 W (Tptpll) 
3-6 W (Tptpll) 
3-7 W (Tptpll) 
3-8 W (Tptpll) 
3-9 W (Tptpll) 
3-10 E (Tptpmn) 
3-11 E (Tptpmn) 
3-12 E (Tptpmn) 
3-13 E (RHHtop/ 
Tptpmn) 
3-14 E (RHHtop) 
3-15 E (RHHtop) 
3-16 E (RHHtop) 
3-17 E (RHHtop) 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 168180], Table 9 
for drift numbers; 
DTN:  MO0012MWDGFM02.002 
[DIRS 153777], for rock type; 
RHHtop is the lowermost portion of 
the Tptpul. 
File in Earthvision:  Horizon 
from/usr6/restored/ism4/Faults/f00
drill.2grd 
                                                 
4 Table 1 of IED Waste Package Configuration [Sheet 1 of 1] (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501]) has 5,024.5 mm as the length of the 
24-BWR waste package.  This appears to be a conversion error, because 197.81-in = 5,024.4 mm, not 5,024.5 mm as stated in 
Table 1 of the reference.  The corrected value is listed in Table 4-1. 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 4-8 August 2005 
Table 4-1.  Direct Input Information for Seismic Consequence Abstractions (Continued) 
Input Information Value Source 
Emplacement Drift Numbers and Rock Type 
Intersected by the Pagany Wash Fault 
(Rock type or types identified in parentheses) 
3-1 W (Tptpll) 
3-1 E (Tptpll) 
3-2 E (Tptpll) 
3-3 E (Tptpll) 
3-4 E (Tptpll) 
3-5 E (Tptpmn) 
3-6 E (Tptpmn) 
3-7 E (Tptpmn) 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 168180], Table 9 
for drift numbers; 
DTN:  MO0012MWDGFM02.002 
[DIRS 153777], for rock type; 
File in Earthvision:  Horizon 
from/usr6/restored/ism4/Faults/f00
pagany.2grd 
Emplacement Drift Numbers and Rock Type 
Intersected by the Sever Wash Fault 
(Rock type or types identified in parentheses) 
3-2 E (Tptpll) 
3-3 E (Tptpll) 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 168180], Table 9 
for drift numbers; 
DTN:  MO0012MWDGFM02.002 
[DIRS 153777], for rock strata; 
File in Earthvision:  Horizon 
from/usr6/restored/ism4/Faults/f00
sever.2grd 
Emplacement Drift Numbers Intersected by the 
western splay off the main Ghost Dance Fault 
2-17, 2-18, 2-19, 
2-20, 2-21, 2-22, 
2-23, 2-24, 2-25, 
2-26, and 2-27 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 168180], Table 9 
Fault Displacement Hazard at Site 3 on the Drill Hole 
Wash Fault 
See the Excel file 
Appendix E 
Rev02.xls, 
worksheet 
“Table 6.7-5 
Calculations” in 
Appendix G for 
the mean hazard 
curve data at 
Site 3 
DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 
[DIRS 166962], file: 
./displ/tot_haz/s3.frac_mean.gz 
Fault Displacement Hazard at Site 5 on the Sundance 
Fault 
See the Excel file 
Appendix E 
Rev02.xls, 
worksheet 
“Table 6.7-5 
Calculations” in 
Appendix G for 
the mean hazard 
curve data at 
Site 5 
DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 
[DIRS 166962], file: 
./displ/tot_haz/s5.frac_mean.gz 
Fault Displacement Hazard at Site 7a, a generic 
repository location, approximately 100 m east of the 
Solitario Canyon Fault, with a hypothetical small fault 
with 2-m offset 
See the Excel file 
Appendix E 
Rev02.xls, 
worksheet 
“Table 6.7-5 
Calculations” in 
Appendix G for 
the mean hazard 
curve data at 
Site 7a 
DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 
[DIRS 166962], file: 
./displ/tot_haz/s7a.frac_mean.gz 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 4-9 August 2005 
Table 4-1.  Direct Input Information for Seismic Consequence Abstractions (Continued) 
Input Information Value Source 
Fault Displacement Hazard at Site 8a, a generic 
repository location, midway between the Solitario 
Canyon and Ghost Dance Faults, with a hypothetical 
small fault with a 2-m offset. 
See the Excel file 
Appendix E 
Rev02.xls, 
worksheet 
“Table 6.7-5 
Calculations” in 
Appendix G for 
the mean hazard 
curve data at 
Site 8a 
DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000  
[DIRS 166962], file: 
./displ/tot_haz/s8a.frac_mean.gz 
Fault Displacement Hazard at Sites 7b, 7c & 7d – 
generic repository locations, approximately 100 meters 
east of the Solitario Canyon fault.  Site 7b has a 
hypothetical shear with 10-cm offset, site 7c has a 
hypothetical fracture with no cumulative displacement, 
and site 7d is intact rock. 
See the Excel file 
Appendix E 
Rev02.xls, 
worksheet 
“Table 6.7-5 
Calculations” in 
Appendix G for 
the mean hazard 
curve data at 
Sites 7b, 7c, 
and 7d 
DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 
[DIRS 166962], files: 
./displ/tot_haz/s7b.frac_mean.gz,./
displ/tot_haz/s7c.frac_mean.gz, 
and 
displ/tot_haz/s7d.frac_mean.gz, 
Fault Displacement Hazard at Sites 8b and 8c – 
generic repository locations, midway between the 
Solitario Canyon and Ghost Dance faults.  Site 8b has 
a hypothetical shear with 10 cm offset and site 8c has 
a hypothetical fracture with no cumulative 
displacement. 
See the Excel file 
Appendix E 
Rev02.xls, 
worksheet 
“Table 6.7-5 
Calculations” in 
Appendix G for 
the mean hazard 
curve data at 
Sites 8b and 8c 
DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000  
[DIRS 166962], files: 
./displ/tot_haz/s8b.frac_mean.gz 
and 
./displ/tot_haz/s8c.frac_mean.gz 
Nominal Quantity for LA of 21-PWR Waste Packages 
with Absorber Plates. 
4,299 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 13 
Nominal Quantity for LA of 21-PWR Waste Packages 
with Control Rods. 
95 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 13  
Nominal Quantity for LA of 12-PWR Long Waste 
Packages with Absorber Plates. 
163 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 13  
Nominal Quantity for LA of 44-BWR Waste Packages 
with Absorber Plates. 
2,831 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 13  
Nominal Quantity for LA of 24-BWR Waste Packages 
with Absorber Plates. 
84 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 13  
Nominal Quantity for LA of 5 HLW Short/1 DOE Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Short Waste Package. 
1,147 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 13  
Nominal Quantity for LA of 5 HLW Long/1 DOE Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Long Waste Package. 
1,406 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 13  
Nominal Quantity for LA of 2 MCO/2 HLW Waste 
Package. 
149 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 13  
Nominal Quantity for LA of 5 HLW Long/1 DOE Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Short Waste Package. 
31 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 13  
Nominal Quantity for LA of 5 HLW Long Only Waste 
Package. 
679 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 13  
Nominal Quantity for LA of Naval Short Waste 
Package. 
144 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 13  
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Table 4-1.  Direct Input Information for Seismic Consequence Abstractions (Continued) 
Input Information Value Source 
Nominal Quantity for LA of Naval Long Waste 
Package. 
156 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 13  
Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class: 
Horizontal PGV for the 10-5 per year mean annual 
exceedance frequency on the unbounded hazard 
curve at Point B, the waste emplacement level. 
1.05 m/s DTN:  MO0401SEPPGVRL.022 
[DIRS 169099] 
Horizontal PGV for the 10-6 per year mean annual 
exceedance frequency on the unbounded hazard 
curve at Point B, the waste emplacement level. 
2.44 m/s DTN:  MO0303DPGVB106.002 
[DIRS 162712] 
Horizontal PGV for the 10-7 per year mean annual 
exceedance frequency on the unbounded hazard 
curve at Point B, the waste emplacement level. 
5.35 m/s DTN:  MO0210PGVPB107.000 
[DIRS 162713] 
Bounded horizontal peak ground velocity hazard curve 
at Point B, the waste emplacement level. 
See DTN for 
data; numerical 
values are 
identified in 
Table 6.4-1 
DTN:  MO0501BPVELEMP.001 
[DIRS 172682] 
PGV values at Point B for the single ground motion 
corresponding to the 1×10-4 per year mean annual 
exceedance frequency.  This ground motion was 
developed for design purposes and matches the target 
design spectrum.  The resulting PGV value of 38.38 
cm/s differs by about 10 percent from the PGV value 
on the hazard curve at Point B for the 10-4 per year 
mean annual exceedance frequency (Table 6.1-1). 
38.38 cm/s for 
the first horizontal 
component, 
rounded to 
0.384 m/s; 
43.78 cm/s for 
the second 
horizontal 
component; 
47.51 cm/s for 
the vertical 
component 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], 
Table X-1 
NOTES: tptpll refers to the lower lithophysal stratum at the repository horizon. 
tptpmn refers to the middle nonlithophysal stratum at the repository horizon 
RHHTop refers to the top of the repository host horizon, encompassing the lower part of the upper lithophysal 
zone. 
4.2 CRITERIA 
General programmatic requirements for this document are listed in Technical Work Plan 
For:  Analysis of Waste Package and Drip Shield Response to Vibratory Ground Motion and 
Revision of the Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173171]).  The TWP 
specifies that this document and the analyses described herein must adhere to the requirements of 
LP-SIII.10Q-BSC, Models.  The TWP specifies that this document must discuss the barrier 
function of the EBS components (waste package, drip shield, and emplacement pallet) that may 
be affected by seismically-induced hazards.  The TWP also specifies that the acceptance criteria 
in Yucca Mountain Review Plan, Final Report (NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274]) must be addressed. 
The general requirements for the TSPA are stated in 10 CFR 63.114 [DIRS 173273].  
Section 2.2.1.3.2.3 of Yucca Mountain Review Plan, Final Report (NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274]) 
provides guidance regarding the acceptance criteria that may be used by the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to determine whether the technical requirements have been 
met by the seismic consequence abstractions.  The five general acceptance criteria in 
Section 2.2.1.3.2.3 are listed below, along with the subcriteria specifically addressed by this 
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report.  Where a subcriterion includes several components, only some components may be 
addressed.  Section 8.2 provides a detailed discussion of how the seismic abstractions and the 
seismic scenario class meet the applicable acceptance criteria from Yucca Mountain Review 
Plan, Final Report (NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274]). 
Acceptance Criteria from Section 2.2.1.3.2.3, Mechanical Disruption of Engineered Barriers 
Acceptance Criterion 1:  System Description and Model Integration Are Adequate. 
(1) Total system performance assessment adequately incorporates important design 
features, physical phenomena, and couplings, and uses consistent and appropriate 
assumptions throughout the mechanical disruption of engineered barrier abstraction 
process. 
(2) The description of geological and engineering aspects of design features, physical 
phenomena, and couplings, that may affect mechanical disruption of engineered 
barriers, is adequate.  For example, the description may include materials used in the 
construction of engineered barrier components, environmental effects 
(e.g., temperature, water chemistry, humidity, radiation, etc.) on these materials, and 
mechanical-failure processes and concomitant failure criteria used to assess the 
performance capabilities of these materials.  Conditions and assumptions in the 
abstraction of mechanical disruption of engineered barriers are readily identified and 
consistent with the body of data presented in the description. 
(3) The abstraction of mechanical disruption of engineered barriers uses assumptions, 
technical bases, data, and models that are appropriate and consistent with other related 
U.S. Department of Energy abstractions.  For example, assumptions used for 
mechanical disruption of engineered barriers are consistent with the abstraction of 
degradation of engineered barriers (Section 2.2.1.3.1 of the Yucca Mountain Review 
Plan).  The descriptions and technical bases provide transparent and traceable support 
for the abstraction of mechanical disruption of engineered barriers. 
(4) Boundary and initial conditions used in the total system performance assessment 
abstraction of mechanical disruption of engineered barriers are propagated throughout 
its abstraction approaches. 
(5) Sufficient data and technical bases to assess the degree to which features, events, and 
processes have been included in this abstraction are provided. 
Subcriterion (6) is not discussed here because it is related to transient criticality and beyond the 
scope of this report.  Subcriterion (7) is not discussed here because there are no activities related 
to peer review or qualification of existing data discussed in this report. 
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Acceptance Criterion 2:  Data Are Sufficient for Model Justification. 
(1) Geological and engineering values, used in the license application to evaluate 
mechanical disruption of engineered barriers, are adequately justified.  Adequate 
descriptions of how the data were used, interpreted, and appropriately synthesized into 
the parameters are provided. 
(3) Data on geology of the natural system, engineering materials, and initial 
manufacturing defects, used in the total system performance assessment abstraction, 
are based on appropriate techniques.  These techniques may include laboratory 
experiments, site-specific field measurements, natural analog research, and 
process-level modeling studies.  As appropriate, sensitivity or uncertainty analyses 
used to support the U.S. Department of Energy total system performance assessment 
abstraction are adequate to determine the possible need for additional data. 
(4) Engineered barrier mechanical failure models for disruption events are adequate.  For 
example, these models may consider effects of prolonged exposure to the expected 
emplacement drift environment, material test results not specifically designed or 
performed for the Yucca Mountain site, and engineered barrier component fabrication 
flaws. 
Subcriterion (2) is not discussed here because data collection activities related to the geology of 
the natural system engineering materials, and initial manufacturing defects are beyond the scope 
of this report. 
Acceptance Criterion 3:  Data Uncertainty Is Characterized and Propagated Through the 
Model Abstraction. 
(1) Models use parameter values, assumed ranges, probability distributions, and bounding 
assumptions that are technically defensible, reasonably account for uncertainties and 
variabilities, and do not result in an under-representation of the risk estimate. 
(2) Process-level models used to represent mechanically disruptive events, within the 
emplacement drifts at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, are adequate.  
Parameter values are adequately constrained by Yucca Mountain site data, such that 
the effects of mechanically disruptive events on engineered barrier integrity are not 
underestimated.  Parameters within conceptual models for mechanically disruptive 
events are consistent with the range of characteristics observed at Yucca Mountain. 
(3) Uncertainty is adequately represented in parameter development for conceptual 
models, process-level models, and alternative conceptual models considered in 
developing the assessment abstraction of mechanical disruption of engineered barriers.  
This may be done either through sensitivity analyses or use of conservative limits; and 
Review Plan for Safety Analysis Report 2.2-33. 
Subcriterion (4) is not discussed here because an expert elicitation was not performed during the 
development of the seismic damage abstractions. 
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Acceptance Criterion 4:  Model Uncertainty Is Characterized and Propagated Through the 
Model Abstraction. 
(2) Consideration of conceptual model uncertainty is consistent with available site 
characterization data, laboratory experiments, field measurements, natural analog 
information and process-level modeling studies; and the treatment of conceptual 
model uncertainty does not result in an under-representation of the risk estimate. 
(3) Appropriate alternative modeling approaches are investigated that are consistent with 
available data and current scientific knowledge, and appropriately consider their 
results and limitations using tests and analyses that are sensitive to the processes 
modeled. 
Subcriterion (1) is not discussed here because alternate modeling approaches for features, events, 
and processes is beyond the scope of this report. 
Acceptance Criterion 5:  Model Abstraction Output Is Supported by Objective 
Comparisons. 
(1) Models implemented in this total system performance assessment abstraction provide 
results consistent with output from detailed process-level models and/or empirical 
observations (laboratory and field testings and/or natural analogs). 
(2) Outputs of mechanical disruption of engineered barrier abstractions reasonably 
produce or bound the results of corresponding process-level models, empirical 
observations, or both. 
(3) Well-documented procedures, that have been accepted by the scientific community to 
construct and test the mathematical and numerical models, are used to simulate 
mechanical disruption of engineered barriers. 
Subcriterion (4) is not discussed here because sensitivity studies or bounding analyses are not 
provided to TSPA within this report. 
4.3 CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATIONS 
No codes or standards are applicable to the development of the seismic consequence 
abstractions.  The regulation that is applicable to the development of this abstraction is 10 CFR 
Part 63, Energy:  Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic Repository at Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada [DIRS 173273], specifically 10 CFR 63.114, Requirements for Performance 
Assessment, which requires providing the technical basis for the data, models, parameter 
uncertainties, and alternative conceptual models that are included in TSPA, and 10 CFR 63.115, 
Requirements for Multiple Barriers, which requires providing the technical basis for the barriers 
that are important to waste isolation. 
The technical basis for the damage abstractions for the waste package and cladding in response 
to vibratory ground motion is described in Section 6.5.  The technical basis for the response of 
EBS components to rockfall is described in Section 6.6.  The technical basis for the response of 
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EBS components to fault displacement is described in Section 6.7.  The recommended 
methodology for incorporating the seismic damage abstractions into the seismic scenario class 
for TSPA is described in Section 6.9.  These damage abstractions and the computational 
methodology provide a basis for evaluating the performance of the EBS barriers that are 
important for waste isolation in the seismic scenario class. 
Data uncertainty is explicitly included in the seismic abstractions for TSPA-LA.  In the PSHA, 
parameter uncertainty and model uncertainty were directly incorporated into the seismic hazard 
curves that are direct inputs to the fault displacement damage abstraction and the computational 
methodology for the seismic scenario class.  Parameter uncertainty is also included in the ground 
motion time histories that are direct inputs to the rockfall analyses, structural response 
calculations, and kinematic calculations that provide the basis for the damage abstractions.  
Uncertainty in the input parameters is directly represented in the input data for the structural 
response calculation, kinematic calculations, and rockfall analyses.  Further details on data and 
parameter uncertainty for the seismic damage abstractions can be found in Section 8.2. 
The development of seismic consequence abstractions also considered alternative conceptual 
models.  The damaged areas for end-to-end impacts of adjacent waste packages are based on 
kinematic calculations with multiple waste packages.  Kinematic calculations have been 
performed with LS-DYNA and UDEC using slightly different modeling approaches and 
modeling assumptions (Section 6.5.1.1).  The uncertainty in the kinematic approaches has been 
propagated into the abstraction for TSPA-LA by providing separate damage abstractions for 
UDEC and for LS-DYNA.  This approach directly maintains the uncertainty in damaged area 
due to the computational approaches in the seismic scenario class for TSPA.   
Model uncertainty has also been directly incorporated into the hazard curves that are direct 
inputs to the fault displacement analysis and the computational methodology for the seismic 
scenario class.  Finally, the damage abstraction for fault displacement has been compared to an 
alternative conceptual model proposed by Waiting et al. (2003 [DIRS 164449]).  Again, further 
details on model uncertainty and alternative conceptual models for the seismic damage 
abstractions can be found in Section 8.2.  
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5. ASSUMPTIONS 
5.1 PAGANY WASH AND SEVER WASH FAULT DISPLACEMENTS 
Assumption:  The fault displacement hazard curves for the Pagany Wash and Sever Wash faults 
can be considered equal to the fault displacement hazard curve for the Drill Hole Wash fault 
(DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962], file: ./displ/tot_haz/s3.frac_mean.gz). 
Basis:  The assumption of equivalency is justified by the results of field investigations that are 
summarized by Menges and Whitney (1996 [DIRS 106342], Section 4.2.4.10).  The reasoning 
that supports the assumption of equivalency is as follows: 
1. Previous geologic studies have consolidated discussion of the three faults based 
on similar characteristics and apparent similarity in fault development in response 
to the extensional environment.  These faults are characterized as 
northwest-trending faults that are extensional structures related to the left-oblique 
component of displacement along the north-trending faults.  They are, generally, 
strike-slip faults with a right lateral movement (Menges and Whitney 1996 
[DIRS 106342], Section 4.2.4.10 and Table 4.2.1.2). 
2. The field data for the three sites includes surface exposures and trench studies for 
Pagany Wash fault and Sever Wash fault, and drill core data for the Drill Hole 
Wash fault.  Because of the existence of subsurface data, and consistent with the 
choice of representative locations used by the expert elicitation panel as presented 
in Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis for Fault Displacement and Vibratory 
Ground Motion at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (PSHA) (CRWMS M&O 1998 
[DIRS 103731], Section 4.3.2), it is reasonable to use the response of the Drill 
Hole Wash fault as the basis for the seismic hazard. 
3. None of the faults suggest displacement in Quaternary alluvial terraces, so it is 
appropriate to assume a low probability of significant displacement for these three 
faults. 
4. The scale of vertical displacement is less than 5 to 10 meters for each structure 
(Menges and Whitney 1996 [DIRS 106342], Table 4.2.1.2), consistent with a 
maximum displacement of approximately 2 meters for a single low probability 
event (CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 103731], Figure 8.4). 
5. Total fault length, an important factor in seismic hazard assessment, is similar for 
the three faults and ranges from 2 km for the Drill Hole Wash fault to 4 km for the 
other faults. 
6. Spatial orientation to the Solitario Canyon and Bow Ridge faults, also an 
important factor in a hazard assessment, is similar for the three faults as illustrated 
in Figure 4.2.2 of Seismotectonic Framework and Characterization of Faulting at 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada and described by Menges and Whitney (1996 
[DIRS 106342], Section 4.2.4.10).  Spatial orientation to more distant seismic 
sources is also similar. 
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It is, therefore, reasonable to treat the Drill Hole Wash fault, the Sever Wash fault, and the 
Pagany Wash fault in a similar manner with regard to the potential seismic hazard. 
Confirmation Status:  This assumption does not require confirmation.  Probabilistic Seismic 
Hazard Analyses for Fault Displacement and Vibratory Ground Motion at Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada (CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 103731]) defines fault displacement hazards at 15 faulting 
conditions within the immediate vicinity of Yucca Mountain.  The PSHA did not characterize 
closely spaced faults separately because their displacements during a seismic event are expected 
to be similar.  Assumption 5.1 follows the same approach used during the PSHA to characterize 
the response at representative fault locations (CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 103731], 
Section 4.3.2).  
Use In Model:  This assumption is used in Section 6.7.3. 
5.2 RANDOMNESS OF SEISMIC EVENTS 
Assumption:  Seismic events occur in a random manner, following a Poisson process, over long 
periods of time. 
Basis:  The assumption that the behavior of the earth is generally random (i.e., a Poisson process) 
is a common assumption in seismology.  In other words, earthquakes are considered as 
independent events with regard to magnitude, time, and location.  This assumption is similar to 
Assumption 6.4.2 in Characterize Framework for Seismicity and Structural Deformation at 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168030]).  Although there may be cases where 
sufficient data and information exist to depart from this assumption, the Poisson process is 
generally an effective representation of nature and represents a compromise between the 
complexity of natural processes, availability of information, and the sensitivity of results of 
engineering relevance.   
Confirmation Status:  This assumption does not require confirmation because it is a common 
engineering assumption in seismology and because it is an implicit assumption in the 
development of hazard curves for the seismic scenario class (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168030], 
Section 6.4.2). 
Use In Model:  This assumption is used in Section 6.1.2. 
5.3 SUMMARY OF MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS IN SUPPORTING CALCULATIONS 
The seismic consequence abstractions are based on the results from three main sources: 
 Structural response calculations for EBS components in response to vibratory ground 
motion 
 Analyses of rockfall induced by vibratory ground motion, and 
 Analysis of the effective transport area through the dense network of stress corrosion 
cracks that is postulated to exist within the damaged areas on EBS components.   
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The structural response calculations and rockfall analyses are summarized in Table 1-1 but are 
not described in this report; rather, the results from these engineering calculations and scientific 
analyses provide the input data that the abstractions are based on.  The structural response 
calculations and rockfall analyses include several major assumptions that are not directly used in 
the abstraction process, but are noteworthy enough to deserve repeating here.  Similarly, the 
major assumptions for the determination of the effective transport area through a crack network 
are also summarized here. 
The structural response calculations for the waste package and drip shield incorporate 
assumptions for structural thickness (degradation) and for material properties of Alloy 22 and of 
Titanium Grade 7.  The thicknesses of the drip shield plates and the waste package outer barrier 
have been reduced by 2-mm to conservatively represent the potential degradation of these 
structures by general corrosion over the first 10,000 years after repository closure.  The material 
properties of Alloy 22 and of Titanium Grade 7 have been evaluated at an elevated temperature 
(150°C) that provides conservative values for mechanical properties over 97 percent of the 
10,000-year duration for an unfilled drift.  The rationale for the temperature assumption is 
discussed below.  The rationale for the thickness reduction is discussed in more detail in several 
design calculations (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Assumption 3.21; BSC 2004 [DIRS 172448], 
Assumption 3.10). 
A temperature of 150°C is an appropriate and reasonable assumption for evaluation of material 
properties at the time of the seismic event.  This value (150°C) is conservative for evaluation of 
material properties during 97 percent of the first 10,000 years after repository closure.  This 
result is based on a series of thermal analyses that account for uncertainty in host-rock thermal 
conductivity and percolation flux for an unfilled drift (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173944], Figure 6.3-67).  
Results are presented for peak waste package temperature, which also provides an upper bound 
for the peak drip shield temperature.  The peak waste package temperature ranges from 102.0°C 
to 203.1°C (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173944], Table 6.3-38).  The waste package temperature time 
histories demonstrate that temperature exceeds 150°C for, at most, the first 270 years after 
ventilation ceases.  In some cases, the temperature never exceeds 150°C for certain percolation 
fluxes and host rock thermal conductivities.  Since the time period when temperature exceeds 
150°C is not greater than 270 years, it follows that evaluating material properties such as the 
yield strength at 150°C is conservative for at least 97 percent of the 10,000 years following 
repository closure. 
The rockfall analyses for the lithophysal zones also make a key assumption.  In the lithophysal 
zone, the block size distribution is assumed to be a function of the inter-lithophysal fracture 
density and the lithophysae spacing (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Assumption 5.2.2).  This 
assumption is relevant to the abstraction process because the size, mass, and velocity of the 
fragmented rock are related to the potential damage to the drip shield and waste package from 
drift collapse in the lithophysal zone, as discussed in Sections 6.6.2 and 6.6.3. 
The effective cross-sectional area for transport through a network of stress corrosion cracks is a 
distribution of values based on two alternative conceptual models (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], 
Section B6.4; DTN:  MO0403SPASCRKD.000 [DIRS 168105]).  The first conceptual model is 
based on a hexagonal array of randomly oriented cracks, while the second conceptual model is 
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based on a hexagonal array of cracks in parallel rows.  The use of a distribution directly 
represents the uncertainty in these two alternative conceptual models in the TSPA. 
Both conceptual models assume a hexagonal array of cracks because this leads to the closest 
packing of crack centers on a surface.  Both conceptual models are based on recommendations 
from previous analyses (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2) regarding the 
estimated length, intercrack spacing, and crack opening shape and size for the weld region in the 
waste package lid.  For example, the spacing between crack centers is at least the wall thickness 
because cracks with more closely spaced centers will be arrested before penetrating completely 
through the wall thickness.  In addition, the cross-sectional area of a crack is assumed constant 
through the wall thickness, although cracks tend to narrow at the crack tip (Figure 6.3.2 in this 
report).  The minimum spacing between crack centers and the constant cross-sectional area are 
conservative features of either model. 
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6. MODEL DISCUSSION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
6.1.1 Information Sources 
This report presents the abstractions for damage to EBS components due to seismic hazards and 
the computational methodology for the seismic scenario class for TSPA-LA.  These abstractions 
and the computational methodology are the outputs from this model report.  The intended use of 
this output is to define the seismic scenario class for TSPA-LA.  The report includes discussion 
of: 
• The criteria for determining the damaged areas of the waste package and drip shield 
under vibratory ground motions 
• The morphology and abstraction of these damaged areas as a function of the seismic 
hazard 
• Damage to EBS components from fault displacement 
• The abstraction of fuel rod cladding failure in response to waste package impacts 
• The algorithms for including the damage abstractions in the seismic scenario class 
• Post-seismic event changes in seepage, temperature, and relative humidity due to drift 
collapse. 
Figure 6.1-1 illustrates the major components of the EBS in a typical emplacement drift.  The 
major EBS components addressed in this report are the drip shield, the waste package, and the 
fuel rod cladding because failure of these components has the potential to directly release 
radionuclides or to form diffusive or advective transport pathways into the unsaturated zone.  
The drift invert and emplacement pallet are included in the kinematic and structural response 
calculations for the seismic scenario class, but it is not necessary to develop damage abstractions 
for these components because they retain their functionality after strong ground motions.  The 
crushed tuff in the invert does not lose its integrity and the other EBS components rest on the 
invert even after strong vibratory ground motions (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Section VIII-4.2).  
The emplacement pallet also retains its functionality of separating the waste package from the 
invert because it does not collapse from waste package impacts under strong ground motions and 
because the connecting tubing within the pallet does not fail during strong ground motions 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Attachment XI).  The waste package internals and mass of the waste 
form are considered in structural response calculations, but are not represented as separate 
damage abstractions because the fuel rod cladding failure fails for strong ground motions 
(Section 6.5.6.3).  In this situation, the mechanical response of the waste form and the waste 
package internals to strong ground motions is not significant for TSPA.  Figure 6.1-1 also shows 
the steel sets that will be added as ground support in some drifts.  Steel sets are not considered in 
postclosure seismic analysis because rapid corrosion of mild steel is anticipated to limit their 
effectiveness in the postclosure repository environment.  
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The effectiveness of these barriers is potentially compromised by the direct effects from an 
earthquake, including vibratory ground motion, fault displacement, and rockfall induced by 
ground motion.  The effectiveness of these barriers is also potentially compromised by indirect 
effects after an earthquake, including changes in seepage, temperature, and relative humidity if 
an emplacement drift collapses completely during a very low probability earthquake. 
 
Figure 6.1-1. Schematic Diagram of the EBS Components in a Typical Emplacement Drift 
Mathematically, the response of the EBS components to ground motion and fault displacement 
can be represented by the following vector, A
v
, that provides a conceptual representation of the 
major input parameters, the key damage mechanisms, and the post-seismic event changes for the 
seismic scenario class.  In effect, Sections 6.3 through 6.9 provide a definition, an abstraction, or 
a computational algorithm for each term on the right-hand side of this vector: 
 
),,,,,,
,,,,,,,,,,,(
cRHcTEMPcSEEPaHLWFDnHLWFDaNVLFD
nNVLFDaBWRFDnBWRFDaPWRFDnPWRFDfCLDfDSAfWPAdvtA
rr =
(Eq. 6-1) 
where t is the time (year) after repository closure when the seismic hazard occurs; 
v is the amplitude (m/s) of the ground motion from the bounded hazard curve, 
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measured in terms of horizontal PGV; 
d
r
 is a vector of displacements (m) for known faults that intersect emplacement 
drifts;  
fWPA is the fraction of waste package surface area damaged by ground motion.  The 
abstraction for damage to the waste package as a function of v is defined in 
Sections 6.5.1 through 6.5.3, based on information in Mechanical Assessment of 
the Waste Package Subject to Vibratory Ground Motion (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 173172]); 
fDSA is the fraction of drip shield surface area damaged by ground motion.  The drip 
shields are predicted to remain intact during vibratory ground motion and 
rockfall induced by vibratory ground motion, as described in Sections 6.5.4, 
6.5.5, and 6.6), based on information in Structural Calculations of Drip Shield 
Exposed to Vibratory Ground Motion (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172448]) and in Drift 
Degradation Analysis (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107]).  An abstraction for fDSA is 
not included in the seismic scenario class because the drip shields remain intact; 
fCLD is the fraction of fuel rod cladding perforated by the vibratory ground motion.  
The abstraction for damage to the cladding as a function of v is defined in 
Section 6.5.6, based on information in Maximum Accelerations on the Fuel 
Assemblies of a 21-PWR Waste Package During End Impacts (BSC 2003 
[DIRS 162602]) and in Structural Calculations of Waste Package Exposed to 
Vibratory Ground Motion (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083]); 
nPWRFD is the number of PWR waste packages failed due to fault displacement.  The 
abstraction for the number of failed waste packages as a function of exceedance 
frequency is defined in Section 6.7.5, based on design information and on the 
mean hazard curves in the probabilistic seismic hazard analyses 
(DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962]).  Exceedance frequency is 
defined as a function of v through the bounded hazard curve for horizontal PGV 
at the emplacement drifts; 
aPWRFD is the damaged area (m2) on PWR waste packages and their associated drip 
shield and fuel rod cladding resulting from fault displacement.  The abstraction 
for waste package damaged area and for damage to drip shield and cladding is 
defined in Section 6.7.5; 
nBWRFD is the number of BWR waste packages failed due to fault displacement.  The 
abstraction for the number of failed waste packages as a function of exceedance 
frequency is defined in Section 6.7.5, based on design information and on the 
mean hazard curves in the probabilistic seismic hazard analyses 
(DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962]).  Exceedance frequency is 
defined as a function of v through the bounded hazard curve for horizontal PGV 
at the emplacement drifts; 
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aBWRFD is the damaged area (m2) on BWR waste packages and their associated drip 
shields and fuel rod cladding resulting from fault displacement.  The abstraction 
for damaged area and for damage to drip shield and cladding is defined in 
Section 6.7.5; 
nNVLFD is the number of Naval waste packages failed due to fault displacement.  The 
abstraction for the number of failed waste packages as a function of exceedance 
frequency is defined in Section 6.7.5, based on design information and on the 
mean hazard curves in the probabilistic seismic hazard analyses 
(DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962]).  Exceedance frequency is 
defined as a function of v through the bounded hazard curve for horizontal PGV 
at the emplacement drifts; 
aNVLFD is the damaged area (m2) on Naval waste packages and their associated drip 
shields and fuel rod cladding resulting from fault displacement.  The abstraction 
for damaged area and for damage to drip shields is defined in Section 6.7.5; 
nHLWFD is the number of HLW waste packages failed due to fault displacement.  The 
abstraction for the number of failed waste packages is defined in Section 6.7.5, 
based on design information and on the mean hazard curves in the probabilistic 
seismic hazard analyses (DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962]).  
Exceedance frequency is defined as a function of v through the bounded hazard 
curve for horizontal PGV at the emplacement drifts; 
aHLWFD is the damaged area (m2) on HLW waste packages and their associated drip 
shields and fuel rod cladding resulting from fault displacement.  The abstraction 
for damaged area and for damage to drip shields is defined in Section 6.7.5; 
cSEEP is an indicator variable (dimensionless) for the change in seepage flux in the 
lithophysal zone if a seismic event with intensity measure v collapses the 
emplacement drifts, as described in Section 6.8.1; 
cTEMP is an indicator variable (dimensionless) for the change in temperature on the 
waste packages in the lithophysal zone if a seismic event with intensity measure 
v collapses the emplacement drifts, as described in Section 6.8.3; 
cRH is an indicator variable (dimensionless) for the change in relative humidity on 
the waste packages in the lithophysal zone if a seismic event with intensity 
measure v collapses the emplacement drifts, as described in Section 6.8.3; 
The level of ground motion is based on the mean bounded hazard curve defined in 
DTN:  MO0501BPVELEMP.001 [DIRS 172682].  The levels of fault displacement are based on 
the mean hazard curves defined in DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962], (the 
relevant data files in this DTN are defined in Table 4-1 of this report), based on the Probabilistic 
Seismic Hazard Analyses for Fault Displacement and Vibratory Ground Motion at Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada (PSHA) (CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 103731]).  The structural response of 
the EBS components incorporates an allowance for corrosion and degradation of the waste 
package and drip shield over the 10,000 years following repository closure (see Assumption 5.3).  
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The seismic scenario class has been designed to accurately represent the seismic hazards that 
cause significant structural damage, and considers hazards with an annual exceedance probability 
of 10-8 per year or greater, per 10 CFR 63.114(d) [DIRS 173273]. 
6.1.2 Terminology 
The terminology for the seismic hazard curves and for the suite of ground motions corresponding 
to a given exceedance frequency is explained here.  In addition, the difference between a damage 
abstraction and a response surface is briefly explained. 
A mean hazard curve defines the relationship between the mean estimate of the mean annual 
frequency of exceedance and the amplitude of the seismic effect, either for vibratory ground 
motion (measured by PGV) or for fault displacement (measured by a vertical displacement).  The 
mean annual exceedance frequency represents the mean value of the frequency in any year with 
which future seismic events will exceed a given value of the PGV or fault displacement. 
The mean annual exceedance frequency spans many orders of magnitude, from a minimum of 
10-8 per year to a maximum of 1 per year (or greater).  The frequency is defined as the number of 
observed events, divided by the time interval of observation.  This calculated value and hence the 
frequency vary randomly from one observation to the next.  We use the mean of this random 
frequency as a measure of how likely an event is over any future year.  When the mean annual 
exceedance frequency of interest is much less than 1, as it is here, the mean annual exceedance 
frequency and the annual exceedance probability are essentially equal.5  This report uses the term 
exceedance frequency because it is more general, although the annual exceedance frequency and 
annual exceedance probability are interchangeable for the very infrequent seismic hazards 
considered in this study.   
All hazard curves in this report are based on the mean annual exceedance frequency.  The mean 
estimate of the mean exceedance frequency is used for the seismic scenario class because a 
primary objective of TSPA is to estimate mean dose for the reasonably maximally exposed 
individual.  The uncertainty in the mean exceedance frequency is characterized in the PSHA 
(CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 103731]). 
The effect of vibratory ground motion on the EBS components is assessed for a set of ground 
motions with a given value of the horizontal PGV.  Sets of 17 three-component ground motions 
have been developed for horizontal PGVs of 1.05 m/s, 2.44 m/s, and 5.35 m/s.  These ground 
motion sets are often referred to in this project and in some of its reports as the 10-5 per year, the 
10-6 per year and the 10-7 per year ground motions (respectively) because PGV values of 
1.05 m/s, 2.44 m/s, and 5.35 m/s correspond to these frequency values on the unbounded hazard 
curve at Point B (the emplacement drifts).  However, a seismic event with (say) a PGV of 
2.44 m/s will not occur with a frequency of 10-6 per year.  The correspondence of 2.44 m/s with 
10-6 per year on the mean hazard curve means that ground motion events with a PGV equal to or 
greater than 2.44 m/s occur with a mean annual frequency of 10-6 per year.  In other words, the 
                                                 
5 The probability of one or more events for a Poisson process (Assumption 5.2) with annual rate λ over duration T is given by 
(1 - e-λT).  When λ is small enough, the probability that one or more events occur in an interval T becomes (1 - e-λT) = 1 - 
(1 - λT + ½(λT)2 - …) ≈ λT, so the annual probability for one or more events is given by (λT)/T = λ, the annual frequency of 
events. Α typical criterion for the accuracy of this expansion is for λΤ  ≤  0.1. 
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ensemble of seismic ground motions with PGV exceeding 2.44 m/s will occur with a mean 
frequency of 10-6 per year.  To make an additional point, the probability of encountering an 
earthquake with a PGV of exactly 2.44 m/s is zero, and will certainly not occur with a frequency 
of 10-6 per year.   
In this report, ground motions are identified by the appropriate value of PGV.  The value of PGV 
provides a unique and unambiguous identifier for each set of ground motions, even when 
multiple hazard curves have been developed for a site.  In fact, the multiple hazard curves in 
Figure 6.4-2 (Section 6.4.3) illustrate the problem with identifying ground motion amplitude by 
exceedance frequency because a given value of PGV can be associated with multiple values of 
the exceedance frequency. 
The value of PGV refers to the peak ground velocity of the first horizontal component of the 
ground motions.  This first horizontal component may be oriented in the longitudinal direction, 
parallel with the drift axis, or in the transverse direction, perpendicular to the drift axis but still in 
the horizontal plane.  Both orientations have been used in the structural response calculations, as 
discussed in Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2. 
The horizontal PGV is appropriate for parameterizing the damaged area as a function of ground 
motion amplitude, and does not imply that the second horizontal and vertical velocity 
components have the same PGV value.  In fact, ground motion time histories that preserve 
intercomponent variability (see discussion in Section 6.4.2) have substantial variability in the 
PGV values among the three components of the ground motion. 
Finally, the damage abstractions for EBS components are defined in a different manner than 
fragility curves or than response surfaces.  A fragility curve is defined as the probability of a 
binary event; for example, a fragility curve can define the probability of damaged area exceeding 
1 percent of the surface area of the waste package, as a function of PGV.  While it is possible to 
produce a family of fragility curves for multiple damage levels, such as for 0.2 percent, 
0.5 percent, 1 percent, 2 percent, and so on, this is an awkward methodology to incorporate into a 
Monte Carlo approach, such as the TSPA for the Yucca Mountain Project.  A typical response 
surface represents the mean damage and its standard deviation, often as normal or lognormal 
distributions whose parameters are functions of the amplitude of the ground motion or fault 
displacement.  A response surface is more amenable to a Monte Carlo approach, provided the 
deviation about the mean is sampled in an appropriate manner.  The damage abstractions for the 
waste package are similar to a response surface, in the sense that they are based on a power law 
representation for the median damage (also called the geometric mean) and a log-normal 
distribution of the residuals about the mean value.  This approach provides a simple, transparent, 
and accurate representation of the variability and uncertainty in seismically-induced damage 
based on Monte Carlo sampling for TSPA. 
6.1.3 Corroborating Information 
The abstractions for damage to EBS components from seismic hazards are based on the direct 
input information in Table 4-1 of Section 4.1 and on the corroborating information in 
Table 6.1-1. 
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Table 6.1-1.  Corroborating Input Information for Seismic Consequence Abstractions 
Input Information Value Source 
Seismic Failure Criteria: 
Residual stress threshold for initiation of stress 
corrosion cracking on a smooth surface of Titanium 
Grade 7 
50 percent of the yield 
strength of Titanium 
Grade 7 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], 
Section 6.2.1, 2nd paragraph on 
page 6-7 
Damage to the Waste Package from Vibratory Ground Motion: 
Damage to the waste package for the single vibratory 
ground motion at the 0.190 m/s and 0.384 m/s PGV 
levels, corresponding to unbounded annual 
exceedance frequencies of 5×10-4 per year and of 
1×10-4 per year 
No damage BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], 
Section 6.3, last paragraph, and 
Section 6.4, last paragraph 
The top surface of the invert can be represented as a 
rigid surface for the kinematic and structural response 
calculations.   
The rigid representation 
has relatively little 
impact on amplification 
of ground motions or on 
permanent deflection of 
the invert surface. 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], 
Attachment VIII 
Damage to the Fuel Rod Cladding from Vibratory Ground Motion: 
Range of axial g-loads for cladding failure due to 
buckling 
82 g’s to 252 g’s  Chun et al. 1987 [DIRS 144357], 
Table 4 
Range of g-loads for cladding failure from side drops 63 g’s to 211 g’s Chun et al. 1987 [DIRS 144357], 
Table 4 
Rockfall Induced by Ground Motion in the Lithophysal Zone: 
Damage statistics for a drift in the lithophysal zone, 
based on a sampling of vibratory ground motions at 
the 2.44 m/s (10-6 per year) PGV level 
Drift collapses for 
ground motions with 
PGV > 2 m/s 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], 
Section 6.4.2.2.2, 4th bullet under 
subheading Discussion 
Damage to a drift in the lithophysal zone for the 
single vibratory ground motion at the 0.190 m/s PGV 
level 
No rockfall for rock mass 
categories 2-5; minor, 
low-energy rockfall for 
rock mass category 1 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], 
Section 6.4.2.2.1 
Creep response of the drip shield to long-term static 
loading from lithophysal rockfall 
The maximum creep 
displacement after 
10,000 years is 
approximately 5.5 cm, 
and the maximum creep 
strain is less than 
5 percent, which is well 
below the tertiary creep 
rupture strain limit for 
titanium 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 174715], 
Section 3.2, Assumption 3.2.9 
Damage to the Waste Package and Drip Shield from Fault Displacement: 
Fault Displacement Hazard at Site 2 – on the Solitario 
Canyon fault 
See Figure 8-3 in source CRWMS M&O 1998 
[DIRS 103731], Figure 8-3 
Fault Displacement Hazard at Site 4 – on the Ghost 
Dance fault 
See Figure 8-5 in source CRWMS M&O 1998 
[DIRS 103731], Figure 8-5 
Fault Displacement Features of the Sever Wash fault 
and the Pagany Wash fault  
Similar to Drill Hole 
Wash fault  
Menges and Whitney 1996 
[DIRS 106342], Section 4.2.4.10, 
and Section 5.1 of this report  
Fault Displacement Hazard at Site 8d – generic 
repository location, midway between the Solitario 
Canyon and Ghost Dance faults.  Site 8d has intact 
rock. 
Displacement is below 
0.1 cm down to 10-8 per 
year 
CRWMS M&O 1998 
[DIRS 103731], Section 8.2.1, 
first paragraph 
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Table 6.1-1.  Corroborating Input Information for Seismic Consequence Abstractions (Continued) 
Input Information Value Source 
Damage to the Waste Package and Drip Shield from Fault Displacement (Cont.): 
PGV level for complete drift collapse in lower 
lithophysal 
2.0 m/s  BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], 
Section 6.4.2.2.2, 4th bullet under 
subheading Discussion 
Subsurface facility layout and numbering of 
emplacement drifts 
See Figure 1 in source BSC 2004 [DIRS 172801], 
Figure 1 
Alternative conceptual model for probability-weighted 
number of waste package failures from fault 
displacement 
1.91×10-4 to 1.91×10-6 Waiting et al. 2003 
[DIRS 164449] 
Alternative conceptual model for number of fault 
intersections with emplacement drifts 
191 Waiting et al. 2003 
[DIRS 164449] 
Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class: 
Horizontal PGV at Point B for the single ground 
motion corresponding to the 5×10-4 per year mean 
annual exceedance frequency 
 
19.00 cm/s 
(rounded to 0.190 m/s) 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107]  
Table X-1 
Horizontal PGV for the 10-4 per year mean annual 
exceedance frequency on the unbounded hazard 
curve at Point B, the waste emplacement level 
40.19 cm/s DTN:  MO0404PGVRL104.000 
[DIRS 170437] 
Changes Due to Drift Collapse: 
Seepage abstraction if ground motion amplitude 
(PGV) is large enough to collapse the drifts 
See DTN file 
ResponseSurfaceSMPA
CollapsedDrift.dat  
DTN:  LB0307SEEPDRCL.002 
[DIRS 164337] 
Change in temperature of waste package if seismic 
hazard is large enough to collapse the drifts 
See DTN files: 
Twp_dhlw-l1_3case.dat, 
Twp_dhlw-s1_3case.dat
, 
Twp_bwr1-1_3case.dat, 
Twp_bwr1-2_3case.dat, 
Twp_bwr2-1_3case.dat, 
Twp_pwr1-1_3case.dat, 
Twp_pwr1-2_3case.dat, 
and 
 Twp_pwr2-1_3case.dat  
DTN:  LL040310323122.044 
[DIRS 168769] 
Change in relative humidity on the waste package if 
seismic hazard is large enough to collapse the drifts 
See DTN files:  
RHwp_dhlw-s1_3case.d
at, 
RHwp_dhlw-l1_3case.d
at, 
RHwp_bwr1-1_3case.da
t, 
RHwp_bwr1-2_3case.da
t, 
RHwp_bwr2-1_3case.da
t, 
RHwp_pwr1-1_3case.da
t, 
RHwp_pwr1-2_3case.da
t, 
and 
RHwp_pwr2-1 3case.dat 
DTN:  LL040310323122.044 
[DIRS 168769] 
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6.2 RELEVANT FEATURES, EVENTS, AND PROCESSES FOR THE SEISMIC 
SCENARIO CLASS 
The development of a comprehensive list of features, events, and processes (FEPs) potentially 
relevant to postclosure performance of the potential Yucca Mountain repository is an ongoing, 
iterative process based on site-specific information, design, and regulations.  The content of this 
report is relevant to the list of seismic-related FEPs extracted from the LA FEP list 
(DTN:  MO0407SEPFEPLA.000 [DIRS 170760]) and shown in Tables 6.2-1 and 6.2-2.  The 
damage abstractions for the waste package and cladding provide the basis for screening of the 
listed FEPs, based on the relevant sections of this report identified in Tables 6.2-1 and 6.2-2.  
Table 6.2-1 identifies the TSPA-LA FEPs that are included in the seismic scenario class and the 
Section in this report where each FEP is addressed.  Table 6.2-2 identifies the TSPA-LA FEPs 
that are excluded from the seismic scenario class and the Section in this report where the 
screening argument is discussed. 
Table 6.2-1. FEPs Included in Seismic Consequence Abstractions, their Disposition in TSPA-LA, and 
the Relevant Sections of this Report 
FEP # FEP Name Section Where FEP is Addressed 
1.2.02.03.0A Fault displacement 
damages EBS 
components 
Section 6.7 defines the damage abstraction for the waste package, drip 
shield, and fuel rod cladding in response to fault displacement.  Operation 
11 in Section 6.9.2 provides an algorithmic description and definition of 
output parameters for the fault displacement damage abstraction for the 
EBS components.  Table 6.9-1 summarizes the 24 output variables for 
TSPA-LA that specifically relate to damage from fault displacement. 
1.2.03.02.0A Seismic ground 
motion damages EBS 
components 
Sections 6.5.1 through 6.5.3 define the damage abstraction for the waste 
package in response to vibratory ground motion.  Operations 3 through 7 
in Section 6.9.2 provide an algorithmic description and definition of output 
parameters for the damage abstractions for this barrier.  Table 6.9-1 
summarizes the 43 output variables for TSPA-LA that specifically relate to 
damage to the waste package from vibratory ground motion. 
Sections 6.5.4 and 6.5.5 provide the basis for screening out damage to the 
drip shield from vibratory ground motion for the TSPA-LA.   
Section 6.5.6 defines the damage abstraction for the fuel rod cladding 
under vibratory ground motion.  Operation 10 in Section 6.9.2 defines the 
algorithm for the damage abstraction for cladding in the TSPA-LA.  
Table 6.9-1 identifies the single output variable for the abstraction of 
cladding damage. 
1.2.03.02.0
D 
Seismic-induced drift 
collapse alters in-drift 
thermohydrology  
Section 6.9.2 summarizes the changes in the in-drift environment after a 
seismic event.  Operations 12 and 13 in Section 6.9.2 summarize the 
methodology for the post-seismic event changes for TSPA. 
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Table 6.2-2. FEPs Excluded from Seismic Consequence Abstractions and the Relevant Sections of this 
Report 
FEP # FEP Name Section Where FEP is Addressed 
1.2.03.02.0B Seismic-induced 
rockfall damages 
EBS components 
Damage to EBS components from the seismically-induced fall of individual 
rock blocks is excluded from the seismic scenario class for TSPA-LA.  A 
detailed technical discussion of the screening arguments for excluding this 
FEP is presented in Features, Events, and Processes:  Disruptive Events 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173981], Section 6.2.1.4).  Selected analyses in 
Section 6.6 support the screening arguments for this FEP and are 
summarized here. 
In the nonlithophysal zones, large rock blocks can be shaken free from the 
walls and drop onto the drip shield under the influence of gravity.  
Section 6.6.1 provides a description of the rock block calculations and the 
drip shield structural response calculations for impacts by individual rock 
blocks.  Analysis of en masse rockfall in the lithophysal zones is discussed 
under FEP 1.2.03.02.0C (the next FEP in this table). 
 
The damage to the drip shield from the impact of large rock blocks is not 
included TSPA-LA.  Damaged areas on the drip shield are susceptible to 
accelerated stress corrosion cracking (Section 6.3.3).  However, the 
quantity of liquid that can advectively flow through the resulting crack 
network and impinge on the waste package will be insignificant, as 
discussed in Engineered Barrier System Features, Events and Processes 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173781], Section 6.2.64).  In this situation, damage to 
the drip shield from discrete rock blocks is not included in the seismic 
scenario class for TSPA-LA. 
 
Damage to the waste package or fuel rod cladding from rock blocks is also 
not included in the seismic scenario class for TSPA-LA.  The drip shield 
remains intact during the first 10,000 years to 20,000 years after repository 
closure.  In addition, the drip shield will not separate in response to 
vibratory ground motions (Section 6.5.5).  The drip shield will deflect rock 
blocks away from the waste package and cladding without collapsing or 
contacting the waste package, even for the largest blocks (Section 6.6.1.2).  
It follows that the drip shield provides protection for the waste package and 
cladding from rockfall, so this damage mechanism is not included in 
TSPA-LA. 
1.2.03.02.0C Seismic-induced drift 
collapse damages 
EBS components 
Damage to EBS components from the en masse fall of rock due to 
vibratory ground motion in the lithophysal zones is analyzed but not 
abstracted into the seismic scenario class for TSPA-LA.  A detailed 
technical discussion of the screening arguments for excluding this FEP is 
presented in Features, Events, and Processes:  Disruptive Events 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173981], Section 6.2.1.5).  Selected analyses in 
Section 6.6 of this report support the screening arguments for this FEP, 
and are summarized here. 
Damage to EBS components from seismically-induced rockfall in the 
lithophysal zones is analyzed but not abstracted into the seismic scenario 
class for TSPA-LA.  Vibratory ground motion can cause failure of the host 
rock around the emplacement drifts, but is anticipated to cause insignificant 
damage to the drip shield, waste package, and fuel rod cladding.  The 
lithophysal rock will fragment into small rock fragments that have little 
capability to damage the drip shield, either from individual impacts or from 
their static load, as discussed in Sections 6.6.2 and 6.6.2.1, respectively.  
Damage to EBS components from lithophysal rockfall is not included in 
TSPA on this basis. 
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The seismic scenario class is based on two modeling cases:  (1) a case with mechanical damage 
from vibratory ground motion, and (2) a case with mechanical damage from fault displacement.  
Vibratory ground motions can cause impacts between the waste package, drip shield, pallet, and 
invert.  These impacts may form through wall stress corrosion cracks, resulting in transport 
pathways for release of radionuclides from the EBS.  Fault displacement causes the disruption of 
the drip shield, which can allow seepage water to initiate localized corrosion on the waste 
package under certain geochemical conditions.  Either case has a single seismic event that occurs 
at a randomly chosen time in each realization of the TSPA-LA.  Seismic events with PGV levels 
greater than 0.4019 m/s (exceedance frequencies less than 10-4 per year on the bounded hazard 
curve at Point B, the emplacement drifts) are considered here because the associated ground 
motions and fault displacements have the potential to cause damage to the EBS components 
(Sections 6.5 and 6.7).  The mechanical response of the drip shield, waste package, and fuel rod 
cladding to this single seismic event is represented through damage abstractions for vibratory 
ground motion and for fault displacement.   
The mechanical response of the drip shield, waste package, and Zircalloy cladding to vibratory 
ground motion, to fault displacement, and to rockfall induced by vibratory ground motion are the 
central focus for the seismic scenario class.  The drift invert and the waste package internals are 
considered in structural response calculations or rockfall analyses but are not represented as 
separate damage abstractions because they do not directly control the release radionuclides or the 
formation of advective flow pathways.  The mass of the waste form is included in the structural 
response calculations but the mechanical strength of a stack of uranium oxide pellets or of a 
vitrified waste form is not significant in comparison to the mechanical strength of the inner 
stainless steel shell and outer Alloy 22 shell of the waste package.  Finally, non-Zircalloy 
cladding is not considered here because it has no contribution to barrier capability.   
The areas on the waste package and drip shield that exceed a residual stress threshold are 
susceptible to accelerated stress corrosion cracking, resulting in a network of stress corrosion 
cracks that has the potential to provide a pathway for transport through the engineered barrier 
system.  Once radionuclides are released from the waste package, flow and transport in the 
unsaturated zone and the saturated zone are based on the same models and algorithms as for the 
nominal scenario class, with the exception of changes to the in-drift environment caused by drift 
collapse in the lithophysal zones of the repository.  Biosphere calculations are also unchanged 
from those for the nominal scenario class. 
6.3 FAILURE MECHANISM, RESIDUAL STRESS THRESHOLDS, AND FAILURE 
MORPHOLOGY FOR THE WASTE PACKAGE AND DRIP SHIELD 
6.3.1 Failure Mechanisms Under Seismic Loads 
Mechanical processes that occur during a significant seismic event (i.e., an event with PGV 
greater than 0.4019 m/s, with the capacity to damage the waste package) have the potential to 
compromise the functionality of the waste packages, drip shields, and fuel rod cladding as 
barriers to radionuclide release.  These mechanical processes include impacts caused directly by 
vibratory ground motion during an earthquake, impacts caused by rock blocks and rockfall 
induced by vibratory ground motions, and mechanical loading from fault displacement. 
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Under significant vibratory ground motions, impacts can occur between adjacent waste packages 
and between the waste package and its emplacement pallet, the surrounding drip shield, and the 
invert.  Impacts can also occur between the drip shield and the emplacement pallet, the invert, 
and even the drift wall.  Rockfall induced by vibratory ground motions can result in impacts on 
the drip shield in the postclosure period and impacts on the waste packages in the preclosure 
period, when drip shields are not yet in place.  Rockfall induced by vibratory ground motion in 
the lithophysal zones may collapse the drifts, resulting in static loads from the mass of rubblized 
rock surrounding the drip shield.  Finally, mechanical loads may be generated by fault 
displacement within the repository block.  In this case, EBS components may become pinned if 
fault displacement is greater than the available clearances between components. 
These mechanical processes are associated with a number of potential failure mechanisms, each 
of which is discussed below: 
• Peak dynamic loads have the potential to result in immediate puncture or tearing of an 
EBS component if the localized strain exceeds the ultimate tensile strain.  A puncture 
provides a potential pathway for seepage to flow into and radionuclide transport out of 
an EBS component. 
• Impact-related dynamic loads may dent a component, resulting in permanent structural 
deformation with residual stress.  High levels of residual tensile stress may lead to local 
degradation from accelerated corrosion processes.  Areas that are breached from 
corrosion processes provide a potential pathway for radionuclide transport out of an EBS 
component. 
• Static loads from rockfall may collapse or buckle the drip shields.  Buckling or collapse 
represents a change in the physical shape of the drip shield, potentially compromising its 
ability to deflect seepage and rockfall away from the waste package. 
• Impacts between adjacent waste packages impose dynamic loads on waste package 
internals.  These dynamic loads may result in buckled fuel rods and perforated fuel rod 
cladding.  Failure of cladding provides a potential pathway for release of radionuclides 
from fuel rods. 
• Large displacements on known faults in the repository block may shear waste packages 
and drip shields if the EBS components become pinned by the fault response.  Sheared 
components provide potential pathways for flow into and radionuclide transport out of 
the damaged components. 
The outer wall of the waste package is fabricated from Alloy 22, which is very ductile.  
Immediate puncture or tearing of waste package outer wall would be accompanied by large 
distortions that produce high strains and stresses in a significant volume of material.  Supporting 
calculations for waste package drops on the emplacement pallet were performed using a refined 
finite-element representation of a waste package.  These supporting calculations used impact 
velocities that are similar to those observed in the kinematic calculations for end-to-end impacts 
of adjacent waste packages (Section 6.5.1).  The supporting calculations indicate that the 
maximum stress intensity developed in the outer wall of the waste package is significantly below 
the ultimate tensile strength of Alloy 22 (BSC 2003 [DIRS 165497]).  A localized puncture or 
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tearing due to the impacts caused by vibratory ground motions is not expected during a seismic 
event and is therefore not included in the seismic scenario class. 
The presence of high residual tensile stress has the potential to result in accelerated stress 
corrosion cracking (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3).  This combined mechanical-corrosion failure 
mechanism is expected to be the cause of failure for the waste package and drip shield from 
impact processes caused by vibratory ground motions and by rockfall induced by vibratory 
ground motions.  The areas that exceed the residual tensile stress threshold are referred to as the 
damaged area throughout this document.  The effective area for radionuclide transport through 
the damaged areas will be substantially less than the damaged area because the cross-sectional 
area of the stress corrosion cracks is much less than the total surface area that exceeds the 
residual stress threshold, as derived in Sections 6.3.5 and 6.3.6. 
Application of a residual tensile stress threshold for seismic failures is nonmechanistic in the 
sense that detailed calculations with accelerated corrosion rates or crack propagation are not used 
to determine the actual failure time after a seismic event.  Rather, a network of SCCs is 
considered to immediately form once the residual tensile stress threshold is exceeded, providing 
potential pathways for radionuclide transport through the areas exceeding the residual tensile 
stress threshold.  The residual tensile stress threshold is often referred to as the residual stress 
threshold or more simply the stress threshold, with the understanding that the principal residual 
stress must always be tensile to initiate an accelerated corrosion process. 
Figure 6.3-1 is a simplified illustration of how residual stress is generated by permanent (plastic) 
deformation in a simple uniaxial strain model.  The loading path in Figure 6.3-1 has three 
phases:  (1) elastic loading until reaching the yield strength, (2) plastic loading above the yield 
strength, and (3) elastic unloading when the external load reduces the local stress.  Figure 6.3-1 
also shows that plastic deformation does not always generate a damaged area because the final 
residual stress state may be compressive or, if tensile, may be below the tensile threshold to 
initiate accelerated localized corrosion or stress corrosion cracking. 
The static loads from rockfall may initiate plastic deformation, potentially leading to buckling or 
collapse of the drip shield (Section 6.6.2.2).  The appropriate failure criterion for the onset of 
plastic deformation is the yield strength, which corresponds to the point at the top of the elastic 
loading path in Figure 6.3-1.  The physical configuration of the drip shield can change when 
local stresses exceed the yield strength, resulting in plastic deformation of the structure.  It is 
important to differentiate between the two failure criteria for the drip shield.  For impact loading, 
an area may be damaged as a barrier when it exceeds the residual stress threshold of Titanium 
Grade 7, as discussed in Section 6.3.3.  This failure is a combined mechanical-corrosion response 
of a cold-worked material to dynamic impacts.  For plastic deformation from static loading of the 
drip shield, failure is determined by the yield strength at the onset of plastic yielding, as 
discussed in Section 6.6.2.2.  These criteria are applied separately and independently because the 
appropriate failure mechanisms are distinct physical responses to different loading conditions 
and failure modes. 
The dynamic loads on fuel rods from end-to-end impacts of adjacent waste packages have the 
potential to buckle the fuel rods and fail the fuel rod cladding.  The primary cladding failure 
mechanism is perforation due to accelerations when the waste package impacts the emplacement 
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pallet or when there is an end-to-end impact of adjacent waste packages (see discussion in 
Section 6.5.6).  The g-loads required to buckle fuel rods are estimated from a simple analytic 
model based on Euler buckling of a column in Impact Effects on Spent Fuel Assemblies (Chun 
et al. 1987 [DIRS 144357]).  It is estimated that the cladding fails when the impact accelerations 
are in the range of 82 g to 252 g for axial impacts and 63 g to 211 g for lateral impacts (Chun 
et al. 1987 [DIRS 144357], Table 4). 
 
Figure 6.3-1.  Permanent Deformation from Plastic Yielding Generates Residual Stress 
Large displacements on known faults in the repository block have the potential to shear waste 
packages and drip shields if the EBS components become pinned by the fault response.  The 
response of EBS components to fault displacement is discussed in Section 6.7.  Given the 
complexity of the response of EBS components and the invert to a fault displacement, a 
simplified failure criterion has been applied to determine shear failure in a collapsed drift.  If the 
fault displacement is greater than the clearance between the top of a waste package and the 
underside of the drip shield, the waste package is modeled as failing from shear.  This simple 
failure criterion is appropriate because shear failure from fault displacement only occurs from 
extremely low-frequency, high-amplitude fault displacements, corresponding to an annual 
exceedance frequency of less than or equal to 2 × 10-7 per year. 
Accelerated stress corrosion cracking from high residual stress is expected to be the cause of 
failure for the waste package from impact processes in the seismic scenario class.  The residual 
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stress thresholds for seismic response are similar to the criteria for initiation of stress corrosion 
cracking on smooth surfaces of Alloy 22 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], Section 6.2.1, with 
thresholds defined on p. 6-7).  The use of a stress corrosion cracking initiation criterion is 
appropriate for seismic analysis because regions where the residual stress from mechanical 
damage exceeds the tensile failure criterion are expected to be extensively cold-worked and, 
hence, potentially subject to enhanced stress corrosion cracking. 
A residual stress threshold is a conservative failure criterion because detailed corrosion models 
will have a delay time until failure.  This approach is appropriate because it is consistent with 
other tensile failure criteria (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], Section 6.2.1, second paragraph on 
p. 6-7) and because it is easily applied to the output from structural response calculations.  
6.3.2 Residual Stress Damage Threshold for the Waste Package 
The residual stress threshold for failure of the waste package is represented by a uniform 
distribution with a lower bound of 80 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 and an upper 
bound of 90 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22.  The upper bound is based on experimental 
data and conservatively incorporates a safety factor of 2.2 because of the very long lifetime of 
the waste package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], Section 6.2.1, second paragraph on p. 6-7).  The 
lower bound is introduced to evaluate the effect of the potential uncertainty in the residual stress 
threshold on the damaged area.  This residual stress criterion (80 to 90 percent of the yield 
strength) is also consistent with the failure criterion for initiation of stress corrosion cracking in 
other waste package analyses.   
In practice, the damage to the waste package has been evaluated at the extremes of the uniform 
distribution.  The results from each structural response calculation are postprocessed to 
determine the elements in the outer barrier of the waste package whose residual stress exceeds 
80 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 and to determine the elements in the outer barrier of 
the waste package whose residual stress exceeds 90 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22.  
These elements are then converted into an area susceptible to accelerated stress corrosion 
cracking at the 80 and 90 percent criteria.  The appropriate areas at intermediate values of the 
residual stress threshold can then be defined by linear interpolation between the extremes.  The 
elements that exceed 90 percent of the yield strength are always a subset of the elements that 
exceed 80 percent of the yield strength.  In other words, the damaged area for the 90 percent 
residual stress threshold is always less than or equal to the damaged area for the 80 percent 
residual stress threshold. 
6.3.3 Residual Stress Damage Threshold for the Drip Shield 
For the titanium plates on the drip shield, the residual stress threshold for failure is represented 
by a fixed lower bound of 50 percent of the yield strength of the drip shield plate material 
(Titanium Grade 7) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], Section 6.2.1, second paragraph on p. 6-7).  The 
fixed bound is based on experimental data and conservatively incorporates a safety factor of 2.2 
because of the long lifetime of the drip shield (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], Section 6.2.1, second 
paragraph on p. 6-7).  The following discussion is abridged from Stress Corrosion Cracking of 
the Drip Shield, the Waste Package Outer Barrier, and the Stainless Steel Structural Material 
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(BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], Section 6.2.1), where a more detailed discussion of the experimental 
data and the technical basis for this threshold can be found. 
There is extensive experimental data for Titanium Grade 7 that justifies the use of 50 percent of 
yield strength as a stress corrosion cracking initiation criterion.  These data include long-term 
constant load tests in a concentrated brine environment (~15 percent Basic Saturated Water, 
designated as J-13) at 105°C with specimens loaded to stresses of 110 percent to 140 percent of 
the yield strength.  Some specimens failed relatively early (≤168 hours) at applied stresses in 
excess of 110 percent of yield strength.  At 110 percent of yield strength, there is a mixture of 
failure and non-failure run out times from about 200 hours for first failure to greater than several 
thousand hours without failure.  These data are consistent with a failure threshold that is less than 
110 percent of yield strength. 
A second source of information regarding the stress corrosion cracking initiation criterion for 
Titanium Grade 7 comes from U-bend tests.  Initiation of stress corrosion cracking is not 
observed in fixed deflection U-bend tests on Titanium Grade 7 exposed for one year and 
Titanium Grade 16 (an analogous titanium/palladium alloy) exposed for five years to a range of 
relevant aqueous environments at 60°C and 90°C in the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory Long Term Corrosion Test Facility.  These U-bend tests are more representative of 
secondary residual stress loading that might result from deformation following seismic loadings.  
These U-bend specimens are deflected and then restrained to give apex strains (cold-work level) 
of greater than 10 percent, which results in sustained stress levels near the yield strength.  A very 
conservative value of 50 percent of yield strength is selected as a threshold criterion for Titanium 
Grade 7, even though the initiation of stress corrosion cracking is not observed for residual 
stresses greater than yield strength. 
6.3.4 Morphology of Damage on the Waste Package 
The material for the waste package outer corrosion barrier, Alloy 22, has been shown to be 
potentially susceptible to stress corrosion cracking under environmental conditions that are 
relevant to the repository.  The stress corrosion cracking mode (morphology) is transgranular 
stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC), rather than the intergranular stress corrosion cracking which 
is commonly observed in pressurized systems, such as pipelines or light water reactor 
components (Andresen et al. 2001 [DIRS 167840]).  The primary issue for the seismic scenario 
class is to define the effective area and transport mode (advective or diffusive) resulting from 
seismically-induced deformation and the associated TGSCC through the outer corrosion barrier 
of the waste package.  The conditions leading to TGSCC and the potential geometry of the crack 
system have therefore been investigated in Stress Corrosion Cracking of the Drip Shield, the 
Waste Package Outer Barrier, and the Stainless Steel Structural Material (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 172203], Sections B6.1 through 6.3), and are summarized below. 
Seismically induced deformation has the potential to initiate and propagate cracks on the outer 
barrier of the waste package.  A range of aqueous brine type environments may form on the 
waste package outer corrosion barrier, producing the requisite concurrent conditions for 
accelerated stress corrosion cracking:  (1) high residual tensile stress, (2) an environment that 
supports corrosion, and (3) a material that has been cold worked during the seismic event.  Once 
initiated, the strain fields (residual stresses) produced by the seismically induced impacts can 
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drive crack growth.  Depending on the stress distribution, cracks may propagate through-wall if 
the stress intensity factor remains positive.  If multiple cracks are initiated in the same general 
area, it is theoretically possible, but not expected, that multiple cracks can intersect or coalesce, 
creating a continuous crack around the deformed region. 
There is a very low probability that a residual stress profile would be created that would allow an 
initiated stress corrosion crack to propagate both through-wall and circumscribing a dent or 
deformed area.  Any through-wall residual stress fields resulting from seismic impact loads 
would be a secondary type stress (displacement controlled).  There is no significant stress from 
other sources, such as stress induced by internal pressure.  In addition, stresses and strains are 
generally of higher magnitude at the outer surface and tend to decrease through the thickness for 
the deformation-induced damage from a seismic event.  In this situation, any crack that initiates 
and propagates may arrest before penetrating the full thickness of the outer barrier and is not 
expected to have a positive stress intensity factor throughout that could result in both 
through-wall and 360º cracking around the entire dent (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], 
Sections B6.1 and B6.3). 
Even postulating that a through-wall crack occurs and circumscribes the dented area, the nature 
of stress corrosion cracking will preclude the dented area from falling out.  Cracks in Alloy 22 
are transgranular, but whether transgranular or intergranular, the crack path has complex local 
branches with a roughness and tortuosity, as illustrated in Figure 6.3-2 (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 172203] Figure B-1), that make it geometrically impossible for an inner “plug” to 
disengage from the vessel in the absence of a superimposed primary load (i.e., significant 
internal pressure).  Any internal pressure that develops from heat up to about 150°C and/or 
corrosion-generated gas with the small amount of internal water vapor that is available would not 
be sufficient to force the dented area from the wall. 
This analysis is consistent with many years of experience with stress corrosion cracks in light 
water reactor components and other internally pressurized systems (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], 
Section B6.3).  A number of incidents of stress corrosion cracking have been observed in light 
water reactors involving both austenitic stainless steels and nickel-based alloys.  The observed 
stress corrosion cracking has been extensive in many of these incidents, sometimes becoming 
fully circumferential in response to weld-induced residual tensile stress and pressure-induced 
primary stresses.  Even under these conditions, which are more severe than in the post-seismic 
environment, there has not been a documented case where any Section of material dropped out as 
a result of the observed cracking (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], Section B6.3). 
6.3.5 Effective Area for Transport From the Waste Package 
Since the expected failure mechanism from a seismic event is accelerated stress corrosion 
cracking and since the damaged areas that exceed the residual stress failure for Alloy 22 are 
expected to remain physically intact, it is reasonable to represent these areas as a dense network 
of stress corrosion cracks, rather than as a plug of material that separates from the outer barrier.  
The effective area for transport through the crack network has been estimated with the following 
procedure. 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 6-18 August 2005 
 
Source:  BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], Figure B-1. 
Figure 6.3-2.  Typical Example of TGSCC in Stainless Steel 
The range of crack densities and crack widths has been estimated for four closely spaced 
networks of cracks (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203] Section B6.4; DTN:  MO0403SPASCRKD.000 
[DIRS 168105]).  Figure 6.3-3 presents one of these hexagonal arrays, with parallel rows of 
randomly oriented cracks.  In this approach, centers of through-wall cracks are located in a 
densely packed hexagonal array and are separated by at least a wall thickness.  The wall 
thickness is anticipated to be the minimum possible separation because stress relief from 
propagation of adjacent cracks relieves the local stress intensity factor, preventing tighter spacing 
between through-wall cracks.  The width of each crack is estimated by assuming an elliptical 
opening with constant through-wall stress given by the yield strength.  This is a conservative 
approach because the crack tips tend to narrow at the inner surface (Figure 6.3-2) and because 
stress relief from adjacent cracks will again tend to reduce the local stress levels at a crack. 
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Source:  BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], Figure B-4. 
NOTE:  Not drawn to scale. 
Figure 6.3-3.  Parallel Rows of Randomly Oriented Flaws, with Row Spacing Equal to Wall Thickness, t 
The hexagonal network of closely spaced cracks is a convenient conceptual model for estimating 
a range of crack densities and crack opening areas for TSPA-LA.  However, this crack geometry 
is not commonly observed in industrial systems.  Rather, an axisymmetric dent often produces 
cracks that are oriented circumferentially around the center of the dent because the 
circumferential direction is normal to the main stress gradients in the radial direction.  An 
analysis for circumferential cracks (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], Section B6.4.3) indicates that the 
effective area of a typical circumferential crack network is within the range of uncertainty from 
the hexagonal model. 
The effective cross-sectional area for transport out of the waste package per unit damaged area is 
given by the product of the crack density per unit surface area, ρSCC, and the gap area per crack, 
ASCC.  The product, ρSCCASCC, ranges from 0.00328 to 0.0131 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], 
Table B-2) for the four crack networks.  Stated differently, the effective transport area through 
the crack network is a factor of 76 to 305 less than the failed surface area that exceeds the 
residual stress threshold.  The product has been evaluated using material properties for room 
temperature because this is slightly more conservative than material properties at 150°C. 
A comprehensive analysis of the potential for advective flow through the stress corrosion crack 
(SCC) network in the waste package indicates that advective flux will be insignificant 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173781], Section 6.2.63).  Advection of liquid and solid material through 
SCCs in the waste package outer barrier is limited, and is not expected to admit significant 
quantities of liquid water into the waste package.  The potential flow through stress corrosion is 
so small that its omission from TSPA has an insignificant effect on the magnitude and time of 
radionuclide releases to the accessible environment.  Advective flow of seepage through SCCs 
on the waste package outer barrier is excluded from TSPA on the basis of low consequence. 
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The SCC network does provide a potential pathway for diffusive transport of radionuclides out 
of the waste package.  The effective area for diffusive transport from the waste package is 
determined by the product of two random parameters, ρSCCASCC.  The first parameter is the factor 
defining the ratio of effective area for diffusive transport to damaged area on the waste package.  
This factor is determined in each realization of the seismic scenario class by sampling a uniform 
distribution with a lower bound of 0.00328 and an upper bound of 0.0131.  The second 
parameter is the damaged area on the waste package, which is a random distribution whose upper 
bound is a function of PGV of the seismic disturbance.  The product of these two parameters 
determines the effective area for diffusive transport from the waste package in each realization. 
6.3.6 No Advective Flow Through the Drip Shield 
Advection of liquids and solids through cracks in the drip shield is excluded on the basis of low  
consequence.  A comprehensive technical analysis of the potential for advective flow through an 
SCC network on the drip shield indicates that advective flux will be insignificant (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 173781], Section 6.2.64).  This conclusion is based on the combination of several factors: 
(1) there are few damaging rockfall events, (2) creep and stress relaxation in dented areas on the 
drip shield may eliminate formation of through-wall cracks, and (3) capillary effects, 
evaporation, and plugging in tight cracks can significantly limit the amount of seepage water that 
can flow through cracks in the drip shields.  Because the advection of liquid and solids through 
the drip shield will be minor, its omission from TSPA-LA will have an insignificant effect on the 
magnitude and time of the resulting radionuclide releases to the accessible environment.  The 
complete technical discussion for this FEP exclusion argument is in BSC 2005 ([DIRS 173781], 
Section 6.2.64 and Appendix C). 
6.4 GROUND MOTIONS AT THE EMPLACEMENT DRIFTS 
6.4.1 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis 
A PSHA was performed to assess the seismic hazards of vibratory ground motion and fault 
displacement at Yucca Mountain.  The PSHA (CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 103731]) provides 
quantitative hazard results to support an assessment of the repository’s long-term performance 
and to form the basis for developing seismic design criteria for the license application.  Key 
attributes of the PSHA methodology for Yucca Mountain are:  (1) utilization of an extensive 
geologic and seismologic database developed over a 20-year period in the Yucca Mountain 
region; (2) explicit consideration and quantification of uncertainties regarding alternative 
seismic-source, ground-motion, and fault-displacement models; and (3) use of a formal, 
structured expert elicitation process to capture the informed scientific community’s views of key 
inputs to the PSHA. 
The PSHA methodology for vibratory ground motions has become standard practice for deriving 
vibratory ground motion hazards for design purposes.  Less commonly, probabilistic fault 
displacement analyses are conducted to provide quantitative assessments of the location and 
amount of differential ground displacement that might occur.  Both analyses provide hazard 
curves, which express the annual frequency of exceeding various amounts of ground motion (or 
fault displacement).  The resulting seismic hazard curves represent the integration over relevant 
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earthquake sources and over the magnitudes of the frequency of future earthquake occurrence 
and, given an occurrence, its effect at a site of interest. 
The basic elements of a PSHA for vibratory ground motions are: 
a) Identification of seismic sources that contribute to the vibratory ground motion hazard 
at Yucca Mountain and characterization of their geometry; 
b) Characterization of seismic sources by the recurrence rate of earthquakes of various 
magnitudes and the maximum magnitude; 
c) Attenuation relations that define a specified ground motion parameter (such as peak 
ground velocity) as a function of magnitude, source-to-site distance, local site 
conditions, and, in some cases, seismic source characteristics; 
d) Integration of the seismic source characterization and ground motion attenuation 
evaluations, including associated uncertainties, into a seismic hazard curve and 
associated uncertainty distribution. 
Probabilistic fault displacement hazard analysis follows a similar path: 
a) Identification of fault sources of fault displacement (principal faults); 
b) Characterization of the frequency, size, and locations of displacements on principal 
faults; 
c) Characterization of the amounts and locations of subsidiary displacements as a 
function of distance from principal faults and magnitudes; 
d) Integration of source characterization and distance distribution, including associated 
uncertainties, into a fault displacement hazard curve and associated uncertainty 
distribution. 
The PSHA incorporates both variability and uncertainty.  Variability, also termed randomness or 
aleatory uncertainty, is the natural randomness in a process.  For discrete variables, the 
randomness is parameterized by the probability of each possible value.  For continuous variables, 
the randomness is parameterized by the probability density function.  An example of variability 
is the range of amplitudes of ground motions that would occur at a particular location from 
repeated earthquakes having exactly the same magnitude at exactly the same distance (say, 
magnitude 6 at 25-km distance).  Variations in ground motion amplitude are expected due to 
unknowable complexities in earthquake-to-earthquake source properties and in the propagation 
path. 
Uncertainty, also termed epistemic uncertainty, is the scientific uncertainty in the model of the 
process.  It is due to limited data and knowledge.  The uncertainty is characterized by alternative 
models and/or parameter values.  For discrete random variables, the epistemic uncertainty is 
modeled by alternative probability distributions.  For continuous random variables, the 
uncertainty is modeled by alternative probability density functions.  Examples of uncertainty are 
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alternative ground motion attenuation relations that express the median amplitude of ground 
motion at a particular site as a function of distance to the source and earthquake magnitude.  
Unlike variability, uncertainty is potentially reducible with additional knowledge and data. 
Given the input evaluations, the hazard calculation method integrates over of the full range of the 
variables and estimates the annual frequency of exceedance of any ground-shaking amplitude at 
the site.  The hazard curve quantifies the variability of the earthquake occurrence and 
ground-shaking attenuation.  In addition to the variability of the seismic hazard, however, is 
uncertainty about the seismotectonic environment of a site.  Significant advances in development 
of methodology to quantify uncertainty in seismic hazard have been made in the past 20 years, as 
discussed in Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis:  Guidance on the Uncertainty and Use of 
Experts (Budnitz et al. 1997 [DIRS 103635]).  These advances involve the development of 
alternative interpretations and representations of the earthquake sources and of the propagation 
of ground motions from the sources to the site.  Evaluations by multiple experts are made within 
a structured expert elicitation process designed to minimize uncertainty due to uneven or 
incomplete knowledge and understanding (Budnitz et al. 1997 [DIRS 103635]).  The weighted 
alternative interpretations are expressed by use of logic trees.  Each pathway through the logic 
tree represents a weighted interpretation of the seismotectonic environment of the site for which 
a seismic hazard curve is computed.  The result of computing the hazard for all relevant 
pathways is a distribution of hazard curves representing the full variability and uncertainty in the 
hazard at a site. 
The seismic scenario class for TSPA-LA uses the mean hazard curves for peak ground velocity 
and for fault displacement.  Each mean hazard curve, which is defined as the mean estimate or 
average of the distribution of hazard curves referred to in the preceding paragraph, typically lies 
above the 80th percentile of the distribution because the average is dominated by the larger 
values of the distribution.  The use of the mean hazard curves simplifies the Monte Carlo 
sampling process for TSPA and provides an accurate representation for the mean dose to the 
reasonably maximally exposed individual, as required to demonstrate acceptable repository 
performance over 10,000 years. 
6.4.2 Site-Specific Ground Motions 
Site-specific ground motions are needed for the structural response calculations and rockfall 
analyses supporting postclosure performance assessment.  Ground motion results from the PSHA 
are for a hypothetical reference rock outcrop and do not reflect site-specific soil and rock 
properties at the locations for which the ground motions are needed (e.g., the emplacement area 
level).  The PSHA was conducted in this fashion because the site-specific rock and soil 
properties were not characterized at the time of the PSHA.  Thus, further analyses are carried out 
to modify the PSHA results to reflect the appropriate site-specific conditions for the site of 
interest.  These site-specific analyses are briefly described here, based on the detailed description 
in Development of Earthquake Ground Motion Input for Preclosure Seismic Design and 
Postclosure Performance Assessment of a Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, NV 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 170027]). 
Postclosure performance assessment requirements determine the location and the annual 
exceedance probabilities for which site-specific ground motions are needed.  For analyses 
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supporting postclosure performance assessment, site-specific ground motions are developed for 
the waste emplacement level.  Selection of annual exceedance probabilities is motivated by the 
requirement to “consider only events that have at least one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 
10,000 years” (10 CFR 63.114(d) [DIRS 173273]).  To address this requirement, ground motions 
are developed for PGV levels of 1.05 m/s, 2.44 m/s, and 5.35 m/s, corresponding to annual 
exceedance probabilities of 1 × 10−5, 1 × 10−6, and 1 × 10−7 per year on the unbounded hazard 
curve at the waste emplacement level.  Analyses using the developed ground motions form the 
basis for evaluating repository performance for seismic events with annual exceedance 
probabilities from 1 × 10−4 per year to as low as 1 × 10−8 per year. 
A detailed site response model provides the basis for development of seismic time histories at the 
emplacement drifts (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170027]).  Different approaches are used for developing 
time histories depending on how they will be used (e.g., in design or in evaluating postclosure 
repository performance).  For Yucca Mountain, three approaches have been used to develop time 
histories:  spectral matching, scaling to peak ground velocity, and scaling to peak ground 
velocity preceded by spectral conditioning.  The spectral-matching approach is used primarily to 
develop time histories that will be used in design analyses and is not discussed further here. 
The peak-ground-velocity scaling approaches are used to develop time histories for postclosure 
analyses.  The goal of these analyses is to determine how the EBS components perform under 
earthquake loads that are significantly beyond their design basis.  In addition to determining the 
consequences of these low-probability ground motions, another goal is to evaluate the variability 
in the consequences.  Because much of the variability in consequences will be driven by random 
variability in the ground motion, the time histories for postclosure analyses are developed to 
capture and represent that random variability. 
Peak ground velocity is selected as the scaling parameter because damage to underground 
structures has been correlated with peak ground velocity (McGarr 1984 [DIRS 163996], p. 206).  
PGV is appropriate for structural damage caused by sliding or impact under earthquake loads 
(Newmark and Rosenblueth 1971 [DIRS 151246], Sections 11.3.5 and 11.4).  Finally, PGV is 
also appropriate for the response of a rock mass to dynamic loading because the change in stress 
across a weak compression wave6 is directly proportional to the particle velocity.  The 
abstractions in this document therefore use the horizontal PGV as the measure of the amplitude 
of the ground motion.   
In the PGV-scaling approach, the earthquake recordings are scaled such that their peak ground 
velocity matches the peak ground velocity determined in the site-response analysis for a location 
of interest.  The records may be scaled such that both horizontal components match the target 
horizontal peak ground velocity and the vertical component matches the target vertical peak 
ground velocity.  Alternatively, one horizontal component may be scaled to the target horizontal 
peak ground velocity with the scaling of the other components done in a manner to maintain the 
intercomponent variability of the original recordings.  Both of these methods have been used at 
Yucca Mountain. 
                                                 
6 A compression wave, also known as a p-wave, has particle velocity in the same direction as the direction of wave propagation.  
The wave is weak if the wave velocity is equal to the acoustic (compressional) velocity in the medium.  An acoustic wave in air 
is an example of a weak compression wave. 
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For each annual exceedance frequency of interest, 17 sets of time histories are developed.  Each 
set of time histories consists of acceleration, velocity and displacement in each of two horizontal 
component directions and in the vertical component direction.  The site-specific time histories 
are based on actual recordings of strong ground motion from earthquakes in the western United 
States and around the world (McGuire et al. 2001 [DIRS 157510], Appendix B).  Recordings are 
selected to represent those earthquakes that dominate the seismic hazard at a given annual 
probability of exceedance.  In other words, the recordings used as a basis for the time histories 
are selected to have a range of magnitudes and distances that corresponds to the magnitudes and 
distances of earthquakes making the dominant contribution to the seismic hazard at the given 
annual exceedance frequency.  By basing the time histories on actual earthquake recordings and 
choosing records consistent with the seismic hazard, the resulting time histories exhibit realistic 
frequency content and phase characteristics as well as durations. 
A variation of the PGV-scaling approach involves spectrally conditioning the original 
strong-ground-motion records before using them to develop time histories.  Spectral conditioning 
modifies the original strong motion records such that their response spectra reflect to a greater 
degree the site conditions at Yucca Mountain.  Conditioning can be done with respect to the 
PSHA reference rock outcrop conditions (referred to as Point A in Figure 6.4-1) or to the waste 
emplacement level conditions (referred to as Point B in Figure 6.4-1) that reflect the site 
response.  Conditioning can be thought of as a weak spectral match.  A strong spectral match is 
not desired in this case because it would tend to reduce the random variability of the original 
recordings. 
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Source:  Modified from CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 103731]. 
Figure 6.4-1.  Schematic Diagram Showing Location of Points A and B 
For the 2.44-m/s PGV level, two suites of 17 sets of time histories each were developed.  The 
17 sets of recorded strong ground motion that form part of the basis for the time histories were 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 6-25 August 2005 
selected to represent the range of magnitudes and distances consistent with the range indicated 
by the PSHA.  The first suite consists of time histories for which both horizontal components 
were scaled to the site-specific horizontal peak ground velocity and the vertical component was 
scaled to the site-specific vertical peak ground velocity.  The observed intercomponent 
variability is therefore not maintained for the first suite.  Also, the records used to generate the 
time histories were not spectrally conditioned prior to scaling. 
A second suite of time histories for the 2.44 m/s PGV level was developed by first spectrally 
conditioning the records to weakly match Yucca Mountain site conditions based on the response 
spectra for the PSHA reference rock outcrop.  Specifically, the ratios between mean response 
spectra for average western U.S. conditions and mean response spectra for the PSHA reference 
rock outcrop at Yucca Mountain were determined.  The western U.S. response spectra are 
considered typical of the strong ground motion records forming the basis for Yucca Mountain 
time histories.  These smooth ratios, or transfer functions, were then applied to the naturally 
irregular response spectrum for each of the strong ground motion records to be used in 
generating time histories.  Finally, the modified response spectra formed targets for weak 
spectral matches of the original records.  Following this conditioning, the records were scaled to 
the site-specific peak ground velocity.  In this case, only one horizontal component was scaled to 
the peak ground velocity and the other components were scaled by the same factor to preserve 
the intercomponent variability of the original records. 
Two suites of 17 sets of time histories were also developed for the 5.35-m/s PGV level.  For both 
of these suites, the records forming the basis for the time histories were spectrally conditioned 
prior to scaling.  In one case, they were spectrally conditioned to weakly match the response 
spectra for the PSHA reference rock outcrop, similar to the approach for the second suite of 
ground motions for the 2.44-m/s PGV level.  In the second case, they were conditioned to the 
site-specific response spectra for the waste emplacement area. 
Analyses of rockfall and EBS structural response have used the most current suite of ground 
motions that were available when the studies were performed.  The original EBS structural 
response calculations for the 2.44-m/s PGV level ground motions were performed with the first 
suite of ground motions, wherein the time histories are scaled to the known values of PGV in the 
horizontal and vertical directions; intercomponent variability was not preserved.  The original 
EBS structural response calculations for the 5.35-m/s PGV level ground motions were performed 
with the first suite of ground motions that were spectrally conditioned to the reference rock 
outcrop and preserved the intercomponent variability of the original records.  More recent 
kinematic calculations for multiple waste packages are based on the 2.44-m/s PGV level ground 
motions with weak spectral conditioning for a reference rock outcrop (see Point A in 
Figure 6.4-1) and on the 5.35-m/s and 1.05-m/s PGV level ground motions with weak spectral 
conditioning for the emplacement level (see Point B in Figure 6.4-1).  Each set of the ground 
motions for the kinematic calculations preserve intercomponent variability.  
6.4.3 Bounded PGV Hazard Curve at the Emplacement Drifts 
The hazard curve at Point A is unbounded, in the sense that PGV continues to increase (albeit 
more slowly) with decreasing values of the exceedance frequency.  This general behavior leads 
to PGV values that exceed 5.35 m/s for annual exceedance frequencies below 10-7 per year.  
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These PGV values are extremely large and may not be physically realizable for the seismic 
sources and geologic conditions in and around Yucca Mountain.  In particular, the physical 
properties of the lithophysal rocks at the emplacement drift level are expected to provide 
physical limits on the PGV experienced at that location (Point B) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170137]). 
A recent study (BSC 2005 [DIRS 170137]) has estimated the limits for maximum shear strain in 
the lithophysal rock, based on existing large-core compression testing and on numerical analyses 
of fracturing limits using field-mapped lithophysae geometries.  The maximum shear strain can 
be related to the in situ response by using the site response model (Section 6.4.2) to determine 
the dynamic shear strains induced at the repository horizon as a function of the PGV level of the 
ground motion.  The PGV levels equivalent to the maximum shear strains define a distribution of 
horizontal PGV values that are consistent with the observation that failure or fracturing of the 
lithophysae has not occurred in approximately 12.8 million years.  The final result of this study is 
a bounded hazard curve for horizontal PGV at the repository waste emplacement level 
(DTN:  MO0501BPVELEMP.001 [DIRS 172682]). 
The points on the bounded hazard curve are listed in Table 6.4-1.  The bounded and unbounded 
hazard curves at Point B are compared in Figure 6.4-2.  With the bounded hazard, the value of 
PGV never exceeds 4.07 m/s for annual exceedance frequencies greater than or equal to 10-8 per 
year.  It follows that structural response calculations based on ground motions at the 5.35-m/s 
PGV level will exceed the expected response at the site, even at the lowest annual probability 
level (10-8 per year) that is considered in TSPA.  Stated differently, the range of PGV for the 
structural response calculations encompasses the PGV range on the (bounded) hazard curve for 
the 10-4 to 10-8 annual exceedance frequencies considered by TSPA. 
Table 6.4-1.  Bounded Hazard Curve for Horizontal PGV at the Emplacement Drifts 
Horizontal PGV (m/s) Mean Annual Exceedance Frequency (1/yr) 
0.4019 1.000 × 10-04 
0.60 3.826 × 10-05 
0.80 1.919 × 10-05 
1.05 9.955 × 10-06 
1.20 6.682 × 10-06 
1.40 3.812 × 10-06 
1.60 2.136 × 10-06 
1.80 1.288 × 10-06 
2.00 8.755 × 10-07 
2.20 6.399 × 10-07 
2.44 4.518 × 10-07 
2.60 3.504 × 10-07 
2.80 2.507 × 10-07 
3.00 1.731 × 10-07 
3.20 1.137 × 10-07 
3.40 7.168 × 10-08 
3.60 4.362 × 10-08 
3.80 2.508 × 10-08 
4.00 1.319 × 10-08 
4.20 5.967 × 10-09 
Source:  DTN:  MO0501BPVELEMP.001 [DIRS 172682]. 
NOTE:  *Horizontal PGV values have been converted from cm/s to m/s by dividing by 100. 
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Source: MO0501BPVELEMP.001 [DIRS 172682] for the bounded hazard curve at Point B; Tables 4-1 and 6.1-1 for 
PGV values on the unbounded hazard curve at Point B with exceedance frequencies greater than or equal 
to 10-7 per year.   
NOTE: The exceedance frequency corresponding to 1,000 cm/s on the unbounded hazard curve is based on a 
power law extrapolation.7 
Figure 6.4-2. Bounded and Unbounded Hazard Curves for Horizontal Peak Ground Velocity at Point B, 
the Repository Waste Emplacement Level 
While the hazard curve for horizontal PGV has been bounded, only the “first” horizontal 
component, H1, of the ground motions is scaled to a given value of PGV (such as 2.44 m/s or 
5.35 m/s).  The second horizontal component, H2, and the vertical component, V, are not directly 
scaled, but are scaled to maintain the intercomponent variability in the original accelerogram.  
The resulting PGVs for the H2 and V components may exceed the scaled PGV for the H1 
component and may exceed the maximum PGV value on the bounded hazard curve, 4.07 m/s. 
                                                 
7 The exceedance frequency at 1,000 cm/s is estimated from a power law fit to the points at the 10-6 and 10-7 annual 
exceedance frequencies on the unbounded hazard curve: (244 cm/s, 10-6 1/yr) and (535 cm/s, 10-7 1/yr).  For a 
power law fit of λ = a(PGV)b to these data,  b and a are calculated to be b = log(10-6/10-7)/log(244/535) = -2.9329, 
and a = (10-6)/(244)-2.9329 = 10.046.  The value of λ at 1,000 cm/s on the unbounded hazard curve is then given by 
λ = a(PGV)b = (10.046)(1,000)-2.9329 = 1.597 × 10-8 1/yr. 
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6.5 DAMAGED AREA ABSTRACTIONS FOR VIBRATORY GROUND MOTION 
This Section defines the damaged area abstraction for the waste package and the failure 
abstraction for the Zircalloy cladding in response to vibratory ground motion.  The response of 
the rock mass and emplacement drifts to vibratory ground motion and the potential for rockfall 
induced by vibratory ground motion to cause mechanical damage to the drip shield, waste 
package, and cladding are discussed in Section 6.6. 
The total damage to the waste package has two separate components:  damage from end-to-end 
impacts of adjacent waste packages and damage from waste package-pallet impacts.  The 
calculations that define the damage from end-to-end impacts and the abstraction of the resulting 
damaged areas are discussed in Section 6.5.1.  The calculations that define the damage from 
waste package-pallet impacts and the abstraction of the resulting damaged areas are presented in 
Section 6.5.2.  The total damage to the waste package is given by the sum of these two individual 
abstractions. 
The development of separate damage abstractions for end-to-end impacts versus waste 
package-pallet impacts reflects the new data from kinematic calculations with multiple waste 
packages (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2).  Previous calculations for 
damaged areas on the waste package are based on the response of a single waste package 
contained within rigid walls (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083]).  This approach does not represent the 
potential for synchronous motion of adjacent waste packages to reduce end-to-end impacts.  The 
potential for synchronous motion is accounted for in the kinematic calculations with multiple 
waste packages.   
The results from the kinematic calculations provide the basis for the new damage abstraction 
from end-to-end impacts of adjacent waste packages.  This damage abstraction is developed in a 
two step process:  first, the kinematic calculations define the number, velocity, and angle of 
impacts between adjacent waste packages and, second, the impact velocities are converted to 
damaged area.  This second step is based on a catalog or look-up table for damaged area from 
end-on impacts as a function of impact velocity.  The second step is necessary because the 
finite-element grid for the kinematic calculations is designed to accurately represent the gross 
rigid body motions and interactions of multiple packages, but is not fine enough to accurately 
predict the residual stress distribution from the end-to-end or waste package-pallet impacts.  This 
limitation in the kinematic calculations is avoided by using a look-up Table that is based on 
calculations with a highly refined finite-element grid.  The catalog or look-up table is described 
in Section 6.5.1.2 and the procedure for calculating the damaged areas with the catalog is 
discussed in Section 6.5.1.3. 
The limitation on the use of the kinematic calculations also extends to waste package-pallet 
impacts:  the finite-element grid in the kinematic calculations is not fine enough to directly 
calculate residual stress distributions from waste package-pallet impacts.  The damage 
abstraction for waste package-pallet impacts is, therefore, based on the previous calculations for 
a single waste package contained within rigid walls (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083]) because the grid 
for the single waste package calculations is fine enough to represent the damaged areas on the 
surface of the waste package from waste package-pallet impacts.  The new abstraction for 
damaged areas from waste package-pallet impacts is described in Section 6.5.2.   
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The potential for damage from lateral impacts between the waste package and drip shield, 
abbreviated as waste package-drip shield impacts, is not included in the seismic damage 
abstractions for TSPA.  The basis for not including the potential damage from waste 
package-drip shield impacts is based on several observations:  (i) the damaged areas from 
side-on impacts of a waste package on an elastic surface are significantly less than the damaged 
areas from end-on impacts on an elastic surface, (ii) waste package-drip shield impacts occur 
much less frequently and with lower impact velocities than the end-to-end impacts in the single 
waste package calculations, implying that the damaged areas from end-to-end impacts will be  
significantly greater than the damaged areas from waste package-drip shield impacts, 
(iii) cross-drift calculations for a waste package and a drip shield surrounded by rockfall 
demonstrate that significant lateral impact velocities only occur for ground motions at the 
2.44-m/s PGV level with PGV values beyond the relevant range on the bounded hazard curve for 
TSPA, and (iv) the conservatism in the approach for calculating damaged areas from end-to-end 
impacts encompasses the potential contribution to damaged areas for waste package-drip shield 
impacts.  Each of these observations is explained in Section 6.5.3.1. 
Finally, the abstraction for failure of the Zircalloy cladding is discussed in Section 6.5.6. 
In this section, damage is synonymous with a damaged area that exceeds the residual stress 
threshold for Alloy 22, resulting in enhanced susceptibility to accelerated stress corrosion 
cracking and the formation of pathways for radionuclide transport from the waste package.  
Permanent structural deformation does not always result in damage because the residual stress 
may be below the stress threshold for Alloy 22.  No damage is equivalent to zero percent 
damaged area on the surface of the package, so there is no transport of radionuclides from the 
waste package.   
In this section, end-to-end impact indicates the impact between two adjacent waste packages in 
the axial direction from the kinematic calculations.  End-on impact is reserved for the calculation 
of a single waste package impacting an elastic surface with a highly refined finite-element mesh; 
the end-on impact calculations provide the basis for the catalog of damaged areas 
(Section 6.5.1.2) and are completely separate from the kinematic calculations. 
6.5.1 Abstraction for Waste Package Damage from End-to-End Impacts 
This abstraction defines the damage generated by end-to-end impacts of adjacent waste packages 
in response to vibratory ground motion.  To this end, two suites of kinematic calculations 
(Section 6.5.1.1) have been performed to determine the timing and velocities of end-to-end 
impacts in a drift filled with multiple waste packages.  The impact parameters from both suites of 
calculations are converted to damaged area by interpolating within a catalog or lookup table of 
damaged areas, as described in Sections 6.5.1.2 and 6.5.1.3.  The catalog defines damaged areas 
at five values of impact velocity and four values of impact angle that span the range of impact 
parameters observed in the kinematic calculations.  The resulting damaged areas are then 
abstracted as a function of the horizontal peak ground velocity (PGV), as described in 
Sections 6.5.1.4 and 6.5.1.5. 
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6.5.1.1 Kinematic Calculations for End-to-End Impacts 
Two suites of kinematic calculations have been performed with multiple waste packages to 
determine the kinematic parameters and damaged areas due to end-to-end impacts between 
adjacent packages (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2).  The two suites are 
based on different computational techniques with different numbers and types of waste packages.  
The two suites represent alternate technical approaches to the kinematic calculations, allowing 
this uncertainty to be propagated into the waste package damage abstraction for TSPA.   
A total of 51 calculations have been performed for each suite:  the first with LS-DYNA, 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Section 5.4.1; DTN:  MO0504SPALSDYN.000 [DIRS 173338]) and 
the second with UDEC, (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172] Section 5.4.2; 
DTN:  MO0503SPAUDECW.000 [DIRS 173337]).  Each suite evaluates the kinematic response 
for 17 ground motion time histories at each of three PGV levels:  1.05 m/s, 2.44 m/s, and 
5.35 m/s.  Each calculation produces kinematic data for end-to-end impacts on the three central 
21-PWR waste packages.  It is useful to consider the three central packages for two reasons.  
First, this approach provides 153 observations of damaged areas, rather than 51 observations for 
the central waste package alone.  And second, any variability in damaged areas between the three 
central packages is incorporated into the damage abstraction.  The impact data from other 
packages are not considered because the free boundaries at either end of the string of waste 
packages can alter the number and velocity of impacts for packages closer to these ends. 
The kinematic calculations do not represent the dynamic response of the invert to the ground 
motion.  Instead, the top surface of the invert moves synchronously with the ground motions, as 
though it is a rigid surface.  The impact of representing the dynamic response of the invert is 
analyzed in BSC 2005 ([DIRS 173172] Attachment VIII).  For these calculations, the invert is 
represented as a cohesionless, granular material that is subjected to ground motions at the 2.44 
and 5.35 m/s PGV levels.  The computational results demonstrate that the rigid representation 
has relatively little impact on amplification of ground motions or on permanent deflection of the 
invert surface.  The simpler representation of the invert as a rigid surface is therefore retained for 
the kinematic calculations. 
6.5.1.1.1 Calculations with LS-DYNA 
Each finite-element calculation with LS-DYNA is a quasi-three-dimensional analysis for a group 
of seven waste packages (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Section 5.4.1).  The finite-element 
representation describes the full three-dimensional geometry of the waste packages and their 
associated pallets, but only allows motion in two directions:  the vertical direction and the 
longitudinal direction (along the drift axis).  Exclusion of motion in the transverse horizontal 
direction eliminates a degree of freedom in the LS-DYNA calculations relative to a fully three-
dimensional calculation.  This reduction in the degrees of freedom forces more motion along the 
drift axis than in a fully three dimensional calculation, conservatively promoting more waste 
package interaction in the LS-DYNA calculations.  The quasi-three-dimensional approach is an 
appropriate starting point for the kinematic calculations with LS-DYNA. 
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Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Figure 5-4. 
Figure 6.5-1.  Finite-Element Representation for the LS-DYNA Calculations 
 
Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Figure 5-5. 
Figure 6.5-2. Geometry of 21-PWR and DHLW Long Packages, Shown from the Symmetry Plane Side.  
Adjacent Waste Packages Are Initially 10 cm Apart 
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The LS-DYNA finite-element representation includes multiple waste packages, their 
emplacement pallets, and a rigid representation of the invert and drip shield (Figure 6.5-1).  Two 
types of waste packages are represented:  the 21-PWR package and the DOE High Level Waste 
(DHLW) Long package.  The group of seven waste packages in Figure 6.5-1 has five 21-PWR 
packages and two DHLW-Long packages.  The three central 21-PWR packages are 
“sandwiched” between a single DHLW package on either side.  The DHLW packages are in turn 
“sandwiched” by a single 21-PWR package on each side of the group of seven.  These latter 
waste packages have a free boundary on their outside ends—their longitudinal motion is not 
restricted.   
The invert and drip shield extend beyond the waste packages by the length of four packages to 
accommodate relative longitudinal motion of the packages.  The drip shield and invert move 
synchronously with the free field ground motion, which corresponds to a drip shield that is 
pinned to the invert by rockfall from a collapsed drift. 
The waste packages are represented as hollow cylinders with end caps (Figure 6.5-2).  The inner 
diameter and end cap thickness of the waste packages are selected as convenient dimensions to 
approximate the inner cavity of the waste packages and to produce material densities on the same 
order as the density of other components in the finite-element representation, with the intent of 
maintaining reasonable computational time steps.  A detailed description of the component 
geometries and configuration in the LS-DYNA analyses is provided in (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 173172], Attachment I). 
Seventeen ground motion time histories scaled to three different levels of longitudinal PGV are 
used as boundary conditions for the calculations.  The three PGV levels are 1.05 m/s, 2.44 m/s, 
and 5.35 m/s.  Since the value of PGV is controlled for only one horizontal component of the 
ground motion, the controlled component can be oriented randomly in the horizontal plane.  For 
these calculations, the controlled horizontal component is oriented in the longitudinal direction 
because it simplifies the abstraction process (see the discussion in Section 6.5.1.5.2 regarding 
“stripes” versus a “cloud” of data points) and because the physical response of the system is 
expected to correlate most strongly with the longitudinal component of ground motion, rather 
than the transverse component of ground motion.   
Only the longitudinal and vertical components of each ground motion are applied to the finite 
element representation.  The resulting response is symmetric about the vertical plane through the 
longitudinal axis (i.e., the y-z plane in Figure 6.5-2).  With this symmetry plane, there is no 
transverse displacement and no rotation out of the symmetry plane (about the y-axis or z-axis). 
The stochastic (uncertain) input parameters for the simulations are the 17  ground motion time 
histories at each PGV level, the metal-to-metal friction coefficients, and the metal-to-rock 
friction coefficients.  A Monte Carlo sampling scheme defines the appropriate combinations of 
ground motion and friction coefficients (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Attachment X).  The 
metal-to-metal and metal-to-rock friction coefficients are independently sampled for each waste 
package/pallet from uniform distributions with a lower bound of 0.2 and an upper bound of 0.8.  
The static and dynamic friction coefficients are taken to be the same.  
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All interactions between components in the LS-DYNA finite-element representation use viscous 
damping.  This damping factor has been calibrated through numerical testing to provide a 
reasonable value for the coefficient of restitution (COR) (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], 
Attachment I, Section I-3.3.1).  The target value for the COR is 0.6 for the combined response of 
the waste package, pallet, and invert.  Numerical testing for the calculated response in a drop test 
of the waste package on the invert and pallet achieved a COR of 0.65, closely matching the 
target COR.  The target value of 0.6 is considered an upper bound on the expected COR for the 
impact of large, multicomponent structures.  The use of a bounding value for the COR minimizes 
the viscous damping in the LS-DYNA calculations, providing a conservative but reasonable 
representation of energy dissipation in the impact process. 
The 7 package representation for the LS-DYNA simulations are a portion of the approximately 
100 packages in an emplacement drift, so it is important to determine this representation does not 
unduly affect the kinematic response of the three middle waste packages in Figure 6.5-1.  The 
response for multiple waste packages was analyzed in a variety of configurations, which 
included a baseline representation of a single 21-PWR waste package between fixed adjacent 
waste packages, 5 to 13 waste packages with a single, central DHLW-Long package, and 
13 waste packages with five middle 21-PWR waste packages between two DHLW-Long 
packages.  The initial results from these calculations indicated that it is advantageous to have 
multiple DHLW-Long packages in the waste package representation.  Additional calculations 
compared various configurations with two DHLW Long packages surrounding a group of central 
21-PWR waste packages.  Based on comparisons of number of impacts, maximum impact forces, 
and simulation animations, the seven waste package configuration with three central 21-PWR 
waste packages between two DHLW packages (Figure 6.5-1) was selected for the LS-DYNA 
calculations (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Attachment I, Section I-3.3.4).  This seven waste 
package configuration also approximates the anticipated mix of emplaced waste package sizes.  
For example, 21-PWR-sized packages account for almost 65 percent of the inventory for 
TSPA-LA (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 13, for the 21-PWR absorber plate, 21-PWR 
control rod, and 44-BWR absorber plate), and the proportion of 21-PWR sized packages in the 
7 package representation is 71 percent. 
The finite-element representation in LS-DYNA provides a reasonable representation of the 
impact kinematics between multiple waste packages, and is considered appropriate for its 
intended use for several reasons.  First, the calculations are based on standard, commercially 
available software (LS-DYNA) that has demonstrated the capability to accurately analyze impact 
processes and kinematic response.  Second, the appropriate number of waste packages to 
accurately represent the kinematic response of the three central waste packages has been 
carefully investigated.  Third, the finite-element grid for the kinematic calculations provides a 
reasonable representation of the three-dimensional geometries of packages and pallets that can 
accurately resolve the gross rigid body motions of and contacts between these bodies.  Fourth, 
the major parameter uncertainties are represented in the calculations.  The uncertainties due to 
ground motions and friction coefficients are directly represented by random sampling of inputs 
for the calculations.  The uncertainty in contact damping is bounded by adjusting the viscous 
damping factor to provide a conservative but reasonable representation of energy dissipation in 
the impact process.  Finally, the potential uncertainties in material properties are not represented 
in the calculations because the materials in the waste package will be fabricated to design 
specifications that follow standard values in handbooks and industrial publications, and because 
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the sensitivity to variation in standard material properties is expected to be minor in comparison 
to that produced by the uncertainties in ground motions and friction coefficients.  
6.5.1.1.2 Kinematic Data from LS-DYNA 
Kinematic calculations with LS-DYNA were performed for 17 ground motions at each of three 
PGV levels: 1.05 m/s, 2.44 m/s, and 5.35 m/s.  The results for the three central 21-PWR waste 
packages are summarized in Table 6.5-1 (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172] Table 5-2).  Table 6.5-1 
includes the number of impacts greater than 0.85 m/s, which is the velocity threshold for nonzero 
damage as explained in Section 6.5.1.2.  Table 6.5-1 also presents the maximum impact 
velocities for each realization.  There are no impacts above 0.85 m/s at the 1.05-m/s PGV motion 
level, so there is no damage at this level.  At the 2.44-m/s PGV level, impacts above 0.85 m/s 
occur in 9 (out of 17) realizations.  A large number of impacts are predicted at the 5.35-m/s PGV 
level, although the 5.35-m/s PGV level is beyond the scope of TSPA because the minimum 
annual exceedance frequency of 10-8 per year for TSPA corresponds to a PGV of 4.07 m/s on the 
bounded hazard curve (Section 6.4.3).  Table 6.5-1 does not present information on relative 
impact angle because the catalog of damaged areas is based on the mean value of the damaged 
areas at 1°, 5°, and 8°, as explained in Section 6.5.1.2. 
Table 6.5-1.  Summary of Impact Data from LS-DYNA Kinematic Calculations 
1.05-m/s PGV level 2.44-m/s PGV level 5.35-m/s PGV level 
Number of impacts 
> 0.85 m/s 
Max . velocitya 
(m/s) 
Number of impacts 
> 0.85 m/s 
Max . velocitya 
(m/s) 
Number of impacts 
> 0.85 m/s 
Max . velocitya 
(m/s) 
Real. 
No. 
Ground 
Motion 
No. 
left center right left center right left center right left center right left center right left center right
1 17 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 16 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 1 2 0.00 0.87 0.92 5 2 1 7.91 1.15 1.46
3 3 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 2 4 1.99 2.59 2.59 6 5 3 4.73 11.92 11.92
4 2 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 1 1 0.87 0.87 0.99 8 8 7 3.82 3.20 3.20
5 11 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 2 2 1.95 1.95 1.76
6 4 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.88 6 8 7 3.30 4.08 4.08
7 12 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.89 6 6 4 2.11 2.11 1.11
8 5 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 5 4 2.33 2.88 2.21
9 15 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 1 1 1.35 0.89 1.10
10 9 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 4 6 1.49 1.49 2.23 8 11 8 5.39 6.25 6.25
11 8 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 4 2 1 2.39 1.99 1.26
12 6 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 9 10 8 1.76 1.76 2.00
13 10 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 5 5 6 2.47 2.47 1.68
14 1 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 4 3 4 2.64 2.54 2.54
15 7 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 2 3 2.73 2.73 2.17 8 7 7 3.14 2.71 2.71
16 14 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 1 2 0.91 1.02 1.22 6 3 3 1.48 1.85 1.85
17 13 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 1 1 0.00 0.95 0.95 5 4 4 2.11 2.11 1.45
Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Table 5-2. 
a If greater than 0.85 m/s. 
6.5.1.1.3 Calculations with UDEC 
Each discrete-element calculation with UDEC is a two-dimensional analysis for a group of 
twenty-one waste packages (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Section 5.4.2).  The two-dimensional 
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analysis represents a vertical cross-section through the packages and their associated pallets, a 
portion of which is shown in Figure 6.5-3.  Pallets and waste packages are represented as 
rectangular blocks located beneath the drip shields.  The length and height of a block 
representing a waste package is equal to the length and diameter, respectively, of the waste 
package.  The length of a block representing an emplacement pallet is equal to the length of the 
pallet.  The height of a block representing an emplacement pallet is equal to the minimum height 
of the waste package above the invert, as shown in Figure 6.5-4.  The two-dimensional geometry 
excludes motion in the horizontal direction, transverse to the drift axis.  This exclusion 
eliminates a degree of freedom in the UDEC calculations relative to a fully three-dimensional 
calculation.  This reduction in the degrees of freedom forces more motion along the drift axis 
than in a fully three dimensional calculation, conservatively promoting more waste package 
interaction in the UDEC calculations. 
 
Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Figure 5-7. 
Figure 6.5-3.  Geometric Representation for the Two-Dimensional UDEC Calculations 
 
Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Figure 5-8. 
Figure 6.5-4.  Comparison of the Actual Geometry and its Representation in the Numerical Analysis 
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Each waste package in the analysis is a 21-PWR waste package type.  The mass assigned to each 
block in the numerical representation is equal (per unit out-of-plane thickness, see Figure 6.5-4) 
to the mass of the body that it represents.  This approach preserves the contacts between adjacent 
packages in the two-dimensional geometry, but does not preserve the three-dimensional 
moments of inertia of the packages or pallets.  A more detailed description of the numerical 
representation of the three-dimensional system in the two-dimensional geometry is provided in 
BSC (2005 [DIRS 173172], Attachment II).   
The drip shield and all boundaries move synchronously with the free field ground motion.  This 
approach is equivalent to a drip shield that is pinned to the invert by rockfall from a collapsed 
drift.  The outermost waste packages have a free boundary.  The initial distance between an end 
of the string of waste packages and the vertical boundaries, which represent the ends of the 
emplacement drift, is approximately five package lengths.  These boundary conditions are 
similar to the boundary conditions for the LS-DYNA calculations.   
The UDEC calculations use hysteretic damping to dissipate a portion of the impact energy 
between two bodies.  Different normal contact stiffnesses are assigned to the loading and 
unloading phases of the contact process.  The ratio of the unloading stiffness to the loading 
stiffness is the main parameter that controls energy dissipation in hysteretic damping.  This 
parameter is calibrated through numerical testing to match the metal-to-metal COR for the drop 
of the waste package on the pallet and to match the metal-to-rock COR for the drop of the pallet 
on the invert.  The target values for metal-to-metal COR and for metal-to-rock COR are 0.6 and 
0.2, respectively.  The numerical testing showed that stiffness ratios of 2.7 and 50.0 resulted in 
responses that closely matched the target values for the CORs.  The values of 0.6 and 0.2 are 
upper bounds on the expected coefficients of restitution for impacts of a large, complex structure.  
The use of bounding values minimizes the hysteretic damping in the UDEC calculations, 
providing a conservative but still reasonable representation of the kinematic process. 
Seventeen ground motion time histories scaled to three different levels of longitudinal PGV are 
used as boundary conditions for the calculations.  The three PGV levels are 1.05 m/s, 2.44 m/s, 
and 5.35 m/s.  The first horizontal component of the ground motion, with a PGV of 1.05 m/s, 
2.44 m/s or 5.35 m/s, is aligned with the longitudinal direction (along the emplacement drift) for 
the reasons explained in Section 6.5.1.1.1.  Only two components of each ground motion are 
applied to the finite element representation:  the longitudinal component and the vertical 
component.  The two-dimensional representation prevents block motion in the transverse 
horizontal direction. 
The information that is archived for all twenty one waste packages includes:  (a) the times for all 
impacts; (b) the location of impacts relative to the local coordinate system; and (c) the relative 
impact velocities decomposed into normal and tangential directions relative to the impacted 
surface.  Impacts between adjacent packages, between packages and pallets, and between 
packages and drip shields (i.e., the upper boundary) are archived.  Although the impact 
information is recorded for all waste packages, the waste package damage abstraction is based on 
the kinematic data for the three packages in the middle of the string.  
The 21 waste packages in the UDEC simulations are a portion of the approximately 
100 packages in an emplacement drift, so it is important to verify that the number of packages in 
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the numerical simulation does not affect the kinematic response of the three waste packages in 
the middle of the string.  Qualitative review of the results from the numerical simulations shows 
that end effects from the free boundaries propagate at most 6 or 8 packages in from either end.  
As an example, the final waste package configuration in response to ground motion 7 at the 
5.35-m/s PGV level is shown in Figure 6.5-5.  Ground motion 7 is one of the strongest ground 
motions at this PGV level.  Figure 6.5-5 also presents the contours of horizontal displacement 
and details of displacements at the end of the string.  
Figure 6.5-5 shows that 3 packages on the left end and 8 packages on the right end have drifted 
away from the middle of the string during the ground motion.  On the right side, the end package 
completely fell off the pallet.  The packages that are within the regions of influence of the free 
ends will have fewer impacts and lower impact velocities because of the increased spacing 
between adjacent packages.  On the other hand, the three waste packages in the middle of the 
string will not be significantly affected by end effects because the ten packages in the middle of 
the string are largely unaffected by end effects.  It follows that 21 packages are sufficient to 
simulate end-to-end impacts of adjacent packages for the three central packages. 
The finite-difference representation in UDEC provides a reasonable representation of the impact 
kinematics between multiple waste packages, and is considered appropriate for its intended use 
for several reasons.  First, the calculations are based on standard, commercially available 
software (UDEC) that has demonstrated the capability to accurately analyze kinematic response 
for granular media.  Second, the appropriate number of waste packages to accurately represent 
the kinematic response of the three central waste packages has been carefully investigated.  
Third, the finite-element grid for the kinematic calculations provides a reasonable representation 
of the package and pallet geometries that can accurately resolve the gross rigid body motions of 
and contacts between these bodies.  Note that this representation is two-dimensional in UDEC, 
rather than the three-dimensional representation in LS-DYNA.  Fourth, the major parameter 
uncertainties are represented in the calculations.  The uncertainties due to ground motions and 
friction coefficients are directly represented by random sampling of inputs for the calculations.  
The uncertainty in contact damping is bounded by adjusting the hysteretic damping to provide a 
conservative but reasonable representation of energy dissipation in the impact process.  Finally, 
the potential uncertainties in material properties are not represented in the calculations because 
the materials in the waste package will be fabricated to design specifications that follow standard 
values in handbooks and industrial publications and because the sensitivity to variation in 
standard material properties is expected to be minor in comparison to that produced by the 
uncertainties in ground motions and friction coefficients. 
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Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Figure 5-10. 
Figure 6.5-5.  Displacement Contours (m) At The End of Ground Motion 7 at the 5.35-m/s PGV Level 
6.5.1.1.4 Kinematic Data from UDEC 
Kinematic calculations with UDEC were performed for 17 ground motions at each of three PGV 
levels: 1.05 m/s, 2.44 m/s, and 5.35 m/s.  The results for the three central 21-PWR waste 
packages are summarized in Table 6.5-2 (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Table 5-3).  Table 6.5-2 
includes the number of impacts greater than 0.85 m/s, which is the velocity threshold for nonzero 
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damage as explained in Section 6.5.1.2.  Table 6.5-2 also presents the maximum impact 
velocities for each realization.  There are only two impacts with velocity greater than 0.85 m/s 
from all realizations at the 1.05-m/s PGV level.  At the 2.44-m/s PGV level, impacts above 
0.85 m/s occur in 10 realizations.  A large number of impacts with relatively large impact 
velocities are predicted at the 5.35-m/s PGV level.  It is worthwhile to note that the 5.35-m/s 
PGV level is beyond the scope of TSPA because the minimum annual exceedance frequency of 
10-8 per year for TSPA corresponds to a PGV of 4.07 m/s on the bounded hazard curve 
(Section 6.4.3).  Table 6.5-2 does not present information on relative impact angle because the 
catalog of damaged areas is based on the mean value of the damaged areas at 1°, 5°, and 8°, as 
explained in Section 6.5.1.2. 
Table 6.5-2.  Summary of Impact Data from UDEC Kinematic Calculations 
1.05-m/s PGV level 2.44-m/s PGV level 5.35-m/s PGV level 
Number of impacts 
> 0.85 m/s 
Max . velocitya 
(m/s) 
Number of impacts 
> 0.85 m/s 
Max . velocitya 
(m/s) 
Number of impacts 
> 0.85 m/s 
Max . velocitya 
(m/s) Real. 
No. 
Ground 
Motion 
No. left center right left center right left center right left center right left center right left center right
1 17 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 5 5 7 1.73 1.71 1.86
2 16 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 17 13 12 2.29 3.11 3.24
3 3 2 1 0 0.96 0.87 0.00 2 2 2 1.13 1.64 1.75 11 9 12 4.17 6.06 6.16
4 2 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 4 2 5 2.23 2.23 1.55 26 24 22 4.62 4.61 5.89
5 11 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 11 13 7 1.99 2.04 2.42
6 4 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 1 0 0.90 0.90 0.00 27 31 32 3.93 3.87 2.96
7 12 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 28 24 22 3.04 3.18 3.17
8 5 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 11 12 12 2.93 4.27 4.48
9 15 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 1 0.00 0.00 1.76 9 8 9 1.80 1.82 2.09
10 9 0 1 1 0.00 1.15 1.15 7 8 9 2.40 2.91 2.92 28 29 28 4.35 5.40 7.30
11 8 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 1 1 0.00 0.95 0.95 14 14 9 4.42 2.99 2.91
12 6 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 1 2 0.00 1.43 1.41 26 26 24 6.76 6.42 6.67
13 10 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 9 14 12 3.37 2.54 2.21
14 1 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 1 1 0.00 0.91 0.92 17 14 17 5.76 5.74 3.89
15 7 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 6 8 8 5.22 2.71 4.37 26 27 28 5.10 7.08 6.12
16 14 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 9 6 9 3.15 3.19 1.78
17 13 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 4 1 0 1.16 1.24 0.00 28 28 26 5.72 5.72 5.18
Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Table 5-3. 
a If greater than 0.85 m/s. 
6.5.1.2 Catalog of Damaged Areas for End-On Impacts 
The long duration of the ground motions and the representation of multiple waste packages in the 
kinematic calculations preclude the use of a highly refined finite-element mesh.  In this situation, 
it is more accurate to perform a set of very detailed “sidebar” calculations of the impact process 
using representative values for impact velocities and impact angles.  These “sidebar” calculations 
determine the damage to a 21-PWR waste package from end-on impact on an elastic plate 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Section 5.4.3 and BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178], Tables 2 and 3).  
These “sidebar” analyses” are completely separate from the kinematic calculations described in 
Section 6.5.1.1.  The elastic plate is referred to as an “unyielding” surface in the documentation 
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for the sidebar analyses (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Section 5.4.3).  The plate will be referred to 
as an elastic surface, with the understanding that it has finite thickness. 
The sidebar calculations provide a parametric study for end-on impacts of a 21-PWR waste 
package on an elastic surface.  The parameters of the study include five values of impact 
velocity:  1 m/s, 2 m/s, 4 m/s, 6 m/s and 10 m/s, and four values of the impact angle:  0°, 1°, 5°, 
and 8°.  The selected ranges of impact velocity and impact angle are sufficiently wide to 
encompass all velocities and angles encountered in the end-to-end impacts generated by the 
kinematic calculations. 
The use of an elastic surface reduces the computational mesh by a factor of two and also 
provides a conservative representation of the damaged area.  The damaged area with an elastic 
surface will generally be greater than the damaged area with an adjacent waste package because 
the elastic surface has a high modulus of elasticity and a fixed boundary that limits 
displacements on the side of the plate away from the waste package.  These features maximize 
the impact stresses and deformation of the waste package (for a given impact velocity and impact 
angle) in comparison to an adjacent waste package. 
Material properties are based on a temperature of 150°C.  As noted in Assumption 5.3, a 
temperature of 150°C is conservative for over 97 percent of the first 10,000 years after repository 
closure.  Calculations have also been performed at 100°C and 200°C to evaluate the sensitivity 
of damaged area (i.e., the area that exceeds the residual stress threshold) to temperature, but only 
the results for 150°C are incorporated into the catalog of damaged areas from end-on impacts. 
These structural response calculations provide a reasonable representation of the end-on impact 
for a single waste package and are considered appropriate for defining the catalog of damaged 
areas.  The calculations are based on standard, commercially available software (LS-DYNA) that 
has demonstrated the capability to accurately analyze impact processes and kinematic response.  
Appropriate mesh refinement studies have been performed to ensure that the damaged areas are 
largely independent of the finite-element grid.  It is not necessary to represent uncertainties in 
ground motions or friction coefficients because these calculations have a single, end-on impact at 
a given impact velocity and impact angle.  The uncertainty in contact damping is bounded by 
having no energy dissipation in the contact process itself, although there is energy dissipation 
due to plastic yielding of the waste package.  The potential uncertainties in material properties 
are not represented in the calculations because the waste package will be fabricated to design 
specifications that follow standard values in handbooks and industrial publications, and because 
the sensitivity of damaged area to variation in standard material properties is expected to be 
minor in comparison to the sensitivity of damaged area to uncertainty in ground motions and 
friction coefficients. 
Further details of the mesh refinement studies are documented in 21-PWR Waste Package End 
Impacts - A Mesh Study (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178], Tables 2 and 3).  The final results for the 
damaged areas are summarized in Table 6.5-3 for the residual stress thresholds of 80 percent and 
90 percent of the yield strength (YS) of Alloy 22 at 150°C.  The damaged areas are also 
presented graphically in Figure 6.5-6. 
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Table 6.5-3. Catalog of Damaged Areas from End-On Impact of a 21-PWR Waste Package on an 
Elastic Surface 
 
Impact 
Damaged Area (m2) for Stress Threshold of 
80 Percent of YS as Function of Impact Angle 
Damaged Area (m2) for Stress Threshold of 
90 Percent of YS as Function of Impact Angle 
Velocity 0º 1º 5º 8º 0º 1º 5º 8º 
1 m/s 0.0 0.0020 0.0027 0.0020 0.0 0.0017 0.0014 0.0012 
2 m/s 0.0024 0.0282 0.0130 0.0105 0.0 0.0035 0.0052 0.0051 
4 m/s 0.0122 0.0421 0.0651 0.0474 0.0122 0.0126 0.0288 0.0212 
6 m/s 0.0264 0.0521 0.1466 0.0967 0.0124 0.0222 0.0655 0.0335 
10 m/s 0.0419 0.0571 0.2822 0.2244 0.0377 0.0259 0.1542 0.1206 
Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178], Tables 2 and 3. 
YS = Yield Strength 
The damaged area data in Figure 6.5-6 has a complex angular dependence that has been 
simplified for the purpose of determining damaged areas from end-to-end impacts.  The 
simplification is motivated by two factors: 
• The kinematic calculations are two-dimensional analyses that exclude the transverse 
horizontal component of each ground motion.  This transverse horizontal component 
may increase or decrease the relative impact angle between two adjacent waste 
packages.  Given the uncertainty in impact angle, it is reasonable to simplify the 
dependence shown in Figure 6.5-6. 
• Interpolation of damaged areas at small relative impact angles may not be accurate.  The 
damaged areas near zero degrees may be artificially low because the geometry for the 
end-on impact generally cannot be duplicated by the impact between two adjacent waste 
packages, as explained next.   
The end-on impact calculations for the catalog generally produce damage at the 0° impact angle 
that is quite small relative to the damage at 5°.  Small damage at 0° is most probably caused by 
the fact that the waste package is perfectly aligned with the elastic surface.  Perfect alignment 
will spread the impact load over a large surface area, thereby reducing the residual stress 
concentrations and the resulting damage area on the waste package.  But perfect alignment 
generally does occur during the impact between two adjacent waste packages.  The typical 
contact between two packages will often be the corner of one package impacting the trunnion 
sleeve or the lid of the adjacent package, rather than perfect alignment of the trunnion sleeve on 
one package with the end lid on the other package.   
In this situation, the catalog of damaged areas has been simplified by assigning the mean value 
of the damaged areas at 1°, 5°, and 8° as the damaged area at a given impact velocity.  This 
approach eliminates interpolation for impact angles near 0°.  This approach also eliminates the 
potential sensitivity to changes in impact angle generated by the transverse horizontal component 
of the ground motion.  Equal weighting of the damaged areas at 1°, 5°, and 8° is a reasonable 
approximation because these values span the range of impact angles observed in the kinematic 
calculations.  Figure 6.5-7 plots the mean values overlayed over the full data catalog of damaged 
areas and Table 6.5-4 presents the resulting mean values.   
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(a) Damaged Area from End-On Impacts for a Residual Stress Threshold of 80 Percent of Yield Strength 
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(b) Damaged Area from End-On Impacts for a Residual Stress Threshold of 90 Percent of Yield Strength 
Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178] Tables 2 and 3; graphics created in Appendix A. 
Figure 6.5-6. Catalog of Damaged Area Data for End-On Impact of a Waste Package on an Elastic 
Surface 
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(a) Mean Damaged Area from End-On Impacts for a Residual  
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(b) Mean Damaged Area from End-On Impacts for a Residual  
Stress Threshold of 90 Percent of Yield Strength 
Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178] Tables 2 and 3; graphics created in Appendix A. 
Figure 6.5-7. Mean Value of Damaged Area for Impact Angles of 1º, 5º and 8º at a Given Impact 
Velocity in the Catalog of Damaged Area Data for End-On Impact of a Waste Package 
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Table 6.5-4. Mean Damaged Areas for 1º, 5º, and 8º End-On Impacts of a 21-PWR Waste Package on 
an Elastic Surface 
Impact 
Velocity 
Mean Damaged Area (m2) for 
Stress Threshold of 80 Percent of 
YS 
Mean Damaged Area (m2) for 
Stress Threshold of 90 Percent of 
YS 
1 m/s 0.00223 0.00143 
2 m/s 0.0172 0.0046 
4 m/s 0.0515 0.0209 
6 m/s 0.0985 0.0404 
10 m/s 0.1879 0.1002 
Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178], Tables 2 and 3, repeated in Table 6.5-2. 
YS = Yield Strength 
The mean damaged areas in Table 6.5-4 have nonzero values, even at the smallest impact 
velocity of 1 m/s.  In order to use the results in Table 6.5-4 to determine damaged areas from 
end-to-end impacts, it is necessary to define a velocity threshold corresponding to no damage.  
The velocity threshold is estimated by extrapolating the mean damaged curve for a residual stress 
threshold of 80 percent of yield strength.  The mean damaged area curve is plotted in 
Figure 6.5-8 as a function of the impact velocity.  A simple linear extrapolation of the points at 
1 m/s and 2 m/s indicates that the x-intercept of the curve corresponds to 0.851 m/s.  The 
velocity threshold has been rounded to 0.85 m/s for the purpose of calculating damaged areas 
from end-to-end impacts of adjacent packages.  This velocity threshold is also appropriate at 
90 percent residual stress threshold because damaged area for the 80 percent stress threshold is 
always equal to or greater than the damaged area for the 90 percent residual stress threshold.  
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Source:  Table 6.5-4; graphic created in Appendix A. 
Figure 6.5-8. Mean Damaged Areas as a Function of Impact Velocity for a Residual Stress Threshold of 
80 Percent of Yield Strength.   
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6.5.1.3 Calculation of Damaged Areas for End-to-End Impacts 
The mean damaged areas in Table 6.5-4 and the velocity threshold of 0.85 m/s (corresponding to 
zero damage) provide the basis for determining damaged areas from end-to-end impacts of 
adjacent waste packages in the kinematic calculations.  The methodology for determining total 
damaged area uses the relative impact velocity between adjacent packages from the kinetic 
analyses (defined in the spreadsheets in DTN:  MO0504SPALSDYN.000 [DIRS 173338] and in 
DTN:  MO0503SPAUDECW.000 [DIRS 173337]) as an interpolation parameter between the 
given impact velocities in Table 6.5-4.  The total damaged area is then defined as the sum of the 
damaged areas from the individual impacts. 
The damaged area calculation for UDEC Realization 3 at the 2.44-m/s PGV level is illustrated in 
Table 6.5-5.  The data in the first six columns is based on output from the UDEC calculation for 
the central waste package.  The data in the last two columns is based on Table 6.5-4 and the 
velocity threshold of 0.85 m/s.  The first, second, third, and sixth impacts in Table 6.5-5 have 
zero damaged area because the magnitude of the normal impact velocity is less than 0.85 m/s.  
The fourth and fifth impacts in Table 6.5-5 have nonzero damaged areas because the magnitude 
of the velocity is greater than 0.85 m/s.  The nonzero damaged areas are determined by linear 
interpolation using the catalog of damaged areas in Table 6.5-4.  For example, the damaged area 
for the fourth impact at a residual stress threshold of 80 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 
is calculated as follows: 
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 (Eq. 6-2) 
where the points (1 m/s, 0.00223 m2) and (2 m/s, 0.0172 m2) are based data in Table 6.5-4.  The 
result in equation 6-2 matches the numerical value for the fourth impact in the seventh column of 
Table 6.5-5.  The total damaged area for the residual stress threshold of 80 percent of the yield 
strength of Alloy 22 is the sum of the damaged areas in the seventh column for the six impacts.  
Table 6.5-5. Illustration of Damaged Area Calculation - Realization 3 at 2.44-m/s PGV for UDEC 
Time 
(s) 
X-Coord. 
(m) 
Y-Coord. 
(m) 
V-Norm. 
(m/s) 
V-Tan. 
(m/s) 
Impact 
Angle (º) 
DA for 
80 Percent 
YS 
(m2) 
DA for 
90 Percent 
YS 
(m2) 
4.63E+00 -8.08E-05 1.71E+00 2.88E-01 6.72E-01 1.25E-01 0 0 
4.26E+00 5.03E+00 2.37E-02 -4.22E-01 1.42E+00 4.98E-01 0 0 
3.35E+00 5.98E-06 1.71E+00 3.63E-01 -5.00E+00 5.42E+00 0 0 
3.14E+00 5.03E+00 1.71E+00 -1.64E+00 7.59E-01 3.22E+00 1.18E-02 3.46E-03 
3.12E+00 -8.17E-05 1.94E-02 1.17E+00 -1.55E+00 1.75E+00 4.84E-03 1.98E-03 
3.04E+00 5.03E+00 5.58E-01 4.64E-02 1.57E+00 1.21E+00 0 0 
Total Damaged Area for Normal End-to-End Impacts > 0.85 m/s (m2): 1.67E-02 5.44E-03 
Source:  Worksheet “Real3 GM3” in 21- PWRs 1e-6 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to central WP.xls.  This file is 
included in the CD in Appendix G. 
Notes: X-Coord. = x-coordinate; Y-Coord. = y-coordinate; V-Norm. = normal (relative) impact velocity; V-Tan. = 
tangential (relative) impact velocity; DA = damaged area; YS = yield strength. 
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This methodology has two significant conservatisms: 
• The relative impact velocity between adjacent waste packages from the kinematic 
calculations is ideally a factor of two less than the equivalent end-on impact velocity for 
interpolation in Table 6.5-4.  As a concrete example, a 1 m/s end-on impact of a single 
waste package onto an elastic surface is equivalent to the impact of two adjacent,  
identical packages with velocities of +1 m/s and -1 m/s, for a total relative velocity of 
2 m/s.  Stated differently, the elastic surface provides a plane of symmetry for the end-on 
impact calculations, and this plane of symmetry implies that packages are moving in 
equal and opposite directions on either side of the plane for the kinematic calculations, 
resulting in the factor of two difference for equal packages. 
• The simple summation of damage from individual impacts overestimates the damage if 
impacts occur in the same location or if the damaged areas from adjacent impacts 
overlap significantly. 
The methodology for analyzing damaged area does not incorporate the factor of two between 
end-on impact velocity and relative impact velocity.  Adjacent packages are not always equal in 
mass and in their geometric configuration.  The factor will be reduced below two for unequal 
packages, but the exact reduction is uncertain at this time.  In addition, impact of the corner of 
one waste package onto the lid of the adjacent waste package is not represented in the 
calculations for end-on impacts onto an elastic surface.  The potential reduction in damaged 
areas due to the factor of two has therefore been excluded from the damage abstractions. 
Similarly, the two-dimensional kinematic calculations do not represent the potential variation in 
impact location from a three-dimensional process.  Until three-dimensional results are available 
to quantify the variability in impact location, a simple summation of the damaged areas from 
individual impacts is appropriate for the abstraction of waste package damage. 
This methodology has been applied to the kinematic output from the two suites of calculations 
discussed in Section 6.5.1.1.  The damaged area calculations for the 80 percent and the 
90 percent residual stress criteria are documented in Excel files that are archived on a compact 
disk in Appendix G of this report.  The names of these Excel files and their contents are 
summarized in Table 6.5-6.   
6.5.1.4 Abstraction of Damaged Areas for End-to-End Impacts 
Four abstractions have been developed to represent the damaged areas from end-to-end impacts: 
• Damaged areas from kinematic calculations with LS-DYNA for a residual stress 
threshold of 80 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 
• Damaged areas from kinematic calculations with LS-DYNA for a residual stress 
threshold of 90 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 
• Damaged areas from kinematic calculations with UDEC for a residual stress threshold of 
80 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 
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• Damaged areas from kinematic calculations with UDEC for a residual stress threshold of 
90 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 
Table 6.5-6. Listing of Spreadsheets with Damaged Area Calculations for the Kinematic Calculations 
Name of Excel File Description of Content 
LLNL_Impact_Velocities_E-5.xls Kinematic results for LS-DYNA calculations with 17 
ground motions at the 1.05-m/s PGV level.  There are no 
damaged areas in this file because all relative impact 
velocities are below 0.85 m/s. 
LLNL_Damage_E-6 with 0.85mps Cutoff.xls Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for 
LS-DYNA calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
2.44-m/s PGV level 
LLNL_Damage_E-7 with 0.85mps Cutoff.xls Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for 
LS-DYNA calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
5.35-m/s PGV level 
21-PWRs 1e-5  damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to central 
WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
1.05-m/s PGV level; central waste package 
21-PWRs 1e-5  damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to center 
right WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
1.05-m/s PGV level; center right waste package 
21-PWRs 1e-5  damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to center 
left WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
1.05-m/s PGV level; center left package 
21-PWRs 1e-6  damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to central 
WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
2.44-m/s PGV level; central waste package 
21-PWRs 1e-6  damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to center 
right WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
2.44-m/s PGV level; center right waste package 
21-PWRs 1e-6  damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to center 
left WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
2.44-m/s PGV level; center left package 
21-PWRs 1e-7 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to central 
WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
5.35-m/s PGV level; central waste package 
21-PWRs 1e-7 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to center 
right WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
5.35-m/s PGV level; center right waste package 
21-PWRs 1e-7 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to center left 
WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
5.35-m/s PGV level; center left package 
Source:  Files are available on the CD in Appendix G. 
The decision to develop four separate abstractions, rather than one combined abstraction, is 
motivated by the following considerations:  (i) four separate abstractions allow direct 
representation of the epistemic uncertainty in TSPA from the computational approaches 
(LS-DYNA versus UDEC) and from the residual stress thresholds (80 percent versus 
90 percent), and (ii) the damaged areas for these four cases exhibit statistically significant 
differences.  There is approximately a factor of three increase in damaged area between the 
90 percent and the 80 percent residual stress threshold for a given computational approach, and 
there is approximately a factor of three increase in damaged areas between the damaged areas for 
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LS-DYNA and UDEC.  These factors are generally greater than the standard error of the four 
individual data sets, so it is incorrect to combine the data from the four cases. 
Each abstraction, however, is based on the same three relationships: 
• The probability of no damage as a function of PGV. 
• A power law fit to the nonzero damaged areas as a function of PGV.  This power law fit 
is conditional on the existence of nonzero damage, based on the first relationship.  This 
power law fit is equivalent to a least squares linear fit for the natural logarithm of 
damaged area versus the natural logarithm of PGV.  The natural logarithm, rather than 
the logarithm to base 10, has been used throughout the abstraction process.  The natural 
logarithm will be abbreviated as “ln” in the text.   
• A fit with a normal distribution for the residuals of nonzero damaged area in ln-ln space.  
This fit is again conditional on the existence of nonzero damage.  The residual is defined 
as the difference between the natural logarithm of the nonzero damaged area and the 
natural logarithm of the power law fit at the appropriate value of PGV.  This normal 
distribution in ln-ln space is equivalent to a ln-normal distribution in “physical” space.  
The standard deviation of the normal fit in ln-ln space is constant, independent of PGV. 
Since each abstraction is based on the same relationships, the statistical analysis is illustrated for 
the damaged areas from LS-DYNA calculations with a residual stress threshold of 80 percent of 
the yield strength of Alloy 22 in the next subsections.  The other three abstractions are treated 
equivalently and combined in Section 6.5.3.  The basis for the four abstractions is documented in 
the Excel file entitled WP-WP Damage Abstraction with 0.85mps Cutoff Rev00d.xls.  This file is 
available on the compact disk in Appendix G of this report.   
6.5.1.5 Abstraction of Damaged Areas for LS-DYNA Results with 80 Percent Residual 
Stress Threshold 
The damaged areas from the LS-DYNA calculations with a residual stress threshold of 
80 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 are presented in Table 6.5-7.  As a reminder, the 
LS-DYNA calculations represent a total of 7 waste packages; the three central packages are 
21-PWR waste packages.  Table 6.5-7 presents the damaged areas for these three packages, 
labeled as center, center-right, and center-left, at the 2.44-m/s and 5.35-m/s PGV ground motion 
levels.  There are 17 observations at each PGV level, corresponding to the 17 ground motion 
(GM) time histories at each PGV level.  Summary statistics for the center, center-left, and center 
right package include the mean, the standard deviation, the mean of the natural logarithm of the 
nonzero observations, the median or geometric mean of the nonzero observations, the standard 
deviation of the natural logarithm of the nonzero observations, and the fraction with no damage.  
Summary statistics are also presented for the three waste packages at the 2.44-m/s and the 
5.35-m/s PGV ground motion levels.  No results are presented for the 1.05-m/s PGV level 
because the relative end-to-end impact velocity is below the velocity threshold of 0.85 m/s for 
initiation of damage in each of the 17 observations. 
The summary statistics in Table 6.5-7 indicate that the arithmetic standard deviation is greater 
than the arithmetic mean for a given package and PGV level.  If a normal distribution is used to 
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describe the scatter of these data, it would be severely truncated on the lower end to avoid 
negative damaged areas.  The need for truncation can be avoided by using a ln-normal 
distribution to represent the data scatter in the abstractions.   
Table 6.5-7. Damaged Areas from the LS-DYNA Analyses for the Three Central Waste Packages with a 
Residual Stress Threshold of 80 Percent of the Yield Strength of Alloy 22 
 PGV-Longitudinal = 2.44 m/s PGV-Longitudinal = 5.35 m/s 
 Damaged 
Area 
Center-Left 
(m2) 
Damaged 
Area 
Center 
(m2) 
Damaged 
Area 
Center-Right
(m2) 
Damaged 
Area 
Center-Left
(m2) 
Damaged 
Area 
Center 
(m2) 
Damaged 
Area 
Center-Right
(m2) 
Ground Motion No. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ground Motion No. 2 0 3.42E-04 1.44E-03 1.54E-01 8.19E-03 9.10E-03 
Ground Motion No. 3 1.71E-02 3.11E-02 3.71E-02 1.52E-01 3.35E-01 2.86E-01 
Ground Motion No. 4 3.13E-04 3.13E-04 2.13E-03 1.87E-01 1.57E-01 9.61E-02 
Ground Motion No. 5 0 0 0 1.80E-02 2.68E-02 2.40E-02 
Ground Motion No. 6 0 0 3.72E-04 9.58E-02 1.93E-01 1.40E-01 
Ground Motion No. 7 0 0 5.36E-04 4.96E-02 3.02E-02 6.33E-03 
Ground Motion No. 8 0 0 0 5.84E-02 7.40E-02 3.95E-02 
Ground Motion No. 9 0 0 0 8.03E-03 5.66E-04 3.70E-03 
Ground Motion No. 10 9.76E-03 1.41E-02 3.19E-02 2.60E-01 2.72E-01 2.84E-01 
Ground Motion No. 11 0 0 0 4.37E-02 2.32E-02 6.13E-03 
Ground Motion No. 12 0 0 0 5.52E-02 6.53E-02 5.22E-02 
Ground Motion No. 13 0 0 0 4.43E-02 5.09E-02 2.84E-02 
Ground Motion No. 14 0 0 0 4.09E-02 3.81E-02 5.67E-02 
Ground Motion No. 15 4.44E-02 4.98E-02 4.00E-02 7.43E-02 6.69E-02 6.45E-02 
Ground Motion No. 16 9.23E-04 2.55E-03 8.10E-03 2.88E-02 2.57E-02 2.20E-02 
Ground Motion No. 17 0 1.41E-03 1.41E-03 3.26E-02 3.28E-02 2.56E-02 
       
Mean 0.0043 0.0059 0.0072 0.0767 0.0823 0.0673 
Standard Deviation 0.0113 0.0139 0.0141 0.0712 0.0985 0.0896 
Mean of Ln(DA>0) -5.3735 -5.6167 -5.4949 -2.8575 -3.1512 -3.3656 
Median = 
Exp(Mean(Ln(DA>0))) 0.0046 0.0036 0.0041 0.0574 0.0428 0.0345 
Standard Deviation of 
Ln(DA>0) 2.0765 2.0780 1.8460 0.9029 1.5239 1.3123 
Fraction without Damage 0.71 0.59 0.47 0.06 0.06 0.06 
       
 Summary Statistics for the  
Three Waste Packages 
Summary Statistics for the  
Three Waste Packages 
Mean of Ln(DA>0) -5.507 -3.1248 
Median= 
Exp(Mean(Ln(DA>0)) 0.0041 0.0439 
Standard Deviation of 
Ln(DA>0) 1.879 1.26 
Fraction without Damage 0.588 0.059 
Source: Worksheet entitled:  ABSTR for LS-DYNA 80% YS, in the file WP-WP Damage Abstraction with 0.85mps 
Cutoff Rev00d.xls.  File is on the CD in Appendix G. 
Notes: DA = damaged area; DA>0 = nonzero damaged areas only; the Median is also called the geometric mean. 
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The average response of the data could be described by a least squares fit using a power law or 
using a straight line.  The power law has been selected because it has significantly greater 
coefficient of determination (i.e., r2 value) with the data than a linear fit.  
Observations with zero damage cannot be included in a ln-normal distribution.  Two options 
were considered for representing the observations with zero damage:  assigning a small nonzero 
value to each observation with zero damage, or defining the probability of no damage as a 
function of PGV.  The preferred approach is to define the probability of no damage because it 
eliminates the arbitrariness in selecting the magnitude of the small nonzero value. 
6.5.1.5.1 Probability of No Damage 
The first relationship in the abstraction is definition of the probability of no damage as a function 
of PGV.  This function is based on the following observations: 
• The probability of no damage is 1.0 at 1.05 m/s.  All of the LS-DYNA calculations at 
the 1.05-m/s PGV ground motion level have zero damaged areas because the end-to-end 
impact velocities are below the 0.85 m/s velocity threshold for damage. 
• The probability of no damage is 0.588 at 2.44 m/s.  This value is an average for the 
center, center-left, and center-right packages, as shown by the last row in Table 6.5-7. 
• The probability of no damage is 0.059 at 5.35 m/s, based on the average of the three 
central waste packages (see the last row in Table 6.5-7). 
The first and second observations imply that the probability of no damage first drops below 1 for 
a PGV value between 1.05 m/s and 2.44 m/s.  For the purposes of this abstraction, this PGV 
value is conservatively set to 1.05 m/s.  The third observation implies that the probability of no 
damage becomes zero at a PGV value above 5.35 m/s.  For the purposes of this abstraction, this 
PGV value is conservatively set to 5.35 m/s.  The points for the probability function are listed in 
Table 6.5-8 
Table 6.5-8. Data Points for Abstraction of the Probability of No Damage 
PGV Value 
(m/s) 
Probability of No Damage
(-) 
1.05 1.0 
2.44 0.588 
5.35 0.0 
 
These three points are fit with a power law function of the following form: 
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βα  (Eq. 6-3) 
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where PND is the probability of no damage, PGV is the horizontal peak ground velocity in the 
units of m/s, and α and β are constants.  Note that the form of the power law guarantees that PND 
is zero at 5.35 m/s.  A simple fit to the data points at 1.05 m/s and 2.44 m/s results in the 
following relationship for PND: 
 
.35.50
,35.505.1)35.5)(1376.0(
,05.11
36.1
≥=
<<−=
≤=
PGVfor
PGVforPGV
PGVforPND
 (Eq. 6-4) 
Figure 6.5-9 is a plot of the relationship for probability of no damage as a function of PGV. 
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Source: Worksheet ABSTR for LS-DYNA 80% YS, in the file WP-WP Damage Abstraction with 0.85mps Cutoff 
Rev00d.xls.  This file can be found on the CD in Appendix G. 
Figure 6.5-9. Probability of No Damage As a Function of PGV 
6.5.1.5.2 Power Law Fit to the Nonzero Damaged Areas 
A power law fit to the nonzero damaged areas (conditional on the existence of damage) is the 
second relationship in the abstraction.  The power law fit to the nonzero damaged areas in 
Table 6.5-7 is presented in Figure 6.5-10.  Figure 6.5-10(a) presents the power law least squares 
fit generated by Excel, and Figure 6.5-10(b) presents the equivalent (linear) fit for the natural 
logarithm of the nonzero damaged areas as a function of ln(PGV).  The coefficient of 
determination for the power law fit is 0.36.  This value can be compared to the coefficient of 
determination for a linear fit, which is found to be 0.15 (the linear trendline is not shown in 
Figure 6.5-10).  The power law fit has a significantly higher coefficient of determination than the 
linear fit.  
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(a) Power Law Fit to the Nonzero Damaged Areas 
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(b) Power Law Fit in Ln-Ln Representation 
Source: Worksheet ABSTR for LS-DYNA 80% YS, in the file WP-WP Damage Abstraction with 0.85mps Cutoff 
Rev00d.xls.  This file can be found on the CD in Appendix G. 
Figure 6.5-10. Power Law Fit to the Nonzero Damaged Areas for LS-DYNA with a Residual Stress 
Threshold of 80 Percent of the Yield strength of Alloy 22 
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The data in Figure 6.5-10 fall into “stripes” because the first horizontal component of PGV has 
been oriented in the longitudinal direction, parallel with the drift axis.  The first horizontal 
component has a fixed value of 2.44 m/s or 5.35 m/s, so damaged areas plot above one of these 
two values of PGV.  The selection of the longitudinal direction for the first horizontal component 
is motivated by the engineering judgment that damage from end-to-end impacts is expected to 
correlate more strongly with the longitudinal, rather than the transverse, component of ground 
motion.  In addition, the presence of stripes simplifies the statistical analysis. 
6.5.1.5.3 Comparison of Residuals for Nonzero Damaged Area Versus a Normal 
Distribution in Ln-Ln Space 
Figure 6.5-11 presents a cumulative probability distribution plot for the residuals of the natural 
logarithm of the nonzero damaged areas versus a cumulative normal distribution.  Figure 6.5-11 
demonstrates that the residuals follow a normal distribution in ln-ln space with a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of 1.463.  This standard deviation is based on the residuals for all the 
nonzero data points.  A quantile plot provides a more discriminating comparison of the residuals 
versus a ln-normal distribution.  Figure 6.5-12 presents the quantile plot for the residuals.  This 
plot demonstrates that a normal distribution provides a reasonable representation of the residuals 
in ln-ln space. 
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Source: Worksheet ABSTR for LS-DYNA 80% YS, in the file WP-WP Damage Abstraction with 0.85mps Cutoff 
Rev00d.xls.  This file can be found on the CD in Appendix G. 
Figure 6.5-11. Comparison of the Cumulative Distribution for the Natural Logarithm of the Residuals for 
Nonzero Damaged Areas with a Cumulative Normal Distribution 
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Source: Worksheet ABSTR for LS-DYNA 80% YS, in the file WP-WP Damage Abstraction with 0.85mps Cutoff 
Rev00d.xls.  This file can be found on the CD in Appendix G. 
Figure 6.5-12. Quantile Plot for the Natural Logarithm of the Residuals for Nonzero Damaged Areas 
Versus a Normal Distribution 
6.5.1.5.4 Comparison of Abstraction with Data for Nonzero Damaged Areas 
Figure 6.5-13 overlays the nonzero damaged areas from Figure 6.5-10 with the 0.05 and 0.95 
nonexceedance probability curves for a ln-normal distribution with the standard deviation of 
1.483 determined in Figures 6.5-11 and 6.5-12.  The 0.05 to 0.95 nonexceedance probability 
curves generally encompass all of the data points for nonzero damaged areas, with the 0.95 
nonexceedance probability curve significantly exceeding all damaged areas at the 5.35-m/s PGV 
level.  This behavior is consistent with Figure 6.5-12, wherein the residuals for a normal 
distribution exceed the residuals for the four rightmost data points in Figure 6.5-12.  This 
comparison provides confidence that the ln-normal distribution provides an appropriate 
abstraction for the nonzero damaged areas from end-to-end impacts.  
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Source: Worksheet ABSTR for LS-DYNA 80% YS, in the file WP-WP Damage Abstraction with 0.85mps Cutoff 
Rev00d.xls.  This file can be found on the CD in Appendix G. 
Figure 6.5-13. Comparison of Data for Nonzero Damaged Areas With the 0.05 and 0.95 Nonexceedance 
Probability Curves for the Ln-Normal Distribution 
6.5.1.6 Conversion to Percent Surface Area 
The damage abstractions for end-to-end impacts produce damaged area in square meters, based 
on the mechanical response of the 21-PWR waste package.  It is reasonable to calculate damage 
for the 21-PWR waste package type because this package type comprises 64.6 percent of the 
total inventory of waste packages.  In calculating this percentage, it is noted that the 21-PWR 
package type with absorber plates, the 21-PWR package type with control rods, and the 44-BWR 
package type have very similar nominal length, nominal diameter, and nominal loaded weight 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1).  The numbers of these package types in the LA inventory 
are 4299, 95, and 2831, respectively, out of a total of 11,184 packages, or 64.6 percent of the 
total inventory (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 13). 
TSPA requires damage estimates for commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) and codisposal 
(CDSP) package types.  The damage for these package types is estimated by converting the 
damaged area in square meters to a percent of total surface area for the 21-PWR waste package 
type.  The total surface area for the 21-PWR package is based on a nominal length of 5024.4-mm 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1) and on the diameter of the outer barrier (i.e., the outer 
barrier) of 1637-mm (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1, to drawing 
000-MW0-DSU0-00402-000-00B).  The surface area, including the two circular end caps, is 
given by 0.5*π*(1.637m)2 + π*(1.637m)*(5.0244m) = 30.05 m2.  Total surface area is 
appropriate here because the end-on waste package impacts at positive impact angle result in 
damaged area on the end cap and side of the waste package.  Areas from the end-to-end damage 
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abstraction are converted to a percent damage by dividing by 30.05 m2, and this percent damage 
is applied to the CSNF and CDSP packages in the TSPA model. 
6.5.2 Abstraction for Damage from Waste Package-Pallet Impacts 
This abstraction defines the damage generated by impacts of the waste package on its pallet in 
response to vibratory ground motion.  The damage generated by waste package-pallet impacts is 
based on detailed structural response calculations for a single waste package contained within 
rigid walls (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083]).  These structural response calculations provide a direct 
analysis of the damaged areas on the sides of the waste package from waste package-pallet 
impacts.  That is, the damage from waste package-pallet impacts is determined by analyzing the 
results of the finite-element calculations to determine the element areas where the residual stress 
exceeds 80 percent or 90 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22.  A damage catalog and 
velocity threshold are not required for this direct analysis of the finite-element results.  The 
resulting damaged areas are then abstracted as a function of the horizontal peak ground velocity 
(PGV).   
The kinematic calculations discussed in Section 6.5.1.1 cannot be used directly or indirectly to 
estimate the damage from waste package-pallet impacts.  The kinematic calculations are not 
zoned finely enough to directly calculate the damaged areas from waste package-pallet impacts.  
In addition, a catalog or lookup table for converting kinematic parameters from waste 
package-pallet impacts into damaged areas is not available.  The finite-element calculations for a 
single waste package contained within rigid walls provide the most accurate estimate of the 
damaged areas from waste package-pallet impacts, so these data form the basis for this damaged 
abstraction. 
The potential for damage from impacts between the waste package and drip shield is included in 
the structural response calculations for a single waste package; however, the damage is 
negligible because the drip shield is unrestrained and can be moved freely by the much heavier 
waste package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Assumption 3.15).  In particular, the drift is unfilled 
at the time of the seismic event and the potential coupling between rockfall and the dynamic 
motion of the EBS components during the seismic event is not included in the structural response 
calculations. 
A total of 20 calculations for dynamic waste package structural response are performed for the 
suite of ground motions with a PGV of 2.44 m/s (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Section 6.1; 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717], Section 6.2).  These calculations are based on 15 ground motions that 
do not include spectral conditioning and do not preserve intercomponent variability of the 
original records (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Section 6.1) and on 5 ground motions that do 
include spectral conditioning to a reference rock outcrop (Point A in Figure 6.4-1) and do 
preserve intercomponent variability (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717], Section 6.2).  The latter 
5 analyses were performed primarily to determine the sensitivity of damaged area to these 
aspects of the ground motions.  A total of 16 calculations for dynamic waste package response 
are performed for the suite of ground motions with a PGV of 5.35 m/s (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 167083], Section 6.2).  These calculations are based on 15 ground motions that are 
spectrally conditioned to a reference rock outcrop (called Point A in Figure 6.4-1) and preserve 
the intercomponent variability of the original records (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Section 6.2).  
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Two additional calculations are performed with ground motions 5 and 15 to help complete a full 
suite of results (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717], Section 6.1).  Finally, a total of 15 calculations for 
dynamic waste package response are performed for the suite of ground motions with a PGV of 
1.05 m/s (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717], Section 6.3).  The structural response calculations at the 
1.05-m/s PGV level were performed with a suite of ground motions that were spectrally 
conditioned to the emplacement drifts (called Point B in Figure 6.4-1) and preserved the 
intercomponent variability of the original records.  Section 6.4.2 has further details on the 
methodology for deriving site-specific ground motions.   
These values for PGV correspond to the peak of the first horizontal velocity component, which is 
in a horizontal plane and transverse to the longitudinal direction, along the centerline of the drift, 
for these calculations.  However, the abstraction for damage from waste package-pallet impacts 
is based on PGV-longitudinal for consistency with the abstraction of end-to-end damage in 
Section 6.5.1.  A tabulation of the values of PGV-longitudinal for the 1.05-m/s, 2.44-m/s, and 
5.35-m/s PGV levels provides the relevant values of PGV-longitudinal for these abstractions 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Tables X-2 through X-5). 
The stochastic (uncertain) input parameters for the simulations are the 15 sets of 
three-component ground motion time histories, the metal-to-metal friction coefficient, and the 
metal-to-rock friction coefficient.  A Monte Carlo sampling scheme defines the appropriate 
combinations of ground motion and friction coefficients (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169999], Section 6.4) 
for each PGV level.  The same sets of ground motion time histories (accelerograms) are also 
used for the analyses of drip shield damage from vibratory ground motions described in 
Section 6.6.1.  The structural response calculations for a single waste package have energy 
dissipation due to plastic deformation of the outer corrosion barrier and emplacement pallet; 
however, there is no energy dissipation in the contact process itself, so it is not necessary to 
define a COR for these calculations.  
These structural response calculations provide a reasonable representation of the waste 
package-pallet impacts for a single waste package, and are considered appropriate for the 
intended use for several reasons.  First, the calculations are based on standard, commercially 
available software (LS-DYNA) that has demonstrated the capability to accurately analyze impact 
processes and kinematic response.  Second, appropriate mesh refinement studies have been 
performed to ensure that the damaged areas on the surface of the waste package can be 
accurately predicted by the finite-element grid.  In particular, a mesh-sensitivity study indicates 
that the mesh size does not have a significant effect on the calculation results at the 2.44 m/s 
PGV level, which is located approximately midway between the minimum and maximum PGV 
levels of 0.4019-m/s and 4.07-m/s, respectively, sampled for TSPA  (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], 
Attachment IX-1).  Third, the major parameter uncertainties are represented in the calculations.  
The uncertainties due to ground motions and friction coefficients are directly represented by 
random sampling of inputs for the calculations.  The uncertainty in contact damping is bounded 
by assuming that there is no energy dissipation in the contact process, although there is energy 
dissipation from plastic deformation of the waste package and pallet.  Finally, the potential 
uncertainties in material properties are not represented in the calculations because the materials 
in the waste package will be fabricated to design specifications that follow standard values in 
handbooks and industrial publications, and because the sensitivity to variation in standard 
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material properties is expected to be minor in comparison to that produced by the uncertainties in 
ground motions and friction coefficients. 
The structural response calculations do not represent the dynamic response of the invert to the 
ground motion.  Instead, the invert moves synchronously with the ground motion, as though it is 
a rigid surface.  The impact of representing the invert as a non-rigid surface is analyzed in 
BSC 2005 ([DIRS 173172] Attachment VIII).  For these calculations, the invert is represented as 
a cohesionless, granular material that is subjected to ground motions at the 2.44 and 5.35 m/s 
PGV levels.  The computational results with the granular invert demonstrate that the rigid 
representation has relatively little impact on amplification of ground motions or on permanent 
deflection of the invert surface.  The simpler representation of the invert as a rigid surface is 
therefore retained for the structural response calculations.  
The damage to the waste package is determined by comparing the residual first principal stress 
on the waste package outer barrier to the failure criterion defined in Section 6.3.2.  More 
specifically, two residual stress thresholds are used to define the damaged area on the outer 
barrier of the waste package.  The two stress thresholds are 80 and 90 percent of the yield 
strength of Alloy 22.  These values correspond to the lower and upper bound of the uniform 
distribution for the residual stress threshold defined in Section 6.3.2.  The area on the outer 
barrier of the waste package for which the residual first principal stress exceeds the residual 
stress threshold is referred to as the “damaged area” throughout this document. 
6.5.2.1 Damage from Waste Package-Pallet Impacts 
The damaged areas from waste package-pallet impacts for realizations with horizontal PGV 
values of 1.05 m/s, 2.44 m/s, and 5.35 m/s are summarized in Table 6.5-9 (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 173500], Tables 1 and 2; BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717] Tables 6.1-4, 6.2-7, and 6.3-6).  The 
results for Realization 8 at the 2.44-m/s PGV level is not presented in Table 6.5-9 because an 
input error8 was discovered for this calculation during the checking process.  The results for 
realization 2 at the 5.35-m/s PGV level are not presented in Table 6.5-9 because the impacts 
between package and pallet are outside the finely meshed region of the outer barrier, thereby 
reducing the numerical accuracy of the damage calculation for this realization.  
The failure criterion for Alloy 22 is defined as a uniform distribution between 80 and 90 percent 
of the yield strength (Section 6.3.1).  In other words, there is uncertainty in the value of the 
appropriate residual stress threshold for Alloy 22.  Table 6.5-9 presents damaged areas at the two 
extremes (80 percent and 90 percent) of the residual stress threshold.  Since the damaged area is 
defined by the elements of the finite-element grid whose residual stress exceeds the value of the 
residual stress threshold, it follows that the damaged area for the 90 percent threshold is always 
less than or equal to the damaged area for the 80 percent threshold. 
 
                                                 
8 The three initial velocity components do not correspond to the beginning of the acceleration time history for Realization 8 at the 
2.44 m/s PGV level.  Consequently, the velocity and displacement time histories are not appropriately specified, so the results 
from this realization are not included in the abstraction process. 
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Table 6.5-9. Damaged Area from Waste Package-Pallet Impacts at 2.44-m/s, 5.35-m/s, and 1.05-m/s 
PGV Levels 
Damaged Area on the Waste Package 
Waste Package-Pallet 
Damaged Area at 2.44-m/s 
PGV-Transverse Level 
(m2) 
Waste Package-Pallet 
Damaged Area at 5.35-m/s 
PGV-Transverse Level 
(m2) 
Waste Package-Pallet 
Damaged Area at 1.05-m/s 
PGV-Transverse Level 
(m2) 
Realization 
Number 
Ground 
Motion 
Number 
PGV- 
Long. 
(m/s) 
80% Yield 
Strength
90% Yield 
Strength
PGV- 
Long. 
(m/s) 
80% Yield 
Strength 
90% Yield 
Strength
PGV- 
Long. 
(m/s) 
80% Yield 
Strength
90% Yield 
Strength 
1 7 2.44 0.0029  0.0014  5.31 0.20 0.17 0.89 0 0 
2 16d 2.44 0 0 N/Ac N/Ac N/Ac 0.67 0 0 
3 4 2.43 0.0050 0 5.69 0.096 0.083 1.00 0 0 
4 8 2.44 0.030 0.0064 8.81 0.12 0.096 1.52 0.0014 0 
5 11 2.44 0.0015 0 5.61 0.093 0.071 1.26 0 0 
6 1 2.43 0.025 0.0028 4.28 0.046 0.024 0.83 0.0015 0 
7 2 2.44 0.017 0 5.89 0.038 0.028 1.25 0 0 
8 13 N/Aa N/Aa N/Aa 6.65 0.095 0.068 1.04 0 0 
9 10 2.38 0.0035 0 1.72 0.0052 0.0035 0.32 0 0 
10 9 2.44 0 0 17.91 0.16 0.14 3.58 0 0 
11 5 2.43 0.012 0.0037 5.64 0.032 0.0070 1.67 0 0 
12 6 2.43 0.0039 0 2.90 0.062 0.041 0.46 0.0040 0.0014 
13 12 2.43 0 0 5.95 0.027 0.018 0.70 0 0 
14 14 2.44 0.010 0.0043 2.75 0.020 0.016 0.41 0 0 
15 3 2.43 0.0078 0.0015 14.09 0.0045 0 2.62 0.028 0.014 
2b 15’ 1.53 0 0 3.36 0.0080c 0.0020c   
3b 4’ 2.60 0.0014 0     
4b 8’ 4.02 0.0032 0 
6b 1’ 1.95 0.0081 0.0014 
15b 3’ 6.43 0.043 0.010 
(Additional calculations were not performed at the 1.05 m/s and 
5.35-m/s PGV levels because these ground motions already 
included spectral conditioning and intercomponent variability.) 
Sources: BSC 2005 [DIRS 173500], Table 1 and Table 2; BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717] Tables 6.1-4, 6.2-7, and 6.3-6; BSC 2004
[DIRS 166107], Appendix X, Tables X-2, X-3, X-4, and X-5. 
a Results for realization 8 are not presented because of an error in the input file for this calculation. 
b Additional calculations were performed primarily to determine the sensitivity of damaged area to spectral conditioning and 
intercomponent variability of the ground motions at the 2.44-m/s PGV level (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717], Sections 6.1 and 6.2).  
These ground motions are denoted as 2’, 3’, 4’, 6’, and 15’ to indicate the differences in the ground motion time histories.   
C Results for realization 2 with ground motion 16 are not presented because the kinematics of the waste package are such that the 
impacts between package and pallet occur outside the finely meshed region of the outer barrier.  Results for realization 2 with 
ground motion 15’ are not exact because the waste package-pallet impacts occur partly outside the finely zoned mesh on the 
outer barrier, but are included in the statistical analyses because the data lie within the range of the other realizations at the 
5.35-m/s PGV level (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717], Section 6.1.3). 
d Calculations are performed with 15 ground motions numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 14, and 16.  Seventeen sets of ground motion time 
histories were initially developed from which 15 sets were selected for these postclosure analyses.  Ground motion #16 was 
initially substituted for ground motion #15 because of concerns about its response spectrum.  Subsequent analyses with ground 
motion #15’ at the 2.44-m/s and 5.35-m/s PGV levels (fifth line from the bottom in the table) indicate that ground motion #15’ does 
not result in anomalous behavior (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717], Section 6.2). 
NOTES: PGV-Long.  Is the horizontal component of ground motion in the longitudinal direction, along the drift axis.  The 
abstraction for damage from waste package-pallet impacts is based on the value of PGV-longitudinal for consistency with 
the damage abstraction for end-to-end impacts. 
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6.5.2.2 Abstraction of Damaged Areas from Waste Package-Pallet Impacts 
The technical approach to developing abstractions for the damaged areas from waste 
package-pallet impacts is identical to that for the damaged areas from end-to-end impacts of 
adjacent waste packages.  Two abstractions have been developed to represent the damaged areas 
from waste package-pallet impacts: 
• Damaged areas from dynamic structural response calculations (with LS-DYNA) for a 
residual stress threshold of 80 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 
• Damaged areas from dynamic structural response calculations (with LS-DYNA) for a 
residual stress threshold of 90 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 
The decision to develop two separate abstractions, rather than one combined abstraction, is 
motivated by:  (i) separate abstractions allow direct representation of the epistemic uncertainty in 
TSPA from the residual stress thresholds (80 percent versus 90 percent), and (ii) the damaged 
areas for these two cases exhibit statistically significant differences.  Each abstraction, however, 
is based on the same three relationships, as discussed in the next subsections: 
• The probability of no damage as a function of PGV. 
• A power law fit to the nonzero damaged areas as a function of PGV.  This power law fit 
is conditional on the existence of nonzero damage, based on the first relationship.  This 
power law fit is equivalent to a least squares linear fit for the natural logarithm of 
nonzero damaged area versus the natural logarithm of PGV.   
• A fit with a normal distribution for the residuals of nonzero damaged area in ln-ln space, 
again conditional on damage occurring.  The residual is defined as the difference 
between the natural logarithm of the nonzero damaged area and the natural logarithm of 
the power law fit at the appropriate value of PGV.  This normal distribution in ln-ln 
space is equivalent to a ln-normal distribution in “physical” space.  The standard 
deviation of the normal fit in ln-ln space is constant, independent of PGV. 
The statistical analysis is illustrated for the damaged areas with a residual stress threshold of 
80 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 in the next subsections.  The basis for both 
abstractions is documented in the Excel file entitled WP-Pallet Damage Area Abstraction 
Rev00e.xls.  This file is available on the compact disk in Appendix G of this report. 
6.5.2.2.1 Probability of No Damage 
The first relationship in the abstraction is definition of the probability of no damage as a function 
of PGV-longitudinal.  Definition of this function is more complex than for the end-to-end 
damage abstraction because the data in Table 6.5-9 form a “cloud” as a function of 
PGV-longitudinal, rather than two or three discrete stripes.  The transverse horizontal velocity 
component had a fixed value of PGV for these finite-element calculations, but the intensity 
measure is PGV-longitudinal for consistency with the abstractions for end-to-end impacts.  
PGV-longitudinal is significantly different than PGV-transverse for ground motions that preserve 
the intercomponent variability of the original records, so the data points do not lie in stripes.   
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Figure 6.5-14 presents the distribution of damaged areas as a function of PGV-longitudinal.  
Figure 6.5-14 does not include two points with extreme PGV-longitudinal values of 14.1 m/s and 
17.9 m/s.  The damage state at these large PGV values has no impact on definition of the 
probability of no damage because the PGV range of interest has an upper bound of 4.07 m/s.  
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Source: Worksheet ABSTR for 80% YS, in the file WP-Pallet Damage Area Abstraction Rev00e.xls.  This file can 
be found on the CD in Appendix G; WP = waste package. 
Figure 6.5-14. Distribution of Damaged Area Data (All Points) as a Function of PGV-Longitudinal 
Definition of the probability of no damage is based on the following considerations: 
• For PGV-longitudinal values less than or equal to 1 m/s, there are six calculations with 
no damage and two calculations with nonzero damage.  The six calculations with no 
damage have PGV-longitudinal values of 0.32 m/s, 0.41 m/s, 0.67 m/s, 0.70 m/s, 
0.89 m/s, and 1.00 m/s.  The two calculations with nonzero damage have 
PGV-longitudinal values of 0.46 m/s and 0.83 m/s.  (Nonzero damage can occur for 
small values of PGV-longitudinal because the PGV of the vertical or transverse 
horizontal components may be substantially greater than the PGV of the longitudinal 
component.  However, this does not occur very often, based on the results in 
Figure 6.5-14.)  Since the minimum value of PGV-longitudinal with nonzero damage is 
0.46 m/s, it follows that the probability of no damage is less than 1 at PGV-longitudinal 
of 0.46 m/s. 
 Additional insight is available from structural response calculations with ground motions 
at the 0.384 m/s and the 0.19-m/s PGV levels (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Section 6.4; 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 6-62 August 2005 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717], Section 6.4).  These PGV levels correspond approximately to 
the 10-4 and 5×10-4 annual exceedance frequencies on the hazard curve, and the 
calculations are identified by these frequencies in the reference documents.  The 
structural response calculations, which are performed without system damping or 
contact damping, demonstrate that the relative motion between the waste package and 
pallet is practically nonexistent.  For example, the maximum impact velocity between 
waste package and pallet is less than 0.006 m/s and the relative vertical displacement 
between waste package and pallet varies between 0 to 0.3 mm at the 0.384-m/s PGV 
level (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Section 6.4).  Without significant relative motion or 
relative velocity between the waste package and pallet, the outer barrier of the package 
remains completely undamaged in either simulation.  The PGV values for the individual 
ground motion components at the 0.384-m/s PGV level are 0.3838 m/s (transverse 
horizontal), 0.4378 (longitudinal), and 0.4751 m/s (vertical) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], 
Table X-1).  The latter two values are consistent with the data in Figure 6.5-14, wherein 
the onset of nonzero damage occurs for a PGV longitudinal of 0.46 m/s.   
 Based on this information, the threshold for the onset of the nonzero damage state is 
estimated to fall between PGV-longitudinal values of 0.384 m/s and 0.46 m/s.  While the 
threshold could be set to the average of these two values, a PGV-longitudinal threshold 
of 0.4 m/s, closer to the lower value, is selected because of uncertainty in the PGV value 
for the other ground motion components.  The threshold value in the functional fit 
(Table 6.5-10 below) is set to 0.4019 m/s because this value corresponds to the PGV 
value on the bounded hazard curve at 10-4 annual exceedance frequency.  This value is 
consistent with the data in Table 6.5-9 from the structural response calculations of waste 
package-pallet impacts.  This value is also consistent with results from the structural 
response calculations at the 0.19-m/s and 0.384-m/s PGV levels (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 167083], Section 6.4; BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717], Section 6.4). 
• There are 13 calculations with PGV-longitudinal between 2.42 m/s and 2.45 m/s.  Three 
of these 13 calculations have no damage, providing a probability of no damage at 
2.44 m/s of 0.231.  The high density of points between 2.42 m/s and 2.45 m/s is caused 
by the suite of ground motions that did not preserve intercomponent variability.  In this 
case, the values of both the transverse and longitudinal components were scaled to a 
PGV value of 2.44 m/s, resulting in a mini-stripe in Figure 6.5-14 at this PGV value. 
• All calculations with PGV-longitudinal equal to or greater than 4.02 m/s have nonzero 
damage.  On the other hand, realization 10 for the 1.05-m/s PGV level has zero damage 
with a PGV-longitudinal value of 3.58 m/s.  Based on this information, the threshold for 
damage always occurring is estimated to fall between PGV-longitudinal values of 
3.58 m/s and 4.02 m/s.  While this threshold could be set to the average of these two 
values, it is simply set to 4 m/s.  This is a reasonable approximation because most 
realizations at this PGV level will have damage whether the threshold is set to 3.8 m/s 
(the average value) or 4.0 m/s.  
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The points for the probability function are listed in Table 6.5-10. 
Table 6.5-10. Data Points for Probability of No Damage 
PGV-Longitudinal 
(m/s) 
Probability of No Damage
(-) 
0.4019 1.0 
2.44 0.231 
4.0 0.0 
 
These three points are fit with a power law of the following form: 
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where PND is the probability of no damage, PGV is the peak ground velocity in units of m/s, and 
α and β are constants.  Solving for the values of α and β results in the following relationship for 
PND that is plotted in Figure 6.5-15: 
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Source: Worksheet ABSTR for 80% YS, in the file WP-Pallet Damage Area Abstraction Rev00e.xls.  This file can 
be found on the CD in Appendix G. 
Figure 6.5-15. Probability of No Damage as a Function of PGV-Longitudinal 
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6.5.2.2.2 Power Law Fit to the Nonzero Damaged Areas 
A linear fit and a power law fit were considered to represent the expected response of the 
nonzero damaged areas as a function of PGV.  These fits are conditional on the occurrence of 
nonzero damage, based on the probability function defined in the previous subsection.  
Figure 6.5-16 compares the data with the linear and power law least squares trendlines generated 
by Excel.  An important point about the data set in Figure 6.5-16 is that two data points have 
been dropped from the abstraction process.  The two data points have PGV-longitudinal values 
of 14.1 m/s and 17.9 m/s.  These values are much greater than the maximum PGV of 4.07 m/s at 
an annual exceedance frequency of 10-8 on the bounded hazard curve.  The rationale for dropping 
these two points is twofold:  (i) there is no need to skew the fit to the expected behavior at two 
points that far exceed the PGV levels of interest in TSPA, and (ii) the coefficient of 
determination of both fits is improved by dropping these two points.  The same two points 
produced little change in the abstraction for the residual stress threshold of 90 percent of the 
yield strength of Alloy 22, so the points are retained in this other case. 
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Source: Worksheet ABSTR for 80% YS, in the file WP-Pallet Damage Area Abstraction Rev00e.xls.  This file can 
be found on the CD in Appendix G; WP = waste package. 
Figure 6.5-16.  Comparison of Power Law and Linear Least Squares Fits to the Damaged Area Data 
The coefficients of determination (i.e., the values of R2 in Figure 6.5-16) for the linear and power 
law fits are essential the same.  However, the power law fit is preferable because of its behavior 
near smaller values of PGV, as shown in Figure 6.5-17.  The linear fit crosses through zero 
damage at 1.4 m/s, but the data in Figure 6.5-17 show several points with nonzero damage below 
1 m/s.  The power law fit, on the other hand, falls more smoothly toward zero damage below 
1 m/s, providing a more reasonable physical behavior.  The power law least squares fit shown in 
Figures 6.5-16 and 6.5-17 is therefore the basis for the damage abstraction. 
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6.5.2.2.3 Comparison of Residuals for Nonzero Damaged Area Versus a Normal 
Distribution in Ln-Ln Space 
Figure 6.5-18 presents a cumulative probability distribution plot for the residuals of the natural 
logarithm of the nonzero damaged areas versus a cumulative normal distribution.  These 
residuals are conditional on the occurrence of nonzero damage, based on the probability function 
defined in Section 6.5.2.2.1.  This Figure demonstrates that the residuals follow a normal 
distribution in ln-ln space with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.023.  This standard 
deviation is based on the residuals for the nonzero data points.  
A quantile plot provides a more discriminating comparison of the residuals versus a ln-normal 
distribution.  Figure 6.5-19 presents the quantile plot for the residuals.  This plot demonstrates 
that a normal distribution provides a reasonable representation of the residuals in ln-ln space. 
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Source: Worksheet ABSTR for 80% YS, in the file WP-Pallet Damage Area Abstraction Rev00e.xls.  This file can 
be found on the CD in Appendix G; WP = waste package. 
Figure 6.5-17.  Comparison of Power Law and Linear Least Squares Fits At Smaller Values of PGV 
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Source: Worksheet ABSTR for 80% YS, in the file WP-Pallet Damage Area Abstraction Rev00e.xls.  This file can 
be found on the CD in Appendix G. 
Figure 6.5-18. Comparison of the Cumulative Distribution for the Residuals for Nonzero Damaged Areas 
in Ln-Ln Space with a Cumulative Normal Distribution 
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Source: Worksheet ABSTR for 80% YS, in the file WP-Pallet Damage Area Abstraction Rev00e.xls.  This file can 
be found on the CD in Appendix G; DA = damaged area. 
Figure 6.5-19. Quantile Plot for the Residuals for Nonzero Damaged Areas in Ln-Ln Space Versus a 
Normal Distribution 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 6-67 August 2005 
As a final check on the scatter in the normal distribution, the data were separated into three 
classes, as shown in Figure 6.5-20.  The first class corresponds to data with ln(PGV) less than 
0.86, the second class corresponds to data with ln(PGV) between 0.86 and 1.05, and the third 
class corresponds to data with ln(PGV) greater than 1.05.  These classes provide a convenient 
split of the data, although it is not possible to provide equal numbers of data points in each class 
because the data tend to group at ln(2.44) = 0.89.  This grouping occurs because most ground 
motions at the 2.44-m/s PGV level do not preserve intercomponent variability, resulting in 
constant values for PGV-longitudinal.   
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Source: Worksheet ABSTR for 80% YS, in the file WP-Pallet Damage Area Abstraction Rev00e.xls.  This file can 
be found on the CD in Appendix G. 
Figure 6.5-20. Three Data Classes for Calculation of Standard Deviation are Identified by the Dashed 
Lines and Red Arrows 
The standard deviations are listed in Table 6.5-11 for each of the three classes.  These results 
demonstrate that the standard deviation of the data is reasonably constant over the range of 
PGV-longitudinal for the damage abstraction, consistent with the use of Excel’s least squares fit 
with equal weighting of the data points.   
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Table 6.5-11. Standard Deviations of the Three Classes 
Definition of Class Number of Points Standard Deviation 
Ln(PGV-longitudinal) < 0.86 m/s 5 1.09 
0.86 m/s ≤ Ln(PGV-longitudinal) ≤ 
1.05 m/s 
14 1.04 
Ln(PGV-longitudinal) > 1.05 m/s 13 0.99 
Source:  Worksheet ABSTR for 80% YS, in the file WP-Pallet Damage Area Abstraction Rev00e.xls in Appendix G. 
6.5.2.2.4 Comparison of Abstraction with Data for Nonzero Damaged Areas 
Figure 6.5-21 overlays the nonzero damaged areas from Figure 6.5-16 with the 0.05 and 0.95 
nonexceedance probability curves for a ln-normal distribution with the standard deviation of 
1.023 determined in Figures 6.5-18 and 6.5-19 and in Table 6.5-11.  The 0.05 to 0.95 
nonexceedance probability curves generally encompass all of the data points for nonzero 
damaged areas, with the 0.95 nonexceedance probability curve significantly exceeding all 
damaged areas above the 5.35-m/s PGV level.  This conservatism will not have any impact on 
TSPA because the maximum value of PGV is 4.07-m/s, based on the bounding hazard curve 
presented in Section 6.4.3.  This comparison provides confidence that the ln-normal distribution 
provides an appropriate abstraction for the nonzero damaged areas from waste package-pallet 
impacts.  
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Source: Worksheet ABSTR for 80% YS, in the file WP-Pallet Damage Area Abstraction Rev00e.xls.  This file can 
be found on the CD in Appendix G; WP = waste package. 
Figure 6.5-21. Comparison of Data for Nonzero Damaged Areas With the 0.05 and 0.95 
Nonexceedance Probability Curves for the Ln-Normal Distribution 
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6.5.2.4 Conversion to Percent Surface Area 
The damage abstractions for waste package-pallet impacts produce damaged area in square 
meters, based on the mechanical response of the 21-PWR waste package.  It is reasonable to 
calculate damage for the 21-PWR waste package type because this package type comprises 
64.6 percent of the total inventory of waste packages (see discussion in Section 6.5.1.6).  The 
TSPA-LA model requires damage estimates for commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) and 
codisposal (CDSP) package types.  The damage for these package types is estimated by 
converting the damaged area in square meters to a percent of total surface area for the 21-PWR 
waste package type.  The total surface area for the 21-PWR package in the waste package-pallet 
impact calculations is 28.2 m2 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Section 6.1.1).  This value differs 
from the surface area of the 21-PWR package in the recent kinematic calculations, 30.05 m2, 
because of changes in the package design.  Areas from the waste package-pallet abstraction are 
converted to a percent damage by dividing by 28.2 m2, and this percent damage is applied to the 
CSNF and CDSP packages in the TSPA-LA model. 
6.5.3 Final Abstraction for Waste Package Damage 
6.5.3.1 Analysis of Waste Package-Drip Shield Impacts 
The potential for damage from lateral impacts between the waste package and drip shield is not 
included in the seismic damage abstractions for TSPA.  The basis for not including damage from 
waste package-drip shield impacts is based on several observations: (i) the damaged areas from 
side-on impacts of a waste package on an elastic surface are significantly less than the damaged 
areas from end-on impacts on an elastic surface, (ii) waste package-drip shield impacts occur 
much less frequently and with lower impact velocities than end-to-end impacts in the single 
waste package calculations, implying that the damaged areas from end-to-end impacts are 
significantly greater than from waste package-drip shield impacts, (iii) cross-drift calculations for 
a waste package and a drip shield surrounded by rockfall demonstrate that significant lateral 
impact velocities between the waste package and drip shield only occur for ground motions at 
the 2.44-m/s PGV level that are beyond the PGV values on the bounded hazard curve, and (iv) 
the conservatism in the approach for calculating damaged areas from end-to-end impacts 
encompasses the potential increase in damaged areas for waste package-drip shield impacts.  
Each of these observations is explained in this section. 
Table 6.5-12 summarizes the damaged areas from end-on impacts of the waste package versus 
side-on impacts of the waste package for selected values of impact velocity and angle of impact 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 162293], Table 4).  Table 6.5-12, which is based on the 80 percent residual 
stress threshold for Alloy 22, does not include the data for an impact velocity of 20 m/s in 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 162293], Table 4) because none of the end-to-end impacts in Section 6.5.1 
exceed 12 m/s.  Table 6.5-12 also does not include data for a 0º impact angle because perfect 
alignment during the impact process is very improbable, as explained in Section 6.5.1.2. 
The ratios of damaged areas for end-on to side-on impacts vary between 3.0 and 20.9 (or infinite 
in three cases), implying that damage from end-on impacts is typically much greater than 
damage from side-on impacts throughout the ranges of impact velocities (1 m/s to 10 m/s) and 
impact angles (1º to 8º) that are relevant to damaged areas.  
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Table 6.5-12. Comparison of Damaged Areas (m2) From End-On and Side-On Impacts of a Waste 
Package for a Residual Stress Threshold of 80 percent of the YS of Alloy 22 
  1º  
End-On 
Impact 
1º 
Side-On 
Impact 
Area 
Ratio 
8º  
End-On 
Impact 
8º  
Side-On 
Impact 
Area 
Ratio 
1 0.0033 0 ∞ 0.0011 0 ∞ 
2 0.0221 0.0020 11.1 0.0113 0 ∞ 
4 0.0734 0.0063 11.7 0.0716 0.0068 10.5 
6 0.1665 0.0204 8.2 0.1082 0.0153 7.1 
Impact Velocity 
(m/s) 
10 0.0834 0.0283 3.0 0.1061 0.0508 20.9 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 162293], Table 4. 
Note:  Area Ratio = (End-On Impact Area)/(Side-On Impact Area) 
YS = Yield Strength 
Table 6.5-13 summarizes the frequency and maximum velocities of end-to-end impacts versus 
waste package-drip shield impacts for the single waste package calculations (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 167083], Tables 6.1.3-1 through 6.1.3-5 and Tables 6.1.2-1 through 6.1.2-15).  The data 
summarized in Table 6.5-13 are for the 2.44-m/s PGV level.  This PGV level is appropriate 
because it is approximately midway between the minimum PGV value of 0.4019-m/s and the 
maximum PGV value of 4.07-m/s sampled for TSPA.  The single waste package calculations are 
useful for this comparison because of their fully three-dimensional geometry, in contrast to the 
kinematic calculations which have a two dimensional geometry that does not include motion in 
the transverse horizontal direction.  While the single waste package calculations cannot represent 
synchronous motion, it is more important to capture the transverse horizontal motion in 
comparing the potential for waste package-drip shield impacts versus end-to-end impacts.  
Section 6.5.2 has a general description of the single waste package calculations.   
The comparison of waste package-drip shield and end-to-end impacts in Table 6.5-13 
demonstrates that there are very few waste package-drip shield impacts in comparison to 
end-to-end impacts at the 2.44-m/s PGV level.  In addition, the maximum waste package-drip 
shield impact velocity is usually significantly less than the maximum end-to-end impact velocity 
in a given realization.  This comparison implies that the damaged areas from end-to-end impacts 
will be significantly greater than the damaged areas from waste package-drip shield impacts for 
the ground motions at the 2.44-m/s PGV level.   
The comparison in Table 6.5-13 is confirmed by the results from the two-dimensional cross-drift 
calculations for a waste package and drip shield that is surrounded by rubble from a collapsed 
drift (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Section 5.6.1).  The data from the cross-drift calculations, 
presented in Table 6.5-14, confirms that many realizations have no waste package-drip shield 
impacts, similar to the results in the second column of Table 6.5-13.   
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Table 6.5-13. Comparison of Damaged Areas (m2) From End-On and Side-On Impacts of a Waste 
Package for a Residual Stress Threshold of 80 percent of the YS of Alloy 22 
Waste Package-Drip Shield (Lateral) Impacts End-to-End Impacts 
Realization No. 
No. of Impacts Max. Impact Velocity 
(m/s) 
No. of Impacts Max. Impact Velocity 
(m/s) 
1 0 N/A 3 1.5 
2 0 N/A 3 1.8 
3 0 N/A 9 3.9 
4 1 2.9 4 3.5 
5 0 N/A 14 4.4 
6 0 N/A 7 4.0 
7 1 1.2 7 4.5 
8 0 N/A 5 1.9 
9 5 4.1 10 2.8 
10 0 N/A 3 1.6 
11 1 1.8 7 2.8 
12 0 N/A 7 3.0 
13 0 N/A 5 2.0 
14 0 N/A 3 1.4 
15 1 1.2 1 2.0 
Sources: BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Tables 6.1.3-1 through 6.1.3-5 and Tables 6.1.2-1 through 6.1.2-15. 
YS = Yield Strength 
Table 6.5-14. Comparison of Maximum Waste Package-Drip Shield Impact Velocities from the Cross-Drift 
Calculations with PGV Values for the Transverse and Vertical Components at the 2.44-m/s 
PGV Level. 
Realization No. Ground Motion No. 
PGV-Transverse 
(m/s) 
PGV-Vertical 
(m/s) 
Max. Impact Velocity 
(m/s) 
1 17 1.60 1.75 0 
2 16 1.58 2.12 0 
3 3 6.43 6.09 5.35 
4 2 2.69 2.33 0.193 
5 11 2.56 1.28 0 
6 4 2.60 2.97 0.669 
7 12 2.71 1.95 0.195 
8 5 2.57 1.14 0 
9 15 1.53 4.54 0 
10 9 8.17 4.57 5.41 
11 8 4.02 1.54 1.27 
12 6 1.32 2.71 0 
13 10 0.78 0.84 0 
14 1 1.95 1.11 0 
15 7 2.42 6.37 1.85 
16 14 1.26 2.46 0 
17 13 3.04 3.37 0 
Sources: BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Table V-5; BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Appendix X, Table X-3 
Note: The cross-drift calculations are based on all 17 ground motion time histories, while the single waste 
package calculations in Table 6.5-13 are based on a subset of 15 ground motions. 
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The data in Table 6.5-14 also demonstrate that a waste package-drip shield impact velocity 
above 1 m/s only occurs for ground motions with a PGV component greater than 4 m/s, 
approximately the maximum PGV value for the 10-8 annual exceedance frequency on the 
bounded hazard curve.  For example, realization numbers 3, 10, 11, and 15 have maximum 
lateral impact velocities above 1 m/s, and the corresponding maximum PGV value for either 
component is 6.43 m/s, 8.17 m/s, 4.02 m/s, and 6.37 m/s, respectively.  On the other hand, the 
other ground motions result in maximum waste package-drip shield impact velocities below 
0.669 m/s.  The results with the cross-drift calculations confirm that waste package-drip shield 
impact velocities are expected to be less than 1 m/s when ground motion components are at or 
below a PGV of 4 m/s.  In this situation, the damage from waste package-drip shield impacts is 
anticipated to be minor in comparison to that from end-to-end impacts and from waste 
package-pallet impacts. 
Finally, the methodology for calculating damage from end-to-end impacts has two significant 
conservatisms: (1) the catalog of end-on damage assumes a plane of symmetry, equivalent to an 
impact velocity that is one-half the relative impact velocity between two adjacent packages.  
However, the calculation of damaged areas does not include the potential reduction in relative 
impact velocity by a factor of two; and (2) a simple summation of damage from individual 
impacts overestimates the damage if impacts occur in the same location or if the damaged areas 
from adjacent impacts overlap significantly. 
Based on these observations, the potential damage from waste package-drip shield impacts is not 
included in the seismic damage abstractions because the damaged areas from side-on impacts are 
significantly less than the damaged areas from end-on impacts, because the damaged areas from 
end-to-end impacts are expected to be significantly greater than the damaged areas from waste 
package-drip shield impacts, and because the conservatism in the approach for calculating 
damaged areas from end-to-end impacts encompasses the potential increase in damaged areas for 
waste package-drip shield impacts.  
6.5.3.2 Total Damage Abstraction for the Waste Package 
The results in Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 provide damage abstractions for end-to-end impacts of 
adjacent waste packages and for waste package-pallet impacts.  The methodology for combining 
these multiple abstractions within the TSPA framework is described in this section. 
Within each realization of the TSPA, the guidelines for combining the damage abstractions are 
as follows: 
• The total damaged area is defined as the sum of the damaged areas from end-to-end 
impacts and from waste package-pallet impacts.  The damage abstractions for 
end-to-end impacts and for waste package-pallet impacts are treated as uncorrelated 
parameters to provide robust sampling across the full range of seismically-induced 
damage. 
• The results from the LS-DYNA and the UDEC kinematic calculations for end-to-end 
impacts are represented as equally probable in TSPA.  There is insufficient information 
to select one kinematic approach over the other at the present time, so it is reasonable to 
represent both abstractions in TSPA on an equal basis.  An advantage of using both 
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abstractions is that the uncertainty in the computational methodologies for end-to-end 
impacts is directly represented in TSPA. 
• Abstractions define the damaged areas at 80 percent and 90 percent of the yield strength 
of Alloy 22.  However, the residual stress threshold for Alloy 22 is based on a uniform 
distribution between 80 percent and 90 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22.  The 
damaged area is linearly interpolated between the known values at 80 percent and 
90 percent of yield strength to define the damage area at intermediate values of the 
residual stress threshold.  The linear interpolation between the damaged areas at 
80 percent and 90 percent of the yield strength are identical within a given realization, 
providing perfect correlation between the damaged areas from end-to-end impacts and 
from waste package-pallet impacts with regard to the effective residual stress threshold 
for Alloy 22. 
For a given kinematic approach (i.e., once LS-DYNA or UDEC is selected), the abstractions for 
residual stress thresholds of 80 percent and 90 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 are 
sampled in an identical fashion statistically.  In particular, the value of the random number for 
determining the probability of no damage is identical for both abstractions and the sampling of 
the ln-normal distributions about the power law is therefore perfectly correlated.  This latter 
statement means that the sampling of both ln-normal distributions will return values 
corresponding to the same quantile from both ln-normal distributions. 
The damage to the waste package is applied to all waste packages in the repository, except for 
those packages that experience early time failures from manufacturing defects or from defects 
that occur during emplacement.  There is no spatial variability for damage to the waste package. 
As explained in Sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5, TSPA-LA requires the effective area for transport 
through the waste package, rather than the damaged area that exceeds the residual stress 
threshold for Alloy 22.  The effective area is determined by the density of stress corrosion cracks 
(SCCs) and the area of individual cracks in the regions where the residual stress exceeds the 
residual stress threshold.  The product of the crack density per unit surface area, ρSCC, and the 
area per crack, ASCC defines the effective area of the SCC network per unit area of damaged 
surface.  This product ranges from 0.00328 to 0.0131 at room temperature 
(DTN:  MO0403SPASCRKD.000 [DIRS 168105]).  Stated differently, the effective area of a 
crack network is a factor of 76 to 305 less than the damaged surface area that exceeds the 
residual stress threshold. 
For TSPA-LA, the crack network on the waste package provides a pathway for diffusive 
transport of radionuclides out of the waste package.  The factor defining the effective area for 
diffusive transport is sampled from a uniform distribution with a lower bound of 0.00328 and an 
upper bound of 0.0131.  The sampled value for the factor is then multiplied by the sampled value 
for the combined damaged areas from end-to-end and waste package-pallet impacts.  This 
procedure directly incorporates the uncertainty in the distribution of damaged areas and the 
uncertainty in the factor defining the effective area of a crack network into TSPA-LA. 
Advective flow through the network of stress corrosion cracks on the waste package is not 
included in TSPA, as discussed in Section 6.3.5.  A comprehensive technical analysis of the 
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potential for advective flow through the SCC network in the waste package indicates that 
advective flux will be insignificant (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173781], Section 6.2.63).  The potential 
flow through SCCs is so small that its omission from TSPA has an insignificant effect on the 
magnitude and timing of radionuclide releases to the accessible environment.  Advective flow of 
seepage through SCCs on the waste package outer barrier is excluded from TSPA on the basis of 
low consequence. 
6.5.4 Drip Shield Damage from Ground Motion 
The mechanical response of the drip shield to vibratory ground motions has the potential to 
damage the drip shield as a barrier to flow.  This loss of integrity could occur because of 
damaged areas on the drip shield (i.e., those areas that exceed the residual stress threshold for 
Titanium Grade 7) from impacts between the drip shield and the waste package, emplacement 
pallet, invert, and drift wall.  Loss of integrity as a barrier to flow could also occur because of 
separation between two adjacent drip shields.  Separation is an important consideration because 
it neutralizes the drip shield as a flow barrier and rockfall barrier.   
Structural response calculations determine the damaged areas on the drip shield under vibratory 
ground motions.  However, the presence of damaged areas and the associated network of stress 
corrosion cracks are excluded from TSPA-LA because the advective flux of liquid through the 
drip shield is predicted to be negligible (see discussion in Section 6.3.6).  This conclusion is 
based on the combination of several factors: (1) there are few damaging rockfall events, (2) creep 
and stress relaxation in dented areas on the drip shield may eliminate formation of through-wall 
cracks, and (3) capillary effects, evaporation, and plugging in tight cracks can significantly limit 
the amount of seepage water that can flow through cracks in the drip shields.  Because the 
advection of liquid and solids through the drip shield will be minor, its omission from TSPA-LA 
will have an insignificant effect on the magnitude and time of the resulting radionuclide releases 
to the accessible environment (BSC 2005 ([DIRS 173781], Section 6.2.64 and Appendix C). 
The same structural response calculations also determine the onset and degree of drip shield 
separation.  However, as discussed in Section 6.5.5, drip shield separation is excluded from 
TSPA-LA because the ground motion amplitudes that are sufficient to separate the drip shields 
are also large enough to partially or completely collapse drifts in the lithophysal or 
nonlithophysal zones of the repository.  The presence of rockfall, either as larger rock blocks or 
small fragments around the drip shield, causes frictional loads on the sides of the drip shield.  
Rockfall can also cause gravitational loads on top of the drip shield if the rockfall completely 
covers the drip shield.  The presence of even small frictional or gravitational loads has been 
shown to restrain the relative motion between adjacent drip shields, thereby preventing drip 
shield separation (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169753], Section 5.3).   
In summary, damage to the drip shield from vibratory ground motion is not included in the 
TSPA-LA.  The structural response calculations for the drip shield are briefly summarized in the 
next two subsections, followed by a summary of the analysis that excludes drip shield separation 
from TSPA-LA. 
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6.5.4.1 Structural Response Calculations 
Damage to the drip shield from vibratory ground motion is determined by structural response 
calculations (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172448]).  A set of 15 calculations for the dynamic response of 
the drip shield was performed for a set of 15 ground motions with a PGV of 2.44 m/s.  A similar 
set of calculations was also performed for a PGV of 5.35 m/s.  The stochastic (uncertain) input 
parameters for the 15 calculations are the 15 sets of three-component ground-motion time 
histories, the metal-to-metal friction coefficient, and the metal-to-rock friction coefficient.  
A Monte Carlo sampling scheme defines the appropriate combinations of ground-motion time 
histories and friction coefficients (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169999], Section 6.4).  The set of 
15 ground-motion time histories for these analyses is identical with that for the analyses of 
rockfall induced by vibratory ground motion and for waste package structural response.  The 
drift is unfilled at the time of the seismic event and the potential coupling between rockfall and 
the dynamic motion of the EBS components during the event is not included in the analyses. 
These calculations incorporate the potential for corrosion to degrade the drip shield by reducing 
the thickness of the drip shield plates by 2 mm.  This thickness reduction is a conservative 
representation of material loss by general corrosion over the first 10,000 years after repository 
closure and a reasonable representation of barrier degradation for 20,000 years after repository 
closure.  These calculations evaluate mechanical properties at 150°C to represent the potential 
degradation in mechanical strength if a seismic hazard occurs during the initial thermal pulse 
after repository closure (Assumption 5.3).  The objectivity of the finite-element mesh was also 
demonstrated (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172448], Attachment III). 
The damage to the drip shield is determined by comparing the residual first principal stress on 
the drip-shield plates to the failure criterion for Titanium Grade 7, which is defined in 
Section 6.3.3.  The results from each structural response calculation are evaluated to determine 
the elements in the plates whose residual stress exceeds 50 percent of the yield strength of 
Titanium Grade 7; the failed elements are then converted into a damaged surface area.  This 
conversion conservatively considered that if a single element on the surface of the waste package 
fails, then the elements beneath this element also fail. 
The structural response calculations do not represent the dynamic response of the invert to the 
ground motion.  The invert is represented as an elastic body whose surface responds 
instantaneously and uniformly with the given ground motion, as though it is a rigid surface.  The 
impact of representing the dynamic response of the invert is analyzed in BSC 2005 
([DIRS 173172] Attachment VIII).  For these calculations, the invert is represented as a 
cohesionless, granular material that is subjected to ground motions at the 2.44 and 5.35 m/s PGV 
levels.  The computational results demonstrate that the rigid representation has relatively little 
impact on amplification of ground motions or on permanent deflection of the invert surface.  The 
simpler representation of the invert as a rigid surface is therefore retained for the structural 
response calculations. 
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6.5.4.2 Drip Shield Damage 
The results of the structural response calculations for ground motions at the 0.19 m/s, 2.44 m/s, 
and 5.35-m/s PGV levels are summarized as follows: 
• One simulation performed at the 0.19-m/s PGV level indicates that there is no damage to 
the drip shield (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], Calculation Results I).  This simulation is 
based on the single (three component) ground motion that was developed for preclosure 
design purposes at the 0.19-m/s PGV level.  More specifically, the drip shields do not 
separate and no area of the drip shield exceeds the residual stress threshold of 50 percent 
of the yield strength of Titanium Grade 7. 
• Fourteen simulations were performed to completion at the 2.44-m/s PGV level.  The 
results of these calculations do not indicate any separation of drip shields.  The data for 
damaged area on the drip shield (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], Table 4) indicates that the 
mean percent damaged area is 0.70 percent and the maximum percent damaged area is 
2.13 percent.  As with the waste package calculations for the 2.44-m/s PGV level, 
ground motion #16 was substituted for ground motion #15 because of its anomalous 
response spectrum (see footnote d to Table 6.5-9 for additional details). 
The suite of ground motions for computing drip shield response at the 2.44-m/s PGV 
level does not include intercomponent variability (Section 6.4.2).  In this situation, it is 
possible that some realizations might experience drip shield separation if the structural 
response calculations had been performed with a suite of ground motions that include 
intercomponent variability.  The damage abstraction for TSPA-LA is based on the 
results for ground motions without intercomponent variability, which indicate no 
separation.  This is a reasonable approach because the damage areas for the 2.44-m/s 
PGV level are generally small, indicating limited potential for the large relative 
displacements in the vertical direction that are required to separate adjacent drip shields.   
• Five simulations performed at the 5.35-m/s PGV level indicate separation of adjacent 
drip shields in each calculation (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], Calculation Results III).  
The ground motions become very intense at 5.35 m/s, resulting in large displacements 
and high-speed impacts for the unanchored repository components. 
Separation occurs between adjacent drip shields because of plastic deformation of the 
drip shield and because of the large magnitude of the ground motions.  In fact, each of 
the five simulations demonstrates that a drip shield rides over its adjacent neighbor, 
implying that a separation must occur somewhere in the emplacement drift.  The degree 
to which the drip shield rides over its neighbor is substantial, on the order of 10 to 
25 percent of the length of the drip shield (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172448], Figures IV-3 
through IV-7).  These separations represent a lower bound because four of the 
five numerical simulations terminated before the end of the ground-motion time history. 
The prediction of drip shield separation for the 5.35-m/s PGV level is very idealized for 
two reasons.  First, the finite-element representation has rigid boundaries (that move 
with the invert) at the axial ends of the computational space, and the presence of rigid 
boundaries amplifies the interaction between adjacent drip shields.  The ground motions 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 6-77 August 2005 
are expected to be synchronous over the length scale of the drip shields in an 
emplacement drift.  Synchronous ground motions will generally lead to synchronous 
motions of the drip shields, all other factors being equal.  However, synchronous motion 
of adjacent drip shields is destroyed once a drip shield impacts either rigid boundary at 
the ends of the computational space.  The resulting asynchronicity increases the relative 
motion and impacts between adjacent drip shields, decreasing the onset time for and 
increasing the degree of drip shield separation in the calculations.  The second reason is 
that the presence of rockfall is not included in the structural response calculations for the 
drip shields, as explained in the next section.  The ground motion amplitudes at the 
5.35-m/s PGV level are large enough to cause rockfall in both the lithophysal and 
nonlithophysal zones (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Sections 6.4.2.2.2 and 6.3.1.6.4).  The 
presence of rubblized backfill and larger rock blocks around the drip shields restricts the 
relative vertical displacement between adjacent drip shields, reducing the potential for 
separation at extreme ground motions. 
6.5.5 Rockfall Prevents Drip Shield Separation 
Drip shield separation is excluded from TSPA-LA because (1) ground motion amplitudes that 
are sufficient to cause drip shield separation are also large enough to partially or completely 
collapse drifts in the repository, (2) rockfall occurs within the first second or two of the arrival of 
these large amplitude ground motions, and (3) a kinematic study indicates that small static loads 
from rubble or frictional loads between EBS components are sufficient to eliminate separation of 
drip shields.  In this situation, rockfall provides restraints on the motion of the drip shields, 
preventing differential motion that could lead to separation. 
Ground motion amplitudes near and above the 2.44-m/s PGV level are large enough to cause 
rockfall in both the lithophysal and nonlithophysal zones.  In the lithophysal zones, drift collapse 
is observed at approximately the 2-m/s PGV level (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.4.2.2.2, 
fourth bullet under subheading ‘Discussion’).  Figure 6.5-22 presents an example of rockfall in 
lithophysal rock for the case of a peak ground velocity of 3.33 m/sec for three rock quality levels 
that span the expected strength range.  Collapse of the drifts occurs for the full range of rock 
quality levels in Figure 6.5-22, covering the drip shield with rubble.  Partial collapse of drifts 
occurs for peak ground velocities below 2 m/sec, resulting in rubble constraint to the sidewalls of 
drip shield.  In the nonlithophysal zones, significant collapse is observed at 2.44 m/s and at 
5.35 m/s (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.3.1.6.4). 
The collapse in the lithophysal rock is coincident with the arrival of the first strong ground 
motion—i.e., collapse occurs within seconds of the arrival of the first pulse of the accelerogram 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.4.2.2.2).  Large blocks also start to fall from the drift walls 
in the nonlithophysal zones shortly after the arrival of the ground motion (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 166107], Section 6.3.1.6.1). 
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Source:  BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Figure 6-127. 
NOTE: (upper left) Rock Strength Category 1 (40.6 m2/m drift length), (upper right) Category 5 (19.7 m2/m), 
(lower left) Category 3 (15.4 m2/m), and (lower right) Ground Motion History 7, PGV=333 cm/sec. 
Figure 6.5-22. Collapse of Emplacement Drifts for the Full Range of Rock Qualities of Lithophysal Rock 
for Peak Ground Velocity of 333 cm/sec 
In either the lithophysal or nonlithophysal zones, rockfall occurs at PGV levels substantially 
lower than the 5.35-m/s PGV level that results in drip shield separation (Section 6.5.4.2).  It 
follows that the drip shield is partly surrounded by rockfall whenever separation could 
potentially occur, and this rockfall occurs within the first few seconds of the ground motion.  The 
larger rock blocks or the smaller rock fragments provide normal and shear confinement to the 
sidewalls and possibly the crown of the drip shield.  The horizontal acceleration imparted to the 
drip shield by the ground motion will be resisted by the weight of the rockfall and by the 
frictional forces between the rock and the drip shield plates and between the footings and the 
invert.  The exterior bulkhead structure of the drip shield (Figure 6.5-23) provides an additional 
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physical restraint or “locking” mechanism between the drip shield and rubble that will constrain 
lateral movement.  Thus, the presence of rockfall around the drip shields will restrict the relative 
displacements that are required to separate adjacent drip shields, so that separation is not 
expected to occur, even for extreme ground motions. 
 
Source:  BSC 2004 [DIRS 168275]. 
Figure 6.5-23. Geometry of the Drip Shield—Side View 
Smaller, more frequent seismic events will also provide rockfall around the drip shield.  Smaller 
events are much more probable during a 10,000-year period.  For a Poisson process 
(Assumption 5.2), smaller seismic events with a rate of 3×10-6 per year are about 10 times more 
probable than more extreme events with a rate of 3×10-7 per year.  These smaller events can 
contribute to the buildup of rockfall around the drip shield before an extreme event occurs.  
Ground motions greater than the 1.5-m/s PGV level, which corresponds to the 3×10-6 per year 
annual exceedance frequency on the bounded hazard curve (Table 6.4-1), generate rockfall from 
partial collapse of the drifts in the lithophysal zones (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], 
Section 6.4.2.2.2).  Since these higher probability (e.g., 3×10-6) events are ten times more likely 
than the lower probability 3×10-7 events, which corresponds to ground motions greater than the 
2.7-m/s PGV level on the bounded hazard curve (Table 6.4-1), it is reasonable to expect that 
some rubble would exist in the drift and provide some confinement for the drip shield prior to the 
occurrence of a high amplitude, very low probability ground motion that could potentially result 
in drip shield separation. 
A kinematic study of drip shield motion (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169753], Section 5.3) has confirmed 
that a relatively small amount of rubble can constrain the asynchronous motion of the drip 
shields and prevent drip shield separation.  This study considers the kinematic response of 
multiple drip shields in a single emplacement drift under vibratory ground motion.  Analyses 
were conducted for emplacement drifts that are open, partly filled with collapsed rock, and 
completely filled with collapsed rock.  The drip shields remain connected for almost all cases, 
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even for open drifts with extreme ground motions at the 5.35-m/s PGV level.  Separation is only 
observed in the very unrealistic case that there is no metal-to-metal friction, an open drift, and 
the 5.35-m/s PGV ground motion.  However, the kinematic calculations demonstrate that a small 
weight of rock or a small amount of friction force is sufficient to stabilize the motion of the drip 
shields and prevent drip shield separation.  Since rockfall in the lithophysal or nonlithophysal 
zones occurs at PGV levels substantially lower than the 5.35-m/s PGV level that results in drip 
shield separation (Section 6.5.4.2), and since smaller, more frequent seismic events may also 
provide rockfall around the drip shield, the weight of the rockfall and the associated friction 
forces will be present to prevent drip shield separation. 
6.5.6 Failure Abstraction for the Fuel Rod Cladding from Ground Motion 
The mechanical response of the waste package to vibratory ground motion can produce dynamic 
impacts between adjacent waste packages, between the waste package and its emplacement 
pallet, and between the waste package and the drip shield.  During each of these impacts, the 
waste package may experience very high acceleration in the axial and lateral directions.  These 
accelerations can be “transmitted” to the fuel rod assemblies and fuel rods.  The assemblies and 
fuel rods may impact the lid of a waste package due to the end-on (axial) impact of adjacent 
waste packages, or be pushed sideways, toward the sidewall of the waste package, during impact 
with the emplacement pallet or drip shield.  Either of these impacts has the potential to fail the 
fuel rod cladding.  The focus in the following subsections is on axial impacts because these alone 
have the potential to buckle the fuel rods, resulting in perforation and failure of the cladding. 
6.5.6.1 Structural Response Calculations 
The maximum waste package velocities from end-on impacts with the 15 ground motions at the 
2.44-m/s PGV level vary between 1.4 to 4.5 m/s (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Tables 6.1.2-1 
through 6.1.2-15).  In other words, each realization with ground motions with 2.44-m/s PGV has 
an end-to-end impact velocity of at least 1.4 m/s.  Similarly, the maximum waste package 
velocities for end-on impacts at the 5.35-m/s PGV level vary between 1.3 m/s and 6.5 m/s 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Tables 6.2.2-1 through 6.2.2-15).  That is, realizations for ground 
motions with 5.35-m/s PGV have an impact velocity of at least 1.3 m/s (The minimum value for 
the 5.35-m/s PGV level is less than that for the 2.44-m/s PGV level because substantial 
stochastic variability in the 15 ground motions leads to substantial variability in waste package 
response.). 
The resulting fuel assembly accelerations due to this range of impact velocities have been 
analyzed using a finite-element representation of the fuel assemblies.  The maximum peak 
acceleration and the average peak acceleration for the assemblies in a waste package have been 
determined through detailed structural response calculations for a waste package with internal 
fuel rod assemblies impacting a rigid wall (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173500], Tables 3 and 4).  The 
peak and average accelerations from the structural response calculations have been evaluated for 
cutoff frequencies of 450 Hertz, 600 Hertz, and 1,000 Hertz.  The accelerations for a cutoff 
frequency of 450 Hertz are repeated in Table 6.5-15. 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 6-81 August 2005 
Table 6.5-15. Fuel Assembly Accelerations from Waste Package-to-Waste Package Impact 
Calculations for a 450 Hertz Cutoff Frequency 
Initial Impact Velocity (m/s) 
Parameter 0.5 1 2 4 6 
Maximum Peak Acceleration (g’s) 75 144 263 323 506 
Average Peak Acceleration (g’s) 35 72 115 155 194 
Source:  BSC 2004 [DIRS 173500], Tables 3 and 4. 
The finite-element calculations for the fuel assembly accelerations do not include any damping.  
Impact calculations with no damping often produce acceleration time histories with peak values 
that are influenced by the spatial and temporal discretization of the calculations.  In this situation, 
the output is typically filtered through a low-pass filter to determine a more realistic acceleration 
time history.  The cutoff frequency for the filter is a compromise between damping the 
extraneous numerical noise while leaving the fundamental modes of the structure intact.  
Filtering the output below 400 Hertz dampens the fundamental modes of waste package and fuel 
assembly, potentially leading to erroneous results.  Filtering the output at greater than 
1,000 Hertz preserves computational noise and can also lead to misleading results.  A cutoff 
frequency of 450 Hertz dampens the numerical noise but has minimal impact on the fundamental 
modes of fuel assembly and waste package (BSC 2003 [DIRS 162602], Appendix D). 
6.5.6.2 Cladding Failure from Buckling 
The minimum impact velocity for the 2.44 m/s and 5.35-m/s PGV ground motions is 1.3 m/s, as 
noted in Section 6.5.6.1.  Interpolating on the results in Table 6.5-15 for the known accelerations 
from impact calculations for velocities of 1 m/s and 2 m/s, the maximum peak acceleration is 
180 g’s9 and the average peak acceleration is 85 g’s10 for an impact at 1.3 m/s with a 450 Hertz 
cutoff frequency.   
The integrity of fuel rod cladding during cask drop or tip over incidents has been extensively 
studied for zircalloy-clad light water reactor spent fuel assemblies (Chun et al. 1987 
[DIRS 144357]; Sanders et al. 1992 [DIRS 102072].  The work by Chun et al. (1987 
[DIRS 144357]) is more useful here because it explicitly calculates g-loads for axial buckling 
and for yielding due to side drops.  The range of g-loads for failure due to axial buckling varies 
between 82 g’s for the Westinghouse 17×17 fuel assembly to 252 g’s for the Combustion 
Engineering 16×16 fuel assembly (Chun et al. 1987 [DIRS 144357], Table 4]).  The range of 
g-loads for yielding due to side drops varies between 63 g’s for a Westinghouse 17×17 fuel 
assembly to 211 g’s for a Combustion Engineering 16×16 fuel assembly (Chun et al. 1987 
[DIRS 144357], Table 4).  The actual g-loads for failure may be lower because:  (1) the weight 
of the fuel pellets is not transferred to the cladding (Chun et al. 1987 [DIRS 144357], page 2), 
and (2) the potential effects of cladding defects or existing failures are not included in the 
analysis.  These effects increase the inertial mass or weaken the clad, possibly causing failure at 
lower g-loads. 
                                                 
9  Maximum peak acceleration at 1.3 m/s = 144 g’s + (263 g’s – 144 g’s)/(2 m/s–1m/s)(1.3m/s – 1m/s) = 179.7 g’s. 
10  Average peak acceleration at 1.3 m/s = 72 g’s + (115 g’s – 72 g’s)/(2m/s – 1m/s)(1.3m/s – 1m/s) = 84.9 g’s. 
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Based on Table 6.5-15, end-on impacts of adjacent waste packages result in average fuel 
assembly accelerations of 85 g’s10 at the lowest impact velocity, and often much greater values 
for higher impact velocities.  Simple fuel rod failure criteria indicate that clad failure occurs 
between 82 g’s and 252 g’s, depending on the type of fuel rod (Chun et al. 1987 [DIRS 144357], 
Table 4).  In this situation, 100 percent perforation of the cladding is reasonable when a ground 
motion event occurs with a PGV of 2.44 m/s or greater. 
One calculation is available for the structural response of the waste package to a ground motion 
with PGV values of 0.19 m/s and 0.384 m/s (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Sections 6.3 and 6.4).  
There is no damage to the cladding for these ground motions because there is no appreciable 
motion of the waste package and no impact between adjacent waste packages.  However, the 
potential exists for more significant displacements and impacts at the 1.05-m/s PGV level. 
6.5.6.3 Abstraction for Cladding Failure 
Cladding failure for ground motions at the 1.05-m/s PGV level is conservatively set to 
100 percent.  In addition, the cladding failure goes to zero at the 0.55-m/s PGV level.  This 
approach is consistent with the results from the structural response calculations, whereby damage 
from vibratory ground motion first begins between the 0.384-m/s PGV level, corresponding to an 
exceedance frequency of about 10-4 per year, and the 1.05-m/s PGV level, corresponding to an 
exceedance frequency of 10-5 per year.  The PGV value of 0.55 m/s is an intermediate value, 
corresponding to an exceedance frequency of 5×10-5 per year (Table 6.4-1).  In other words, 
ground motions greater than those at the 0.384-m/s PGV level are required to damage the 
cladding.  
The abstraction for cladding failure is then a simple look-up Table with a linear interpolation 
between the four points in Table 6.5-16, as illustrated in Figure 6.5-24.  There is no uncertainty 
in this abstraction because the abstraction represents a conservative, bounding estimate for 
cladding response across the full range of PGV values.  Cladding failure occurs within all waste 
packages for TSPA—there is no spatial variability in the damage.   
Table 6.5-16. Abstraction for Cladding Failure from Vibratory Ground Motion 
PGV Value 
(m/s) 
Cladding Failure 
(%) 
0.0 0 
0.55 0 
1.05 100 
> 1.05 100 
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Figure 6.5-24.  Damage Abstraction for Cladding Failure Via Perforation 
6.6 RESPONSE TO ROCKFALL 
Rockfall induced by vibratory ground motion has the potential to damage the drip shield and 
waste package as barriers to flow and transport.  Rockfall refers to the large rock blocks that may 
be ejected from the nonlithophysal zones of the repository during vibratory ground motion.  
Rockfall also refers to the rubblized material that may surround the drip shield and fill the drifts 
during catastrophic collapse of drifts in lithophysal zones of the repository.  Detailed rockfall 
analyses have been performed for both of these failure mechanisms under vibratory ground 
motions (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107]). 
The mechanical response of the drip shield has been analyzed for the impacts from large rock 
blocks and under the static load from rubblized backfill.  Drip shield damage due to rock impact 
and the potential for waste package damage from rockfall have been considered to determine the 
damage to the drip shield and waste package from rockfall.  
Damage to EBS components from rockfall has not been included in TSPA-LA.  Table 6.6-1 
summarizes the relevant analyses and key results that support excluding damage from rockfall 
from the seismic scenario class for TSPA-LA.  As an example, consider the impact from a large 
rock block on the drip shield (first row in Table 6.6-1).  This impact may result in deformation 
and residual stress that exceed the residual stress threshold for accelerated stress corrosion 
cracking.  However, the resulting network of stress corrosion cracks are not a pathway for 
advective flow and have been screened out of TSPA (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173781], Section 6.2.64 
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and Appendix C).  The rockfall and structural response calculations for this analysis are 
discussed in Sections 6.6.1.1 and 6.6.1.2, respectively.  The drip shield therefore remains 
structurally intact and can deflect rockfall and seepage away from the waste package, so 
rockfall-related damage to EBS components is excluded from the seismic scenario class. 
6.6.1 Drip Shield Damage from Rockfall in the Nonlithophysal Zone 
The potential source of damage to the drip shield in the nonlithophysal zones arises from the 
large rock blocks that may be shaken loose from the drift walls and fall onto the drip shield in 
response to vibratory ground motion (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.3).  Large rock 
blocks have the potential to deform the drip shield, resulting in accelerated stress corrosion 
cracking in areas that exceed the residual stress threshold for Titanium Grade 7.  Large rock 
blocks also have the potential to collapse the drip shield.  However, damage to the drip shield 
from large rock blocks in the nonlithophysal zones is not included in TSPA-LA because the 
associated crack network is not a pathway for advective flow (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173781], 
Section 6.2.64) and because impact by the largest rock block does not collapse the drip shield 
onto the waste package, as explained in Section 6.6.1.2.  The drip shield therefore remains 
structurally intact and can deflect rockfall and flow away from the waste package. 
6.6.1.1 Nonlithophysal Rockfall Analyses 
Geologic structure and rock strength define the failure mode in the nonlithophysal rock.  The 
failure mode in these rocks results from stress-induced yield in the intact rock or along joint 
surfaces, followed by gravity-induced drop of discrete rock blocks that are ejected from the walls 
of the drift.  Analysis of rockfall in the nonlithophysal zone requires ground motion time 
histories, fracture geometries, and fracture properties as input parameters or boundary conditions 
for the analyses.  To ensure adequate representation of uncertainty and variability in block size 
and impact energy, 50 realizations are performed for ground motions at the 1.05-m/s and 
2.44-m/s PGV levels and 42 realizations are performed for ground motions at the 5.35-m/s PGV 
level.  At each PGV level, the input for the individual rockfall calculations draws from a set of 
15 ground motions combined with 105 synthetic fracture patterns.  The Drift Degradation 
Analysis model report (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.3) provides a detailed description of 
the nonlithophysal rockfall analyses with the 3DEC computer program. 
Based on the results of these analyses, a set of representative blocks and representative impact 
locations was selected to span the range of block impacts from the 3DEC analyses.  The idea 
behind this approach is to perform a limited set of analyses that span the range of rock sizes, rock 
velocities, and rock impact points on the drip shield.  This limited set of analyses then provides 
the basis for determining the structural response of the drip shield (1) to the maximum rock block 
in the nonlithophysal zone, and (2) to the smaller blocks that can be ejected during drift collapse 
in the lithophysal zone. 
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Table 6.6-1. Summary of Rockfall Damage to EBS Component 
Damage Mechanism 
Relevant Analyses 
(Section Ref.) 
Key Results  
(Section Ref.) 
Status in TSPA 
(Section Ref.) 
Impact of rock blocks 
in nonlithophysal 
zones 
• Rockfall analyses with 3DEC 
(6.6.1.1) 
• Drip shield structural 
response calculations for 
representative rock blocks 
(6.6.1.2) 
• Drip shield does not 
buckle or collapse, even 
from impact of the 
largest rock block 
(6.6.1.2) 
• Drip shield does not 
contact the waste 
package, even for 
impact of the largest 
rock block (6.6.1.2) 
• Drip shield remains 
structurally intact and can 
deflect rockfall and 
seepage away from the 
waste package 
(6.6.1.2)(6.3.6) 
• Drip shield damage from 
rock blocks excluded from 
TSPA 
Damage from drift 
collapse in lithophysal 
zones 
• Rockfall analyses for static 
loads from drift collapse 
(6.6.2.1) 
• Drip shield structural 
response calculations under 
static load (6.6.2.2) 
• Drift collapse produces 
small rock fragments 
with little capacity to 
damage drip shield 
(6.6.2.1) 
• Drip shield does not 
buckle or collapse under 
static loads (6.6.2.2) 
• Drip shield does not 
collapse or undergo 
excessive deformation 
from creep in response 
to static loads (6.6.2.2) 
• Drip shield remains 
structurally intact and can 
deflect rockfall away from 
the waste package 
(6.6.2.2) 
• Drip shield damage under 
static load excluded from 
TSPA 
Damage to the waste 
package and cladding 
• Drip shields do not separate 
and can deflect rockfall away 
from the waste package 
(6.5.5) 
• Drip shield structural 
response calculations for 
degree of separation (6.5.4) 
• Rockfall analyses in 
lithophysal zones (6.6.2.1) 
 
• Drip shields do not 
separate and can deflect 
rockfall away from the 
waste package (6.5.5) 
• Rock fragments in 
lithophysal zone 
(85 percent of 
repository) have little 
capacity to damage 
waste package (6.6.3) 
• Drip shields do not 
separate or collapse under 
rockfall loads and can 
deflect rockfall away from 
the waste package (6.5.5) 
• Damage to waste package 
and cladding from rockfall 
excluded from TSPA 
 
6.6.1.2 Structural Response Calculations 
Damage to the drip shield from impact of individual rock blocks is determined by structural 
response calculations (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168993]), supplemented by the results in (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 174052]).  The objectives of the initial calculations (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168993]) are to 
determine the areas on the drip shield where the residual stress exceeds the threshold value 
(50 percent of yield strength) for Titanium Grade 7 and to determine the potential for buckling 
and collapse.  Six representative rock sizes impact the drip shield from three different 
angles:  vertically downward onto the top of the drip shield, at a 60° angle (with the horizontal) 
onto the transition region between the top and side of the drip shield, and into the side wall at a 
40º angle with the horizontal.  The block impacts the drip shield edge-on to maximize damage.  
These calculations incorporate the potential for corrosion to degrade the drip shield by reducing 
the thickness of the drip shield plates by 2 mm.  This thickness reduction is a conservative 
representation of material loss by general corrosion over the first 10,000 years after repository 
closure and a reasonable representation of barrier degradation for 20,000 years after repository 
closure.  The 20,000-year period is selected to demonstrate that repository performance remains 
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robust well after the first 10,000 years following repository closure.  These calculations also 
evaluate mechanical properties at 150°C to represent the potential degradation in mechanical 
strength if a seismic hazard occurs during the initial thermal pulse after repository closure. 
The objectives of the supplemental calculations (BSC 2005 [DIRS 174052]) are to determine 
permanent deflection of the drip shield for edge-on and corner-on impacts and to determine the 
associated damaged areas.  Six representative rock blocks impact vertically downward on the 
drip shield in an edge-or or corner-on orientation.  These blocks include a 28.29 metric ton (MT) 
block with the maximum kinetic energy of 706,914 Joules.  Other features of the supplemental 
calculations are similar to the initial calculations, including a reduction in plate thickness by 2 
mm to represent general corrosion and evaluation of material properties at 150˚C.  
The initial and supplemental calculations provide a conservative estimate of damaged area on  
the drip shield from rock block impact.  The calculations are conservative because (1) an 
individual rock block cannot shatter on impact with the drip shield, (2) the residual stress failure 
criterion for titanium Grade 7 is conservatively set to 50% of the yield strength to represent the 
potential for long-term degradation of the material, (4) the potential for creep to reduce the stress 
intensity driving SCCs through the titanium plates is ignored, and (5) blocks are always oriented 
so that their center of mass is directly above the point or edge of impact. 
A key result from the initial suite of calculations is that the maximum vertical displacement in 
the drip shield components takes place in the longitudinal stiffener during the vertical impact of 
the 11.5 MT rock block with a kinetic energy of 348,174 Joules (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168993], 
Section 6).  The maximum peak dynamic displacement is 25.4 cm (254 mm) (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 168993], Figure II-5).  A key result from the supplemental calculations is that the 
permanent deflection for the 28.29 MT block with the maximum kinetic energy is 0.114 m and 
0.129 m for edge-on and corner-on impacts, respectively (BSC 2005 [DIRS 174052], Tables 7-5 
and 7-6).  The drip shield does not buckle or collapse from any of the impacts (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 174052], Figures 7-14 to 7-20).  In addition, the maximum displacements are less than the 
minimum clearance, 367.1 mm, between the interior height of the drip shield and the top of any 
waste package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168489], Figure 1).  It follows that the drip shield does not 
contact any waste package even for an impact by the rock block with the maximum kinetic 
energy, thereby preventing rockfall from directly or indirectly contacting the waste package and 
cladding. 
Table 6.6-2 shows the damage results from the initial calculations for the rock blocks generated 
by ground motions with PGV between 2.44 m/s and 5.35 m/s (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], 
Tables 2 and 3).  The information in Table 6.6-2 provides data on the potential for smaller rock 
blocks to damage the drip shield, and is useful for the analysis of damage in the lithophysal 
zones in the next section. 
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Table 6.6-2. Damaged Area from Individual Rock Blocks Impacting the Drip Shield 
Damaged area (m2; and as a % of Total Drip Shield Surface Area) 
Rock Mass and 
Kinetic Energy  
(MT and Joules) 
Rockfall Onto Top  
Of Drip Shield 
(90° from horizontal) 
Rockfall Onto Drip 
Shield Corner 
(60° from horizontal) 
Rockfall Onto Drip 
Shield Side-Wall 
(40° from horizontal) 
0.25 MT Rock 
(~0 J) 
0.0 
(0.00%) 
0.0 
(0.00%) 
0.0 
(0.00%) 
0.11 MT Rock 
(42 J) 
0.0 
(0.00%) 
0.0 
(0.00%) 
0.0 
(0.00%) 
0.15 MT Rock 
(902 J) 
0.0015 
(0.00%) 
0.0091 
(0.02%) 
0.0 
(0.00%) 
3.3 MT Rock 
(24712 J) 
0.548 
(1.43%) 
0.416 
(1.09%) 
0.0 
(0.00%) 
14.5 MT Rock 
(163083 J) 
3.508 
(9.17%) 
0.612 
(1.60%) 
0.079 
(0.21%) 
11.5 MT Rock 
(348174 J) 
4.304 
(11.25%) 
2.835 
(7.41%) 
1.126 
(2.94%) 
Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], Tables 2 and 3. 
MT = metric ton; J = joules. 
6.6.2 Drip Shield Damage from Rockfall in the Lithophysal Zone 
Two potential sources of damage to the drip shield have been considered in the lithophysal 
zone:  damage from the individual rock fragments that fall onto the drip shield and the static load 
on the drip shield from drift collapse.  The individual rock fragments are too small to do 
significant damage to the drip shield and the mean static loads from a collapsed drift are not 
predicted to collapse the drip shield.  Damage to the drip shield from rockfall in the lithophysal 
zone is not included in the drip shield damage abstraction for TSPA-LA, but is discussed here for 
completeness. 
6.6.2.1 Lithophysal Rockfall Analyses 
In the lithophysal zones, the rock mass has very low compressive strength and is permeated with 
void spaces of varying size.  Average joint spacing is less than 1 meter, and at certain locations 
this spacing is much smaller, on the order of 0.1 meters (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], 
Section 6.1.4.1).  The drifts in the lithophysal zone are predicted to collapse into small fragments 
with particle sizes of centimeters to decimeters (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 8.1) under 
the loads imposed by vibratory ground motions with a PGV of 2.0 m/s or greater.  The Drift 
Degradation Analysis model report (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107] Section 6.4) provides a detailed 
description of the lithophysal rockfall analyses. 
The small fragments from lithophysal failure have little capability to damage the drip shield 
because the small mass and energy of the individual fragments cannot cause significant 
permanent deformation of the drip shield, as shown by the top rows of Table 6.6-2.  As an 
example, consider a fragment that is a cube 0.1-meter (4-inches) on a side.  The volume of this 
fragment is 0.001 m3 and its mass is 2.3 kg (0.0023 MT), assuming a tuff density of 2,300 kg/m3.  
The velocity of this fragment is approximated as 7.7 m/s for a 3-meter drop under gravitational 
acceleration, and the associated kinetic energy is 59 Joules.  A comparison of the mass and 
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kinetic energy of the 0.1 meter fragment with the second row in Table 6.6-2 indicates that there 
is no damage from the impact of this fragment on the drip shield. 
The probability of large coherent (key) blocks being generated by the collapse process in the 
lithophysal zones is very low (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.4.3), so their presence is not 
considered in this analysis.   
6.6.2.2 Structural Response to Static Loads 
Drift collapse in the lithophysal zones can impose a static load on the drip shield from the weight 
of the natural backfill that fills the drifts as a result of the collapse.  The structural response of the 
drip shield to the static rock loads in the lithophysal zones after complete collapse of the 
emplacement drift have been analyzed for six cases using a discontinuum representation of the 
host rock (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.4.2.5 and Figure 6-174).  The average pressures 
on the top, left side, and right side of the drip shield for the 6 cases are 128 kPa, 42 kPa, and 
62 kPa, respectively.  The maximum mean pressures on the top, left side, and right side are 
155 kPa, 70 kPa, and 129 kPa, respectively.  These mean pressures are an average over the 
individual elements of the finite-element model on the top, left side, or right side of the structure.  
The peak local pressure on an individual element is 700 kPa (all data from BSC 2004 
[DIRS 166107], Section 6.4.2.5).  The drip shield is does not buckle or collapse under these 
loads.  To estimate a factor-of-safety for structural stability of the drip shield under quasi-static 
load, the density of the rubble was progressively increased by 2.5, 3, and 4 times.  This approach 
is appropriate because it increases the vertical and lateral pressures in tandem, without additional 
assumptions about extreme vertical or lateral loads.  The drip shield does not buckle or 
collapse at density multiplication factors of 2.5 and 3.  The drip shield undergoes severe plastic 
deformation in its support beams at a density multiplication factor of 4.  The conclusion from 
this discontinuum rockfall analysis is that there is a factor of safety of approximately 3 for the 
drip shield under static loading (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.4.2.5). 
Titanium is observed to undergo creep under static loads.  The long-term creep of the drip shield 
has therefore been analyzed for the static loading in a collapsed drift (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 174715]).  The static loading utilizes the six loading cases derived from a discontinuum 
representation of the collapsed host rock (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.4.2.5 and 
Figure 6-174).  The creep response of titanium is simulated using a single-component power law 
whose coefficients are based on curve fits that bound laboratory creep data for titanium samples.  
The primary data for the curve fits are based on 27-year uniaxial creep tests on commercially 
pure titanium (Drefahl et al. 1985 [DIRS 174820]).  The resulting coefficients in the power law 
cover a wide range of stress conditions and a temperature of 150˚C, providing a conservative 
representation of creep for Titanium Grade 7 and Grade 24. 
The mechanical coupling between drip shield deformation and the loading from the surrounding 
natural backfill must be included for realistic structural response calculations.  An analysis of the  
deformability of the natural backfill provides an effective spring constant between the intact 
emplacement drift wall and the drip shield outer surface (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172] Attachment 
IX).  This spring constant couples drip shield deformation with the backfill loads by developing a 
reactive backpressure (i.e., a confinement) that tends to inhibit further creep deformation.   
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The creep calculations demonstrate that the drip shield is stable over the 10,000-year period after 
closure for the six loading cases.  The maximum creep displacement after 10,000 years is 
approximately 5.5 cm, and the maximum creep strain is less than 5 percent, which is well below 
the tertiary creep rupture strain limit for titanium (BSC 2005 [DIRS 174715], Section 3.2, 
Assumption 3.2.9).  Based on these creep analyses, collapse of the drip shield from creep of 
titanium is screened out from TSPA for the 10,000-year period after repository closure. 
6.6.3 Damage to the Waste Package and Cladding from Rockfall 
Damage to the waste package and cladding from rockfall has not been included in the 
abstractions for TSPA-LA.  The waste package and cladding are not damaged because the drip 
shield remains structurally intact for seismic events with a PGV up to 5.35 m/s, deflecting even 
the largest rock blocks away from the waste package.  The drip shield also does not separate for 
ground motions with a PGV up to 5.35 m/s (Section 6.5.5).  It is therefore reasonable to screen 
out damage to the waste package and cladding from rockfall because the drip shield remains able 
to deflect rockfall up to the maximum PGV level (4.07 m/s) that is considered in the TSPA-LA.  
6.7 RESPONSE TO FAULT DISPLACEMENT 
In addition to inducing severe ground motion/acceleration as discussed in the previous sections, 
seismic events can also result in fault displacements within the emplacement drifts.  Fault 
displacement could impact key EBS components in two ways: 
• Separation between adjacent drip shields could allow a pathway for seepage to contact 
the waste packages, thereby potentially accelerating corrosion-induced waste package 
failure. 
• Mechanical damage to the waste packages, drip shields, and fuel rod cladding caused 
directly by the fault displacement. 
Potential faulting within the emplacement drifts that has a reasonable likelihood of slipping 
during the 10,000 years following repository closure generally results in very small 
displacements associated with the faults.  With the exception of the Solitario Canyon fault and 
the Ghost Dance fault, which are immediately outside the western and eastern boundaries of the 
emplacement drifts, a fault displacement of greater than 0.1 cm is associated with a mean annual 
exceedance frequency of less than 10-5 per year.  For such low-frequency events, there is 
significant uncertainty and variability in the expected magnitude of the fault displacement 
developed by the PSHA.  Given the lack of precision in the estimated fault displacement 
magnitudes for very low frequency events, a highly detailed calculation of drip shield and waste 
package response to such events is not warranted.  Rather, the focus is on the potential for the 
waste package to be pinned when fault displacement is greater than the available clearance 
around the waste package for unfilled and filled drifts.  Thus, the response calculations presented 
herein are intentionally simplistic and conservative. 
For a fault displacement that occurs along an emplacement drift, a sudden discontinuity in the 
floor and roof of the drift may occur.  This would result in one portion of the drift being 
displaced vertically relative to the adjacent section.  Such a discontinuity in the drift axis could 
cause separation of adjacent drip shields, and if severe enough, could cause shearing of a waste 
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package at that location.  The discussion in this Section identifies the conditions under which 
these damage mechanisms could occur. 
6.7.1 Clearance Between EBS Components and the Drift 
To determine the response of the drip shield, waste package and cladding to a fault displacement, 
consider the layout within the emplacement drift, shown schematically in Figure 6.7-1.  The 
emplacement drift itself is nominally 5,500 mm in diameter.  Within the drift, the steel support 
beams and associated ballast form a level invert whose top surface is 863.6 mm above the lowest 
part of the drift floor (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170074]).  Sitting on this invert floor is the waste 
package emplacement pallet, which raises the waste package off the invert floor.  While the 
actual elevation difference between the invert floor and the bottom of the waste package varies 
depending on the specific diameter of the waste package, the exact value is not important for this 
analysis.  As indicated in the discussion that follows, this elevation difference is not actually 
used in the analysis. 
Drip 
Shield 
Invert 
 
Clearance If 
Rockfall Fills 
the Tunnel 
Clearance 
Without 
Rockfall 
Emplacement 
Pallet 
Waste 
Package 
 
Not to Scale 
Figure 6.7-1. Schematic Diagram of EBS Components Illustrating the Clearances for Fault Displacement 
The drip shield is also sitting on the invert floor.  The drip shield has an external height of 
2,885.62 mm (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], Table 1), rounded up to 2,886 mm for this analysis.  
The internal height of the drip shield, defined as the distance from the invert floor to the lowest 
point on the underside of the top of the drip shield, is 2,716 mm (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168489], 
Figure 1).  There is then a clearance of 1,751 mm between the top of the drip shield and the drift 
roof.  A summary of these parameters, which are independent of waste package design, along 
with the source of the values, is provided in Table 6.7-1. 
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Table 6.7-1. Emplacement Drift Configuration Dimensions that are Independent of the Waste Package 
Description Value Source 
Emplacement Drift Diameter 5.5 m BSC 2005 [DIRS 173498], Figure 1 
Invert Thickness (maximum) 863.6 mm BSC 2004 [DIRS 170074]  
Drip Shield Height - Exterior 2885.62 mm BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], Table 1 
Drip Shield Height - Interior 2716 mm BSC 2004 [DIRS 168489], Figure 1 
Clearance from Top of Drip Shield to Roof of Drift 1751 mm Calculated:  
(5500-863.6-2885.62 = 1750.78) 
 
Table 6.7-2 summarizes the exterior dimensions of the various waste package designs 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1), rounded to five significant figures.  The most important 
parameter for the analyses presented herein is the outside diameter of the waste package outer 
barrier, which is seen to vary between 1,294 mm and 2,045 mm.  Also shown in Table 6.7-2 is 
the calculated clearance between the top of the waste package and the underside of the drip 
shield in the undisturbed state, without the pallet.  This clearance is defined as the interior height 
of the drip shield less the outside diameter of the waste package outer barrier.  The elevation of 
the package above the invert is not included in calculating the clearance, as explained below.  
This clearance varies between 671 mm and 1,422 mm, depending on waste package type.  
Table 6.7-2 also shows the clearance between the top of the waste package and underside of the 
drip shield for selected packages with the pallet in place.  The presence of the pallet reduces the 
clearance by 270.9 mm to 303.9 mm. 
Table 6.7-2. Waste Package Dimensions and Clearance Between Drip Shield and Waste Package 
Package Type 
Outside 
Diameter of 
Waste 
Package 
Outer 
Barrier  
(mm) 
Nominal 
Length 
(mm) 
Clearance 
Without 
Pallet 
(mm) 
Clearance 
With 
Pallet 
(mm) 
Difference in 
Clearances 
(mm) 
44-BWR 1675.1 5024.4 1041 765.2 275.8 
24-BWR 1294.1 5024.4 1422 — — 
21-PWR 1637.0 5024.4 1079 806.2 272.8 
12-PWR 1313.2 5560.4 1403 1132.1 270.9 
Naval-Long 1863.7 5837.4 852 562.1 289.9 
Naval-Short 1863.7 5202.2 852 562.1 289.9 
5-DHLW/DOE Spent 
Nuclear Fuel -Short 2044.7 3452.8 671 367.1 303.9 
5-DHLW/DOE Spent 
Nuclear Fuel -Long 2044.7 5059.4 671 367.1 303.9 
2-MCO/2-DHLW 1749.4 5059.4 967 — — 
Source: BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 for nominal length; outside diameter of outer barrier defined by 
drawings identified in BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1; clearance with pallet based on BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170074]. 
NOTES: Clearance without pallet is calculated as the interior height of the drip shield minus the outside 
diameter of the waste package outer barrier, rounded to 4 significant digits. 
 Difference in Clearances = Clearance Without Pallet - Clearance With Pallet. 
BWR = boiling water reactor; DHLW = defense high-level radioactive waste; PWR = pressurized water 
reactor; MCO = multicanister overpack. 
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The clearance between the top of the drip shield and the roof of the drift (Table 6.7-1) and the 
clearance between the top of the waste package and the bottom of the drip shield (Table 6.7-2) 
are measures of how much fault displacement could occur before the waste packages are 
potentially degraded through a shearing mechanism.  At the start of a large seismic event, the 
clearance above the drip shield will be unimpeded because the drifts are expected to be unfilled 
before the seismic event and because a fault displacement can occur in a very short time in 
comparison to the ground motion.  If a drift collapses from a large seismic event, the available 
clearance above the drip shield will be a function of the rubble filling a collapsed drift.  Once a 
drift collapses, the space surrounding the drip shield will be partly or completely filled with 
loosely packed rock fragments.  This loosely packed material still allows significant motion of 
the drip shield during the fault displacement, as explained below.  For those drifts in the lower 
lithophysal zone of the repository, drift collapse is calculated to occur for ground motions with 
PGV values greater than or equal to 2.0 m/s (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.4.2.2.2). 
The actual response of the EBS components to a fault displacement scenario is complicated.  As 
a conservative simplification, the fault displacement is analyzed considering: 
• The fault is perpendicular to the drift axis with the displacement being purely vertical 
• The fault displacement occurs at a discrete plane, creating a “knife-edge” discontinuity. 
Vertical faulting is consistent with the faults investigated at the site.  As part of the exploratory 
studies of the site, the Enhanced Characterization of the Repository Block (ECRB) Cross-Drift 
was dug through a representative part of the repository footprint to obtain visual evidence of both 
rock stratigraphy and faulting.  The results of this investigation (Mongano et al. 1999 
[DIRS 149850], pp. 51 to 59) found evidence for four faults along the length of the ECRB 
Cross-Drift between the Ghost Dance and Solitario Canyon faults that bound the location of the 
emplacement drifts.  One of these was the Sundance fault, the other three are unnamed faults that 
showed between one and a few meters of cumulative faulting from multiple seismic events.  In 
each of these cases, the measured displacements were characterized as vertical, which is 
consistent with the assumption made herein.  By treating the faults as perpendicular to the drift 
axis, no credit is taken for sideways movement of the waste packages that could lessen the 
degree to which fault displacement could cause damage. 
An actual fault zone has a finite width over which the displacement could occur.  However, 
based on the observations reported in the investigation of the ECRB Cross-Drift (Mongano 
et al. 1999 [DIRS 149850], pp. 51 to 59), the width of the fault disturbed zone varied between 
just under a meter to a little over 2 meters.  Thus, the width of the zone is less than the length of 
any waste package type.  If during a single seismic faulting event, the total displacement were to 
be distributed over a sufficiently wide zone, a single waste package could potentially see less 
than the total fault displacement, resulting in a decreased probability of failure.  By treating fault 
displacement as a sharp discontinuity in the drift floor/roof, the likelihood of damage to the 
waste package is increased.  Thus, the overall treatment is conservative. 
A sudden discontinuity in the drift floor would tend to raise one end of a drip shield and waste 
package.  However, the other EBS components, specifically the invert and emplacement pallet, 
would also be affected.  A significant amount of the invert ballast from the elevated portion of 
the drift is expected to fall into the lower drift segment.  In addition, the steel supports in the 
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invert and the emplacement pallet are expected to collapse at the plane of displacement, further 
degrading the integrity of the invert.  Movement along a sudden discontinuity will also affect the 
rubble surrounding the drip shield after drift collapse.  The rubble is a loosely packed material 
with a typical porosity in the 20 percent to 30 percent range.  With this free space, the rubble has 
substantial movement in the plane of discontinuity and longitudinally along the drift axis during 
the fault displacement.  The movement of the rubble will allow the drip shield to move with the 
fault displacement, rather than being rigidly pinned to the invert.  In this situation, the effective 
clearance around the drip shield is expected to be significantly larger than space between the top 
of the waste package and bottom of the drip shield.  
The exact details of these events are difficult to predict.  For example, the timing of the fault 
displacement versus drift collapse is highly uncertain, so the full clearance between the top of the 
drip shield and the roof of the drift may not be available.  On the other hand, the potential for 
substantial movement of rubble after drift collapse has been confirmed in ground motion 
analyses at the 2.44-m/s PGV level (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.4.2.5.3).  These 
simulations demonstrate that the rubble particles undergo large dynamic motion in response to 
displacements of the drift walls, similar to what would occur during a vertical fault displacement.  
It follows that the clearance between the top of the drip shield and the roof of the drift will be 
partly available, but the exact value is difficult to quantify. 
As a simplification, the approximation is made that the clearance between the top of the waste 
package and the bottom of the drip shield is determined without the pallet.  This is a reasonable 
approximation because the clearance between the top of the drip shield and the roof of the drift, 
1751 mm (Table 6.7-1), is more than five times greater than the differences in clearance with or 
without the pallet, 270.9 mm to 303.9 mm (Table 6.7-2).  In other words, the height of rubble 
above the drip shield is much greater than the difference in clearance due to the pallet.  Since the 
porosity and dynamic motion of the rubble allows the drip shield to displace horizontally and 
vertically during the ground motion, the difference in clearance due to the pallet can be 
accommodated by drip shield displacements that are a small percentage of the height of the 
rubble.  It follows that the potential for upward displacements of the drip shield into the large 
rubble-filled space between the top of drip shield and roof of the drift allows for vertical motions 
that can exceed the maximum difference (303.9-mm) in clearance due to the pallet.  It is then 
reasonable to exclude the presence of the pallet in defining clearances between components 
because of the potential for upward displacement of the drip shield.  No credit is taken for any 
shifting of the ballast in the invert. 
The maximum allowable displacement of the waste package before it is pinned also depends on 
the condition and dynamic response of the drift after the seismic event.  In those cases where 
drift collapse does not occur from the ground motion or from gradual degradation of the host 
rock, then the allowable waste package displacement without damage is much greater than the 
free height under the drip shield.  For example, upward displacement of the waste package could 
cause the drip shield to lift since there is no drift debris to hold it in place.  In those cases where 
the drift collapses, the loosely packed rubble can still allow substantial dynamic movement of the 
drip shield.  The maximum allowable fault displacement prior to waste package damage is 
determined without including the pallet, as explained above.  The calculated clearances are 
summarized in Table 6.7-3. 
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The values in Table 6.7-3 represent the failure criteria for waste packages and drip shields under 
fault displacement.  Fault displacement in excess of these values is conservatively considered to 
fail the waste package, the overlying drip shield, and the internal cladding through direct 
shearing. 
Failure of the drip shields could also occur without direct waste package damage.  One 
mechanism for this is lifting of one drip shield relative to its neighbor, thereby creating a 
pathway for ingress of seepage water onto the waste package.  However, drip shield failure 
without waste package damage will generally have low consequence for performance 
assessment, so it will be screened out from TSPA-LA based on low consequence and is not 
considered further herein. 
Table 6.7-3. Maximum Allowable Displacement Before Waste Package is Pinned 
Package Type 
Maximum Allowable Displacement 
With Drift Collapse (mm) 
Maximum Allowable Displacement 
Without Drift Collapse (mm) 
44-BWR 1041 2792 
24-BWR 1422 3173 
21-PWR 1079 2830 
12-PWR 1403 3154 
Naval-Long 852 2603 
Naval-Short 852 2603 
5-DHLW/DOE Spent 
Nuclear Fuel -Short 671 2422 
5-DHLW/DOE Spent 
Nuclear Fuel -Long 671 2422 
2-MCO/2-DHLW 967 2717 
NOTES: Maximum allowable displacement with drift collapse = clearance without pallet in Table 6.7-2.
Maximum allowable displacement without drift collapse is given by the interior height of the drip 
shield (2716 mm) minus the outer diameter of the waste package (Table 6.7-2) plus 
1750.78 mm, rounded to 4 significant digits. 
 BWR = boiling water reactor; DHLW = defense high-level radioactive waste; PWR = pressurized 
water reactor; MCO = multicanister overpack 
6.7.2 Faults Intersecting Emplacement Drifts 
The location, frequency, and magnitude of potential fault displacements within the emplacement 
drift footprint must be analyzed to determine the potential impacts of fault displacement on the 
Yucca Mountain repository.  Such fault displacements could occur at known faults that intersect 
the emplacement drifts (based on surface mapping), or at other locations within the repository. 
6.7.2.1 Location of Known Faults 
Information on known faults intersecting the emplacement drifts is obtained from three sources.  
The traces for the Sever Wash fault, Drill Hole Wash fault, Pagany Wash fault, and the western 
splay off the main Ghost Dance fault relative to the repository are provided in BSC (2004 
[DIRS 168180], Figure 4).  The intersection of these traces with individual emplacement drifts is 
defined in BSC (2004 [DIRS 168180], Table 9); the western splay off the main Ghost Dance is 
denoted as the West Ghost Dance fault in Figure 4 and Table 9 of BSC 2004 [DIRS 168180].  
The trace of the Sundance fault relative to the emplacement drifts is provided in the Geologic 
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Framework Model (DTN:  MO0012MWDGFM02.002 [DIRS 153777]).  Lastly, the location of 
emplacement drifts relative to the geologic units is defined in by the Geologic Framework Model 
(DTN:  MO0012MWDGFM02.002 [DIRS 153777]).  From these three sources of information, 
the intersections of known faults with specific drifts and the local rock type (lithophysal or 
nonlithophysal) can be determined.   
This information is summarized in Table 6.7-4, where drifts are identified by panel number and 
drift number, plus a designation for east or west when appropriate (see BSC 2004 
[DIRS 172801], Figure 1, for the drift nomenclature).  As can be seen from Table 6.7-4, there are 
22 locations in the lithophysal zones where a known fault intersects an emplacement drift, plus 
another eight locations where such an intersection occurs in the nonlithophysal zones.  
Intersections where two rock types occur at an intersection are conservatively assigned to the 
lithophysal category because this is most restrictive in terms of clearance for the waste package.  
This information, along with the frequency of a fault displacement of sufficient magnitude to 
cause waste package failure at these locations, can be used to determine the frequency and 
consequence of waste package failure. 
The potential drift intersections with the western splay off the main Ghost Dance fault are not 
included in Table 6.7-4 and are not included in the fault displacement damage abstraction for 
TSPA-LA.  The western splay off the main Ghost Dance fault intersects drifts 2-17 through 2-27, 
at the southernmost end of panel 2 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168180], Figure 4 and Table 9, denoted as 
the West Ghost Dance fault).  Drifts 2-18 through 2-27 lie in a contingency area for repository 
development (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168370], Figure 2).  This area has been designated as a 
contingency area because it is in the vicinity of the intensely fractured zone between 
Stations 42+00 and 51+50 of the ESF Main Drift (Albin et al. 1997 [DIRS 101367], discussion 
of the Third Domain on pages 69-72).  Special mining procedures may be required for drift 
excavation and ground support in this area because of the ground conditions, and the utility of 
this emplacement area will be determined during repository development.  Given the 
uncertainties in the use of the contingency area at this time, it is reasonable to exclude it from 
consideration in TSPA-LA. 
6.7.2.2 Faulting Other Than at Known Faults 
During a major seismic event, faulting could occur not only coincident with the location of well 
characterized, known faults, but also elsewhere in the repository.  In characterizing the potential 
magnitude of fault displacement elsewhere in the repository (Section 6.7.3), rock conditions 
ranging from intact rock to the presence of existing small faults with about 2 meters of 
cumulative offset are considered.  As is discussed in Section 6.7.3, the frequency of significant 
fault displacement (>10 cm) is low, even for the most extreme events with exceedance frequency 
of 10-8 per year, except where an existing fault is located with cumulative offset of about 
2 meters.  However, the exact location and number of such small faults is not known because 
they are not readily identified through surface mapping.  Thus, it is necessary to estimate the 
density of such small faults based on either existing site data or natural analogues. 
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Table 6.7-4. Intersections of Known Faults with Emplacement Drifts 
Fault Designator 
Drift Intersections in 
Lithophysal† Zones 
Drift Intersections in 
Nonlithophysala Zones 
Sundance fault 1-6 1-8 
 1-7 2-1 
Drill Hole Wash fault 4-1 3-10 E 
 4-2 3-11 E 
 3-4 W 3-12 E 
 3-5 W - 
 3-6 W - 
 3-7 W - 
 3-8 W - 
 3-9 W - 
 3-13E  
 3-14 E - 
 3-15 E - 
 3-16 E - 
 3-17 E - 
Pagany Wash fault 3-1 W 3-5 E 
 3-1 E 3-6 E 
 3-2 E 3-7 E 
 3-3 E - 
 3-4 E - 
Sever Wash fault 3-2 E - 
 3-3 E - 
a Lithophysal zones are the RHHtop (top of Tptpul) and Tptpll strata  
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 168370], Table 8); Nonlithophysal zones are the Tptpmn 
and Tptpln strata (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168370], Table 8). 
Sources: BSC 2004 [DIRS 168180], Table 9 for drift intersections with Sever 
Wash, Drill Hole Wash, and Pagany Wash faults. 
DTN: MO0012MWDGFM02.002 [DIRS 153777] for drift intersections with 
Sundance fault and for locations of geologic units relative to fault traces 
and emplacement drifts.  See Table 4-1 for the relevant Earthvision files. 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 172801], Figure 1 for panel and drift nomenclature. 
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One means of quantifying the likelihood of such smaller faults is through use of the data 
obtained from the characterization of the ECRB Cross-Drift (Mongano et al. 1999 
[DIRS 149850], pp. 51 to 59).  The ECRB Cross-Drift extends through the repository footprint 
near its north/south midpoint and spans the approximate east/west extent of the repository.  Over 
the length of this drift, three small faults were identified with cumulative displacement of 
between about one meter and a few meters.  This is thought to be generally representative of the 
density of small faults throughout the repository, so one can make an estimate of the number of 
such small faults that might intersect the emplacement drifts.  In reviewing the repository layout 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 172801], Figure 1), it can be seen that there are 57 emplacement drifts that 
span the entire north to south extent of the repository (designated 3-1 W through 3-22 W, 
1-1 through 1-8, and 2-1 through 2-27).  While in several cases these drifts are much shorter than 
the ECRB Cross-Drift, for abstraction purposes the three unknown small faults intersect the 
repository footprint along its entire north to south extent.  Emplacement drifts  2-18 through 2-27 
lie in the contingency area (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168370], Figure 2), in the vicinity of an intensely 
fractured zone (Albin et al. 1997 [DIRS 101367], discussion of the Third Domain on 
pages 69-2), and their development and use in the repository is uncertain at this time.  Without 
drifts 2-18 through 2-27, there are a total of 47 drifts and 141 locations (47 times 3) where small 
faults have the potential to intersect the emplacement drifts. 
Since the exact location of these potential faults is unknown, one cannot determine with certainty 
whether they would intersect the emplacement drifts in the lithophysal zones or not.  To estimate 
the fraction of intersections corresponding to lithophysal zones, we use the fact that the estimated 
fraction of the overall repository in the lithophysal zone is 0.85, based on the emplacement areas 
in the upper lithophysal zone, Tptpul, and in the lower lithophysal zone, Tptpll11.  This fractional 
area is applied to the 141 small fault intersections to get a probability-weighted distribution of 
fault intersections versus rock stratigraphy.  The result is 119.85 small fault intersections with 
drifts in lithophysal zones and 21.15 small fault intersections with drifts in nonlithophysal zones. 
6.7.3 Fault Displacement Hazards 
Magnitudes of fault displacement along two of the known faults (Sundance and Drill Hole Wash) 
as a function of probability are obtained from Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analyses for Fault 
Displacement and Vibratory Ground Motion at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 1998 
[DIRS 103731]; DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962]).  In Section 8 of that 
document, the DOE has developed fault displacement hazard curves for fifteen faulting 
conditions mapped within the immediate vicinity of Yucca Mountain.  Mean fault displacement 
hazard curves are used in the following analyses.  The faulting conditions relevant to this 
abstraction are as follows: 
• Site 2 - Solitario Canyon fault 
• Site 3 - Drill Hole Wash fault 
• Site 4 - Ghost Dance fault 
                                                 
11  The fraction of the repository in the Tptpul and Tptpll = (224,398 m2 + 4,013,268 m2)/(4,983,152 m2) = 0.85, based on the 
data in BSC (2004 [DIRS 168370], Table 8). 
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• Site 5 - Sundance fault 
• Site 7 - A generic location within the repository, approximately 100 meters east of the 
Solitario Canyon fault.  The ground conditions at the generic location include intact rock 
(7d), a hypothetical fracture with no cumulative displacement (7c), a hypothetical shear 
with 10 cm of offset (7b), and a hypothetical small fault with 2 meter offset (7a). 
• Site 8 - A generic location within the repository, midway between the Solitario Canyon 
fault and the Ghost Dance fault.  The ground conditions at the generic location include 
intact rock (8d), a hypothetical fracture with no cumulative displacement (8c), a 
hypothetical shear with 10 cm of offset (8b), and a hypothetical small fault with 2 meter 
offset (8a). 
Four known faults intersect the emplacement areas of the repository.  These four faults are the 
Drill Hole Wash fault, the Sundance fault, the Pagany Wash fault, and the Sever Wash fault.  It is 
assumed that displacements on the Pagany Wash and Sever Wash faults are identical to those on 
the Drill Hole Wash fault (Assumption 5.1). 
Generic locations identified as Site 7 and Site 8 apply throughout the repository.  Locations 7a 
and/or 8a correspond to small hypothetical faults with about 2 meter offset.  There are 
141 intersections of these small faults with the emplacement drifts, based on the estimate in 
Section 6.7.2.2. 
Table 6.7-5 provides the displacement values from the mean hazard curves as a function of the 
mean annual exceedance frequency (or probability) (DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 
[DIRS 166962], data files associated with sites 2, 3, 4, 5, 7a-7d and 8a-8c are identified in 
Table 4-1 of this report).  The first and third faults (Solitario Canyon and Ghost Dance Faults) in 
Table 6.7-5 are adjacent to the repository block and are not considered further because no waste 
packages lie on these faults.  Locations 7 and 8 have essentially the same estimated hazard 
curves and fault displacements relative to the accuracy of the results in Probabilistic Seismic 
Hazard Analyses for Fault Displacement and Vibratory Ground Motion at Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada (CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 103731]; DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 
[DIRS 166962]).  Thus, this analysis does not distinguish between Sites 7a and 8a for estimating 
the consequences to waste packages that lie on these faults. 
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Table 6.7-5. Fault Displacement from Mean Hazard Curves 
Mean Annual Exceedance Frequency (1/yr) 
 10-4 10-5 10-6 10-7 10-8 
Site Number and Fault Name Displacement (cm) 
2 - Solitario Canyon <0.1 32.0 190 500 >1000 
3 - Drill Hole Wash a <0.1 <0.1 17 80 240 
4 - Ghost Dance <0.1 <0.1 13 58 160 
5 - Sundance <0.1 <0.1 6 42 ~145 
7a - small fault with 2-m offset <0.1 <0.1 2 20 ~75 
7b - shear with 10-cm offset <0.1 <0.1 1 6 9 
7c - fracture with no displacement <0.1 <0.1 0.1 <1 <1 
7d - intact rock <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 
8a - small fault with 2-m offset <0.1 <0.1 2 20 ~75 
8b - shear with 10-cm offset <0.1 <0.1 1 6 9 
8c - fracture with no displacement <0.1 <0.1 0.1 <1 <1 
8d - intact rock b <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 
DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962]; data files associated with sites 2, 3, 4, 
5, 7a-7d and 8a-8c are listed in Table 4-1 of this report.  Displacements are 
calculated in the worksheet “Table 6.7-5 Calculations” in the file Appendix E 
Rev02.xls.  This file is included on the CD in Appendix G. 
a Also representative of Pagany Wash and Sever Wash faults. 
b Data for Site 8d are based on the observation that the fault displacements for Sites 7a, 
7b, and 7c are essentially identical with the fault displacements for Sites 8a, 8b, and 
8c, respectively.  In this situation, the fault displacements at Site 8d are anticipated to 
be very similar to the fault displacements at Site 7d considering that both generic 
locations involve intact rock within the repository block.  This observation is 
corroborated by information in CRWMS M&O (1998 [DIRS 103731] Section 8.2.1, first 
paragraph), which indicates that displacements at Site 8d are below 0.1 cm down to 
10-8 per year annual exceedance frequency. 
6.7.4 Consequence for the Waste Packages 
A comparison of Table 6.7-5 with Table 6.7-3 shows that no waste package would be damaged 
by even the most extreme events with exceedance frequency of 10-8 per year at locations 7b, 7c, 
7d, 8b, 8c, and 8d.  The waste packages will survive these events because the maximum 
displacement at these sites, 9 cm (90 mm), is less than the available clearances in Table 6.7-3.  
However, several of the waste package designs could potentially fail due to fault displacement 
for hazards near the 10-8 per year level if they are directly over one of the four known faults 
(Drill Hole Wash, Sundance, Pagany Wash, and Sever Wash) intersecting the emplacement 
drifts.  Further, the defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW) waste packages could 
potentially fail when placed over the small hypothetical faults at Sites 7a and 8a.  Thus, the 
frequency of waste package failure at a given fault location is a function of the clearance for the 
specific type of waste package emplaced there. 
Waste package distribution by type is available in the design basis inventory (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 173501], Table 15).  This inventory is repeated in Table 6.7-6, along with the waste 
package dimensions.  IED WASTE PACKAGE CONFIGURATION (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], 
Table 1), the source document for the waste package dimensions, does not provide information 
for the 5-DHLW Long/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel - Short or the 5-DHLW Long Only waste 
package configurations.  This is because these two configurations use the same waste package as 
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the 5-DHLW Long/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel - Long configuration with different assemblies 
loaded.  Thus, the waste package exterior dimensions are the same for these three configurations. 
Table 6.7-6. Design Basis Waste Package Dimensions and Inventory 
Waste Package Configuration 
Waste Package 
Length (m) 
Waste Package 
Diameter (m) Nominal Quantity 
21-PWR with Absorber Plates 5.0244 1.6370 4299 
21-PWR with Control Rods 5.0244 1.6370 95 
12-PWR with Absorber Plates - Long 5.5604 1.3132 163 
44-BWR with Absorber Plates 5.0244 1.6751 2831 
24-BWR with Absorber Plates 5.0244 1.2941 84 
5-DHLW Short/1 DOE Spent Nuclear 
Fuel - Short 
3.4528 2.0447 1147 
5-DHLW Long/1 DOE Spent Nuclear 
Fuel - Long 
5.0594 2.0447 1406 
5-DHLW Long/1 DOE Spent Nuclear 
Fuel - Short 
5.0594 2.0447 31 
5 HLW Long Only 5.0594 2.0447 679 
2-MCO/2-HLW 5.0594 1.7494 149 
Naval-Short 5.2022 1.8637 144 
Naval-Long 5.8374 1.8637 156 
Sources: BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 for nominal length; outside diameter of outer barrier defined by 
drawings referenced in BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1. 
 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 13 for nominal quantity. 
NOTES: The diameter of the HLW packages is taken to be that of the DHLW packages in Table 6.7-2. 
The length of the DHLW Short package is taken to be that of the 5-DHLW/DOE Spent Nuclear 
Fuel - Short package in Table 6.7-2. 
The length of the DHLW Long and HLW Long packages is taken to be that of the 5-DHLW/DOE 
Spent Nuclear Fuel - Long package in Table 6.7-2. 
BWR =  boiling water reactor; DHLW = defense high-level radioactive waste; PWR = pressurized 
water reactor; MCO = multicanister overpack 
To simplify the analysis, the inventory of waste packages is split into four groups.  Waste 
packages of similar design (similar waste type) are grouped together, and the maximum diameter 
for the waste package types in each group is conservatively assigned to the group.  These 
groupings are chosen to facilitate consequence assessment for the waste package groupings in 
TSPA-LA.  The four groupings are as follows. 
• PWR:  includes 21-PWR with absorber plates, 21-PWR with control rods, and the 
12-PWR Long with absorber plates. 
• BWR:  includes 44-BWR with absorber plates and 24-BWR with absorber plates. 
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• Naval:  includes Naval-Long and Naval-Short. 
• HLW:  includes 5-DHLW/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel-Short, 5-DHLW/1 DOE Spent 
Nuclear Fuel-Long, and all other high-level radioactive waste (HLW) designs. 
The waste package designs in bold letters are the ones with the largest diameter in the group, and 
thus are chosen to represent the diameter for all packages in that group.  While the inclusion of 
the 12-PWR design with the PWR group, the 24-BWR design with the BWR group, and the 
2-multicanister overpack/2-DHLW design with the HLW group conservatively accounts for the 
likelihood of failure for those waste package designs (by overestimating diameter), the impact of 
this approximation is small because in each case the number of such packages is small relative to 
the total number of packages in the group. 
The percentage of the inventory of the waste packages for each group is calculated based on the 
total length of that waste package type versus the total length of all emplaced waste packages.  
Length is the appropriate parameter here because it more accurately represents the probability 
that a waste package is directly on a fault.  These results are shown in Table 6.7-7.  The average 
length per package type is shown for information only.  It is used to calculate the fraction of 
waste packages by waste package type. 
Table 6.7-7. Parameters for Simplified Groups of Waste Packages 
Waste 
Package 
Group 
Effective 
Waste 
Package 
Lengthc, 
Leff (m) 
Maximum 
Waste 
Package 
Diameter, Dmax 
(m) 
Waste 
Package 
Surface Area a
(m2) 
Nominal
Quantity
(-) 
Total Waste 
Package Length 
for Group b (m) 
Fraction of 
Waste 
Packages (% of 
Total Length) 
PWR 5.0436 1.6370 30.15 4557 22984 42.0 
BWR 5.0244 1.6751 30.85 2915 14646 26.8 
Naval 5.5325 1.8637 37.85 300 1660 3.0 
HLW 4.5193 2.0447 35.60 3412 15420 28.2 
NOTE:  (-)=dimensionless. 
a Surface Area = (π/2)(Dmax)2 + πDmaxLeff. 
b Total Waste Package Length for Group= Σ( Length)i × (Nominal Quantity)i summed over the package types in 
each group, based on the lengths and nominal quantities in Table 6.7-6. 
c Effective Waste Package Length = Leff = Total Length / Nominal Quantity. 
PWR = pressurized water reactor, BWR = boiling water reactor 
Using the maximum waste package diameter in Table 6.7-7 and the calculated maximum fault 
displacements before the waste package is pinned in Table 6.7-3, the following maximum fault 
displacement values (to cause waste package damage) are used in the analysis. 
A determination of waste package failure is made by comparing the maximum allowable 
displacements in Table 6.7-8 with the fault displacement hazard curve in Table 6.7-5.  As a 
reminder, the Solitario Canyon and main Ghost Dance faults are not included in this analysis 
because these faults lie outside the emplacement areas of the repository, and the western splay 
off the main Ghost Dance fault is not included in this analysis because its development and use 
in the vicinity of an intensely fractured zone is uncertain at this time. 
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Table 6.7-8. Maximum Allowable Fault Displacements Before a Waste Package Group Is Pinned 
Waste Package 
Group 
Maximum Allowable Displacement 
With Drift Collapse 
Maximum Allowable Displacement 
Without Drift Collapse (mm) 
PWR 1079 mm (107.9 cm) 2830 mm (283.0 cm) 
BWR 1041 mm (104.1 cm)  2792 mm (279.2 cm) 
Naval 852 mm (85.2 cm) 2603 mm (260.3 cm) 
HLW 671 mm ( 67.1 cm) 2422 mm (242.2 cm) 
BWR = boiling water reactor; PWR = pressurized water reactor, HLW = high-level radioactive waste. 
Consider the case where drift collapse has not occurred.  As can be seen from Table 6.7-8, the 
HLW waste package group is subject to potential failure when the fault displacement exceeds the 
maximum allowable displacement of 2,422 mm.  However, as can be seen from Table 6.7-5, the 
maximum fault displacement for any of the faults that intersect the emplacement drifts is 
240 cm = 2,400 mm, which corresponds to a 10-8 fault displacement along the Drill Hole Wash 
fault (the Solitario Canyon fault has larger displacements, but no drifts in the current repository 
layout intersect this known fault).  Thus, since the maximum fault displacement is less than the 
allowable displacement of 2,422 mm, no damage to EBS components would be predicted 
without drift collapse.  The same conclusion is valid for the other waste package designs, with 
even greater margin. 
Now consider the case where drift collapse has occurred, as is expected in the lower lithophysal 
zones for seismic hazards with an annual exceedance frequency of 10-6 or less.  First, it is evident 
from a comparison of Tables 6.7-8 and 6.7-5 that the BWR, PWR, and Naval waste packages are 
predicted to survive a fault displacement event for Sites 7a and 8a, even in the lower lithophysal 
zones.  The maximum fault displacement in Table 6.7-5 for Sites 7 and 8 is 75 cm = 750 mm, 
less than the allowable fault displacement of 852 mm for the Naval group with drift collapse in 
the lower lithophysal units.  Again, the same conclusion is valid for the BWR and PWR waste 
package designs, with even greater margin. 
However, at mean annual exceedance frequencies between 10-7 per year and 10-8 per year, waste 
package failure may occur for any of the waste packages placed directly over the four known 
faults (Drill Hole Wash, Sundance, Pagany Wash, and Sever Wash faults) intersecting the 
emplacement drifts, as well as for the HLW waste package group placed over faults 
characterized by location 7a and 8a.  In those cases, the fault displacement values in Table 6.7-5 
exceed the maximum allowable displacements summarized in Table 6.7-8 for the case of drift 
collapse. 
The probability of a fault displacement event severe enough to cause waste package failure is a 
function of both the specific fault (different fault displacements for a given probability) as well 
as the specific waste package design (different allowable displacements).  The exceedance 
frequency is equal to the exceedance probability for values much less than one per year.  To 
determine the probability associated with a fault displacement event severe enough to cause 
waste package damage, the fault displacement hazard curves from the Probabilistic Seismic 
Hazard Analyses for Fault Displacement and Vibratory Ground Motion at Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada (MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962]) are used.  The relevant information is 
provided in file: ./displ/tot-haz/s3.frac_mean.gz of the DTN for the Drill Hole Wash fault, in file: 
./displ/tot_haz/s5.frac_mean.gz for the Sundance fault, and in files: 
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./displ/tot-haz/s7a.frac_mean.gz and ./displ/tot-haz/s8a.frac_mean.gz of the DTN for locations 7a 
and 8a.  These curves show the predicted fault displacement as a function of probability of the 
event (a graphical presentation of the results in Table 6.7-5).  Using the maximum allowable 
displacements from Table 6.7-8 (for each waste package group), the associated event 
probabilities are determined from the hazard curves in DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 
[DIRS 166962].  The resulting fault exceedance probabilities that would cause waste package 
failure are summarized in Table 6.7-9.  As previously stated, the Pagany Wash and Sever Wash 
faults are represented by the Drill Hole Wash fault (Assumption 5.1).  Again, these results only 
apply to the lower lithophysal zone, which is predicted to collapse from seismic hazards at these 
annual exceedance frequencies. 
As expected, the highest frequency fault displacement events leading to waste package failure 
are associated with the HLW waste packages, which have the largest diameter. 
Table 6.7-9. Fault Exceedance Frequencies (per year) That Cause Failure in the Lower Lithophysal 
Zonea 
Fault PWR BWR Naval HLW 
Sundance < 2×10-8 < 2×10-8 < 3×10-8 < 5×10-8 
Drill Hole Wash < 5×10-8 < 5×10-8 < 1×10-7 < 2×10-7 
Pagany Wash < 5×10-8 < 5×10-8 < 1×10-7 < 2×10-7 
Sever Wash < 5×10-8 < 5×10-8 < 1×10-7 < 2×10-7 
7a/8ab N/A N/A N/A < 2×10-8 
a Drifts in the lithophysal zones are predicted to collapse from ground motions at these mean annual exceedance 
frequencies, so the maximum allowable displacement is based on Table 6.7-8 with drift collapse and Table 6.7-5 
for fault displacement as a function of exceedance frequency. 
b The value of 2×10-8 is conservative for the hazard curve at sites 7a/8a.  The plotted hazard curves at Sites 7a/8a 
(CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 103731], Figures 8-8 and 8-11) indicate exceedance frequency values of about 
1.2×10-8 and 1.4×10-8 corresponding to the allowable displacement of 671 mm for the HLW group.  These 
exceedance frequencies are almost at the low probability cutoff for the scenario.  The value entered in 
Table 6.7-9 has been conservatively rounded up to 2×10-8. 
BWR = boiling water reactor, PWR = pressurized water reactor, HLW = high-level radioactive waste. 
There are two locations where the Sundance fault intersects the emplacement drifts in the lower 
lithophysal zone (from Table 6.7-4), 20 locations where either the Drill Hole Wash, Pagany 
Wash, or Sever Wash faults intersect the emplacement drifts in the lower or upper lithophysal 
zones (Table 6.7-4), and 119.85 locations (probability-weighted) where additional small faults 
intersect the emplacement drifts in the lower lithophysal zone (Section 6.7.2.2).  Combining this 
information with the probability of finding a particular waste package group at a given point in 
the repository (Table 6.7-7), an estimate can be made of the expected number of each type of 
waste package at the four known faults (Drill Hole Wash, Sundance, Pagany Wash, and Sever 
Wash faults).  This result is shown in Table 6.7-10.  Note that the number of waste packages is 
not an integral number because it represents an average expectation of finding a particular waste 
package along a particular fault.  The Pagany Wash, Sever Wash and Drill Hole Wash faults 
have been combined in Table 6.7-10 because they have the same fault displacement hazard 
curves. 
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Table 6.7-10. Expected Number of Waste Packages Emplaced on Faults in Lithophysal Zones 
 PWR Group BWR Group Naval Group HLW Group Total 
Sundance 0.84 0.54 0.06 0.56 2 
Drill Hole Wash, etc. 8.40 5.35 0.61 5.64 20 
7a/8a 50.3 32.1 3.64 33.8 119.85 
NOTE:  Total values are based on the spreadsheet in Appendix E.  Sums of the contributions by fault are not 
exact because of round off. 
BWR =  boiling water reactor, PWR = pressurized water reactor, HLW = high-level radioactive waste. 
6.7.5 Damage Abstraction for Fault Displacement 
The expected number of waste package failures in the lithophysal zones as a function of annual 
exceedance frequency is calculated by combining the results in Tables 6.7-9 and 6.7-10.  These 
results are shown in Table 6.7-11.  A spreadsheet with the details of this calculation is provided 
as Appendix E.   
When a waste package fails by fault displacement, the damaged area on the waste package is 
determined by sampling a uniform distribution with a lower bound of 0 m2 and an upper bound 
equal to the area of the waste package lid, as explained below.  The area of the lid for the PWR, 
BWR, Naval, and HLW groups is 2.105 m2, 2.204 m2, 2.728 m2 and 3.284 m2, respectively, 
based on maximum waste package diameters of 1.637 m, 1.6751 m, 1.8637 m, and 2.0447 m in 
Table 6.7-7.  For example, PWR group has a maximum diameter of 1.637 m, corresponding to a 
lid area of π(1.637 m)2/4 = 2.105 m2; similar calculations are performed for the other waste 
package groups.  The total damaged area from a faulting event is based on the weighted sum of 
the damage to each type of waste package. 
Table 6.7-11. Expected Waste Package Failures versus Annual Exceedance Frequency 
Expected Number of Waste Package Failures Annual Exceedance 
Frequency (1/yr) PWR BWR Naval HLW Total 
> 2 × 10-7 0 0 0 0 0 
1 × 10-7  to 2 × 10-7 0 0 0 5.64 5.64 
5 × 10-8  to 1 × 10-7 0 0 0.61 5.64 6.24 
3 × 10-8  to 5 × 10-8  8.40 5.35 0.61 6.20 20.56 
2 × 10-8  to 3 × 10-8 8.40 5.35 0.67 6.20 20.62 
1 × 10-8  to 2 × 10-8 9.24 5.89 0.67 39.98 55.78 
NOTE: Total values are based on the spreadsheet in Appendix E.  Sums 
of the contributions by waste package type are not exact because 
of round off. 
BWR =  boiling water reactor; PWR = pressurized water reactor, HLW = 
high-level radioactive waste. 
The lower bound is appropriate for annual exceedance frequencies near 10-7 per year because a 
waste package that is minimally pinned from fault displacement is expected to have only minor 
crimping with a very small damaged area.  The upper bound is appropriate for a fault that shears 
a waste package near its lid.  In this case, the lid welds have the potential to fracture, separating 
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the lid from the package and potentially exposing the entire waste form to seepage and release.  
The use of a uniform distribution is appropriate here because reasonable upper and lower bounds 
can be defined and because the use of this type of distribution maintains the uncertainty in the 
damaged area for this abstraction. 
When a waste package fails from fault displacement, the associated drip shield and fuel rod 
cladding also fail as barriers to flow and transport.  A sheared drip shield will allow all seepage 
to pass through it for TSPA; that is, the damaged area is taken as the total surface area of the drip 
shield so there is no flux splitting (diversion of seepage) on the drip shield.  Similarly, fuel rod 
cladding becomes 100 percent perforated in response to a fault displacement that can shear a 
waste package.  These damage abstractions for the drip shield and fuel rod cladding represent 
conservative, bounding approximations, particularly for annual exceedance frequencies near 10-7 
per year. 
6.7.6 An Alternative Conceptual Model for Damage from Fault Displacement 
The analysis of waste package failure due to fault displacement presented herein provides a basis 
for estimating the number of potentially damage-inducing faults that intersect the emplacement 
drifts.  This analysis uses the known location of larger faults (e.g., Sundance fault, Drill Hole 
Wash fault, etc.) relative to the planned location of the emplacement drifts, as well as an estimate 
of the density of smaller-displacement faults based on the observed fault density along the 
exploratory tunnel.  The maximum allowable fault displacement before waste package damage 
occurs was shown to vary between 671 mm and 1,079 mm depending on waste package design 
(Table 6.7-8).  Using this site-specific information, it is shown that there are 30 locations where 
known faults intersected the planned emplacement drifts (Table 6.7-4) plus an estimated 
141 locations where unmapped faults could intersect the drifts (Section 6.7.2.2) for a total of 
171 fault intersections.  Of these, there are a maximum of 55.8 locations (probability weighted 
by waste package type and location within the repository footprint) that are calculated to cause 
waste package damage (Table 6.7-11) with an occurrence frequency between 2×10-7 per year and 
10-8 per year. 
As an alternative conceptual model, we consider work published in “Methodologies for the 
Evaluation of Faulting at Yucca Mountain, Nevada” (Waiting et al. 2003 [DIRS 164449]).  This 
paper presents an assessment of the consequences of fault displacement at Yucca Mountain 
based on historical earthquake activity in the Western United States.  Four historic rupture events 
were considered to arrive at a median value for fault rupture density (length of faulting per unit 
area of surface).  A conservative median value of 20 km/km2 was obtained from this analysis of 
the four events considered.  Using this value, along with a representative angle of 50 degrees 
between the typical drift orientation and the orientation of the faults and an 80 meter drift 
spacing, the authors determined that there would be 191 waste package locations where a fault 
would intersect an emplacement drift at Yucca Mountain.  This result compares favorably to the 
171 fault intersections calculated in this report. 
The specific analog event considered by Waiting et al. (2003 [DIRS 164449]), for purposes of 
quantification, was the Borah Peak earthquake from 1983.  Prior analysis of this event had 
shown that the maximum displacement for the Borah Peak earthquake was 2.7 meters, with an 
average displacement of approximately 1 meter.  Given the fact that the mean annual exceedance 
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frequency for 1 meter of displacement at Yucca Mountain ranges from approximately 10-6/yr for 
the Solitario Canyon fault to approximately 10-8/yr for the Sundance fault, the 
probability-weighted number of waste package failures is calculated to be between 1.91×10-4 to 
1.91×10-6.  Note that the upper end of this range applies only to the Solitario Canyon fault.  As 
discussed in Section 6.7.3, no drifts intersect the Solitario Canyon fault or the main Ghost Dance 
fault for the current repository footprint.  The largest fault displacement would be expected to 
correspond to the Drill Hole Wash fault.  The mean annual exceedance frequency for one meter 
of displacement for this fault is on the order of 10-7/yr.  Thus, the probability-weighted number 
of waste package failures would be between 1.91×10-5 to 1.91×10-6. 
The results presented in Table 6.7-11 are not stated in terms of probability-weighted number of 
waste package failures.  Thus, a direct comparison with the results of the alternate model is not 
possible.  However, it is straightforward to recast the Table 6.7-11 results in a compatible form.  
Considering the number of incremental waste packages that are calculated to fail within each 
probability range, the product of the annual exceedance frequency (using the upper end of the 
range) and the number of incremental waste packages calculated to fail represents the 
probability-weighted number of waste package failures for that exceedance interval.  The sum of 
this result over the full range of exceedance frequencies gives the equivalent total number of 
probability-weighted waste package failures.  Table 6.7-12 presents the details of this 
calculation. 
So the probability-weighted number of waste package failures for the model in this report is 
2.61×10-6.  This value is within the range of results provided by the alternative conceptual model, 
1.91×10-5 to 1.91×10-6.  Thus, the alternative conceptual model based on the use of analog data 
provides results that are consistent with the results of the model presented in this report for both 
the probability-weighted number of waste package failures and the number of fault intersections 
with the emplacement drifts.  This comparison provides added confidence in the validity of the 
results presented herein. 
Table 6.7-12. Calculation of Probability-Weighted Waste Package Failures 
Exceedance Frequency  
(Per Year) 
# Incremental Waste  
Package Failures 
Probability Weighted Waste  
Package Failures 
2×10-7 5.64 1.13×10-6 
1×10-7 0.60 0.06×10-6 
5×10-8 14.32 0.72×10-6 
3×10-8 0.06 0.002×10-6 
2×10-8 35.16 0.70×10-6 
Totals 55.78 2.61×10-6 
Source: Data in Table 6.7-11 for Total Expected Number of Waste Package Failures provide the basis for 
calculating incremental waste package failures and probability weighted waste package failures.  
Calculation is explained in the two paragraphs preceding this Table and documented in Appendix E.. 
6.7.7 Failure by Waste Package Type for Criticality Studies 
As noted in Section 6.7.4, the inventory of waste packages for the fault damage abstraction is 
divided into four groups:  PWR, BWR, Naval, and HLW.  While this grouping is convenient for 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 6-107 August 2005 
TSPA, criticality analyses require a more detailed analysis of the potential for waste package 
failure by individual waste package type.  This section applies the same methodology that is used 
for the fault damage abstraction to individual waste package types in support of criticality 
studies.   
The information for the criticality analysis is consistent with the damage abstraction for fault 
displacement in TSPA-LA, but represents a finer level of detail.  This detail is necessary because 
individual waste package types have different outside diameters, while the four groups of waste 
packages for TSPA conservatively use the maximum package diameter for each group.  The 
different outside diameters for individual package types result in different clearances between 
EBS components and different numbers of package failures for a given range of exceedance 
frequency.  It is not possible to simply scale the results in Table 6.7-12 based on the inventory of 
a given package type because it is the outer diameter of a package type that determines the 
available clearance between EBS components, not the number of packages.   
Tables 6.7-1 through 6.7-6 remain unchanged for the criticality analysis by waste package type.  
Table 6.7-7 is modified for 10 individual waste package types, as shown in Table 6.7-13.  
Appendix E provides details of the calculations for Tables 6.7-13 through 6.7-17. 
Table 6.7-13. Parameters for Simplified Inventory for Criticality 
Waste Package Group 
Nominal 
Length 
(m) 
Nominal 
Quantity
(-) 
Total Length 
for Package 
Typea (m) 
Fraction of Waste 
Packages (% of 
Total Length) 
21-PWR with Absorber Plates 5.0244 4299 21600. 39.48 
21-PWR with Control Rods 5.0244 95 477.32 0.87 
12-PWR with Absorber Plates - Long 5.5604 163 906.35 1.66 
44-BWR with Absorber Plates 5.0244 2831 14224. 26.00 
24-BWR with Absorber Plates 5.0244 84 422.05 0.77 
5-DHLW Short/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel 
- Short 
3.4528 
1147 
3960.4 
7.24 
5-DHLW/DOE – Longb 5.0594 2116 10706. 19.57 
2-MCO/2-HLW 5.0594 149 753.85 1.38 
Naval-Short 5.2022 144 749.12 1.37 
Naval-Long 5.8374 156 910.63 1.66 
TOTALS 11,184 54709. 100.00 
Sources: BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 for nominal length; BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 13 for nominal 
quantity. 
NOTE:  (-)=dimensionless. 
a
  Total Length for Package Type = (Nominal Length) × (Nominal Quantity), rounded to 5 significant figures. 
b
  5-DHLW-DOE Long Package represents three package types:  5-DHLW Long/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel – Long, 
5-DHLW Long/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel – Short, the 5 HLW Long Only Package Types.  The clearances for 
these three package types are identical because they have the same nominal length and outer diameter of outer 
barrier (Table 6.7-7), so their damage from fault displacement is also identical. 
BWR = boiling water reactor; DHLW = defense high-level radioactive waste; PWR = pressurized water reactor; MCO 
= multicanister overpack, DHLW = defense high-level radioactive waste, HLW = high-level radioactive waste, DOE = 
U.S. Department of Energy. 
Table 6.7-14 presents the calculated maximum fault displacements before each waste package is 
pinned.  This Table is essentially identical with Table 6.7-3, although the 21-PWR waste 
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package type has two entries, with absorber plates and with control rods, in Table 6.7-14, versus 
one entry in Table 6.7-3.  The maximum allowable fault displacements in Table 6.7-14 are based 
on a collapsed drift because the fault displacements for the most severe event considered by 
TSPA are insufficient to pin a waste package when the emplacement drift does not collapse. 
Table 6.7-14. Maximum Allowable Displacement With Drift Collapse Before Waste Package is Pinned 
Package Type 
Waste Package Outer Diameter
(mm) 
Maximum Allowable 
Displacement With Drift 
Collapse (mm) 
21-PWR with Absorber Plates 1637.0 1079 
21-PWR with Control Rods 1637.0 1079 
12-PWR with Absorber Plates - Long 1313.2 1403 
44-BWR with Absorber Plates 1675.1 1041 
24-BWR with Absorber Plates 1294.1 1422 
5-DHLW Short/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel 
- Short 2044.7 671 
5-DHLW/DOE - Long 2044.7 671 
2-MCO/2-HLW 1749.4 967 
Naval-Short 1863.7 852 
Naval-Long 1863.7 852 
NOTE: Outside diameter of outer barrier defined by drawings identified in BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1; 
Maximum allowable displacement with drift collapse is the clearance without pallet in Table 6.7-2.  
Clearance without pallet is calculated in Table 6.7-1 as the interior height of the drip shield minus the 
outside diameter of the package outer barrier, rounded to 4 significant figures. 
BWR = boiling water reactor; PWR = pressurized water reactor; MCO = multicanister overpack, HLW = high-level 
radioactive waste.  
A comparison of the maximum allowable displacements in Table 6.7-14 with the fault 
displacement hazard curves provides a basis for determining failure of the different waste 
package types for the faults within the repository block.  The Solitario Canyon and main Ghost 
Dance faults are not included in this analysis because these faults lie outside the emplacement 
areas of the repository, and the western splay off the main Ghost Dance fault is not included in 
this analysis because its development in the vicinity of an intensely fractured zone is uncertain at 
this time. 
Waste package failure may occur for any of the waste packages placed directly over the 
four known faults intersecting the emplacement drifts, as well as for the HLW waste package 
group placed over faults characterized by location 7a and 8a.  The frequency of a fault 
displacement event severe enough to cause waste package failure is a function of both the 
specific fault (different fault displacements for a given exceedance frequency) as well as the 
specific waste package type (different allowable displacements).  The fault displacement hazard 
curves from the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analyses for Fault Displacement and Vibratory 
Ground Motion at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962]) are 
used to determine the annual exceedance frequency associated with a displacement severe 
enough to cause damage (see calculations in Appendix E).  The fault displacement 
hazard curves are provided in file: ./displ/tot-haz/s3.frac_mean.gz for the Drill Hole Wash fault, 
in file: ./displ/tot_haz/s5.frac_mean.gz for the Sundance fault, and in files: 
./displ/tot_haz/s7a.frac_mean.gz and ./displ/tot-haz/s8a.frac_mean.gz for locations 7a and 8a.  
These curves show the predicted fault displacement as a function of exceedance frequency.  
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Using the maximum allowable displacements from Table 6.7-14, the resulting fault exceedance 
probabilities that would cause waste package failure are summarized in Table 6.7-15.  The 
Pagany Wash and Sever Wash faults are represented by the Drill Hole Wash fault 
(Assumption 5.1). 
Table 6.7-15. Fault Exceedance Frequencies (Per Year) That Cause Failure in Lithophysal Zonesa 
Package Type Sundance 
Drill Hole Wash, 
Pagany Wash, & 
Sever Wash 7a/8ab 
21-PWR with Absorber Plates < 1.8×10-8 < 5.2×10-8 N/Ab 
21-PWR with Control Rods < 1.8×10-8 < 5.2×10-8 N/A 
12-PWR with Absorber Plates - Long < 1.1×10-8 < 3.1×10-8 N/A 
44-BWR with Absorber Plates < 2.0×10-8 < 5.5×10-8 N/A 
24-BWR with Absorber Plates < 1.1×10-8 < 3.1×10-8 N/A 
5-DHLW Short/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel - 
Short < 4.3×10-8 < 1.3×10-8 
< 1.4×10-8 
5-DHLW/DOE - Long < 4.3×10-8 < 1.3×10-8 < 1.4×10-8 
2-MCO/2-HLW < 2.3×10-8 < 6.4×10-8 N/A 
Naval-Short < 2.8×10-8 < 7.9×10-8 N/A 
Naval-Long < 2.8×10-8 < 7.9×10-8 N/A 
a  Drifts in lithophysal zones are predicted to collapse from ground motions at these mean annual exceedance 
frequencies, so the maximum allowable displacement is based on Table 6.7-14 with drift collapse.  All 
exceedance frequencies are rounded up from the exact interpolated values in Appendix E. 
b Exceedance frequency based on the maximum value for Sites 7a and 8a.  N/A indicates that the interpolated 
values for exceedance frequency are less than 1×10-8 per year and are excluded from the analysis. 
 BWR = boiling water reactor; DHLW = defense high-level radioactive waste; PWR = pressurized water 
reactor; MCO = multicanister overpack; DOE = U.S Department of Energy; HLW = high-level radioactive 
waste. 
There are two locations where the Sundance fault intersects the emplacement drifts in the 
lithophysal zones (from Table 6.7-4), 20 locations where either the Drill Hole Wash, Pagany 
Wash, or Sever Wash faults intersect the emplacement drifts in the lithophysal zones 
(Table 6.7-4), and 119.85 locations (probability-weighted) where additional small faults intersect 
the emplacement drifts in the lower lithophysal zone (Section 6.7.2.2).  Combining this 
information with the probability of finding a particular waste package group at a given point in 
the repository (see last column of Table 6.7-13), the expected number of each type of waste 
package found at the four known faults is shown in Table 6.7-16.  The number of intersections 
for locations 7a and 8a has been rounded up to 120 in Table 6.7-16. 
The expected number of waste package failures as a function of annual exceedance frequency 
can be calculated by combining the results in Tables 6.7-15 and 6.7-16.  These results are shown 
in Table 6.7-17. 
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Table 6.7-16. Expected Number of Waste Package Types Emplaced on Faults 
Package Type Sundance 
Drill Hole Wash, 
Pagany Wash,  
& Sever Wash 7a/8a 
21-PWR with Absorber Plates 0.7896 7.8962 47.3774 
21-PWR with Control Rods 0.0174 0.1745 1.0470 
12-PWR with Absorber Plates - Long 0.0331 0.3313 1.9880 
44-BWR with Absorber Plates 0.5200 5.1999 31.1992 
24-BWR with Absorber Plates 0.0154 0.1543 0.9257 
5-DHLW Short/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel - 
Short 0.1448 1.4478 
8.6867 
5-DHLW/DOE - Long 0.3914 3.9137 23.4820 
2-MCO/2-HLW 0.0276 0.2756 1.6535 
Naval-Short 0.0274 0.2739 1.6431 
Naval-Long 0.0333 0.3329 1.9974 
TOTALS 2.0000 20.0000 120.00 
 
Table 6.7-17. Failure of Waste Package Types by Annual Exceedance Probability 
Exceedance Frequency Range (Per Year) 
Package Type > 2×10-7 1×10-7 - 2×10-7 6×10-8 - 1×10-7 4×10-8 - 6×10-8 2×10-8 - 4×10-8 1×10-8 - 2×10-8 
21-PWR with Absorber 
Plates 
0 0 0 7.90 7.90 8.69 
21-PWR with Control 
Rods 
0 0 0 0.17 0.17 0.19 
12-PWR with Absorber 
Plates - Long 
0 0 0 0 0.33 0.36 
44-BWR with Absorber 
Plates 
0 0 0 5.20 5.20 5.72 
24-BWR with Absorber 
Plates 
0 0 0 0 0.15 0.17 
5-DHLW Short/1 DOE 
Spent Nuclear Fuel - 
Short 
0 1.45 1.45 1.59 1.59 10.28 
5-DHLW/DOE - Long 0 3.91 3.91 4.31 4.31 27.79 
2-MCO/2-HLW 0 0 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.30 
Naval-Short 0 0 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.30 
Naval-Long 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.37 
TOTALS 0 5.36 6.24 20.05 20.62 54.17 
DHLW = defense high-level radioactive waste; MCO = multicanister overpack, DOE = U.S. Department of Energy, 
HLW = high-level radioactive waste. 
6.8 POST-SEISMIC CHANGES IN THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 
A large seismic event, involving both vibratory ground motion and/or fault displacement, has the 
potential to change the local environment around the emplacement drifts.  The most obvious 
physical change is that the emplacement drifts in the lithophysal zone are predicted to collapse at 
approximately the 2.0-m/s PGV ground motion level (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], 
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Section 6.4.2.2.2), and by inference at greater ground motion levels.  Drift collapse alters the 
shape of the drift and fills it with a natural backfill, resulting in the following potential 
process-level changes in and around the engineered barrier system: 
• Seepage may increase because an irregular drift shape reduces the effectiveness of the 
drift wall as a capillary barrier and because of a loosening of the fractures around the 
drift. 
• Temperature of the drip shield and waste package may increase relative to an unfilled 
drift because the backfill provides an insulating blanket on top of the drip shield. 
• Localized corrosion may increase because of increased temperature and because of rock 
and water contact with the drip shield or waste package. 
• The dissolution rates of CSNF and HLW glass increase with temperature. 
6.8.1 Change in Seepage Flux into the Drifts 
A change in the seepage flux into the emplacement drifts in the lithophysal zones is 
being incorporated into the seismic abstractions for TSPA-LA.  The seepage into the 
emplacement drifts in the lithophysal zones is determined in an analogous manner as ambient 
seepage by using the seepage Table for collapsed drifts as provided in 
DTN:  LB0307SEEPDRCL.002 [DIRS 164337], file: ResponseSurfaceSMPACollapsedDrift.dat.  
This Table is invoked after a seismic event occurs, provided the PGV amplitude is large enough 
to collapse the drifts.  The seepage fluxes provided in this Table are considered conservative.   
For the seismic scenario class in TSPA, all ground motions with PGV equal to or greater than 
0.384 m/s will be considered large enough to collapse the drifts in the lithophysal zones.  This 
threshold for collapse was originally based on output from rockfall analyses at two PGV levels:  
drifts in the lithophysal zone do not collapse for the 0.19-m/s PGV level of ground motion 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.4.2.2.1) but do collapse for the 2.44-m/s PGV level.  The 
response of lithophysal rock at intermediate values of PGV was not available.  Recent rockfall 
analyses have determined that a PGV of approximately 2 m/s is a more reasonable threshold for 
drift collapse in the lithophysal zones (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107] Section 6.4.2.2.2, 4th bullet 
under subheading ‘Discussion’).  However, the seismic scenario class continues to use the value 
of 0.384 m/s because the technical basis for the 2.0 m/s threshold for collapse was established 
after the start of TSPA-LA model development.  The value of 0.384 m/s is considered 
conservative because it results in more seepage into the drifts and higher waste package 
temperatures (Section 6.8.2). 
With this threshold, drifts in the lithophysal zones always collapse after a seismic event in the 
TSPA because PGV is always greater than or equal to 0.4019 m/s, the value that corresponds to 
the 10-4 annual exceedance frequency on the bounded hazard curve (Table 6.4-1).  No further 
changes are made for fault displacement because fault displacement occurs simultaneously with 
vibratory ground motion in the seismic scenario class. 
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There is no change in the seepage flux into the emplacement drifts in the nonlithophysal zones 
after a seismic event.  This is appropriate for two reasons.  First, the seepage abstraction already 
includes an enhancement factor for limited collapse of the emplacement drifts, such as when 
large rock blocks are ejected without catastrophic drift collapse.  Second, complete drift collapse 
is not observed for ground motion amplitudes at the 5.35-m/s PGV level in the nonlithophysal 
rock (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.3.1.6.4).  Since the 5.35-m/s PGV level is beyond the 
maximum PGV value of 4.07 m/s considered by TSPA, complete collapse of drifts in the 
nonlithophysal rock will not occur in TSPA-LA. 
6.8.2 Changes for a Collapsed Drift 
The presence of rubble around the drip shield may cause changes in the temperature and relative 
humidity of EBS components.  A parameter study was conducted to examine the impact of drift 
collapse on in-drift thermohydrologic parameters (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173944], Section 6.3.7).  
The Multiscale Thermohydrologic Model (MSTHM) was used to examine the effect of a drift 
filled with natural backfill on waste package and invert temperature and relative humidity at the 
waste package and invert.  The collapsed drift is represented as having twice its initial diameter 
(i.e., 11 m total), and is filled with natural backfill with a bulking factor of 0.231.  The thermal 
conductivity of the natural backfill (Kth) is defined as the intact rock thermal conductivity of the 
Tptpll multiplied by the factor (1/(1 + BF)) where BF is the bulking factor.  Two thermal 
conductivity values (a “high” case based on a bulking factor of 0.231, and a “low” case which is 
taken to be one-half the “high” case value) of the dry and wet backfill thermal conductivity were 
used in the analyses, as shown in Table 6.8-1.  The appropriate range for the bulking factor, 0.2 
to 0.4, is discussed in BSC (2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.4.2.5.2 under Bulking). 
Table 6.8-1. Thermal Conductivity of Rubble 
Property 
Intact Host-Rock 
Property Value 
Host-Rock Rubble Property 
Value 
Basis for Rubble Property 
Value 
Bulk dry thermal 
conductivity 
1.28 W/m-K 1.0 W/m-K (High-Kth case) 
0.5 W/m-K (Low-Kth case) 
Intact Value x 1/(1 + BF) 
(High-Kth rubble value)/2 
Bulk wet thermal 
conductivity 
1.89 W/m-K 1.515 W/m-K (High-Kth case) 
0.7575 W/m-K (Low-Kth case) 
Intact Value x 1/(1 + BF) 
(High-Kth rubble value)/2 
Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173944], Table 6.2-3. 
Figure 6.8-1 shows the in-drift thermohydrologic parameters as functions of time from repository 
closure for the case of the “hottest” waste package, which is the 21-PWR absorber plate 
commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF).  These plots show three cases:  a) an open, noncollapsed 
drift, b) a collapsed, rubble-filled drift with high-Kth for the rubble, and c) a collapsed, 
rubble-filled drift with low-Kth.  The temperature or any of the other environmental parameters 
follow the intact drift curve until the time of collapse.  At that point, the temperature and other 
parameters translate vertically to one of the other curves, depending on the thermal conductivity 
of the rubble.  TSPA implements the changes for waste package temperature and waste package 
relative humidity shown conceptually in Figures 6.8-1(a) and (c).  TSPA does not implement the 
change in invert temperature or the reduction in liquid phase saturation in the rubble or in the 
invert, as shown in Figures 6.8-1(b), (d) and (e), after drift collapse. 
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Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173944] Figure 6.3-57. 
NOTES: Thermohydrologic response for the mean infiltration flux at the P2WR5C10 location, which is in the Tptpll 
(tsw35) unit (see BSC 2005 [DIRS 173944], Figure 6.3-1 for location).  The cases are: (1) intact-drift 
(nominal) case, (2) low-probability-seismic collapsed drift with high- Kth host-rock rubble, and (3) 
low-probability-seismic collapsed drift with low-Kth rubble.  The plotted parameters are (a) waste package 
temperature, (b) invert temperature, (c) waste package relative humidity, (d) invert liquid-phase saturation, 
and (e) matrix liquid-phase saturation of the rubble surrounding the drip shield. 
The digital results for the temperature time histories are defined in (DTN:  LL040310323122.044 
[DIRS 168769], files:  Twp_dhlw-l1_3case.dat, Twp_dhlw-s1_3case.dat, Twp_bwr1-1_3case.dat, 
Twp_bwr1-2_3case.dat, Twp_bwr2-1_3case.dat, Twp_pwr1-1_3case.dat, Twp_pwr1-2_3case.dat, and 
Twp_pwr2-1_3case.dat).  The digital results for the relative humidity time histories are defined in 
(DTN:  LL040310323122.044 [DIRS 168769], files:  RHwp_dhlw-l1_3case.dat, RHwp_dhlw-s1_3case.dat, 
RHwp_bwr1-1_3case.dat, RHwp_bwr1-2_3case.dat, RHwp_bwr2-1_3case.dat, RHwp_pwr1-1_3case.dat, 
RHwp_pwr1-2_3case.dat, and RHwp_pwr2-1_3case.dat).   
Figure 6.8-1. Thermal-Hydrologic Response for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate CSNF (pwr1-2) Waste 
Package 
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Examination of the waste package temperature history (Figure 6.8-1(a)) shows that significant 
impact to peak waste package temperature results only if drift collapse occurs within the first 
100 to 200 years after closure.  After that time, the waste package temperature remains below the 
peak temperature for the intact drift case that occurs within about 20 to 30 years after closure.  
The total time during which the waste package surface remains above boiling for the “hottest” 
waste package case is approximately 1,000 years for the intact drift, 1,500 years for the high-Kth 
case and 2,000 years for the low Kth case.  The relative humidity at the waste package decreases 
significantly for collapsed drift because of the increase in local temperature. 
When a TSPA model can accept temperature and relative humidity time histories from these 
eight representative waste package emplacement configurations, then the data are applied 
directly to all waste packages in lithophysal zones after drift collapse.  When a TSPA model can 
only accept input for the CSNF or the codisposal waste package types, than a choice must be 
made among these eight time histories. 
The recommended choice for the CSNF waste package groups is based on the BWR or PWR 
configuration in the MSTHM that produces a temperature history closest to the mean response 
for these types of packages.  The mean response is a reasonable approach here because there are 
substantial uncertainties in predictions of the thermal conductivity of the rubble and backfill 
around the drip shield.  The analyses with high and low values for thermal conductivity are 
designed to represent this uncertainty, and the waste package configuration with the mean 
thermal response captures this effect.  The recommended choice for the co-disposal waste 
package groups cannot be based on the mean because there are only two DHLW configurations, 
so the recommended choice is to use the configuration with the maximum temperature change. 
Table 6.8-2 summarizes the maximum temperature change for the six PWR/BWR configurations 
from the MSTHM analyses with the lower bound for thermal conductivity. 
Table 6.8-2. Maximum Temperature Change for MSTHM Configurations with Low Thermal Conductivity 
MSTHM Waste 
Package Configuration Maximum Temperature Change (°C)a 
BWR 1-2 126.77 
BWR 1-1 119.88 
BWR 2-1 118.76 
PWR 1-1 90.01 
PWR 2-1 111.75 
PWR 1-2 121.81 
Mean Value 114.83 
a Each file in DTN:  LL040310323122.044 [DIRS 168769] defines time dependent 
temperatures for the following cases: (i) no backfill, denoted by T0, (ii) backfill with 
low thermal conductivity, denoted by T_l, and (iii) backfill for high thermal 
conductivity, denoted by T_h.  The files also define the temperature change 
between the low thermal conductivity and no backfill cases, denoted by T_l – T0, 
and the temperature change between the high thermal conductivity and no backfill 
cases, denoted by T_h – T0.  The data for maximum temperature change are 
based on the maximum value in the T_l – T0 case. 
BWR = boiling water reactor; MSTHM = Multiscale Thermohydrological Model. 
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The maximum temperature change for the PWR 2-1 package is 111.75°C, which is closest to the 
mean of these six cases.  The recommended choice is to use the PWR 2-1 time histories for 
temperature and relative humidity, files:  Twp_pwr2-1_3case.dat and RHwp_pwr2-1_3case.dat, 
respectively, for the TSPA models based on CSNF waste package groupings. 
The maximum temperature changes for the DHLW-l1 and DHLW-s1 waste package 
emplacement configurations are 99.85°C and 122.98°C, respectively.  The recommended choice 
is to use the DHLW-s1 time histories for temperature and relative humidity, 
files:  Twp_dhlw-s1_3case.dat and RHwp_dhlw-s1_3case.dat, respectively, for the TSPA models 
based on co-disposal waste package groupings. 
For the seismic scenario class in TSPA, all ground motions with PGV equal to or greater than 
0.384 m/s will be considered large enough to collapse the drifts in the lithophysal zones.  This 
threshold for collapse was originally based on output from rockfall analyses at two PGV levels:  
drifts in the lithophysal zone do not collapse for the 0.19-m/s PGV level of ground motion 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.4.2.2.1) but do collapse for the 2.44-m/s PGV level.  The 
response of lithophysal rock at intermediate values of PGV was not available.  Recent rockfall 
analyses have determined that a PGV of approximately 2 m/s is a more reasonable threshold for 
drift collapse in the lithophysal zones (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107] Section 6.4.2.2.2, 4th bullet 
under subheading ‘Discussion’).  However, the seismic scenario class continues to use the value 
of 0.384 m/s because the technical basis for the 2.0 m/s threshold for collapse was established 
after the start of TSPA-LA model development.  The value of 0.384 m/s is considered 
conservative because it results in more seepage into the drifts and higher waste package 
temperatures (Section 6.8.2). 
There is no change in temperature or relative humidity for the emplacement drifts in the 
nonlithophysal zones because the drifts are not expected to be completely filled with rock blocks 
in the nonlithophysal zones (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107], Section 6.3.1.6.4).  In this situation, the 
top and sides of the drip shield will not be completely covered with rock blocks and rubble, so 
the nominal temperature and nominal relative humidity time histories are more appropriate for 
this case. 
6.9 SEISMIC SCENARIO CLASS 
The impact of seismic hazards on repository performance is being represented in a separate 
scenario class, called the seismic scenario class, for TSPA-LA.  The rationale for defining a 
separate scenario class is based on several key observations: 
• Seismic events with annual frequencies down to 10-8 per year must be considered by 
TSPA-LA. 
10 CFR 63.114 [DIRS 173273], Requirements for Performance Assessment, states that: 
Any performance assessment used to demonstrate compliance with §63.113 
must:  (d) Consider only events that have at least one chance in 10,000 of 
occurring over 10,000 years. 
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Seismic events with very large ground motion amplitudes/fault displacements, 
corresponding to annual exceedance frequencies down to 10-8 per year, must be 
considered by TSPA-LA, even though their probability is very low during the first 
10,000 years following repository closure. 
• Events with very small annual frequencies of occurrence cannot be accurately 
represented in the nominal scenario class.  A separate scenario class for seismic hazards 
is desirable. 
Accurate representation of events with annual frequency of occurrence down to 10-8 per 
year would require millions of realizations in the nominal scenario class, which is not 
computationally feasible.  The alternative is to define a separate scenario class for 
seismic hazards that determines dose in a probability-weighted manner, as explained 
below. 
• The mean dose time history is the main parameter for compliance determinations. 
Radionuclide release limits for the repository are expressed in terms of the mean of the 
distribution of projected doses to the reasonably maximally exposed individual, per 
10 CFR 63.303 and 63.311 [DIRS 173273].  Calculation of releases from the seismic 
scenario class must generate mean dose for consistency with the nominal scenario class. 
Damage from seismic events is represented as a network of stress corrosion cracks for 
the damaged areas wherein the residual tensile stress exceeds a given threshold for 
Alloy 22 on the surfaces of the waste package or for Titanium Grade 7 on the surfaces of 
the drip shield.  The probability distributions for these damaged areas are a function of 
the amplitude of the seismic event.  For example, the amplitude of a ground motion is 
defined through the horizontal PGV, and the damage abstractions for the waste package 
evaluate a probability of no damage as a function of PGV and a damaged area 
(conditional on damage occurring) based on a power law fit to the median response and 
ln-normal variability about the median response (Sections 6.5.1 through 6.5.3).  The 
individual damage abstractions for the waste package and the fuel rod cladding are based 
on the results from structural response calculations, kinematic calculations, and rockfall 
analyses, as discussed in Sections 6.5 through 6.8. 
The seismic scenario class is based on a single seismic event that occurs at a randomly chosen 
time in each realization of the TSPA-LA.  That is, the conditional probability of a seismic event 
is one for each realization, even though the exceedance frequency range for these events varies 
from 10-4 per year down to 10-8 per year.  The damage from this single event is based on the 
damage abstractions for the waste package and the fuel rod cladding.  The damaged areas on the 
waste package define a network of stress corrosion cracks that are potential pathways for 
transport through the EBS.  The damage to the drip shield from vibratory ground motion and 
from rockfall induced by vibratory ground motion has been screened out of TSPA-LA.  The 
damage to the fuel rod cladding is expressed as the percent of cladding that is perforated in each 
waste package.  The seepage flux for the emplacement drifts in the lithophysal zones changes 
after a major seismic event that can collapse the drifts.  Once radionuclides are released from the 
EBS, flow and transport in the unsaturated zone and the saturated zone are based on the same 
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models and algorithms as for the nominal scenario class.  Biosphere calculations and biosphere 
parameters for the seismic scenario class are also unchanged from the nominal scenario class. 
Each realization of the seismic scenario class determines an annual dose time history for a single 
seismic event with a specific value for PGVi between 0.4019 m/s and 4.07 m/s, corresponding to 
a mean annual exceedance frequency λ between 10-4 and 10-8 per year, respectively.  These dose 
time histories do not represent the mean dose, as called for in 10 CFR 63.303 [DIRS 173273], 
because a single such event always occurs in each realization.  A mean dose time history is 
calculated using a probability-weighted average of all the realizations for the seismic scenario 
class.  The weighting factor for each realization corrects for the actual expected number of 
seismic events and for importance sampling based on the use of log-uniform distributions. 
6.9.1 Computational Approach 
The mean dose for the seismic scenario class is based on a set of R realizations that have robust 
sampling of all levels of seismic events (i.e., for the ranges of PGV levels and fault displacement 
amplitudes) with the potential to generate releases from the EBS.  The following discussion 
explains how these R realizations are generated using a Monte Carlo computational procedure in 
the TSPA. 
The R realizations represent the future performance of the repository for the seismic hazards of 
ground motion and fault displacement.  These realizations represent the combined epistemic and 
aleatory uncertainty in the TSPA-LA model for the seismic scenario class.  Epistemic uncertainty 
is captured by those stochastic parameters that represent the “lack of knowledge” uncertainty in 
various processes.  Aleatory uncertainty is captured by the stochastic parameters that represent 
the randomness of processes, such as the uncertainty in the timing and amplitude of seismic 
events. 
The TSPA-LA model for the seismic scenario class is very similar to the TSPA-LA model for 
the nominal scenario class, with the following major exceptions:  (1) damaged area on the waste 
package is determined by sampling stochastic parameters in an abstraction for waste package 
damage, rather than by the waste package degradation analysis for corrosion processes; (2) the 
damaged area on the waste package is represented as a network of stress corrosion cracks, rather 
than as large breaches on the package, (3) the failure of fuel rod cladding is represented as a 
percent of fuel rods perforated in each waste package at the time of the seismic event, and (4) a 
single seismic event occurs at a random time during each realization.  The primary output from 
each of these R realizations is a time history of dose to the reasonably maximally exposed 
individual. 
The value of the horizontal peak ground velocity, PGVi, and its associated annual exceedance 
frequency, λi, are determined by a Monte Carlo process that samples appropriate distributions for 
these parameters in the ith realization.  Since PGV and λ are functionally related, it is sufficient to 
sample one parameter or the other; λ is sampled for TSPA-LA. 
λi is determined by sampling a log-uniform distribution with lower bound λmin and upper bound 
λmax.  The sampling for the annual exceedance frequency uses a logarithmic scale, rather than a 
linear scale, to ensure robust sampling throughout the relevant frequency range.  This approach 
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ensures adequate representation of very low frequency events with high PGV levels that may 
result in large doses.  The use of a log-uniform distribution is a computational device for 
accelerating convergence to the mean or expected values in a Monte Carlo scheme; it does not 
represent the physical response of the site.  The bounds of the log-uniform distribution must be 
chosen to encompass the seismic events with the potential to release significant radionuclides 
from the EBS.  Values of λmax and λmin for the seismic scenario class are 10-4 per year and 
10-8 per year, respectively, because this range spans the response of the system, from no damage 
at 10-4 per year to the regulatory probability limit at 10-8 per year. 
Once the value of the annual exceedance frequency (λi) is determined for the ith realization, the 
corresponding value of the peak ground velocity (PGVi) is calculated.  The relationship between 
PGV and λ is defined by the mean bounded hazard curve, and is site- and location-specific 
(Section 6.4). 
The mean bounded hazard curve for vibratory ground motion and the mean hazard curves for 
fault displacements are central to the seismic scenario class.  These mean hazard curves represent 
both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in the hazards (Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2).  The seismic 
scenario class is based on the mean hazard, considering the range of epistemic uncertainty for a 
given value of PGV.  This is a reasonable approach because the mean (epistemic) estimate of the 
(aleatory) mean dose is linear in the exceedance frequency, λ, for a given value of PGV.  The 
derivation of the mean bounded hazard curve is described in Peak Ground Velocities for Seismic 
Events at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (BSC 2005 [DIRS 170137]).  Analysis of the geologic 
conditions at Yucca Mountain and other corroborating evidence provides a basis for estimating 
the maximum feasible or bounding value of PGV at the emplacement drifts.  The numerical 
values for this hazard curve are defined in Table 6.4-1. 
Once the value for PGVi is known, the abstractions for the damaged area on the waste package 
(Sections 6.5.1 through 6.5.3) and for failure of the fuel rod cladding (Section 6.5.6) are 
evaluated.  For example, each waste package damage abstraction is based on three 
relationships:  (i) the probability that there will be no damage as a function of PGV, (ii) a power 
law representation for the median values of the nonzero damaged areas, again as a function of 
PGV, and (iii) a ln-normal distribution for the distribution of damage about the median values.  
(The natural logarithm is abbreviated as “ln” and the common logarithm to base 10 is 
abbreviated as “log” in this document.  The median is also called the geometric mean.)  These 
relationships can be evaluated and/or sampled for a given value of PGVi to determine the 
damaged area on the waste package.  This approach explicitly includes the variability from the 
structural response calculations in the TSPA-LA model through sampling. 
Damage from fault displacement occurs simultaneously with damage from vibratory ground 
motion.  The sampled value of λi determines the number of damaged waste packages by type, 
based on the abstraction in Table 6.7-11 (Section 6.7).  The damaged area from fault 
displacement is determined by sampling a distribution with a lower bound of 0 and an upper 
bound based on the lid area for each type of waste package. 
Simultaneous damage from fault displacement and vibratory ground motion is a reasonable 
approach for the seismic scenario class.  One significant nearby earthquake induces both ground 
motions and local fault displacements.  On the other hand, all the known on-site faults and small 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 6-119 August 2005 
hypothetical faults with a 2 meter cumulative offset (Sites 7a/8a in the PSHA) move 
simultaneously in the abstraction for TSPA-LA.  The potential correlations among displacements 
on different faults in the PSHA were not considered during the expert elicitation for the PSHA, 
and little information is available to support development of correlations for dependent or 
independent displacement along the known faults.  The abstraction is conservative. 
6.9.2 Computational Algorithm 
The computational algorithm has been split into 13 simple operations to document the procedure 
for this scenario class.  The first 11 operations define the constant parameters, stochastic 
parameters, and formulas that represent the epistemic and aleatory uncertainty for the TSPA-LA 
model.  The modifications for post-seismic event response are summarized in Operations 12 and 
13.  Each realization of the TSPA-LA model is based on a single sampling of the stochastic 
parameters from the first 11 operations.  Repeated samplings of the stochastic parameters during 
the R realizations generate a full suite of future histories for the TSPA-LA model.  
A list of the 13 operations in the computational procedure follows.  The parameters for the 
computational procedure are listed in Table 6.9-1. 
1. Determine the mean annual exceedance frequency, λi, for the ith realization. 
The value of λ is sampled from a log-uniform distribution between λmin and λmax.  
A log-uniform distribution ensures robust sampling in each decade of the distribution.  
The values of λmin, λmax, and λi are represented by the parameters LAMBDA_MIN, 
LAMBDA_MAX, and LAMBDA, respectively, in Table 6.9-1. 
2. Determine the corresponding value of PGV on the hazard curve, λ = λ (PGV). 
The value of PGVi is determined by a Table lookup, using the mean bounded hazard 
curve for the emplacement drifts.  The interpolation between points in this Table (see 
the definition of PGV in Table 6.9-1) is based on a linear interpolation using the 
values of log(λ) and log(PGV) at individual points.  This is referred to as a log-log 
interpolation scheme in Table 6.9-1.  The resulting value of PGVi is denoted simply as 
PGV in Table 6.9-1.  The subscript i has been dropped from PGV and from all other 
parameters in Table 6.9-1 because all values in Table 6.9-1 are on a per realization 
basis. 
3. Determine which of the four possible damage states ((i) end-to-end and waste 
package-pallet impact damage, (ii) end-to-end impact damage only, (iii) waste 
package-pallet impact damage only, and (iv) no impact damage) occurs in this 
realization.  Compare a randomly sampled number between 0 and 1 to the damage 
state sampled from a cumulative discrete distribution.  The discrete probability levels 
in the cumulative discrete distribution are a function of the probability of no damage 
from end-to-end impacts and/or waste package-pallet impacts.  The sampled random 
number is denoted as PROB_DAM_RAND in Table 6.9-1.  
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The probability of no end-to-end impact damage is denoted as 
PROB_NODAM_DYNA or PROB_NODAM_UDEC in Table 6.9-1 for LS-DYNA 
and for UDEC, respectively.  The probability of no end-to-end impact damage for this 
realization is denoted as PROB_NODAM in Table 6.9-1 and is defined as: 
 PROB_NODAM = If (SOURCE = 1, PROB_NODAM_DYNA,  (Eq. 6-7) 
 else PROB_NODAM_UDEC). 
The probability of no damage for waste package-pallet impacts in this realization is 
denoted as PROB_NODAM_PALLET_80 for the 80 percent residual stress threshold 
and PROB_NODAM_PALLET_90 for the 90 percent residual threshold in 
Table 6.9-1.  The probability of no damage for the realization is based on sampling a 
uniform distribution with a lower bound of PROB_NODAM_PALLET_90 and an 
upper bound of PROB_NODAM_PALLET_80.  This probability is denoted as 
PROB_NODAM_PALLET in Table 6.9-1.  This parameter is perfectly correlated with 
the parameters DA_DYNA, DA_UDEC and DA_PALLET (see operation (7) below) 
to maintain comparable values of the residual stress threshold. 
The damage state is denoted by DAMAGE_STATE in Table 6.9-1.  The value of 
DAMAGE_STATE is 0 for no damage to the waste package, 1 for damage from waste 
package-pallet impacts only, 2 for damage from end-to-end impacts only, and 3 for 
damage from both end-to-end and waste package-pallet impacts.  The damage state is 
calculated as:. 
If   PROB_DAM_RAND <=  PROB_NODAM*PROB_NODAM_PALLET, 
 DAMAGE_STATE=3 
else if, PROB_DAM_RAND <=  PROB_NODAM, DAMAGE_STATE=2 
else if, PROB_DAM_RAND <= (PROB_NODAM+ PROB_NODAM_PALLET 
- PROB_NODAM*PROB_NODAM_PALLET), DAMAGE_STATE=1  
else, DAMAGE_STATE=0. (Eq. 6-8) 
The damage state variable, NODAM_SWITCH equals 1 if end-to-end impact damage 
occurs and equals 0 if no end-to-end impact damage occurs in this realization.  The 
damage state variable, NODAM_SW_PALLET, equals 1 if waste package-pallet 
impact damage occurs and equals 0 if no waste package-pallet impact damage occurs 
in this realization. 
4. Determine the fraction of damaged waste package surface area due to end-to-end 
impacts in response to vibratory ground motion for each realization. 
The damaged waste package surface area from end-to-end impacts is a random 
variable with parameters that are functions of PGVi.  The damage abstraction for 
end-to-end impacts represents the results of two separate sets of kinematic 
calculations, with LS-DYNA and with UDEC.  Each set of kinematic calculations is 
evaluated for the two extreme values of the residual stress threshold for initiation of 
stress corrosion cracking in Alloy 22: 80 percent and 90 percent of the yield strength 
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(YS).  In effect, there are four data sets for the damage abstraction for end-to-end 
impacts: 
1. Damaged areas based on LS-DYNA for a residual stress threshold of 80 percent 
of the YS of Alloy 22 
2. Damaged areas based on LS-DYNA for a residual stress threshold of 90 percent 
of the YS of Alloy 22 
3. Damaged areas based on UDEC for a residual stress threshold of 80 percent of the 
YS of Alloy 22 
4. Damaged areas based on UDEC for a residual stress threshold of 80 percent of the 
YS of Alloy 22 
The four data sets are maintained separately in TSPA because the four sets have 
differences that are statistically significant, because this approach provides for a direct 
representation of the epistemic uncertainty within each data set in TSPA, and because 
this approach provides for a direct representation of the uncertainty in the 
computational methodologies in TSPA. 
Each of these four data sets is represented by three relationships: (i) the probability 
that there will be no damage, (ii) a power law representation for the median (i.e., the 
geometric mean) values of the nonzero damaged areas, and (iii) a ln-normal 
distribution for the distribution of damage about the median values.  The first two 
relationships are a function of PGV; the standard deviation for the ln-normal 
distribution is a constant, independent of PGV.  The following procedure is 
recommended for computing the end-to-end damage with this four-part abstraction: 
a) Determine the data source for the kinematic calculations, LS-DYNA or UDEC, 
for this realization.  The two sources are sampled on a 50-50 basis using a discrete 
distribution that is denoted as SOURCE in Table 6.9-1.  SOURCE = 1 for 
LS-DYNA and SOURCE = 2 for UDEC. 
b) Determine the nonzero damaged area for both the 80 percent and 90 percent 
residual stress thresholds by calculating the median damage from a power law and 
then sampling a ln-normal distribution about the power law.  This operation is 
conditional on the results from operation 3(b) determining that nonzero damage 
occurs in this realization.  The power law corresponds to the line that provides a 
least squares fit for the natural logarithm of the nonzero damaged area as a 
function of the natural logarithm of longitudinal PGV.  The residuals about this 
line follow a normal distribution (in ln(Damaged Area) space) with a constant 
standard deviation, independent of PGV.  The power law fits of the ln-normal 
distributions are denoted as MEDIAN_DYNA_80, MEDIAN_DYNA_90, 
MEDIAN_UDEC_80, and MEDIAN_UDEC_90 in Table 6.9-1.  The standard 
deviations of the residuals for the ln-normal distributions are denoted as 
SD_DYNA_80, SD_DYNA_90, SD_UDEC_80, and SD_UDEC_90 in 
Table 6.9-1.  The sampled values of the ln-normal distributions are denoted as 
DA_DYNA_80, DA_DYNA_90, DA_UDEC_80, and DA_UDEC_90 in 
Table 6.9-1.   
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The values of DA_DYNA_80 and DA_DYNA_90 are perfectly correlated to 
maintain similar epistemic uncertainty in damaged area relative to the median 
value from the power law fit.  The values of DA_UDEC_80 and DA_UDEC_90 
are also perfectly correlated for the same reason. 
c) Determine the damaged area from end-to-end impacts for the data source in this 
realization by sampling a uniform distribution between the lower and upper 
bounds for the residual stress threshold.  For LS-DYNA, the uniform distribution 
has a lower bound of DA_DYNA_90, an upper bound of DA_DYNA_80, and the 
damaged area is denoted by DA_DYNA in Table 6.9-1.  If the data source is 
UDEC, then the uniform distribution has a lower bound of DA_UDEC_90, an 
upper bound of DA_UDEC_80, and the damaged area is denoted by DA_UDEC 
in Table 6.9-1.   
d) Determine the final damaged area from end-to-end impacts depending on the 
source for this realization.  The final damage area for end-to-end impacts is 
denoted as DA_WPtoWP in Table 6.9-1, based on the test: 
 DA_WPtoWP = If(SOURCE = 1, DA_DYNA, else DA_UDEC). (Eq. 6-9) 
e) Determine the fraction of damaged area from end-to-end impacts by dividing the 
damaged area by the surface area of the 21-PWR waste package.  The surface 
area of the 21-PWR waste package, 30.05 m2, is denoted as SURFAREA_21PWR 
in Table 6.9-1.  The damage fraction is denoted as DAMFRAC_WPtoWP in 
Table 6.9-1.  The formula for the damage fraction is: 
 DAMFRAC_WPtoWP = NODAM_SWITCH*DA_WPtoWP/SURFAREA_21PWR 
 (Eq. 6-10) 
This damage fraction is applied to all waste package types in the TSPA model.   
5. Determine the fraction of damaged waste package surface area due to waste 
package-pallet impacts in response to vibratory ground motion for each realization.  
The damage abstraction for waste package-pallet impacts is similar to the individual 
abstractions for end-to-end impacts, although there is only one source of data as 
explained below. 
The damaged waste package surface area from waste package-pallet impacts is a 
random variable with parameters that are functions of PGVi.  The damage abstraction 
for waste package-pallet impacts represents the results of a single set of structural 
response calculations (with LS-DYNA) for two extreme values of the residual stress 
threshold: 80 percent and 90 percent of the YS of Alloy 22.  The damage abstractions 
at 80 percent and 90 percent of YS are represented by three relationships: (i) the 
probability that there will be no damage, (ii) a power law representation for the median 
(i.e., the geometric mean) values of the nonzero damaged areas, and (iii) a ln-normal 
distribution for the distribution of damage areas about the median values.  The first 
two relationships are a function of PGV; the standard deviation for the ln-normal 
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distribution is a constant, independent of PGV.  The following procedure is 
recommended for computing the waste package-pallet damage: 
a) Determine the nonzero damaged area for both the 80 percent and 90 percent 
residual stress thresholds by calculating the median damage from a power law and 
then sampling a ln-normal distribution about the power law.  This operation is 
conditional on the results from operation 3 determining that nonzero damage 
occurs in this realization.  The power law corresponds to the line that provides a 
least squares fit for the natural logarithm of nonzero damaged areas as a function 
of the natural logarithm of longitudinal PGV.  The residuals about this line follow 
a normal distribution in ln(Damaged Area) space with a constant standard 
deviation, independent of PGV.  The medians (power law fits) are denoted as 
MEDIAN_PALLET_80 and MEDIAN_PALLET_90, in Table 6.9-1.  The 
standard deviations of the ln-normal distributions are denoted as SD_PALLET_80 
and SD_PALLET_90 in Table 6.9-1.  The ln-normal distributions are denoted as 
DA_PALLET_80 and DA_PALLET_90 in Table 6.9-1.  The values of 
DA_PALLET_80 and DA_PALLET_90 are perfectly correlated to maintain 
similar epistemic uncertainty in damaged area relative to the median value from 
the power law fit.   
b) Determine the damaged area from waste package-pallet impacts by sampling a 
uniform distribution with a lower bound of DA_PALLET_90 and an upper bound 
of DA_PALLET_80.  This damaged area is denoted by DA_PALLET in 
Table 6.9-1.  DA_PALLET is perfectly correlated with DA_DYNA/DA_UDEC 
and PROB_NODAM_PALLET (see operation (7) below) to maintain equivalent 
values of the residual stress threshold throughout this realization. 
c) Determine the fraction of damaged area from waste package-pallet impacts by 
dividing the damaged area by the surface area of the 21-PWR waste package.  
The surface area of the 21-PWR waste package, 28.2 m2, is denoted as 
SURFAREA_21PWR_PALLET in Table 6.9-1.  (The package surface area 
matches the design represented in the structural response calculations, but differs 
from the value in operation 4(e) because of changes in package design.)  The 
damage fraction is denoted as DAMFRAC_PALLET in Table 6.9-1.  The formula 
for the damage fraction is: 
DAMFRAC_PALLET = DA_PALLET * NODAM_SW_PALLET 
 /SURFAREA_21PWR_PALLET (Eq. 6-11) 
This damage fraction is applied to all waste package types in the TSPA model. 
6. Determine the total damaged fraction for all waste packages by summing the 
contributions from end-to-end impacts and from waste package-pallet impacts: 
 DAMFRAC_TOTAL = DAMFRAC_WPtoWP + DAMFRAC_PALLET 
 (Eq. 6-12) 
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7. There are four parameters that are determined by sampling a uniform distribution 
between 80 percent and 90 percent residual stress threshold values.  These are 
DA_DYNA (operation 4(c)), DA_UDEC (operation 4(c)), PROB_NODAM_PALLET 
(operation 3), and DA_PALLET (operation 5(b)).  They are perfectly correlated to 
maintain equivalent values of the residual stress threshold throughout the realization.  
This correlation can be implemented by sampling a single uniform distribution 
between 0 and 1.  This distribution is denoted as WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY in 
Table 6.9-1.  The resulting sampled value can be used to interpolate between the  
80 percent and 90 percent values for each of the four parameters.  This is equivalent to 
sampling a uniform distribution between the 80 percent and 90 percent residual stress 
threshold values.  As an example, the calculation of DA_PALLET would be given by 
DA_PALLET = WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY 
*(DA_PALLET_80 - DA_PALLET_90) + DA_PALLET_90  (Eq. 6-13) 
8. Determine the effective transport area through the damaged area on the waste package.  
The effective transport area is based on the geometry and gap widths for a network of 
tight SCCs (Section 6.3.5).  The scaling factor that determines the effective transport 
area is a stochastic parameter because there is uncertainty in the geometry, orientation, 
and gap width for the SCC network.  The scaling factor is sampled from a uniform 
distribution whose lower and upper bounds span the full range of SCC geometries 
considered (Sections 6.3.5 and 6.3.6).  The scaling factor is applied to all waste 
packages in the repository (i.e., there is no spatial variability). 
- The upper bound of the uniform distribution is 0.0131, and represented in 
Table 6.9-1 by the parameter SCALE_FACTOR_MAX. 
- The lower bound of the uniform distribution is 0.00328.  This value is represented 
by the parameter SCALE_FACTOR_MIN in Table 6.9-1. 
- The sampled value of the scaling factor is denoted as SCALE_FACTOR in 
Table 6.9-1. 
- The effective flow/transport area for any type of waste package, as a fraction of 
the total surface area, is denoted as WP_TRANS_AREA and calculated as: 
 WP_TRANS_AREA = DAMFRAC_TOTAL * SCALE_FACTOR. (Eq. 6-14) 
Significant advective flow through the network of tight SCCs on the waste package or 
the drip shield has been screened out of TSPA (Section 6.3.5 and (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 173781], Section 6.2.63)).   
9. Direct, structural deformation of the drip shield from vibratory ground motion and 
from rockfall induced by vibratory ground motion is not included in the seismic 
scenario class for TSPA-LA because the associated SCCs are expected to limit 
advective flow to insignificant levels (Section 6.3.6 and (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173781], 
Section 6.2.64)).  Drip shield separation has also been screened out of TSPA (see 
discussion in Section 6.5.5).   
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10. Fuel rod cladding does not fail for a ground motion with a PGV level of 0.55 m/s or 
less (Section 6.5.6).  Cladding experiences complete failure (i.e., 100 percent of the 
cladding is perforated in all waste packages) at the time of the seismic event for 
ground motions with PGV amplitude of 1.05 m/s or greater (Section 6.5.6). 
The abstraction for fuel rod cladding failure is defined in Table 6.9-1 with a linear 
interpolation for the percent failed cladding between the appropriate values of PGV.  
In other words, percent failed cladding is (1) zero for PGV values less than 0.55 m/s, 
(2) 100 percent for PGV values greater than 1.05 m/s, and (3) based on a linear 
interpolation for intermediate values of PGV between the end points with 0 percent 
failed cladding at 0.55-m/s PGV and 100 percent failed cladding at 1.05-m/s PGV.  
This failure abstraction applies to the fraction of cladding that is not initially damaged. 
This parameter is denoted by CLAD_DAMAGE_GM in Table 6.9-1.  There is no 
uncertainty in this failure abstraction because it is a bounding estimate for fuel rod 
cladding failure.  The percent of failed cladding is applied to all fuel assemblies in the 
repository (i.e., there is no spatial variability), except for any assemblies with initial 
cladding failures. 
11. Determine the percent failed area on the waste packages in the lithophysal zones due 
to fault displacement.  The expected number of waste packages that fail, as a function 
of annual exceedance frequency, is defined in Table 6.9-1.  Fractional values for failed 
waste packages are rounded to the nearest integer. 
- The expected number of waste packages that fail from fault displacement is a 
small fraction of the total packages in the repository because few waste packages 
are located on known faults.  In addition, these failures only occur for a small 
fraction of the realizations in the seismic scenario class because there are no 
failures from fault displacement for a displacement less than 671 mm 
(Table 6.7-3).  Displacements greater than 671 mm first occur on the Drill Hole 
Wash fault, the Pagany Wash fault, and the Sever Wash fault at an annual 
frequency of occurrence less than or equal to 2 × 10-7 per year (Table 6.7-9), 
corresponding to the 2.92-m/s PGV level12 on the bounded hazard curve.  In this 
situation, damage from fault displacement only occurs for PGV values greater 
than 2.92 m/s, and a special waste package group(s) or bin(s) is used to represent 
the waste package failures from fault displacement.   
- The thermohydrologic and seepage environment for the special group(s) or bin(s) 
are chosen independently and randomly.  For example, if the fault-failed packages 
are binned into two groups for commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) and 
codisposal (CDSP) packages, then two randomly chosen environments are used 
for each of the two groups. 
                                                 
12 The exceedance frequency 2×10-7 1/yr is bracketed by the points (2.507×10-7 1/yr, 2.8 m/s) and (1.731×10-7 
1/yr, 3.0 m/s) on the bounded hazard curve.  For a power law fit of λ = a(PGV)b between points,  b and a are 
defined as    b = log(2.507×10-7/1.731×10-7)/log(2.8/3) = -5.3685 and a = (2.507×10-7)/(2.8)-5.3685 = 6.3055×10-5.  
The corresponding value of PGV at 2×10-7 1/yr is then PGV = (λ/a)1/b = (2×10-7/6.3055×10-5)-0.1863 = 2.92 m/s. 
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- When a waste package fails by fault displacement, the failed area per 
representative waste package is determined by sampling a uniform distribution 
with a lower bound of 0 m2 and an upper bound equal to the area of the waste 
package lid.  These sampled distributions are denoted by FAILED_AREA_PWR, 
FAILED_AREA_BWR, FAILED_AREA_NAVAL, and FAILED_AREA_HLW 
in Table 6.9-1. 
- The area of the lid for the PWR, BWR, Naval, and HLW groups is 2.105 m2, 
2.204 m2, 2.728 m2, and 3.2836 m2, respectively.  These areas are denoted as 
LID_AREA_PWR, LID_AREA_BWR, LID_AREA_NAVAL, and 
LID_AREA_HLW in Table 6.9-1. 
- The surface area of a package in the PWR, BWR, Naval, and HLW groups is 
30.15 m2, 30.85 m2, 37.85 m2, and 35.60 m2, respectively.  These areas are 
denoted as SURF_AREA_PWR, SURF_AREA_BWR, SURF_AREA_NAVAL, 
and SURF_AREA_HLW in Table 6.9-1. 
- The fraction of failed area for the CSNF (PWR, BWR, and Naval) waste package 
types is calculated as: 
 FRACTION_FAILED_CSNF = FAILED_AREA_CSNF/SURF_AREA_CSNF 
(Eq. 6-15) 
where  
FAILED_AREA_CSNF = NO_PWR_FAILURES*FAILED_AREA_PWR 
 + NO_BWR_FAILURES*FAILED_AREA_BWR 
 + NO_NAVAL_FAILURES*FAILED_AREA_NAVAL 
  (Eq. 6-16) 
and 
SURF_AREA_CSNF = NO_PWR_FAILURES*SURF_AREA_PWR 
 + NO_BWR_FAILURES*SURF_AREA_BWR 
 + NO_NAVAL_FAILURES*SURF_AREA_NAVAL 
  (Eq. 6-17) 
The fraction of failed area for the CDSP (HLW) waste package type is given by: 
FRACTION_FAILED_CSDP = FAILED_AREA_HLW/SURF_AREA_HLW.  
 (Eq. 6-18) 
These failed areas allow advective flow and advective and diffusive transport. 
- The number of package failures for the four waste package types are denoted by 
NO_PWR_FAILURES, NO_BWR_FAILURES, NO_NAVAL_FAILURES, and 
NO_HLW_FAILURES in Table 6.9-1. 
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- If a waste package is damaged by fault displacement, the associated drip shield is 
taken to be 100 percent damaged.  There is no flux splitting (i.e., diversion of 
seepage) for these failed drip shields.  The number of impacted drip shields is 
then identical to the total number of waste packages that will be damaged by the 
fault displacement.  The parameters NO_DRIP_SHIELD_FD and 
DRIP_SHIELD_DAMAGE_FD in Table 6.9-1 define the number and amount of 
damage to the drip shields from fault displacement. 
- Fuel rod cladding in waste packages that are damaged by a fault displacement is 
taken to be 100 percent perforated.  The 100 percent perforation applies to all the 
fuel assemblies in the number of waste packages that are damaged by the fault 
displacement.  The parameters NO_CLAD_FD and CLAD_DAMAGE_FD in 
Table 6.9-1 define the number and amount of damage to the cladding from fault 
displacement. 
12. Modify the seepage in the lithophysal zones after the seismic event. 
The seepage into the emplacement drifts in the lithophysal zones is determined by 
using the seepage Table for collapsed drifts, as provided in LB0307SEEPDRCL.002 
[DIRS 164337], file:  ResponseSurfaceSMPACollapsedDrift.dat (Section 6.8.1).  This 
seepage Table is invoked after a seismic hazard occurs, provided the hazard is large 
enough to collapse the drifts.  For TSPA-LA, all ground motions with a PGV greater 
than 0.384 m/s will be considered large enough to collapse drifts in the lithophysal 
zones (Section 6.8.1).  Recent rockfall analyses have determined that a PGV of 
approximately 2 m/s is a more reasonable threshold for drift collapse in the lithophysal 
zones (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107] Section 6.4.2.2.2, 4th bullet under subheading 
‘Discussion’).  However, the seismic scenario class continues to use the value of 
0.384 m/s because the technical basis for the 2.0 m/s threshold for collapse was 
established after the start of TSPA-LA model development.  The value of 0.384 m/s is 
considered conservative because it results in more seepage into the drifts and higher 
waste package temperatures (Section 6.8.2).  COLLAPSE_THRESH_LITH in 
Table 6.9-1 defines the PGV threshold (0.384 m/s) for collapse in lithophysal zones.   
There is no change in the seepage flux into nonlithophysal zones after a seismic hazard 
occurs (Section 6.8.1).  The parameter COLLAPSE_THRESH_NONLITH in 
Table 6.9-1 defines the PGV threshold for collapse in nonlithophysal zones.  
COLLAPSE_THRESH_NONLITH is set to 5.35 m/s (Section 6.8.1).  There is no 
collapse in nonlithophysal zones with this value because PGVi is always less than 
4.07 m/s for TSPA-LA (Section 6.4.3). 
13. Modify the temperature and relative humidity on the waste after drift collapse in the 
lithophysal zones. 
The temperature and relative humidity of the waste package after drift collapse will be 
defined by the data in DTN:  LL040310323122.044 [DIRS 168769]:  temperature time 
histories defined in files:  Twp_dhlw-l1_3case.dat, Twp_dhlw-s1_3case.dat, 
Twp_bwr1-1_3case.dat, Twp_bwr1-2_3case.dat, Twp_bwr2-1_3case.dat, 
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Twp_pwr1-1_3case.dat, Twp_pwr1-2_3case.dat, and Twp_pwr2-1_3case.dat; relative 
humidity time histories defined in files:  RHwp_dhlw-l1_3case.dat, 
RHwp_dhlw-s1_3case.dat, RHwp_bwr1-1_3case.dat, RHwp_bwr1-2_3case.dat, 
RHwp_bwr2-1_3case.dat, RHwp_pwr1-_3case.dat, RHwp_pwr1-2_3case.dat, and 
RHwp_pwr2-1 3case.dat.  If a TSPA-LA model cannot accept eight waste package 
emplacement configurations in this DTN, then the PWR 2-1 and DHLW-s1 
configurations are recommended for defining the temperature and relative humidity 
changes for CSNF and co-disposal waste package groups in TSPA-LA.  These new 
histories are used for seismic hazards with a PGV level greater than 0.384 m/s.  There 
is no change in the temperature and relative humidity for the nonlithophysal zones 
because the drifts do not collapse in the nonlithophysal zones (Section 6.8.1), and the 
amount of rubble is generally expected to be insufficient to completely cover the top 
and sides of the drip shield. 
Table 6.9-1. Definition of Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class 
Parameter Name Description, Units, and Type Definition 
LAMBDA Distribution of annual exceedance 
frequency for the seismic scenario class 
Units: {1/yr} 
Type:  Distribution sampled once per 
realization 
Log-Uniform Distribution: 
Minimum Value:  LAMBDA_MIN 
Maximum Value:  LAMBDA_MAX 
LAMBDA_MIN Minimum annual exceedance frequency 
Units: {1/yr} 
Type:  Data  
1 × 10-8 per year 
LAMBDA_MAX Maximum annual exceedance frequency
Units:  {1/yr} 
Type:  Data 
1 × 10-4 per year 
PGV Value of PGV for this realization 
Units:  {m/s} 
Type:  Lookup table, function of 
LAMBDA 
Table lookup as a function of the value of 
LAMBDA for this realization.  Use log-log 
interpolation between λ values: 
 
λ (1/yr)  PGV (m/s) 
1.000 × 10-4 0.4019 
3.826 × 10-5 0.6 
1.919 × 10-5 0.8 
9.955 × 10-6 1.05 
6.682 × 10-6 1.2 
3.812 × 10-6 1.4 
2.136 × 10-6 1.6 
1.288 × 10-6 1.8 
8.755 × 10-7 2.0 
6.399 × 10-7 2.2 
4.518 × 10-7 2.44 
3.504 × 10-7 2.6 
2.507 × 10-7 2.8 
1.731 × 10-7 3.0 
1.137 × 10-7 3.2 
7.168 × 10-8 3.4 
4.362 × 10-8 3.6 
2.508 × 10-8 3.8 
1.319 × 10-8 4.0 
5.967 × 10-9 4.2 
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Table 6.9-1.  Definition of Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class (Continued) 
Parameter Name Description, Units, and Type Definition 
SOURCE Discrete distribution for the source of the 
engineering data for the end-to-end 
damage abstraction;  Value is 1 for 
LS-DYNA or 2 for UDEC 
Units:  {-}a 
Type:  Distribution sampled once per 
realization 
a{-} indicates a dimensionless quantity 
Discrete distribution: 
Value = 1 with probability of 0.5 (for 
LS-DYNA) 
Value = 2 with probability of 0.5 (for UDEC) 
PROB_DAM_RAND Random number between 0 and 1 that 
determines the damage state in this 
realization 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Distribution sampled once per 
realization 
UNIFORM distribution: 
Lower bound = 0 
Upper bound = 1 
DAMAGE_STATE Cumulative discrete distribution for the 
waste package damage state in this 
realization. Value is 3,2,1, or 0 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Distribution sampled once per 
realization 
CUMULATIVE DISCRETE distribution: 
=3, both end-to-end and waste 
package-pallet impact damage occurs; 
=2, only end-to-end impact damage 
occurs; 
=1, only waste package-pallet impact 
damage occurs; 
=0, no impact damage occurs. 
PROB_NODAM_DYNA Probability of no damage for DYNA 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Function of PGV 
MAX(MIN[1, (0.1376)(5.35 – PGV)1.360], 0) 
PROB_NODAM_UDEC Probability of no damage for UDEC 
Units:{ -} 
Type:  Function of PGV 
MAX(MIN[1, (0.3823)(4.0 – PGV)0.8137], 0) 
 
Note:  If PGV is greater than 4.0 m/s, reset 
the term (4.0 – PGV) to zero. 
PROB_NODAM Probability of no damage for this 
realization 
Units:{ -} 
Type:  Switch 
If (SOURCE=1, PROB_NODAM_DYNA, 
Else PROB_NODAM_UDEC) 
NODAM_SWITCH Switch defining the occurrence of 
damage from end-to-end impacts in this 
realization. 
Units:{ -} 
Type:  Switch 
=1 if no end-to-end damage occurs; 
=0 if end-to-end damage occurs. 
WP_DAMAGE_UNCER
TAINTY 
Uniform distribution that defines the 
correlation between the four parameters 
DA_DYNA, DA_UDEC, 
PROB_NODAM_PALLET, and 
DA_PALLET 
Units:{ -} 
Type:  Distribution sampled once per 
realization 
UNIFORM distribution: 
Lower bound = 0 
Upper bound = 1 
MEDIAN_DYNA_80 Median value of damaged area for a 
power law fit for the LS-DYNA data with 
an 80 percent residual stress failure 
criterion 
Units:{m2} 
Type:  Function 
(2.712 × 10-4)PGV3.0338 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 6-130 August 2005 
Table 6.9-1.  Definition of Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class (Continued) 
Parameter Name Description, Units, and Type Definition 
MEDIAN_DYNA_90 Median value of damaged area for a 
power law fit for the LS-DYNA data with 
a 90 percent residual stress failure 
criterion 
Units: {m2} 
Type:  Function 
(2.029 × 10-4)PGV2.6101 
MEDIAN_UDEC_80 Median value of damaged area for a 
power law fit for the UDEC data with an 
80 percent residual stress failure criterion
Units: {m2} 
Type:  Function 
(9.665 × 10-4)PGV3.1475 
MEDIAN_UDEC_90 Median value of damaged area for a 
power law fit for the UDEC data with a 
90 percent residual stress failure criterion
Units: {m2} 
Type:  Function 
(4.850 × 10-4)PGV2.9477 
SD_DYNA_80 Standard deviation of the residuals of the 
natural log of damaged area relative to 
the natural log of the median (i.e., the 
power law fit) for the LS-DYNA data with 
an 80 percent residual stress failure 
criterion 
Units: {-} 
Type:  Data 
1.463 
SD_DYNA_90 Standard deviation of the residuals of the 
natural log of damaged area relative to 
the natural log of the median (i.e., the 
power law fit) for the LS-DYNA data with 
a 90 percent residual stress failure 
criterion 
Units: {-} 
Type:  Data 
1.393 
SD_UDEC_80 Standard deviation of the residuals of the 
natural log of damaged area relative to 
the natural log of the median (i.e., the 
power law fit) for the UDEC data with an 
80 percent residual stress failure criterion
Units: {-} 
Type:  Data 
1.253 
SD_UDEC_90 Standard deviation of the residuals of the 
natural log of damaged area relative to 
the natural log of the median (i.e., the 
power law fit) for the UDEC data with a 
90 percent residual stress failure criterion
Units: {-} 
Type:  Data 
1.164 
DA_DYNA_80 Damaged area for a ln-normal 
distribution, based on the LS-DYNA data 
with an 80 percent residual stress failure 
criterion 
Units: {m2} 
Type:  Distribution 
NB:  This parameter and DA_DYNA_90 
are perfectly correlated. 
LN-NORMAL distribution: 
Median = MEDIAN_DYNA_80 
Standard deviation = SD_DYNA_80 
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Table 6.9-1.  Definition of Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class (Continued) 
Parameter Name Description, Units, and Type Definition 
DA_DYNA_90 Damaged area for a ln-normal 
distribution, based on the LS-DYNA data 
with a 90 percent residual stress failure 
criterion 
Units: {m2} 
Type:  Distribution 
NB:  This parameter and DA_DYNA_80 
are perfectly correlated. 
LN-NORMAL distribution: 
Median = MEDIAN_DYNA_90 
Standard deviation = SD_DYNA_90 
DA_UDEC_80 Damaged area for a ln-normal 
distribution, based on the UDEC data 
with an 80 percent residual stress failure 
criterion 
Units: {m2} 
Type:  Distribution 
NB:  This parameter and DA_UDEC_90 
are perfectly correlated. 
LN-NORMAL distribution: 
Median = MEDIAN_UDEC_80 
Standard deviation = SD_UDEC_80 
DA_UDEC_90 Damaged area for a ln-normal 
distribution, based on the UDEC data 
with a 90 percent residual stress failure 
criterion 
Units: {m2} 
Type:  Distribution 
NB:  This parameter and DA_UDEC_80 
are perfectly correlated. 
LN-NORMAL distribution: 
Median = MEDIAN_UDEC_90 
Standard deviation = SD_UDEC_90 
DA_DYNA Damaged area for the LS-DYNA source 
data, based on interpolating between the 
damaged areas for the 80 and 
90 percent residual stress failure criteria 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Function 
NB:  The sampled value for 
WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY is used 
to interpolate between the 80 and 
90 percent residual stress threshold 
values. 
This parameter and DA_UDEC, 
PROB_NODAM_PALLET and 
DA_PALLET are perfectly correlated 
because the interpolations between the 
values at the 80 and 90 percent residual 
stress thresholds are based on the same 
value of WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY. 
WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY 
*(DA_DYNA_80 – DA_DYNA_90) 
+ DA_DYNA_90 
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Table 6.9-1.  Definition of Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class (Continued) 
Parameter Name Description, Units, and Type Definition 
DA_UDEC Damaged area for the UDEC source 
data, based on interpolating between the 
damaged areas for the 80 and 
90 percent residual stress failure criteria 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Function 
NB:  The sampled value for 
WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY is used 
to interpolate between the 80 and 
90 percent residual stress threshold 
values. 
This parameter and DA_DYNA, 
PROB_NODAM_PALLET and 
DA_PALLET are perfectly correlated 
because the interpolations between the 
values at the 80 and 90 percent residual 
stress thresholds are based on the same 
value of WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY. 
WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY 
*(DA_UDEC_80 – DA_UDEC_90) 
+ DA_UDEC_90 
DA_WPtoWP Damaged area for end-to-end impacts 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Switch 
If (SOURCE=1, DA_DYNA, 
Else DA_UDEC) 
SURFAREA_21PWR Surface area of the 21-PWR waste 
package for the kinematic calculations of 
end-to-end impacts of adjacent waste 
packages 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Data 
30.05 
DAMFRAC_WPtoWP Fraction of surface area on the waste 
package damaged by end-to-end 
impacts.  Includes factor of 
NODAM_SWITCH to represent the 
fraction of realizations without damage 
from end-to-end impacts 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Function 
DA_WPtoWP * NODAM_SWITCH / 
SURFAREA_21PWR 
PROB_NODAM_PALLE
T_80 
Probability of no damage for waste 
package-Pallet impacts for 80 percent 
residual stress threshold 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Function of PGV 
MAX(MIN(1, (0.1049)(4.0 – PGV)1.7613, 0) 
 
Note:  If PGV is greater than 4.0 m/s, reset 
the term (4.0 – PGV) to zero. 
PROB_NODAM_PALLE
T_90 
Probability of no damage for waste 
package-Pallet impacts for 90 percent 
residual stress threshold 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Function of PGV 
MAX(MIN(1, (0.0.3859)(4.0 – PGV)0.7436, 0)
 
Note:  If PGV is greater than 4.0 m/s, reset 
the term (4.0 – PGV) to zero. 
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Table 6.9-1.  Definition of Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class (Continued) 
Parameter Name Description, Units, and Type Definition 
PROB_NODAM_PALLE
T 
Probability of no damage for waste 
package-pallet impacts 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Function 
NB:  The sampled value for 
WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY is used 
to interpolate between the 80 and 
90 percent residual stress threshold 
values. 
This parameter and DA_DYNA, 
DA_UDEC, and DA_PALLET are 
perfectly correlated because the 
interpolations between the values at the 
80 and 90 percent residual stress 
thresholds are based on the same value 
of WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY 
WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY 
*(PROB_NODAM_PALLET_80 – 
PROB_NODAM_PALLET_90) 
+ PROB_NODAM_PALLET_90 
NODAM_SW_PALLET Switch defining the occurrence of 
damage from waste package-pallet 
impacts in this realization 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Switch 
=0 if no damage occurs from waste 
package-pallet impacts; 
=1 if damage occurs from waste 
package-pallet impacts. 
MEDIAN_PALLET_80 Median value of damaged area for a 
power law fit to waste package-pallet 
damage with an 80 percent residual 
stress failure criterion 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Function 
(2.242 × 10-3)PGV1.6586 
MEDIAN_PALLET_90 Median value of damaged area for a 
power law fit to waste package-pallet 
damage with a 90 percent residual stress 
failure criterion 
Units: {m2} 
Type:  Function 
(1.369 × 10-3)PGV1.6860 
SD_PALLET_80 Standard deviation of the residuals of the 
natural log of damaged area versus the 
natural log of the median (i.e., the power 
law fit) for waste package-pallet damage 
with an 80 percent residual stress failure 
criterion 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Data 
1.023 
SD_PALLET_90 Standard deviation of the residuals of the 
natural log of damaged area versus the 
natural log of the median (i.e., the power 
law fit) for waste package-pallet damage 
with a 90 percent residual stress failure 
criterion 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Data 
1.048 
DA_PALLET_80 Damaged area for a ln-normal 
distribution, based on the data for waste 
package-pallet impacts with an 
80 percent residual stress failure criterion
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Distribution 
LN-NORMAL distribution: 
Median = MEDIAN_PALLET_80 
Standard deviation = SD_PALLET_80 
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Table 6.9-1.  Definition of Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class (Continued) 
Parameter Name Description, Units, and Type Definition 
DA_PALLET_90 Damaged area for a ln-normal 
distribution, based on the data for waste 
package-pallet impacts with an 
90 percent residual stress failure criterion
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Distribution 
NB:  This parameter and 
DA_PALLET_80 are perfectly correlated. 
LN-NORMAL distribution: 
Median = MEDIAN_PALLET_90 
Standard deviation = SD_PALLET_90 
DA_PALLET Damaged area for waste package-pallet 
impacts based on interpolating between 
the damaged areas for the 80 and 
90 percent residual stress failure criteria 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  The sampled value for 
WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY is used 
to interpolate between the 80 and 
90 percent residual stress threshold 
values. 
This parameter and DA_DYNA, 
DA_UDEC, and 
PROB_NODAM_PALLET are perfectly 
correlated because the interpolations 
between the values at the 80 and 
90 percent residual stress thresholds are 
based on the same value of 
WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY 
WP_DAMAGE_UNCERTAINTY 
*(DA_PALLET_80 – DA_PALLET_90) 
+ DA_PALLET_90 
SURFAREA_21PWR_P
ALLET 
Surface area of the 21-PWR waste 
package for the waste package-pallet 
impact calculations 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Data 
28.2 
DAMFRAC_PALLET Fraction of surface area on the waste 
package damaged by WP-pallet impacts.  
Includes factor of NODAM_SW_PALLET 
to represent the fraction of realizations 
without damage from waste 
package-pallet impacts 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Function 
DA_PALLET * NODAM_SW_PALLET / 
SURFAREA_21PWR_PALLET 
DAMFRAC_TOTAL Total fraction of damaged surface area 
from waste package-waste package and 
waste package-pallet impacts 
Units: {-} 
Type:  Function 
DAMFRAC_WPtoWP + 
DAMFRAC_PALLET 
SCALE_FACTOR_ 
MIN 
Minimum value of scale factor for 
defining the transport area of a network 
of SCCs on the waste package 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Constant 
0.00328 
 
 
SCALE_FACTOR_ 
MAX 
Maximum value of scale factor for 
defining the area of a network of SCCs 
on the waste package 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Constant 
0.0131 
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Table 6.9-1.  Definition of Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class (Continued) 
Parameter Name Description, Units, and Type Definition 
SCALE_FACTOR Scale factor distribution for the area of a 
network of SCCs on the waste package 
for this realization 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Distribution sampled once per 
realization 
Uniform Distribution: 
Minimum Value:  SCALE_FACTOR_MIN 
Maximum Value:  SCALE_FACTOR_MAX 
WP_TRANS_AREA Effective fractional area for transport 
through a network of SCCs on the waste 
package 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Function 
DAMFRAC_TOTAL * SCALE_FACTOR 
CLAD_DAMAGE_GM Percent failed (perforated) cladding from 
vibratory ground motion 
Units:  {%} 
Type:  Table look-up as function of PGV 
This damage is applied to all fuel 
assemblies, except for assemblies with 
initial clad damage or initial clad failures. 
Table lookup as a function of the value of 
PGV for this realization. 
 
  % Failed 
PGV {m/s} Cladding 
0  0 
0.55  0 
1.05  100 
20b  100 
bThe value of 20 m/s provides the mathematical 
extension of the abstraction for values of PGV 
greater than 1.05 m/s, consistent with 
Table 6.5-16.  Such extreme values of PGV will 
not be sampled in TSPA-LA because PGV is 
always less than or equal to 4.07 m/s.   
LID_AREA_PWR Lid area of the PWR waste package 
group for fault displacement 
Units: {m2} 
Type:  Data 
2.105 m2 
LID_AREA_BWR Lid area of the BWR waste package 
group for fault displacement 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Data 
2.204 m2 
LID_AREA_NAVAL Lid area of the Naval waste package 
group for fault displacement 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Data 
2.728 m2 
LID_AREA_HLW Lid area of the HLW waste package 
group for fault displacement 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Data 
3.284 m2 
FAILED_AREA_PWR Distribution of failed area on the PWR 
waste package group for fault 
displacement 
Units: {m2} 
Type:  Distribution sampled once per 
realization 
UNIFORM Distribution: 
Minimum Value:  0.0 
Maximum Value:  LID_AREA_PWR 
FAILED_AREA_BWR Distribution of failed area on the BWR 
waste package group for fault 
displacement 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Distribution sampled once per 
realization 
UNIFORM Distribution: 
Minimum Value:  0.0 
Maximum Value:  LID_AREA_BWR 
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Table 6.9-1.  Definition of Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class (Continued) 
Parameter Name Description, Units, and Type Definition 
FAILED_AREA_ 
NAVAL 
Distribution of failed area on the Naval 
waste package group for fault 
displacement 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Distribution sampled once per 
realization 
UNIFORM Distribution: 
Minimum Value:  0.0 
Maximum Value:  LID_AREA_NAVAL 
FAILED_AREA_HLW Distribution of failed area on the HLW 
waste package group for fault 
displacement 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Distribution sampled once per 
realization 
UNIFORM Distribution: 
Minimum Value:  0.0 
Maximum Value:  LID_AREA_HLW 
SURF_AREA_PWR Surface area for a waste package in the 
PWR group for fault displacement 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Data 
30.15 m2 
SURF_AREA_BWR Surface area for a waste package in the 
BWR group for fault displacement 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Data 
30.85 m2 
SURF_AREA_ 
NAVAL 
Surface area for a waste package in the 
Naval group for fault displacement 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Data 
37.85 m2 
SURF_AREA_HLW Surface area for a waste package in the 
HLW group for fault displacement 
Units:  {m2} 
Type:  Data 
35.60 m2 
FRACTION_FAILED_A
REA_PWR 
Fraction of failed surface area on PWR 
waste package group from fault 
displacement 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Function 
FAILED_AREA_PWR/SURF_AREA_PWR 
FRACTION_FAILED_A
REA_BWR 
Fraction of failed surface area on BWR 
waste package group from fault 
displacement 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Function 
FAILED_AREA_BWR/SURF_AREA_BWR 
FRACTION_FAILED_A
REA_NAVAL 
Fraction of failed surface area on Naval 
waste package group from fault 
displacement 
Units: {-} 
Type:  Function 
FAILED_AREA_NAVAL/SURF_AREA_ 
NAVAL 
FRACTION_FAILED_A
REA_HLW 
Fraction of failed surface area on HLW 
waste package group from fault 
displacement 
Units: {-} 
Type:  Function 
FAILED_AREA_HLW/SURF_AREA_HLW 
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Table 6.9-1.  Definition of Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class (Continued) 
Parameter Name Description, Units, and Type Definition 
NO_PWR_ 
FAILURES 
Number of failed PWR waste packages 
from fault displacement 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Step function of annual 
exceedance frequency, λ.  Fractional 
values are be rounded to the nearest 
integer. 
NB:  All fault-failed PWR packages are 
located in a single, randomly chosen 
thermohydraulic and seepage 
environment for CSNF packages in each 
realization. 
Table lookup as a function of the value of λ 
for this realization. 
λ (1/yr)   # Failures (-) 
> 5 × 10-8  0 
3 × 10-8  to 5 × 10-8 8.40 
2 × 10-8  to 3 × 10-8 8.40 
1 × 10-8  to 2 × 10-8 9.24 
NO_BWR_ 
FAILURES 
Number of failed BWR waste packages 
from fault displacement 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Step function of annual 
exceedance frequency, λ.  Fractional 
values are rounded to the nearest 
integer. 
NB:  All fault-failed BWR packages are 
located in a single, randomly chosen 
thermohydraulic and seepage 
environment for CSNF packages in each 
realization. 
Table lookup as a function of the value of λ 
for this realization. 
λ (1/yr)   # Failures (-) 
> 5 × 10-8  0 
3 × 10-8  to 5 × 10-8 5.35 
2 × 10-8  to 3 × 10-8 5.35 
1 × 10-8  to 2 × 10-8 5.89 
NO_NAVAL_ 
FAILURES 
Number of failed Naval waste packages 
from fault displacement 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Step function of annual 
exceedance frequency, λ.Fractional 
values are rounded to the nearest 
integer. 
NB:  All fault-failed Naval packages are 
located in a single, randomly chosen 
thermohydraulic and seepage 
environment for CSNF packages in each 
realization.  The environments for CSNF 
and CDSP packages are chosen 
independently. 
Table lookup as a function of the value of λ 
for this realization. 
λ (1/yr)   # Failures (-) 
> 1 × 10-7  0 
5 × 10-8  to 1 × 10-7 0.61 
3 × 10-8  to 5 × 10-8 0.61 
2 × 10-8  to 3 × 10-8 0.67 
1 × 10-8  to 2 × 10-8 0.67 
NO_HLW_FAILURES Number of failed HLW packages from 
fault displacement 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Step function of annual 
exceedance frequency, λ. λ.  Fractional 
values are rounded to the nearest 
integer. 
NB:  All fault-failed HLW packages are 
located in a single, randomly chosen 
thermohydraulic and seepage 
environment for CDSP packages in each 
realization.  The environments for CSNF 
and CDSP packages are chosen 
independently. 
Table lookup as a function of the value of λ 
for this realization. 
λ (1/yr)   # Failures (-) 
> 2 × 10-7  0 
1 × 10-7  to 2 × 10-7 5.64 
5 × 10-8  to 1 × 10-7 5.64 
3 × 10-8  to 5 × 10-8 6.20 
2 × 10-8  to 3 × 10-8 6.20 
1 × 10-8  to 2 × 10-8 39.98 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 6-138 August 2005 
Table 6.9-1.  Definition of Parameters for the Seismic Scenario Class (Continued) 
Parameter Name Description, Units, and Type Definition 
NO_DRIP_SHIELD_ 
FD 
Number of drip shields damaged by fault 
displacement. 
Units:  {-} 
Type:  Function 
NO_PWR_FAILURES + 
NO_BWR_FAILURES + 
NO_NAVAL_FAILURES + 
NO_HLW_FAILURES 
DRIP_SHIELD_DAMAG
E_FD 
Magnitude of drip shield damage for all 
waste packages failed by fault 
displacement. 
Units: {%} 
Type:  Constant 
100% 
NO_CLAD_FD Number of waste packages with cladding 
damaged by fault displacement. 
Units: {-} 
Type:  Function 
NO_PWR_FAILURES + 
NO_BWR_FAILURES + 
NO_NAVAL_FAILURES + 
NO_HLW_FAILURES 
CLAD_DAMAGE_FD Magnitude of clad damage in all waste 
packages failed by fault displacement. 
Units:  {%} 
Type:  Constant 
100% 
COLLAPSE_ 
THRESH_LITH 
The minimum value of PGV that results 
in complete collapse of emplacement 
drifts in the lithophysal zones of the 
repository 
Units:  {m/s} 
Type:  Constant 
0.384 m/sc 
cDrifts in the lithophysal zones always collapse 
after a seismic event because PGV is always 
greater than or equal to 0.4019 m/s, which 
corresponds to the 10-4 annual exceedance 
frequency on the bounded hazard curve. 
COLLAPSE_ 
THRESH_NONLITH 
The minimum value of PGV that results 
in complete collapse of emplacement 
drifts in the nonlithophysal zones of the 
repository 
Units:  {m/s} 
Type:  Constant 
5.35 m/sd 
dThis value is equivalent to no collapse in the 
nonlithophysal zones because the value of PGV 
is always less than or equal to 4.07 m/s. 
NOTE:  The symbol “(-)“ denotes a dimensionless parameter. 
CSNF = commercial spent nuclear fuel; PWR = pressurized water reactor; BWR – boiling water reactor; 
CDSP = codisposal; PGV = peak ground velocity; HLW = high-level radioactive waste; SCC = stress corrosion 
crack. 
6.9.3 Limitations 
There are two important limitations for the seismic scenario class for TSPA-LA:  the duration of 
the simulations, and the possibility of rockfall in the drifts before the seismic event. 
The seismic scenario class for TSPA-LA is designed for a duration of 20,000 years.  This design 
limitation arises from two factors.  The first factor relates to the parameters for the structural 
response calculations, namely structural thicknesses and mechanical properties for the drip shield 
and waste package.  The thicknesses of the drip shield and waste package have been reduced to 
represent the potential degradation of these structures by general corrosion over the first 
10,000 years to 20,000 years after repository closure.  The mechanical properties of Alloy 22 and 
of Titanium Grade 7 have been evaluated at an elevated temperature, 150°C, which provides 
conservative values for over 97 percent of the first 10,000 years following repository closure for 
the high temperature operating model and for 100 percent of the time for the low temperature 
operating mode.  This approach is highly conservative from a risk assessment viewpoint because 
materials will be stronger than represented in the structural response calculations for about 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 6-139 August 2005 
97 percent of the realizations in the TSPA-LA.  The definition of structural thickness and 
material properties may change if the duration of the seismic scenario class is extended beyond 
20,000 years. 
The second factor for the design limitation related to the duration of the seismic scenario class is 
that coupled effects from multiple seismic events (i.e., that drift collapse after the first seismic 
event can alter conditions for the second seismic event) are not considered because seismic 
hazards with the potential to have a significant impact on engineered barriers are anticipated to 
occur very rarely during the 20,000 year period.  This is a reasonable approach for events that 
occur with an annual frequency of 10-5 per year or less over a 10,000 year or 20,000 year period.  
This is also a reasonable approach for annual exceedance frequencies between 10-4 and 10-5 per 
year if the corresponding ground motions and fault displacements produce small damage to EBS 
components (as is true for these abstractions). 
The second limitation is related to the condition of the drifts at the time of the seismic event.  
Structural response calculations for the drip shield and waste package do not include backfill 
around the drip shield at the time of the seismic event.  This representation is consistent with the 
present design that does not include engineered backfill but may become invalid if long-term 
fatigue of the tuff rock causes drift degradation and substantial collapse before a second seismic 
event with the potential to damage EBS components occurs. 
6.10 VERIFICATION OF SCIENTIFIC ANALYSES 
The abstractions for cladding damage from vibratory ground motions and for the EBS damage 
from fault displacement are stochastic distributions whose parameters are a function of the 
amplitude or the exceedance frequency of the ground motion.  These abstractions are considered 
scientific analyses because they are based on standard engineering and statistical techniques that 
bound the component response.  Since these abstractions are not models, they are not validated 
per LP-SIII.10Q-BSC, Models.  Verification that these abstractions are an accurate 
representation of the variability and uncertainty in damage to the EBS components is discussed 
below. 
• Damage to Fuel Rod Cladding from Vibratory Ground Motion 
The abstraction for damage to the cladding has 100 percent of the cladding perforated 
after a ground motion with PGV of 1.05 m/s or larger occurs.  This is a conservative, 
bounding approach (see discussion in Section 6.5.6) that does not require further 
verification. 
• Damage to EBS Components from Fault Displacement 
The abstraction for damage to the waste package and drip shield from fault displacement 
is based on the mean hazard curves for displacement of known faults in the repository 
block and on the available clearances between EBS components.  The analysis of 
damage from fault displacement demonstrates that there is no damage from faulting until 
an annual exceedance frequency less than 2×10-7 per year is reached.  In other words, 
only the largest fault displacements have the potential to damage the EBS components. 
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If a package is damaged by fault displacement, the damaged area on the waste package 
is defined as a uniform distribution with a lower bound of 0 and an upper bound given 
by the lid area.  The lower bound represents a situation with minor crimping of the waste 
package; the upper bound represents a situation in which the welds fail and the lid 
completely separates from the waste package.  These damage states are intended to be 
bounding conditions because there is high uncertainty in the state of the drift, the invert, 
and the EBS components after a major fault displacement. 
If a package is damaged by fault displacement, the damaged area on the drip shield 
surrounding that package is 100 percent.  This total damage state is a bounding condition 
because some fault displacements produce minimal crimping between the waste package 
and drip shield.  Similarly, the fuel rod cladding is 100 percent perforated for a fault 
displacement that damages the waste package. 
The damage abstraction for fault displacement has been compared to an alternative 
conceptual model proposed by (Waiting et al. 2003 [DIRS 164449]).  There is 
reasonable agreement between the damage abstraction in this report and the alternative 
conceptual model, considering that the alternate model is based on historical data for 
fault displacement in the western United States and that the damage abstraction is based 
on hazard curves specific to Yucca Mountain.  For example, the number of fault 
intersections predicted by the damage abstraction is 171, versus 191 for the alternative 
conceptual model.  Similarly, the probability weighted number of waste package failures 
is predicted to be 2.3×10-6 for the damage abstraction, within the range of 1.9×10-6 to 
1.9×10-5 for the alternative conceptual model.  This agreement provides added 
confidence in the damage abstraction for fault displacement. 
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7. VALIDATION 
The Seismic Consequence Abstraction report develops abstractions for the response of EBS 
components to seismic hazards at a geologic repository in Yucca Mountain, Nevada.  It also 
defines the methodology for using these abstractions in a seismic scenario class for the 
TSPA-LA.  The seismic hazards addressed are vibratory ground motion, fault displacement, and 
rockfall induced by ground motion.  The EBS components are the drip shield, waste package, 
and the fuel rod cladding.  Consistent with the intended use, the Technical Work Plan 
For:  Analysis of Waste Package and Drip Shield Response to Vibratory Ground Motion and 
Revision of the Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173171]) specifies model 
validation level of confidence III for the waste package consequence abstraction.   
No validation activities are required for the drip shield because it is predicted to remain intact, 
deflecting seepage and rockfall away from the waste package (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173171], 
Section 2.2.2.3).  The abstractions for cladding damage from vibratory ground motion and for 
damage to EBS components from fault displacement are considered scientific analyses because 
they are based on standard engineering techniques that bound the component response, rather 
than the results from detailed engineering calculations or other scientific analyses.  Since these 
abstractions are conservative, bounding approaches, rather than models, they are not validated 
per LP-SIII.10Q-BSC (BSC 2005 [173171], Section 2.2.2.6, last paragraph).  
Confidence Building During Model Development to Establish Scientific Basis and 
Accuracy for Intended Use 
The applicable TWP (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173171], Section 2.2.2.2) specifies criteria for 
Confidence Building During Model Development.  Additionally, the development of the model 
should be documented in accordance with the requirements of Section 5.3.2(b) of 
LP-SIII.10Q-BSC.  The development of the Seismic Consequences Abstraction has been 
conducted according to these criteria, as follows: 
1. Selection of input parameters and/or input data, and a discussion of how the selection 
process builds confidence in the model. [LP-SIII.10Q-BSC 5.3.2(b) (1) and 
LP-2.29Q-BSC Attachment 3 Level I (a)] 
The types and quality of the data selected as input builds confidence in the model.  The 
inputs to the Seismic Consequences Abstraction have all been obtained from controlled 
sources.  Section 4.1 provides a discussion of the inputs and Table 4-1 identifies the data 
and design parameters used.  Additional information that corroborates Table 4-1 and 
therefore builds additional confidence is discussed in Section 6.1.4.  Discussions of 
parameter ranges and uncertainties are covered throughout Section 6.  Model assumptions 
have been described in Section 5.  Thus, this requirement can be considered satisfied. 
2. Description of calibration activities, and/or initial boundary condition runs, and/or run 
convergences, simulation conditions set up to span the range of intended use and avoid 
inconsistent outputs, and a discussion of how the activity or activities build confidence in 
the model.  Inclusion of a discussion of impacts of any non-convergence runs 
[(LP-SIII.10Q-BSC 5.3.2(b)(2) and LP-2.29Q-BSC Attachment 3 Level I (e)]. 
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The Seismic Consequences Abstractions for waste package damage and drip shield 
response are functional relationships based on structural response calculations and 
kinematic calculations documented elsewhere, therefore detailed discussions regarding 
initial and boundary conditions, run convergences and non-convergences associated with 
the structural response calculations are not included in this report.  The Seismic 
Consequences Abstraction spans the range of intended use by covering the full range of 
peak ground velocities from the bounded PGV hazard curve; by defining the failure 
mechanisms, residual stress thresholds, and failure morphology for the waste package 
and drip shield; by consideration of responses to rockfall; and by responses to fault 
displacement.  
The seismic failure criteria for Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 7 have been selected in a 
conservative manner.  The failure criteria are based on considerations of accelerated 
corrosion due to residual stress, rather than the ultimate tensile failure stress of Alloy 22 
or Titanium Grade 7.  In fact, none of the structures reached ultimate tensile failure in the 
structural calculations.  The rationale for selection of the residual stress thresholds for 
failure is documented in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3, based on information in Stress 
Corrosion Cracking of the Drip Shield, the Waste Package Outer Barrier, and the 
Stainless Steel Structural Material (BSC 2004 [DIRS 172203], p. 6-7 in Section 6.2.1).  
The conservative approach to defining the residual stress thresholds for failure provides a 
safety margin that helps to enhance confidence in the seismic failure criteria.  The failure 
criteria are considered appropriate for their intended use because they are a conservative 
interpretation of the experimental data for the corrosion of Alloy 22 and Titanium 
Grade 7 under conditions relevant to Yucca Mountain and are consistent with current 
scientific understanding. 
The total damage to the waste package has two separate components:  damage from 
end-to-end impacts of adjacent waste packages (Section 6.5.1) and damage from waste 
package-pallet impacts (Section 6.5.2).  The total damage to the waste package is given 
by the sum of these two individual abstractions. 
Damage from end-to-end impacts is based on kinematic calculations that represent the 
potential for adjacent waste packages to experience synchronous motion in an 
emplacement drift (Section 6.5.1).  Two suites of kinematic calculations have been 
performed with multiple waste packages to determine the kinematic parameters and 
damaged areas due to end-to-end impacts between adjacent packages (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 173172], Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2).  The two suites are based on different 
computational techniques with different numbers and types of waste packages.  The 
kinematic impact data for each suite are converted to damaged areas based on a catalog 
or look-up Table of damage as a function of impact velocity and impact velocity 
(Sections 6.5.1.2 and 6.5.1.3; BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Section 5.4.3 and BSC 2005 
[DIRS 173178], Tables 2 and 3).  The damaged areas from both suites of kinematic 
results are independently abstracted, allowing the uncertainty in alternate technical 
approaches to be propagated into the waste package damage abstraction for TSPA.   
Damage from waste package-pallet impacts is based on detailed structural response 
calculations for a single waste package contained within rigid walls (Section 6.5.2 and 
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BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083]).  These structural response calculations provide a direct 
analysis of the damaged areas on the sides of the waste package from waste 
package-pallet impacts.  That is, the damage from waste package-pallet impacts is 
determined by analyzing the residual stress state of the finite-element mesh to determine 
the element areas where the residual stress exceeds 80 percent or 90 percent of the yield 
strength of Alloy 22. 
This requirement can be considered satisfied. 
3. Discussion of the impacts of uncertainties to the model results including how the model 
results represent the range of possible outcomes consistent with important 
uncertainties.[(LP-SIII.10Q-BSC 5.3.2(b)(3) and LP-2.29Q-BSC Attachment 3 Level 1 
(d) and (f)].  
The calculations of damaged areas on the waste package and drip shield due to vibratory 
ground motions and rockfall induced by vibratory ground motions exhibit substantial 
variability induced by the uncertainties in seismic ground motions and other input 
parameters.  This variability has been directly propagated into the TSPA-LA by defining 
stochastic parameters that are sampled during each realization of the seismic scenario 
class.  A more detailed discussion can be found in Section 8.2 under Acceptance 
Criterion 3:  Data Uncertainty Is Characterized and Propagated Through the Model 
Abstraction.  Treatment of model uncertainty is discussed in Section 8.2 under 
Acceptance Criterion 4:  Model Uncertainty Is Characterized and Propagated 
Through the Model Abstraction. 
4. Formulation of defensible assumptions and simplifications.  
[LP-2.29Q-BSC Attachment 3 Level I (b)]. 
Discussion of assumptions is provided in Section 5.  The basis for the simplifications in 
the seismic damage abstractions is provided in Sections 6.5.1 through 6.5.6 and 
Section 6.7. 
5. Consistency with physical principles, such as conservation of mass, energy, and 
momentum.  [LP-2.29Q-BSC Attachment 3 Level I (c)] 
Consistency with physical principles, such as conservation of mass, energy, and 
momentum, is maintained because the abstractions are based on detailed structural 
response calculations.  Structural calculations for the response of large engineered 
components (e.g., waste package, drip shield, or cladding) due to impact and vibration is 
a well-established technology.  The deformation of these types of structures can be 
evaluated with standard, commercially available finite-element programs.  As a result, 
there is high confidence in the results from the computational process because of the 
extensive testing of commercial software on a wide variety of problems, including impact 
calculations.  In addition, each computational study is based on a mesh refinement 
analysis and other supporting calculations that provide additional confidence in the 
results.  No changes to the finite-element software are needed for these calculations.  
These engineering codes have been qualified for their intended use under 
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LP-SI.11Q-BSC and the engineering calculations are performed under AP-3.12Q or 
LP-3.12Q-BSC (for the recent kinematic calculations). 
The abstractions for waste package response to vibratory ground motions are stochastic 
distributions whose parameters are a function of the amplitude of the ground motion.  These 
distributions, also called damage abstractions, are based on information from detailed structural 
response calculations.  These distributions are model abstractions because they represent this 
detailed computational information in a simplified manner for TSPA-LA.  The underlying 
information for the model abstractions are created by models that have been validated under 
LP-SIII.10Q-BSC or by engineering calculations with software qualified under LP-SI.11Q-BSC.  
The status of the engineering calculations for structural response, of the rockfall models and 
analyses, and of the failure criteria are discussed next, followed by a discussion of the validation 
of the individual model abstractions. 
The results from the engineering calculations are considered appropriate for their intended use 
for several reasons.  First, the calculations are based on standard, commercially available 
software that has demonstrated the capability to accurately analyze impact processes and 
kinematic response.  Second, the finite-element representation of EBS components is designed 
(via mesh refinement studies) to accurately represent the potential damage from the impact 
processes.  And lastly, the ground motions for the calculations are based on state-of-the-art 
techniques for representing seismic phenomena.  On the other hand, two features of the boundary 
conditions for these engineering calculations are notable for their conservatism.  First, the 
structural response calculations for a single waste package simulations have a rigid boundary 
(that moves with the invert) at the axial ends of the computational space.  The presence of a rigid 
boundary tends to amplify the number and intensity of end-to-end impacts for the single waste 
package simulations.  The second feature of the boundary conditions is that the very low 
frequency ground motions at the 5.35-m/s PGV level are considered physically unrealizable, as 
discussed in Section 6.4.3. 
The rockfall analyses are also performed with commercially available software, although it is 
necessary to modify the software for computational efficiency, for the representation of fractures 
with short or intermittent trace lengths, and for constitutive relationships for tuff.  Because of 
these modifications, the rock mechanics codes are qualified and the models validated for their 
intended application to lithophysal and nonlithophysal tuffs in accordance with LP-SIII.10Q-
BSC.  This model validation is documented in Section 7 of Drift Degradation Analysis 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107]). 
Confidence Building After Model Development to Support the Scientific Basis of the Model 
The model abstraction for waste package response to vibratory ground motion is a simple 
numerical fit to the failed surface area as a function of PGV.  The fit involves selecting an 
appropriate function to represent the mean or median damage as a function of PGV and selecting 
an appropriate distribution about the mean or median to represent the variability of damage.  The 
appropriate distributions and functional fits for the waste package have been developed and 
documented in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets.  The numerical values in these spreadsheets have 
been verified during the checking process for this model report.  These spreadsheets are 
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described in Appendices A and B and E of this report, and provided electronically on a CD 
(Appendix G).  Details of the validation process for the model abstractions are as follows: 
• Abstraction for Damage to the Waste Package from Ground Motion 
The abstraction for damage to the waste package is based on a probability of no damage 
and a power law fit to the median nonzero damage with a ln-normal distribution.  The 
selection of the power law fits and the ln-normal distributions is justified by the 
comparisons shown in Figures 6.5-10 through 6.5-13 in Section 6.5.1 and 
Figures 6.5-16 through 6.5-19 and Figure 6.5-21 in Section 6.5.2.  Figures 6.5-11, 
6.5-12, 6.5-18, and 6.5-19 provide direct evidence that the residuals for damaged area 
about the power law closely follow a normal distribution in ln(Damaged Area) space.  
In addition, the ln-normal distribution is not truncated, so very large damaged areas can 
be sampled in TSPA, as shown in Figures 6.5-13 and 6.5-21.  As an aside, the mean 
dose is directly determined by the mean damaged area at a given value of PGV, so 
mean dose is insensitive to the exact form of the variance about the power law. 
The level of confidence required for validation of the damage abstraction for the waste 
package under vibratory ground motion is high (Level III) because damage to the waste 
package is a significant factor in determining dose in TSPA calculations.  The 
abstraction for damage to the waste package has been validated by (1) corroboration of 
the abstraction results with damaged areas from structural response calculations, and by 
(2) an independent technical review.  The independent technical review has been 
performed by two individuals, Prof. C. Allin Cornell and Dr. Robert P. Kennedy.  Their 
reviews build and expand upon the first technical review that was performed by 
Dr. Kennedy for the original waste package damage abstraction (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 167780], Attachment III).  The first technical review is not repeated in this 
report because the original waste package damage abstraction has been completely 
superseded and replaced by the abstraction in Sections 6.5.1 through 6.5.3 of this 
report.  The model validation review criteria for either validation activity are 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173171], Section 2.2.2.2): 
1. Is the model abstraction reasonable and appropriate for its intended use? 
2. For given inputs, are the outputs of the model abstraction reasonable? 
3. Are limitations of the model abstraction adequately described? 
Corroboration of Abstraction Model.  The input data for development of the waste 
package damage abstraction are documented in BSC 2005 [DIRS 173172], Sections 5.4.1, 
5.4.2, 5.4.3, and 5.6.1, BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178], Tables 2 and 3, 
DTN:  MO0503SPAUDECW.000 [DIRS 173337], DTN:  MO0504SPALSDYN.000 
[DIRS 173338], BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717] Tables 6.1-4, 6.2-7, and 6.3-6, (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 166107], Tables X-2 through X-5), and IED WASTE PACKAGE DAMAGE FROM 
VIBRATORY GROUND MOTION AND FUEL ASSEMBLY ACCELERATION (BSC 2005 
[DIRS 173500], Tables 1 and 2).   
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1. Is the model abstraction reasonable and appropriate for its intended use? 
The technical approach for the waste package damage abstractions is that the 
damaged areas are fit with three relationships: (i) the probability of no damage as 
a function of PGV-longitudinal, (2) a power law fit to the nonzero damaged areas, 
and (3) a ln-normal fit to the residuals for damaged area about this power law.  
The power law fit and the ln-normal distribution for the residuals provide an 
excellent representation of the damaged areas at the 1.05 m/s, the 2.44 m/s and the 
5.35-m/s PGV levels.  The power law representation provides an accurate fit to 
the median damaged areas at these three PGV levels, as shown by the 
comparisons in Figures 6.5-10, 6.5-16, and 6.5-17.  A ln-normal distribution 
spans the full range of damaged areas observed in the structural response 
calculations, as shown by the comparisons in Figures 6.5-13 and 6.5-21.  In this 
situation, the model abstractions provide a reasonable and appropriate 
representation of damaged area for the seismic scenario class in TSPA. 
Alternate approaches were evaluated for the damage abstractions.  The alternate 
approaches included regression analysis for all damaged areas, as opposed to the 
nonzero damaged areas, and the use of uniform and normal distributions to 
represent the variance about the mean or median (geometric mean) response.  The 
regression analysis for all damaged areas did not improve on the recommended 
regression based on a probability of no damage and a power law fit to the nonzero 
damaged areas.  A ln-normal distribution provided a better representation of the 
variance about the median than a uniform distribution or a normal distribution.  
These results were confirmed through the independent technical review 
performed by Dr. R.P. Kennedy, who could not identify an improved regression 
fit to the damaged area data.  Dr. Kennedy’s review is summarized later in this 
Section and the complete text is in Appendix D.  
2. For given inputs, are the outputs of the model abstraction reasonable? 
The standard deviation for the normal distributions in ln-ln space is between 1.16 
to 1.46 for end-to-end impacts and between 1.02 and 1.04 for waste 
package-pallet impacts (Table 6.9-1).  These large values for standard deviation 
mean that the ln-normal distributions span a wide range of damaged areas for 
TSPA.  In addition, the ln-normal distributions are not truncated, so damaged 
areas significantly greater than the observed data may be sampled in TSPA.  
Clearly, there is a reasonable fit to the median damaged area and the untruncated 
ln-normal distributions span the wide range of damaged area data.  The potential 
for large damaged areas is conservatively represented by the untruncated 
ln-normal distributions in the abstractions.  The outputs of the model abstraction 
provide a reasonable representation of the full range of damaged areas on the 
waste packages from end-to-end impacts and from waste package-pallet impacts. 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 7-7 August 2005 
3. Are limitations of the model abstraction adequately described? 
The general limitations of the abstractions for the seismic scenario class are 
identified in Section 8.1.  The specific limitations for the structural response 
calculations and kinematic calculations that provide the data for the waste 
package damage abstraction are: (1) the use of unbounded ground motion time 
histories as boundary conditions for the structural response calculations and 
kinematic calculations, (2) the potential for rockfall to occur during the seismic 
event is not represented in the calculations, (3) geometric simplifications:  the 
kinematic calculations are two-dimensional and the single waste package 
calculations that determine damaged areas for waste package-pallet impacts have 
rigid end walls, and (4) the damaged area catalog for end-to-end impacts is based 
on relative velocity, conservatively excluding the potential damage reduction 
from the fact that the effective impact velocity between two equal packages 
moving with opposite velocities is one-half the relative velocity.  Conversely, the 
damaged area catalog does not include the potential for corner impacts on the lid 
of the waste package.  
In a more general sense, the first model validation activity is considered successful when 
the abstraction accurately represents the mean or median damage level and when the 
abstraction bounds the range of damage determined by the structural response calculations.  
The information provided under items (1), (2), and (3) confirms that the waste package 
damage abstractions can be successfully compared and corroborated with the underlying 
damaged area data generated by the structural response calculations and the kinematic 
calculations. 
Independent Technical Review By Prof. C. Allin Cornell.  An independent technical review 
of the waste package damage abstractions has been performed by Prof. C. Allin Cornell of 
Stanford University.  The key points from Prof. Cornell’s review are first summarized, 
followed by a response to the limitations identified by Prof. Cornell.  The complete text of 
Prof. Cornell’s review is in Appendix C.   
Regarding the Ground Motions 
• “The range of PGV values used covers that of interest as defined on one end by the onset 
of non-zero damage and at the other by PGV values beyond the 10-8 annual probability 
level.” 
• “For the purposes of the waste package abstraction, however, samples of such 
three-component accelerograms are precisely what are required to estimate the 
response and damage to the EBS.”  
• “Despite the broad variability observed in the response and damage the range of PGV 
and the sample size is sufficient in my view to provide an adequate abstraction of the 
damaged area probability distribution for the primary TSPA objective.  As will be 
elaborated on below I believe the focus should be on the mean value of the damaged 
area as a function of PGV.  Given the (conditional) standard deviations of ln (nonzero) 
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damaged areas of about 1 to 1.5 and total sample sizes of about 40, the standard error 
of estimation of the conditional mean of the (nonzero) damaged area is about 15 to 25%.  
The sample size may not be sufficient to confirm the extreme tails of the damaged area 
conditional distributions but the mean dose estimates are insensitive to these tails.” 
Dynamic Response of the EBS 
• “The dynamic response computations have now been separated into two approaches, 
one kinematic to captured waste package – waste package (WP-WP) impact statistics 
and one fully deformable to obtain damaged areas for waste package-pallet (WP-P) 
impacts.  The latter (based on the nonlinear analysis of a single waste package on a 
pallet surrounded by non-yielding surfaces) are the same analyses used in the initial 
abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167780], Section 6.5) reviewed previously by 
Dr. Robert Kennedy (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167780], Attachment III) and need not be 
reviewed again here.  This author concurs that they provide a reasonable and 
appropriate representation of the damaged areas due to this portion of the impacts and 
that the inputs and outputs are reasonable.”  
• “The new analyses are the 2D kinematic analyses of multiple waste packages designed 
to estimate the velocities and angles of the end-to-end WP-WP impacts for subsequent 
use in calculating damaged areas.  These new analyses are a major step forward in 
capturing the multi-package effects that were missing from the previous, conservative 
single-package analyses of WP-WP impacts.  …… In addition, the significant differences 
in results between the two modeling efforts (LSDYNA and UDEC) underline the 
difficulty of the mechanical analysis problem, its sensitivity to details of the modeling 
and the current limits to our understanding of the finer points of such analyses.  Further 
sensitivity and comparative studies are likely to bring sharper insight into the problem 
and less uncertainty in the conclusions.  The use of weighted results from both LSDYNA 
and UDEC analyses reflects that uncertainty and provides an appropriate and adequate 
abstraction for the present purposes.”   
Damaged Area Estimates 
• “As was true in the previous version of the Seismic Consequence Abstraction the WP-
WP damaged areas are estimated from the list of impacts with their velocities and 
angles using results from fine-mesh studies of a waste package impacting a non-yielding 
flat surface.  This approach has therefore been reviewed and found appropriate 
previously by Dr. Kennedy; this reviewer concurs.  The process has been modified 
somewhat (and likely made more conservative) by averaging over impact angles to 
remove the low value of damage implied by near-zero angles.  This is an improvement.  
This reviewer agrees that use of the relative velocity between packages is conservative 
but that failure to capture impacts of WP corners into lids is not (Section 6.5.1.3).”   
Damaged Area Probability Distributions 
• “The primary output of the TSPA is the mean dose at 10,000 years.  It is physically 
reasonable that the seismic contribution to this mean will be approximately proportional 
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to the mean damaged area (as release from the package(s) is similarly likely 
approximately proportional to damaged area at the small percentage areas of interest).  
Therefore the mean dose will be comparatively insensitive to either the shape of the 
damaged area distribution or its standard deviation.”  
• “The fits of these two damaged area parameter values versus PGV seem very reasonable 
and quite appropriate for the TSPA use.”   
• “All together the output - primarily mean damaged area versus PGV - appears to be 
reasonable given the inputs (ground motion samples, EBS models, and response to 
damaged area relationships).”  
Limitations 
• “Limitations to the new waste package abstraction include the issues of corner-on-lid 
WP-WP damage characterization and the as-yet un-understood differences between the 
two sets of 2D kinematic analyses mentioned above.  Other limitations include 
significant conservatisms such as the unbounded PGV of the perpendicular component 
(a factor only in the WP-P damage case) and the use of relative package velocities in the 
estimation of WP-WP damaged areas.  Limitations whose impacts are less 
predictable include the use of only a 2D representation of the waste packages kinematics 
in the WP-WP case, the use of only a single waste package in the WP-P case, and the 
dependence on a single multiple waste package configuration.  The report would benefit 
in Section 6.5.3 from a comparison between the damaged areas versus PGV predictions 
for the WP-WP and WP-P cases.  I believe it would be sufficient to show simply the 
mean damaged area vs. PGV for the two cases.”  
Project Response to Limitations 
• Differences in kinematic studies.  The potential differences between the calculations 
with UDEC and LS-DYNA have been evaluated in BSC (2005 [DIRS 173172], 
Section 5.4).  The difference in the contact damping mechanisms, viscous versus 
hysteretic, appears to be the major cause of the differences between the UDEC and 
LS-DYNA results.  More important than the sources of the differences, the abstractions 
for TSPA represent the damaged areas from both suites of kinematic calculations 
(Section 6.5.3), thereby propagating any uncertainty related to the technical approaches 
with UDEC and LS-DYNA directly into TSPA (see Operation 4 in Section 6.9.2). 
• Conservatism in ground motions.  There is significant conservatism in the ground 
motion time histories.  While the hazard curve for horizontal PGV has been bounded 
(Section 6.4.3), only the horizontal longitudinal component is scaled to a given PGV 
value.  The horizontal transverse component and the vertical component are not 
bounded, introducing a very significant conservatism in the kinematic calculations and 
the structural response calculations at the 2.44-m/s and 5.35-m/s PGV levels. 
• Conservatism in relative impact velocity.  There is a very significant conservatism in the 
interpretation of relative impact velocity for interpolation within the damaged area 
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catalog for end-on impacts.  The relative impact velocity between adjacent waste 
packages from the kinematic calculations is ideally a factor of two less than the 
equivalent end-on impact velocity for interpolation in Table 6.5-4.  Stated differently, 
the elastic surface provides a plane of symmetry for the end-on impact calculations, and 
this plane of symmetry implies that packages are moving in equal and opposite 
directions on either side of the plane for the kinematic calculations, resulting in a relative 
velocity that is a factor of two greater than the end-on impact velocity.  Damaged area is 
drastically reduced if the relative impact velocity in the kinematic calculations is divided 
by two before interpolating within the damaged area catalog.  Also see Dr. Kennedy’s 
review comments on this issue, directly following Prof. Cornell’s review. 
The conservatisms in ground motions and in relative impact velocity have been retained 
in the abstractions because they tend to compensate for the potential nonconservatisms 
from corner-on-lid contact versus end-to-end contact and for the potential differences 
from the use of two-dimensional versus three-dimensional kinematic representations 
(although the two-dimensional kinematic representations have one less degree of freedom 
and are therefore probably conservative with respect to the three-dimensional 
representations).  Engineering approaches are a necessary part of the analysis process 
because of the complexity of performing three-dimensional multi-body calculations for 
the EBS components in an emplacement drift.  In this situation, the conservatisms in the 
abstractions are designed to account for the approximations that are inherent in the 
engineering approaches. 
The results from Prof. Cornell’s independent review fulfill the requirements in BSC (2005 
[DIRS 173171], Section 2.2.2.2) as follows: 
1. Is the model abstraction reasonable and appropriate for its intended use? 
• The use of three-component ground motions and the range of PGV values for 
these ground motions are reasonable and appropriate.   
• The sample size (number of ground motions) is sufficient to provide an 
adequate abstraction of the damaged area probability distribution, bearing in 
mind that the primary TSPA objective is to define the mean damaged area as a 
function of PGV.   
• The new two-dimensional kinematic calculations are a major step forward in 
capturing the multi-package effects that are missing from the previous 
single-package analyses.  
• The use of a damaged area catalog to define damaged areas from end-to-end 
impacts is appropriate.  The use of mean damaged areas for nonzero impact 
angles in the catalog is an improvement.  The use of the relative impact 
velocity as an interpolation parameter that defines damaged areas is 
conservative. 
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• The use of weighted results from UDEC and LS-DYNA for damage from 
end-to-end impacts provides an appropriate and adequate abstraction. 
• The fits for the probability of no damage and the mean nonzero damaged area 
as functions of PGV are reasonable and appropriate for use in TSPA. 
2. For given inputs, are the outputs of the model abstraction reasonable? 
• The primary output from the damage abstraction, the mean damaged area 
versus PGV, appears to be reasonable and quite appropriate for use in TSPA. 
• The output from the single-package analyses provides a reasonable and 
appropriate representation of the damaged areas due to waste package-pallet 
impacts.  
• The fits for the probability of no damage and the mean nonzero damaged area 
as functions of PGV provide appropriate output for use in TSPA. 
3. Are limitations of the model abstraction adequately described? 
The limitations identified by Prof. Cornell, both conservative and unconservative, 
and the project response to these limitations are summarized on the preceding 
pages. 
Independent Technical Review By Dr. Robert P. Kennedy.  A second independent technical 
reviews of the waste package damage abstractions has been performed by 
Dr. Robert P. Kennedy of RPK Structural Engineering.  The conclusions from 
Dr. Kennedy’s review are repeated here.  The complete text of Dr. Kennedy’s review is in 
Appendix D. 
“In my judgment, the current waste package damage abstraction represents the 
highest quality damage abstraction that can be developed from the existing 
analytical studies of the seismic response of the waste packages.  Any further 
improvements should be concentrated on improving the input data as opposed to 
further development of damage abstractions from the existing analytical studies.  
It is not clear to me whether any further improvements are necessary.  However, 
if further improvements are judged to be warranted, the following areas are 
candidates for improvement: 
1. Develop an improved suite of ground motion time histories anchored to 
longitudinal peak ground velocities PGVL ranging from 1.0 m/sec to 
4.2 m/sec.  The current suite of time histories appear to contain some 
unreasonably high vertical PGVV and peak ground accelerations PGA for a 
given longitudinal PGVL.  These limited number of unreasonably high ground 
motion PGVV and PGA values are likely to have introduced some conservative 
bias to the high end of the damage area estimates.  Unfortunately, revising the 
suite of ground motion records would require all of the time-history waste 
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package response studies and the damage abstractions to have to be redone.  
My judgement is that the current damage estimates are conservative and that 
improving the suite of time-history records would lead to such an extensive 
redo of work that it is probably not necessary. 
2. Reinvestigate the catalog of damaged areas for end on impacts.  The current 
catalog is for a single waste package impacting a rigid boundary.  This 
condition only strictly applies to the case of perfectly symmetric impacts 
between adjacent casks.  This perfectly symmetric impact situation is 
extremely unlikely.  It is much more likely that the corner edge of one waste 
package impacts the lid of the adjacent waste package.  This impact situation 
probably warrants additional study.  If no further study is performed, one 
should continue to use the relative impact velocity between waste packages as 
opposed to half of this velocity when using the current catalog (Table 6.5-2)13 
of damage area as a function of impact velocity.” 
Project Response.  As noted in the project response to Prof. Cornell’s review, only the 
horizontal longitudinal component of a ground motion is limited to the PGV value on the 
bounded hazard curve.  The horizontal transverse component and the vertical component 
are not bounded, introducing a very significant conservatism in the kinematic calculations 
and the structural response calculations at the 5.35-m/s PGV level.  There is also a 
significant conservatism in the use of the relative impact velocity, rather than one-half the 
relative impact velocity, for defining damage based on the catalog of damaged areas from 
end-on impacts.  This latter conservatism is intended to encompass potential corrections for 
corner-to-lid impacts of adjacent waste packages, as Dr. Kennedy implies in Item (2) 
above. 
The results from Dr. Kennedy’s independent review fulfill the requirements in BSC (2005 
[DIRS 173171], Section 2.2.2.2) as follows: 
1. Is the model abstraction reasonable and appropriate for its intended use? 
• The LS-DYNA and UDEC technical approaches represent practical, high 
quality calculations of the impact kinematics for a string of waste packages.   
• The use of a damage catalog to define the damaged areas for the kinematic 
calculations with LS-DYNA and UDEC is appropriate, provided the relative 
impact velocity (rather than one-half the relative impact velocity) is the basis 
for interpolation within the catalog.   
• The damage abstractions for end-to-end impacts of adjacent waste packages 
are reasonable.  The fit to the probability of no damage and the power law fit 
to the median nonzero damaged area as functions of longitudinal PGV are 
reasonable.  Finally, the use of a ln-normal distribution to represent the 
dispersion about the power law fit is reasonable. 
                                                 
13Editorial Note:  The corresponding table number in the final version of this report is Table 6.5-4. 
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• The damage abstractions for waste package-pallet impacts are reasonable.  
The fit to the probability of no damage and the power law fit to the median 
nonzero damaged area as functions of longitudinal PGV are reasonable.  
Finally, the use of a ln-normal distribution to represent the dispersion about 
the power law fit is reasonable. 
• The use of weighted results from UDEC and LS-DYNA for damage from 
end-to-end impacts provides an appropriate and adequate abstraction. 
2. For given inputs, are the outputs of the model abstraction reasonable? 
• The damage abstractions for end-to-end impacts provide a reasonable fit to the 
data for damaged area, and Dr. Kennedy did not identify an improved fit. 
• The damage abstractions for waste package-pallet impacts provide a 
reasonable fit to the damaged area data, and Dr. Kennedy did not identify an 
improved fit. 
3. Are limitations of the model abstraction adequately described? 
The limitations identified by Dr. Kennedy and the project response to these 
limitations are summarized on the previous page. 
As discussed in Section 6.10, the abstractions for cladding damage from vibratory ground 
motions and for EBS damage from fault displacement are considered scientific analyses because 
they are based on standard statistical techniques that bound the component response.  Since these 
abstractions are not models, they are not validated per LP-SIII.10Q-BSC. 
The abstraction for EBS damage from fault displacement is based on standard engineering and 
statistical techniques that bound the response of the waste package, drip shield, and cladding, 
rather than the results from detailed engineering calculations or other scientific analyses.  Since 
the damage abstraction for fault displacement is a conservative, bounding approach, rather than a 
model, it is not validated per LP-SIII.10Q-BSC.  Section 6.7 describes the bounding approach for 
damage from fault displacement. 
The abstraction for damage to the cladding from vibratory ground motion results in 100 percent 
of the cladding being perforated in response to a ground motion with PGV of 1.05 m/s or larger 
(Table 6.5-16).  This is a bounding approach, as discussed in Section 6.5.6, which does not 
require further verification and is consistent with the available information and scientific 
understanding. 
Validation Summary 
The Seismic Consequences Abstraction and its components have been validated by applying 
acceptance criteria based on an evaluation of the model’s relative importance to the potential 
performance of the repository system.  All validation requirements defined in the applicable 
TWP (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173171], Section 2.2.2.2) have been fulfilled.  For the damage 
abstraction of the waste package under vibratory ground motion, this included corroboration of 
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abstraction results with computational data, and independent technical review.  Requirements for 
confidence building during model development have also been satisfied.  The model 
development activities and post development validation activities described establish the 
scientific bases for the Seismic Consequences Abstraction.  Based on this, the Seismic 
Consequences Abstraction and its components are considered to be sufficiently accurate and 
adequate for the representation of seismically-induced damage to EBS components in TSPA and 
to the level of confidence required by each abstraction component’s relative importance to the 
potential performance of the repository system. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 SUMMARY 
The purpose of this work is to develop abstractions for the response of EBS components to 
seismic hazards at a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and to define the 
methodology for using these abstractions in a seismic scenario class for the TSPA-LA.  The 
seismic hazards are vibratory ground motion, fault displacement, and rockfall due to ground 
motion.  The EBS components are the drip shield, the waste package, and the fuel cladding.  The 
following abstractions for seismically-induced damage have been developed: 
• Damage to the waste package from vibratory ground motions 
• Damage to the drip shield from vibratory ground motions 
• Damage to the fuel rod cladding from end-to-end impacts of adjacent waste packages 
• Damage to the waste package, drip shield and fuel rod cladding from fault displacement. 
The recommended implementation of these abstractions and their associated input parameters for 
TSPA-LA is defined in Section 6.9.2 and Table 6.9-1.  This computational algorithm can also be 
referenced through the output DTN:  MO0508SPACOMPA.002.  The recommended 
implementation of damage from fault displacement for criticality analyses is defined in 
Section 6.7.7.  The results in Section 6.7.7 can also be referenced through the output 
DTN:  MO0508SPACOMPA.002.   
Damage to the drip shield from rockfall in the lithophysal zones is not abstracted for TSPA-LA 
because the lithophysal zone is expected to shatter into small fragments that cannot produce 
damaged areas on the drip shield. 
The seismic scenario class is designed to efficiently determine the mean dose for seismic events 
with annual frequencies down to 10-8 per year.  The seismic scenario class is based on a single 
seismic hazard occurring at a randomly chosen time in each realization of the TSPA-LA.  That 
is, the conditional probability of a seismic event is 1 for each realization.  The damage from this 
single event is based on the abstractions for the drip shield, the waste package and the fuel rod 
cladding.  The damaged areas on the EBS components define pathways for flow and transport 
through the EBS.  Once radionuclides are released from the EBS, flow and transport in the 
unsaturated zone and the saturated zone are based on the same models and algorithms as for the 
nominal scenario class.  Biosphere calculations and parameters for the seismic scenario class are 
also unchanged from the nominal scenario class. 
Each realization of the seismic scenario class determines an annual dose time history for a single 
seismic hazard with known value of PGV and fault displacement.  These dose time histories do 
not represent the mean dose, as called for in 10 CFR 63.303 [DIRS 173273], because a single 
hazard always occurs in each realization.  However, a mean dose time history can be calculated 
using a probability-weighted average of all the realizations for the seismic scenario class.  The 
weighting factor for each realization corrects for the expected number of seismic events in each 
realization and for the logarithmic sampling of the hazard curve for PGV and of the time of the 
seismic event. 
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The major limitations of the postclosure abstractions for the seismic scenario class are as 
follows: 
• The structural response calculations include degradation of the waste package and drip 
shield over a 20,000-year time frame, which includes the initial 10,000 years following 
repository closure. 
• Coupled effects from multiple seismic events (i.e., that drift collapse during the first 
seismic event can alter conditions for the response of EBS components during the 
second seismic event) are not considered because seismic hazards with the potential to 
have a significant impact on engineered barriers are anticipated to occur very rarely 
during the 10,000 years following repository closure.  More specifically, seismic hazards 
with the greatest potential to damage the engineered barriers correspond to large 
disruptive events with annual exceedance frequencies much less than 10-4 per year 
(Section 6.5 of this report), so there is only a very small probability that multiple events 
with the potential to induce significant damage will occur over a 10,000-year or 
20,000-year period. 
• Spatial variability has not been represented in the damage abstractions for EBS 
components under ground motion. 
• Structural response calculations for the drip shield and waste package do not include 
backfill around the drip shield at the time of the seismic event.  This representation is 
consistent with the present design that does not include an engineered backfill, is 
consistent with the results from drift degradation analyses under nominal repository 
conditions, and is consistent with rockfall analyses that indicate complete drift collapse 
does not occur until peak ground velocity exceeds a threshold of 2 m/s in the lithophysal 
regions of the repository. 
• Structural response calculations are based on the 21-PWR waste package 
(Section 6.5.1.1).  The design for the 21-PWR package is very similar to the design of 
the 44-BWR package, and these two package types account for almost 65 percent of the 
packages in the inventory for TSPA-LA (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 11, for the 
21-PWR AP, 21-PWR control rod, and 44-BWR absorber plate).  It is reasonable to base 
damage estimates on the 21-PWR waste package because it is the dominant package 
design in the repository. 
• The ground motions for structural response calculations were created using different 
approaches for intercomponent variability and for spectral conditioning.  Section 6.4.2 
provides a discussion on the methodology for defining the suites of ground motions that 
are used in the structural response calculations. 
Two restrictions for subsequent use are identified here: (1) the structural response of degraded 
EBS components may need to be reconsidered if the duration of TSPA calculations is greater 
than 20,000 years, and (2) the appropriateness of determining mean dose from a single seismic 
event in each realization may need to be reconsidered if the duration of TSPA calculations is 
greater than 20,000 years.  
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8.2 HOW THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ARE ADDRESSED 
Acceptance Criterion 1:  System Description and Model Integration Are Adequate. 
(1) Total system performance assessment adequately incorporates important design 
features, physical phenomena, and couplings, and uses consistent and appropriate 
assumptions throughout the mechanical disruption of engineered barrier abstraction 
process; 
Response:  Section 6 explains the basis for the damage abstractions for the waste package 
(Sections 6.5.1 through 6.5.3), drip shield (Sections 6.5.4 and 6.5.5) and fuel rod cladding 
(Section 6.5.6) in response to vibratory ground motion and fault displacement.  The structural 
response calculations in Section 6.5.1 through 6.5.6 include the mechanical coupling between the 
EBS components in defining damaged areas on the drip shield and waste package or percent 
failed cladding.  Section 6.6 considers the potential damage to the EBS components from 
rockfall induced by vibratory ground motion.  Finally, Section 6.8 defines the thermal and 
hydrological changes to the in-drift environment after a seismic event.  These sections 
collectively address the methodology for incorporating design features, seismic response, and 
mechanical/thermal/hydrologic coupling within the damage abstractions for the seismic scenario 
class.  Specific aspects of the methodology are as follows: 
- The abstractions for damaged areas on the waste package and cladding are based on 
a statistically robust sampling of uncertain parameters, including the ground motion 
time histories, rock fracture patterns, rock compressive strength, and friction 
coefficients (Sections 6.5.1 through 6.5.7).  The abstractions are based on rockfall 
analyses and structural response calculations that use consistent assumptions and 
consistent material properties. 
- All abstractions are based on the mean hazard curves for ground motion and fault 
displacement, as discussed in Section 6.4.  This is consistent with Brocoum (2001 
[DIRS 159576], enclosure). 
- Degradation of the drip shield and waste package is addressed for the first 
10,000 years to 20,000 years after repository closure by reducing the thickness of 
the outer barrier of the waste package and the thickness of the drip shield plates by 
2 mm. 
- Material properties for structural response calculations are based on a temperature 
of 150°C, resulting in conservative values for 97 percent of the first 10,000 years 
after closure for the high temperature operating mode, as discussed in 
Assumption 5.3.  This choice is even more conservative over the first 20,000 years 
after repository closure. 
- Drip shield damage from rockfall induced by vibratory ground motion in the 
lithophysal and nonlithophysal zones is analyzed but not included in the damage 
abstractions (Section 6.6).  Rockfall is analyzed with state-of-the-art computer codes 
that are used for other drift degradation analyses. 
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- All relevant seismic-related FEPs are considered in Section 6.2.  The seismic-related 
FEPs in Table 6.2-1 are directly included in these abstractions.  The seismic-related 
FEPs for damage to EBS components from seismic-induced rockfall and from 
seismic-induced drift collapse are screened out of TSPA-LA, based on the 
arguments summarized in Table 6.2-2.   
(2) The description of geological and engineering aspects of design features, physical 
phenomena, and couplings, that may affect mechanical disruption of engineered 
barriers, is adequate.  For example, the description may include materials used in the 
construction of engineered barrier components, environmental effects 
(e.g., temperature, water chemistry, humidity, radiation, etc.) on these materials, and 
mechanical-failure processes and concomitant failure criteria used to assess the 
performance capabilities of these materials.  Conditions and assumptions in the 
abstraction of mechanical disruption of engineered barriers are readily identified and 
consistent with the body of data presented in the description. 
Response:  The structural response calculations and kinematic calculations in Section 6.5.1 
through 6.5.6 include the mechanical coupling between the EBS components in defining 
damaged areas on the drip shield and waste package or percent failed cladding.  Section 6.6 
considers the potential damage to the EBS components from rockfall induced by vibratory 
ground motion.  Finally, Section 6.8 defines the thermal and hydrological changes to the in-drift 
environment after a seismic event.  These sections collectively address the methodology for 
incorporating design features, physical phenomena, and the mechanical/thermal/hydrologic 
coupling between these phenomena within the damage abstractions for the seismic scenario 
class.  Specific aspects of the methodology are as follows 
- All abstractions are based on the mean hazard curves for ground motion and fault 
displacement, as discussed in Section 6.4.  This is consistent with Brocoum (2001 
[DIRS 159576], enclosure). 
- Degradation of the drip shield and waste package is addressed for the first 
10,000 years to 20,000 years after repository closure by reducing the thickness of 
the outer barrier of the waste package and the thickness of the drip shield plates by 
2 mm. 
- Material properties for structural response calculations are based on a temperature 
of 150°C, resulting in conservative values for 97 percent of the first 10,000 years 
after closure for the high temperature operating mode, as discussed in 
Assumption 5.3.  This choice is even more conservative over the first 20,000 years 
after repository closure. 
- The failure criteria for Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 7 are based on a residual stress 
threshold for initiation of stress corrosion cracking, as explained in Sections 6.3.2 
and 6.3.3.  The experimental basis for these failure criteria are defined in these 
sections. 
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(3) The abstraction of mechanical disruption of engineered barriers uses assumptions, 
technical bases, data, and models that are appropriate and consistent with other related 
U.S. Department of Energy abstractions.  For example, assumptions used for 
mechanical disruption of engineered barriers are consistent with the abstraction of 
degradation of engineered barriers (Section 2.2.1.3.1 of the Yucca Mountain Review 
Plan).  The descriptions and technical bases provide transparent and traceable support 
for the abstraction of mechanical disruption of engineered barriers; 
Response:  The seismic scenario class is represented as a separate scenario class in TSPA.  The 
rationale for this approach is explained in Section 6.9.  The seismic scenario class generally uses 
the same assumptions, technical bases, data and models as the nominal scenario class.  Major 
exceptions are:  (1) the failure mechanisms for the waste package and drip shield and cladding, 
as discussed in Section 6.3, (2) changes to the in-drift seepage, temperature, and relative 
humidity after a seismic event (Section 6.8), and (3) alternate flow diversion (also called flux 
splitting) for the drip shield after failure from fault displacement (Section 6.7.5, last paragraph).  
Specific aspects of the seismic scenario class are as follows: 
- All abstractions are based on the mean hazard curves for ground motion and fault 
displacement, as discussed in Section 6.4.  This is consistent with Brocoum (2001 
[DIRS 159576], enclosure). 
- The analysis of rockfall for the seismic scenario class and for the nominal scenario 
class is based on the same set of computer codes (Section 6.6 and BSC 2004 
[DIRS 166107]).  Similarly, the LS-DYNA code is used for both design calculations 
and structural response calculations for the seismic scenario class (Section 6.5). 
- The residual stress threshold for failure of Alloy 22 is also used as the threshold for 
initiation of stress corrosion cracking in the representation of corrosion processes on 
the waste package, as discussed in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. 
(4) Boundary and initial conditions used in the total system performance assessment 
abstraction of mechanical disruption of engineered barriers are propagated throughout 
its abstraction approaches; 
Response:  The rockfall analyses and structural response calculations use the same sets of 
ground motions at the 2.44-m/s PGV level and the 5.35-m/s PGV level.  Other boundary and 
initial conditions that ensure consistency are as follows:  
- The abstractions for damaged areas on the waste package and cladding are based on 
a statistically robust sampling of uncertain parameters, including the ground motion 
time histories, rock fracture patterns, rock compressive strength, and friction 
coefficients (Sections 6.5.1 through 6.5.7).  The abstractions are based on rockfall 
analyses and structural response calculations that use consistent boundary 
conditions and initial conditions.   
- All abstractions are based on the mean hazard curves for ground motion and fault 
displacement, as discussed in Section 6.4.  This is consistent with Brocoum (2001 
[DIRS 159576], enclosure). 
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- Degradation of the drip shield and waste package is addressed for the first 
10,000 years to 20,000 years after repository closure by reducing the thickness of 
the outer barrier of the waste package and the thickness of the drip shield plates by 
2 mm. 
- Material properties for structural response calculations are based on a temperature 
of 150°C, resulting in conservative values for 97 percent of the first 10,000 years 
after closure for the high temperature operating mode, as discussed in 
Assumption 5.3. 
(5) Sufficient data and technical bases to assess the degree to which features, events, and 
processes have been included in this abstraction are provided. 
Response:  The seismic-related FEPs in Table 6.2-1 are directly included in these abstractions.  
The seismic-related FEPs for damage to EBS components from seismic-induced rockfall and 
from seismic-induced drift collapse are screened out of TSPA-LA, based on the arguments 
summarized in Table 6.2-2.  Damage to EBS components from ground motion, rockfall, drift 
collapse, and shear due to fault displacement have been considered in the abstractions for the 
seismic scenario class or in the structural response calculations that support the abstractions. 
Acceptance Criterion 2:  Data Are Sufficient for Model Justification. 
(1) Geological and engineering values, used in the license application to evaluate 
mechanical disruption of engineered barriers, are adequately justified.  Adequate 
descriptions of how the data were used, interpreted, and appropriately synthesized into 
the parameters are provided. 
Response:  The underlying data for geologic properties and for engineering material properties 
are generally not directly used in the development of the seismic damage abstractions, with the 
exception of the residual stress failure criteria for Alloy 22 and for Titanium Grade 7.  
Justification of the appropriate values is provided through external references.  These 
justifications are based on experimental data for stress corrosion cracking, on handbook values 
and on manufacturer’s literature for the elastic and inelastic properties of EBS component 
materials, and on expert elicitation.  Specific source documents that support development of the 
seismic scenario class are as follows: 
- The residual stress failure criteria are based on experimental data for the initiation of 
stress corrosion cracking in Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 7 (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 172203], Section 6.2.1). 
- The constitutive relationships for Alloy 22 and for Titanium Grade 7 are based on 
material properties in the published literature.  More specifically, the Young’s 
modulus, Poisson’s ratio, yield strength, and friction factors are based on data in 
published literature (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083] Section 5). 
- Hazard curves are based on the results of an expert elicitation (CRWMS M&O 1998 
[DIRS 103731]; DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962], with files listed 
in Table 4-1).  The ground motion time histories for the rockfall analyses and 
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structural response calculations have been developed in a manner that is consistent 
with and builds upon the results of this expert elicitation.  
(3) Data on geology of the natural system, engineering materials, and initial 
manufacturing defects, used in the total system performance assessment abstraction, 
are based on appropriate techniques.  These techniques may include laboratory 
experiments, site-specific field measurements, natural analog research, and 
process-level modeling studies.  As appropriate, sensitivity or uncertainty analyses 
used to support the U.S. Department of Energy total system performance assessment 
abstraction are adequate to determine the possible need for additional data. 
Response:  Similar in response to subcriterion 1 above, the underlying data for the seismic 
scenario class are based on experimental data for stress corrosion cracking, on handbook values 
and manufacturer’s literature for the elastic and inelastic properties of EBS component materials, 
and on expert elicitation.  Specific sources that support development of the seismic scenario class 
are as follows: 
- The residual stress failure criteria are based on experimental data for the initiation of 
stress corrosion cracking in Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 7 (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 172203], Section 6.2.1). 
- The constitutive relationships for Alloy 22 and for Titanium Grade 7 are based on 
material properties in the published literature.  More specifically, the Young’s 
modulus, Poisson’s ratio, yield strength, and friction factors are based on data in 
published literature (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083] Section 5). 
- Hazard curves are based on the results of an expert elicitation (CRWMS M&O 1998 
[DIRS 103731]; DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962], with files listed 
in Table 4-1).  The ground motion time histories for the rockfall analyses and 
structural response calculations have been developed in a manner that is consistent 
with and builds upon the results of this expert elicitation. 
(4) Engineered barrier mechanical failure models for disruption events are adequate.  For 
example, these models may consider effects of prolonged exposure to the expected 
emplacement drift environment, material test results not specifically designed or 
performed for the Yucca Mountain site, and engineered barrier component fabrication 
flaws. 
Response:  The potential failure modes of EBS components are analyzed in Section 6.3.1.  
Based on this discussion, accelerated stress corrosion cracking is the expected failure mechanism 
for EBS components during a seismic event, rather than puncture or tearing at the ultimate 
tensile strain.  The constitutive relationships for Alloy 22 and for Titanium Grade 7 are based on 
material properties in the published literature.  More specifically, the Young’s modulus, 
Poisson’s ratio, yield strength, and friction factors are based on data in published literature, as 
summarized in BSC (2004 [DIRS 167083] Section 5). 
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Acceptance Criterion 3:  Data Uncertainty Is Characterized and Propagated 
Through the Model Abstraction. 
Data uncertainty is explicitly included in the seismic abstractions for TSPA-LA.  In the PSHA, 
parameter uncertainty and model uncertainty were directly incorporated into the seismic hazard 
curves that are direct inputs to the fault displacement damage abstraction and the computational 
methodology for the seismic scenario class.  Parameter uncertainty is also included in the ground 
motion time histories that are direct inputs to the rockfall analyses and structural response 
calculations that provide the basis for the damage abstractions.  Uncertainty in the input 
parameters for the structural response calculation and rockfall analyses is described next, 
followed by information on Subcriteria (1), (2), and (3) for this acceptance criterion. 
Uncertainty in Input Parameters for Structural Response Calculations 
The structural response calculations for the waste package response and drip shield under 
vibratory ground motions include three major sources of uncertainty:  (1) the ground motion time 
histories (aleatory uncertainty), (2) the metal-to-metal friction coefficient (epistemic 
uncertainty), and (3) the metal-to-rock friction coefficient (epistemic uncertainty): 
• Multiple three-component ground motion time histories are used to represent the 
uncertainty in the seismic forcing functions at PGV levels of 1.05 m/s, 2.44 m/s, and 
5.35 m/s.  One horizontal component of each ground motion set is scaled to have the 
same horizontal PGV because its uncertainty has been incorporated into the hazard 
curves during the PSHA.  The peak ground acceleration and the duration of the time 
histories span a wide range of response.  For example, the peak ground acceleration for 
the first horizontal ground motion component at the 2.44-m/s PGV level ranges from 
about 1.5 g to 7 g. 
• The metal-to-metal friction coefficient between the waste package and emplacement 
pallet varies from 0.2 to 0.8 to represent the uncertainty in its value.  The friction 
coefficient affects the onset of sliding and dissipation of energy for the EBS components 
as a function of the amplitude of the ground motion.  The static and dynamic friction 
coefficients are taken to be equal within the broad range (0.2 to 0.8) defined for this 
parameter.  However, the importance of friction is anticipated to diminish with 
increasing ground motion level because the EBS components begin to slide almost 
immediately for high amplitude ground motions. 
• The metal-to-rock friction coefficient between the emplacement pallet and the invert or 
between the drip shield and the invert varies from 0.2 to 0.8 to represent the uncertainty 
in its value.  Again, the friction coefficient affects the onset of sliding and dissipation of 
energy for the unanchored EBS components as a function of the amplitude of the ground 
motion.  However, the importance of friction is anticipated to diminish with increasing 
amplitude of the ground motions. 
The selection of friction coefficients as major sources of uncertainty, in addition to the ground 
motions, is based on the potential for frictional forces to influence the kinematics of EBS 
components.  Variability in ground motions is often the most significant uncertainty in structural 
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response calculations for nuclear plant components.  Variability of friction coefficients may be 
important if damage varies significantly with the relative motions or impacts between adjacent 
structures. 
The variations of these uncertain input parameters are simultaneously included in the fifteen 
structural response calculations at each seismic hazard level.  This is accomplished by a 
Monte Carlo procedure that ensures robust sampling of the uncertain parameters over their full 
ranges (Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.4).  The Monte Carlo procedure and the sampled values of the 
three uncertain input parameters are described and documented in Sampling of Stochastic Input 
Parameters for Rockfall and Structural Response Calculations Under Vibratory Ground Motion 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169999], Section 6.4). 
The results from the structural response calculations are post-processed to determine the 
damaged areas on the drip shield or waste package.  The seismic damage abstractions for the 
waste package and drip shield make use of a residual stress threshold as a failure criterion 
(Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3).  If the residual stress from mechanical damage exceeds the stress 
threshold for the barrier, then the affected area(s) are represented as a network of stress corrosion 
cracks.  The residual stress threshold for the waste package is based on a uniform distribution 
between 80 and 90 percent of the yield strength for Alloy 22 (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3).  
Post-processing of the output from waste package calculations determines the damaged areas 
corresponding to both 80 and 90 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 167083], Tables 6.4.1-2 and 6.4.2-2).  The residual stress threshold for titanium is (very) 
conservatively set to a constant value of 50 percent of the yield strength of Titanium Grade 7, so 
no uncertainty is propagated into TSPA-LA for damaged area on the drip shield from vibratory 
ground motion. 
Uncertainty in Input Parameters for Rockfall Analyses 
All rockfall analyses include the ground motion time histories as a major source of uncertainty 
(Section 6.6).  Fifteen ground motions represent the uncertainty in the seismic forcing functions 
at the 1.05-m/s, 2.44-m/s, and 5.35-m/s PGV levels.  In the lithophysal units, the rock 
compressive strength is an uncertain input parameter that is represented as five discrete levels of 
rock strength, ranging from low (5 MPa) to high (30 MPa).  In the nonlithophysal units, the 
synthetic fracture pattern is an uncertain input parameter.  The synthetic fracture pattern is a 
representation of the fracture system geometry in three dimensions.  105 synthetic fracture 
patterns define the fracture geometry (but not the fracture properties; see below) are used in the 
rockfall analyses for the nonlithophysal units.  The variations in these uncertain parameters are 
simultaneously included in the rockfall analyses at each seismic hazard level (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 166107]). 
The stochastic input parameters for the rockfall analyses are based on engineering judgment.  For 
example, the rock compressive strength is a key parameter for drift failure in a continuum 
material, while the fracture geometry is a key parameter for identifying the size and location of 
rock blocks that can be shaken loose from the walls of a drift.  Fracture properties such as 
cohesion and sliding friction can also be important in the nonlithophysal units, but are 
conservatively represented rather than being incorporated into the stochastic sampling scheme. 
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The results from the rockfall analyses are not direct inputs to TSPA-LA.  Rockfall analyses for 
lithophysal units predict drift collapse at PGV levels of 2 m/s and greater; however, the strong 
seismic waves are predicted to shatter the lithophysal rock into small fragments that cannot 
damage the drip shield or waste package as a barrier to seepage. 
Rockfall analyses for the nonlithophysal units predict a wide range of block sizes and velocities 
that can be ejected from the drift walls and impact the drip shield.  More specifically, each 
rockfall analysis for the nonlithophysal unit predicts a complex, time-dependent sequence of 
rock blocks that impact the drip shield at varying locations and velocities.  These impacts can 
cause damage to the drip shield if the block has enough mass and kinetic energy. 
Propagation of Uncertainty Into TSPA 
The calculations of damaged area on the waste package and drip shield due to vibratory ground 
motions exhibit substantial variability induced by the uncertainties in seismic ground motions 
and other input parameters.  This variability has been directly represented in TSPA-LA by 
defining stochastic parameters that are sampled during each realization of the seismic scenario 
class.  For example: 
• For a given value of PGV, damage to the waste package from vibratory ground motion 
is represented as (i) the probability of no damage, (ii) if damage occurs, a power law fit 
represents the median damaged area on the waste package, and (iii) a ln-uniform 
distribution of damage about the median value; this ln-uniform distribution is sampled 
for each realization of the seismic scenario class.  The probability of no damage is 
shown in Figures 6.5-9 and 6.5-15.  The range of data for the power law fit is shown in 
Figures 6.5-10, 6.5-16, and 6.5-17.  The distribution of points about the power law fit is 
shown in Figures 6.5-11, 6.5-12, 6.5-18, and 6.5-19.  The comparison of the 0.05 and 
0.95 nonexceedance probability curves for the ln-normal distribution with the nonzero 
damaged area data is shown in Figures 6.5-13 and 6.5-21. 
• The uncertainty in the residual stress threshold for Alloy 22 has been propagated into the 
abstraction for TSPA-LA.  The damage for end-to-end impacts of the waste packages is 
based on separate damage abstractions for the 80 and 90 percent Alloy 22 failure 
criteria.  Similarly, the damage for waste package-pallet impacts is based on separate 
damage abstractions for the 80 and 90 percent Alloy 22 failure criteria.  This approach 
directly maintains the range in damaged areas due to the uncertainty in failure criterion 
in the TSPA calculations for the seismic scenario class. 
The abstraction for failure of fuel rod cladding does not propagate uncertainty into TSPA-LA 
because it is based on a simplified response that is bounded with two damage states:  zero 
damage below PGV of 0.55 m/s and 100 percent damage for PGV values of 1.05 m/s and 
greater. 
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Discussion for Subcriteria (1), (2), and (3) 
(1) Models use parameter values, assumed ranges, probability distributions, and bounding 
assumptions that are technically defensible, reasonably account for uncertainties and 
variabilities, and do not result in an under-representation of the risk estimate; 
Response:  The above discussion directly addresses the technical defensibility, uncertainty, and 
variabilities in parameter values.  Specific examples include: 
- Rockfall models and structural response calculations use parameter values and 
parameter ranges that are defensible and account for variabilities in rock properties 
and fracture patterns and uncertainties in ground motion time histories and friction 
coefficients. 
- A major uncertainty in the response of the lithophysal zone is the rock compressive 
strength.  This parameter is sampled from 5 levels for the rockfall analyses.  
- Material properties for structural response calculations are based on a temperature 
of 150°C, which is conservative over 97 percent of the time for the first 
10,000 years after closure.  This choice is even more conservative for the first 
20,000 years after repository closure (Assumption 5.3). 
(2) Process-level models used to represent mechanically disruptive events, within the 
emplacement drifts at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, are adequate.  
Parameter values are adequately constrained by Yucca Mountain site data, such that 
the effects of mechanically disruptive events on engineered barrier integrity are not 
underestimated.  Parameters within conceptual models for mechanically disruptive 
events are consistent with the range of characteristics observed at Yucca Mountain. 
Response:  The LS-DYNA code and the UDEC code are used to determine the mechanical 
response of EBS components to vibratory ground motion.  LS-DYNA is used for both design 
calculations and for the structural response calculations for the seismic scenario class 
(Section 6.5).  The analysis of rockfall for the seismic scenario class and for the nominal scenario 
class is based on state-of-the-art computer codes, including UDEC, that can represent continuum 
and discontinuous response of rock in the lithophysal and nonlithophysal units of the repository 
(Section 6.6 and BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107]).  The appropriateness of the parameters within 
LS-DYNA and for the rockfall analyses with UDEC are discussed in underlying documents, 
such as Drift Degradation Analysis (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107]), and are beyond the scope of this 
document. 
(3) Uncertainty is adequately represented in parameter development for conceptual 
models, process-level models, and alternative conceptual models considered in 
developing the assessment abstraction of mechanical disruption of engineered barriers.  
This may be done either through sensitivity analyses or use of conservative limits. 
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Response:  The discussion preceding Subcriterion (1) directly addresses the incorporation of 
parameter uncertainty into the abstraction process.  Specific examples include: 
- A major uncertainty in the response of the lithophysal zone is the rock compressive 
strength.  This parameter is sampled from five levels for the rockfall analyses.  
- A major uncertainty in the response of the nonlithophysal zone is the fracture 
geometry and fracture properties.  These uncertainties are represented by the use of 
numerous synthetic joint fracture patterns that are generated in a statistically sound 
manner and incorporated into the rockfall analyses for the nonlithophysal zones. 
- Material properties for structural response calculations are based on a temperature 
of 150°C, which is conservative over 97 percent of the time for the first 
10,000 years after closure.  This choice is even more conservative for the first 
20,000 years after repository closure (Assumption 5.3). 
- Thicknesses of the waste package outer barrier and drip shield plates have been 
reduced by 2 mm to conservatively account for general corrosion over the first 
10,000 years to 20,000 years after closure. 
- Uncertainty and variability in damaged areas of the waste package and drip shield 
are represented in the abstractions as a sampled distribution (Sections 6.5.3 and 
6.5.6).  This uncertainty is directly incorporated into the abstractions for TSPA-LA. 
Acceptance Criterion 4:  Model Uncertainty Is Characterized and Propagated Through the 
Model Abstraction. 
The seismic consequence abstractions have considered alternative conceptual models.  The 
kinematic calculations include two alternate technical approaches, based on LS-DYNA and 
UDEC, and also provide different representations of the mean or median damage and the 
distribution of damage about the mean or median for the damage from end-to-end impacts.  
Model uncertainty has been directly incorporated into the hazard curves that are direct inputs to 
the fault displacement damage abstraction and the computational methodology for the seismic 
scenario class.   
The distribution of damaged areas on the waste package has been analyzed for the 2.44-m/s, 
5.35-m/s and 1.05-m/s PGV level ground motions.  The damaged areas for end-to-end impacts of 
adjacent waste packages are based on kinematic calculations with multiple waste packages.  
Kinematic calculations have been performed with LS-DYNA and UDEC using slightly different 
modeling approaches and modeling assumptions (Section 6.5.1.1).  The uncertainty in the 
kinematic approaches has been propagated into the abstraction for TSPA-LA by providing 
separate damage abstractions for UDEC and for LS-DYNA.  This approach directly maintains 
the uncertainty in damaged area due to the computational approaches in the seismic scenario 
class for TSPA.  Note that the damage abstraction for waste package-pallet impacts is based on 
the results from LS-DYNA analyses, without an alternate computational technique, so the 
corresponding uncertainty cannot be propagated forward into TSPA. 
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The damage abstraction for fault displacement has been compared to an alternative conceptual 
model proposed by Waiting et al. (2003 [DIRS 164449]).  There is reasonable agreement 
between the damage abstraction in this report and the alternative conceptual model, considering 
that the alternate model is based on historical data for fault displacement in the western United 
States and that the damage abstraction is based on hazard curves specific to Yucca Mountain.  
For example, the number of fault intersections predicted by the damage abstraction is 171, versus 
191 for the alternative conceptual model.  Similarly, the probability weighted number of waste 
package failures is predicted to be 2.3×10-6 for the damage abstraction, within the range of 
1.9×10-6 to 1.9×10-5 for the alternative conceptual model.  This agreement provides added 
confidence in the damage abstraction for fault displacement. 
Discussion for Subcriteria (2) and (3) 
(2) Consideration of conceptual model uncertainty is consistent with available site 
characterization data, laboratory experiments, field measurements, natural analog 
information and process-level modeling studies; and the treatment of conceptual 
model uncertainty does not result in an under-representation of the risk estimate; 
Response:  The above discussion directly addresses how conceptual model uncertainty has been 
incorporated into the abstractions for the seismic scenario class.  Specific examples include: 
- The hazard curves for vibratory ground motion and fault displacement were 
developed from an expert elicitation (CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 103731).  This 
elicitation process explicitly considered conceptual model uncertainty during its 
development of the hazard curves. 
- Grid convergence studies and alternate finite-element representations have been 
evaluated for the rockfall models (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107]) and for the structural 
response calculations (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Attachments VI, VII, VIII, 
and IX) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 173178]).  An alternate damaged area interpolation 
scheme has also been investigated (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170843]).  Calculations and 
analyses have been performed with the most appropriate numerical representations, 
so this particular source of model uncertainty is not propagated through the damage 
abstractions for TSPA-LA. 
(3) Appropriate alternative modeling approaches are investigated that are consistent with 
available data and current scientific knowledge, and appropriately consider their 
results and limitations using tests and analyses that are sensitive to the processes 
modeled. 
Response:  The discussion before Subcriterion (2) directly addresses how alternate modeling 
approaches are addressed.  Specific examples include: 
- The hazard curves for vibratory ground motion and fault displacement are 
developed from a expert elicitation (CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 103731).  The 
individual groupings of experts developed and weighted alternative conceptual 
models for defining the seismic hazards at Yucca Mountain. 
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- Grid convergence studies and alternate finite element representations have been 
performed for the rockfall models (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166107]) and for the structural 
response calculations (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167083], Attachments VI, VII, VIII, 
and IX; and BSC 2004 [DIRS 173178]).  An alternate damaged area interpolation 
scheme has also been investigated (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170843]).  Calculations and 
analyses have been performed with the most appropriate numerical representations, 
so this particular source of model uncertainty is not propagated through the damage 
abstractions for TSPA-LA. 
- Alternative modeling approaches have been evaluated for the conceptual and 
computational models of lithophysal and nonlithophysal rock (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 166107]), but are beyond the scope of this document. 
- The damage abstraction for fault displacement has been compared to an alternative 
conceptual model proposed by Waiting et al. (2003 [DIRS 164449]).   
Acceptance Criterion 5:  Model Abstraction Output Is Supported by Objective 
Comparisons. 
(1) Models implemented in this total system performance assessment abstraction provide 
results consistent with output from detailed process-level models and/or empirical 
observations (laboratory and field testings and/or natural analogs). 
The consistency of the abstractions, with the detailed output from structural response 
calculations, are summarized in Table 8.2-1. 
(2) Outputs of mechanical disruption of engineered barrier abstractions reasonably 
produce or bound the results of corresponding process-level models, empirical 
observations, or both. 
Response:  Objective comparisons between the calculated damage to EBS components and the 
corresponding abstractions for TSPA-LA are summarized in Table 8.2-1. 
(3) Well-documented procedures, that have been accepted by the scientific community to 
construct and test the mathematical and numerical models, are used to simulate 
mechanical disruption of engineered barriers. 
Response:  The objective comparisons in Table 8.2-1 are an accepted method for comparing 
abstractions with the underlying data from structural response calculations or for defining the 
bounding response of EBS components. 
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Table 8.2-1. Comparison of Seismic Abstractions with Objective Evidence 
Abstraction Objective Comparison 
Damage to Waste Package from Ground 
Motion 
The abstraction for damage to the waste package is 
based on kinematic calculations for damage from 
end-to-end impacts and on structural response 
calculations for waste package-pallet impacts.  For the 
end-to-end impacts, four separate abstractions are 
provided for two computational approaches, with 
LS-DYNA or UDEC, and for two residual stress failure 
criteria, 80 percent and 90 percent of the yield strength of 
Alloy 22.  Figures 6.5-10 through 6.5-13 compare the 
damaged area observations to a power law fit and to a 
ln-normal distribution about the power law fit for the 
LS-DYNA results with a residual stress failure criterion of 
80 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22.  For the 
waste package-pallet impacts, two separate abstractions 
are provided for the LS-DYNA results with residual stress 
failure criteria of 80 percent and 90 percent of the yield 
strength of Alloy 22.  Figures 6.5-16 through 6.5-19 and 
Figure 6.5-21 compare the damaged area observations 
to a power law fit and to a ln-normal distribution about 
the power law for the residual stress failure criterion of 
80 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22.   
The spreadsheets on the CD in Appendix G provide 
similar comparisons for all six abstractions.  The plots in 
these spreadsheets provide objective evidence of the 
adequacy of the waste package damage abstraction.  An 
independent technical review has also been performed 
for this damage abstraction to provide increased 
confidence in the model abstraction. 
Damage to Drip Shield from Ground Motion 
(only for validation testing of the TSPA-LA 
model) 
The abstraction for drip shield separation from ground 
motion is based on a uniform distribution.  The upper 
limit of this uniform distribution provides an upper bound 
for the separation at a PGV of 5.35 m/s, providing 
objective evidence of its adequacy. 
Damage to Fuel Rod Cladding from Ground 
Motion 
The abstraction for damage to the cladding has that 
100 percent of the cladding perforated after a ground 
motion with PGV of 1.05 m/s or larger occurs.  This 
scientific analysis is based on a conservative, bounding 
approach. 
Damage to Waste Package, Drip Shield, 
and Fuel Rod Cladding from Fault 
Displacement 
The abstraction for damage to the waste package and 
drip shield from fault displacement is based on the 
hazard curves for displacement of known faults in the 
repository block and available clearances for EBS 
components.  The analysis of fault displacement 
demonstrates that there is only damage from fault 
displacement with a 2 × 10-7 per year annual exceedance 
frequency, or less (Table 6.7-11).  In this situation, 
damage from fault displacement is a very low probability 
occurrence.  In addition, a maximum of 56 packages is 
affected by fault displacement (Table 6.7-11).  In this 
situation, it is appropriate to verify this scientific analysis 
through the normal checking process for model reports. 
EBS = engineered barrier system; PGV = peak ground velocity; TSPA-LA = total system performance 
assessment – license application. 
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A.1 MEAN DAMAGED AREAS FROM END-ON IMPACTS 
The Excel workbook “End-On Damage Catalog.xls” calculates the mean values for damaged 
area as a function of impact velocity.  This workbook also estimate the velocity threshold at 
which damaged area becomes zero for the residual stress threshold of 80 percent of the yield 
strength of Alloy 22.  This workbook has two worksheets, “80% of YS” and “90% of YS”, that 
document the mean value calculations for residual stress thresholds of 80 percent and 90 percent 
of the yield strength for Alloy 22, respectively.  These worksheets are also the source for 
Figures 6.5-6 through 6.5-8 in the main body of this report.  A copy of the file “End-On Damage 
Catalog.xls” is included on the CD in Appendix G of this report.   
Formulas, Input Data, and Output Data 
The calculation of mean damaged area uses the standard AVERAGE statistical function in Excel.  
The input data for calculation of the mean values comes from (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178], 
Table 2) for a residual stress threshold of 80 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22 and 
(BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178], Table 3) for a residual stress threshold of 90 percent of the yield 
strength of Alloy 22.  Only the damaged areas for impact angles of 1°, 5°, and 8° are averaged, 
as explained in Section 6.5.1.2.  The output data from the spreadsheet are the mean values, which 
are found in cells G6 through G10 of either worksheet.  These output data are used for the 
calculation of end-to-end damaged areas, as discussed in Section A.2. 
The mean damaged areas are also used to define the velocity threshold at which damaged area 
becomes zero.  The damaged areas at the impact velocities closest to zero are given by (1 m/s, 
0.00223 m2) and (2 m/s, 0.0172 m2).  The slope and x-intercept of the line between these two 
points are given by: 
 ,015.0
)12(
)00223.00172.0(slope =−
−=  (A-1) 
 m/s.85.0
slope
m0.00223-m/s1intercept
2
==−x  (A-2) 
The x-intercept in equation A-2 defines the velocity threshold for zero damaged area.  The output 
data from this calculation is the velocity threshold, which is used for calculation of the 
end-to-end damaged areas discussed in Section A.2. 
Detailed Description of Excel Workbooks 
Finite-element calculations have been performed to determine the damaged areas from end-on 
impacts of a waste package on an elastic surface (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178], Tables 2 and 3).  
The results from these calculations form the basis for the catalog or lookup table of damaged 
areas as a function of impact velocity and impact angle.  There are five values of impact 
velocity:  1 m/s, 2 m/s, 4 m/s, 6 m/s and 10 m/s, and four values of the impact angle:  0°, 1°, 5°, 
and 8° in the catalog.  The selected ranges of impact velocity and impact angle are sufficiently 
wide to encompass all velocities and angles encountered in the end-to-end impacts generated by 
the kinematic calculations discussed in Section 6.5.1.1. 
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The results for damaged area as a function of impact velocity and impact angle are found in 
cells C6 through F10 of either worksheet.  These areas are repeated in Table A-1, which is 
identical with Table 6.5-3 in the main body of this report.  The angular dependence of damage in 
Table A-1 has been simplified for the purpose of determining damaged areas from end-to-end 
impacts.  For a given impact velocity, the damaged area is determined as the mean value of the 
damaged areas at 1°, 5°, and 8°.  The mean values are calculated in cells G6 through G10 in 
either worksheet.  The resulting mean values are summarized in Table A-2 (identical with 
Table 6.5-4 in the main body of this report).   
The graphics for Figures 6.5-6(a) and 6.5-7(a) are presented in cells A17 through G45 and in 
cells H17 through O45, respectively, in the “80% of YS” worksheet.  The graphics for 
Figures 6.5-6(b) and 6.5-7(b) are presented in cells A17 through G45 and in cells H17 
through O45, respectively, in the “90% of YS” worksheet. 
Table A-1.  Catalog of Damaged Areas from End-On Impact on an Elastic Surface 
Damaged Area (m2) for Stress Threshold of 
80% of Yield Strength as a Function of Impact 
Angle 
Damaged Area (m2) for Stress Threshold of 
90% of Yield Strength as a Function of Impact 
Angle Impact 
Velocity 0º 1º 5º 8º 0º 1º 5º 8º 
1 m/s 0.0 0.0020 0.0027 0.0020 0.0 0.0017 0.0014 0.0012 
2 m/s 0.0024 0.0282 0.0130 0.0105 0.0 0.0035 0.0052 0.0051 
4 m/s 0.0122 0.0421 0.0651 0.0474 0.0122 0.0126 0.0288 0.0212 
6 m/s 0.0264 0.0521 0.1466 0.0967 0.0124 0.0222 0.0655 0.0335 
10 m/s 0.0419 0.0571 0.2822 0.2244 0.0377 0.0259 0.1542 0.1206 
Source:  BSC 2005 [DIRS 173178], Tables 2 and 3. 
Table A-2.  Mean Damaged Areas for 1º, 5º, and 8º End-On Impacts on an Elastic Surface 
Impact 
Velocity 
Mean Damaged Area (m2) for 
Stress Threshold of 80% of Yield 
Strength 
Mean Damaged Area (m2) for 
Stress Threshold of 90% of Yield 
Strength 
1 m/s 0.00223 0.00143 
2 m/s 0.0172 0.0046 
4 m/s 0.0515 0.0209 
6 m/s 0.0985 0.0404 
10 m/s 0.1879 0.1002 
Source: Cells G7 through G11 in either worksheet in the workbook “End-On Damage 
Catalog.xls”.   
The mean damaged areas in Table A-2 for the residual stress threshold of 80 percent of YS form 
the basis for estimating the velocity threshold for the onset of nonzero damage.  The velocity 
threshold is estimated by extrapolating the mean damaged curve below 1 m/s.  A simple linear 
extrapolation of the damaged areas at 1 m/s and 2 m/s indicates that the x-intercept of the curve 
corresponds to 0.851 m/s.  This calculation can be found in cells N3 through O6 of the worksheet 
“80% of YS”.  The adjacent plot, in cells P1 through W25, provides the basis for Figure 6.5-8 in 
the main body of the report. 
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A.2 DAMAGED AREA CALCULATIONS FOR END-TO-END IMPACTS 
The mean damaged areas in Table A-2 and the velocity threshold of 0.85 m/s (corresponding to 
the onset of nonzero damage) provide the basis for determining damaged areas from end-to-end 
impacts of adjacent waste packages in the kinematic calculations.  The methodology for 
calculating damaged area uses the relative impact velocity from the kinetic analyses as the 
interpolation parameter in Table A-2.  The total damaged area is then defined as the sum of the 
damaged areas from the individual impacts. 
This methodology has been applied to the kinematic output from the two suites of calculations 
discussed in Section 6.5.1.1.  The damaged area calculations for the 80 percent and the 
90 percent residual stress criteria are documented in the Excel files identified in Table A-3.  
A copy of all files in Table A-3 is included on the CD in Appendix G of this report.  
Formulas, Input Data, and Output Data 
Interpolation between points in the damaged area catalog uses the standard Excel function 
FORECAST.  The summation of damaged areas uses the standard SUM function in Excel.  The 
input data for the damaged area catalog comes from the results of the Excel workbook “End-On 
Damage Catalog.xls” discussed in Section A.1.  The input data for the kinematic impact 
parameters from LS-DYNA is based on the spreadsheets in DTN:  MO0504SPALSDYN.000 
[DIRS 173338].  The input data for the kinematic impact parameters from UDEC is in 
DTN:  MO0503SPAUDECW.000 [DIRS 173337].  The output data from the spreadsheets are 
the damaged areas for 17 ground motion time histories at the 1.05-m/s, 2.44-m/s, and 5.35-m/s 
PGV levels.  These data are the basis for the damage abstractions from end-to-end impacts with 
LS-DYNA and with UDEC.  The development of the damage abstractions is discussed in 
Appendix B. 
A.2.1 Analysis of Kinematic Data from LS-DYNA Calculations 
The Excel workbooks “LLNL_Damage_E-6 with 0.85mps Cutoff.xls” and “LLNL_Damage_E-7 
with 0.85mps Cutoff.xls” contain the analysis of damaged areas for the center, center-right, and 
center-left waste packages.  Each file has 17 worksheets, one for each of the 
17 realizations/ground motions.  The contents in key columns or cells of each worksheet are as 
follows: 
• Column A identifies the center-right, center, and center-left waste package as cask I, J, 
and K, respectively. 
• Column E has the relative impact velocity for the set of impact to each package. 
• Columns F and G have the damaged areas for all impacts greater than 0.85 m/s at the 
residual stress thresholds of 80 percent and 90 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22. 
• Cells J11 through L16 have the damaged area catalog defined by Table A-2. 
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Table A-3.  Listing of Excel Files with Damaged Area Calculations for the Kinematic Calculations 
Name of Excel File Description of Content 
LLNL_Impact_Velocities_E-5.xls Kinematic results for LS-DYNA calculations with 
17 ground motions at the 1.05-m/s PGV level.  There are 
no damaged areas in this file because all relative impact 
velocities are below 0.85 m/s. 
LLNL_Damage_E-6 with 0.85mps Cutoff.xls Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for 
LS-DYNA calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
2.44-m/s PGV level 
LLNL_Damage_E-7 with 0.85mps Cutoff.xls Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for 
LS-DYNA calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
5.35-m/s PGV level 
21-PWRs 1e-5 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to central 
WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
1.05-m/s PGV level; central waste package 
21-PWRs 1e-5 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to center 
right WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
1.05-m/s PGV level; center right waste package 
21-PWRs 1e-5 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to center left 
WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
1.05-m/s PGV level; center left package 
21-PWRs 1e-6 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to central 
WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
2.44-m/s PGV level; central waste package 
21-PWRs 1e-6 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to center 
right WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
2.44-m/s PGV level; center right waste package 
21-PWRs 1e-6 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to center left 
WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
2.44-m/s PGV level; center left package 
21-PWRs 1e-7 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to central 
WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
5.35-m/s PGV level; central waste package 
21-PWRs 1e-7 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to center 
right WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
5.35-m/s PGV level; center right waste package 
21-PWRs 1e-7 damage with 0.85mps Cutoff to center left 
WP.xls 
Kinematic results and associated damaged areas for the 
UDEC calculations with 17 ground motions at the 
5.35-m/s PGV level; center left package 
Source:  Files on the CD in Appendix G. 
If an impact velocity is greater than 0.85 m/s, the interpolation for the damaged area is performed 
with Excel’s FORECAST function using the velocities in the catalog that bracket the relative 
impact velocity from the kinematic calculation.  It is not necessary to extrapolate beyond the 
catalog data for any impact velocity from the kinematic calculations. 
The total damaged area for each package is calculated for all impacts greater than 1.0 m/s and for 
all impacts greater than 0.85 m/s.  These totals are found toward the top of each worksheet.  The 
totals for impacts greater than 0.85 m/s include the damaged areas from the appropriate impacts 
greater than 0.85 m/s and less than 1.0 m/s, which are listed toward the bottom of each 
worksheet. 
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A.2.2 Analysis of Kinematic Data from UDEC Calculations 
The Excel workbooks identified in Table A-3 contain the analysis of damaged areas for the 
center, center-right, or center-left waste packages.  Each file has 17 worksheets, one for each of 
the 17 realizations/ground motions.  The contents in key columns or cells of each worksheet are 
as follows: 
• Column D has the relative normal impact velocity for each impact to the package at the 
2.44-m/s and 5.35-m/s PGV levels.  Column D has the relative normal impact velocity 
for each impact to the package at the 1.05-m/s PGV level when there is nonzero damage 
(i.e., when a single velocity exceeds the 0.85 m/s velocity threshold).. 
• Columns H and I have the damaged areas for all impacts greater than 0.85 m/s at the 
residual stress thresholds of 80 percent and 90 percent of the yield strength of Alloy 22.  
These columns also have the damaged areas at the 1.05-m/s PGV level when there is 
nonzero damage. 
• The damaged area catalog defined by Table A-2 is in columns B through D, below the 
body of the impact data. 
If an impact velocity is greater than 0.85 m/s, the interpolation for the damaged area is performed 
with Excel’s FORECAST function using the velocities in the catalog that bracket the relative 
impact velocity from the kinematic calculation.  It is not necessary to extrapolate beyond the 
catalog data for any impact velocity from the kinematic calculations.  The total damaged area for 
each package is calculated for all impacts greater than 0.85 m/s.  These totals are found two rows 
beneath the listing of the impact data, in columns H and I. 
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B.1 DAMAGED AREA ABSTRACTIONS FROM END-TO-END IMPACTS 
The Excel workbook “WP-WP Damage Abstraction with 0.85mps Cutoff Rev00d.xls” calculates 
the damage abstractions for end-to-end impacts as a function of PGV-longitudinal.  This 
workbook has four worksheets, “ABSTR for LS-DYNA 80% YS”, “ABSTR for LS-DYNA 
90% YS”, “ABSTR for UDEC 80% YS”, and “ABSTR for UDEC 90% YS”.  That is, there is a 
worksheet for each of the four damage abstractions for end-to-end impacts. 
Formulas, Input Data, and Output Data 
Calculations of mean values and standard deviations use the standard Excel functions 
AVERAGE and STDEV.  Calculations of a normal distribution use the standard Excel function 
NORMDIST.  Least squares fits to the data are based on Excel’s trendline capability for a line or 
a power law.  Residuals are defined as the difference between the natural logarithm of a damaged 
area and the natural logarithm of the damaged area on the power law fit at the corresponding 
value of PGV.  The cumulative probability of the ith point out of n total points is defined as 
(0.5/n + (I – 1)/n).  A power law of the form DA = a(PGV)b passes through two data points 
(PGV1, DA1) and (PGV2, DA2) when the coefficients a and b have values 
b = (ln(DA1/DA2))/(ln(PGV1/PGV2)) and a = DA1/(PGV1)b.  A power law of the form PND = a(V –
 PGV)b passes through two data points (PGV1, PND,1) and (PGV2, PND,2) when the coefficients 
a and b have the values b = ln(PND,1/PND,2)/ln((V–PGV1)/(V – PGV2)) and a = PND,1/(V-PGV1)b. 
The input data for the damaged area abstractions for end-to-end impacts comes from the results 
of the Excel workbooks described in Appendix A.2.  The output data from each of the 
worksheets are:  (i) the probability of no damage as a function of PGV-longitudinal, (ii) the least 
squares power law fit to the damaged area as a function of PGV, and (iii) the standard deviation 
of the residuals of the damaged areas relative to the power law fit in ln-ln space.  These output 
data are the basis for the damage abstractions from end-to-end impacts discussed in 
Section 6.5.1. 
Detailed Description of Excel Workbooks 
The data for damaged areas for end-to-end impacts based on LS-DYNA are listed in columns D 
through I and rows 12 through 28.  These data come directly from the spreadsheets described in 
Appendix A.  Summary statistics can be found in the rows 29 through 40.  Columns K through S 
calculate the statistical parameters for the nonzero damaged areas.  The power law fit to the 
nonzero damaged areas is defined graphically in cells B51 through G78.  The comparison of the 
residuals to a cumulative normal distribution is presented in cells T7 through Z31.  The data for 
the quantile plot is found in columns U, V and W, beginning at row 40.  The quantile plot is 
adjacent to these columns, beginning at cell X40.  Finally, the probability of no damage is 
derived in the upper right hand corner of each worksheet.  The relevant data is in columns AC 
through AE in rows 6 through 32, and the plot of probability of no damage as a function of 
PGV-longitudinal is adjacent to these cells. 
The data for damaged areas for end-to-end impacts based on UDEC are listed in columns D 
through L and rows 11 through 27.  These data come directly from the spreadsheets described in 
Appendix A.  Summary statistics can be found in the rows 28 through 39.  Columns N through V 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction  
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 B-2 August 2005 
calculate the statistical parameters for the nonzero damaged areas.  The power law fit to the 
nonzero damaged areas is defined graphically in cells E49 through K75 and in cells D52 
through J78 for 80 percent of YS and 90 percent of YS, respectively.  The comparison of the 
residuals to a cumulative normal distribution is presented in cells W6 through AD30.  The data 
for the quantile plot is found in columns X, Y, and Z, beginning at row 39.  The quantile plot is 
adjacent to these columns, beginning at cell AA39.  Finally, the probability of no damage is 
derived in the upper right hand corner of each worksheet.  The relevant data are in columns AF 
through AH in rows 5 through 31, and the plot of probability of no damage as a function of 
PGV-longitudinal is adjacent to these cells. 
B.2 DAMAGED AREA ABSTRACTIONS FROM WASTE PACKAGE-PALLET 
IMPACTS 
The Excel workbook “WP-Pallet Damage Area Abstraction Rev00e.xls” calculates the damage 
abstractions for waste package-pallet impacts as a function of PGV-longitudinal.  This workbook 
has two worksheets, “ABSTR for 80% YS” and “ABSTR for 90% YS”.  The structural response 
calculations for waste package-pallet impacts were performed with LS-DYNA.  Damaged areas 
are calculated directly from the finite-element results, so there is no need for a catalog or lookup 
table of damaged areas.  A complete description of these calculations is in Section 6.5.2 of the 
main body of this report. 
Formulas, Input Data, and Output Data 
Calculations of mean values and standard deviations use the standard Excel functions 
AVERAGE and STDEV.  Calculations of a normal distribution use the standard Excel function 
NORMDIST.  Least squares fits to the data are based on Excel’s trendline capability for a line or 
a power law.  Residuals are defined as the difference between the natural logarithm of a damaged 
area and the natural logarithm of the damaged area on the power law fit at the corresponding 
value of PGV.  The cumulative probability of the ith point out of n total points is defined as 
(0.5/n + (I – 1)/n).  A power law of the form DA = a(PGV)b passes through two data points 
(PGV1, DA1) and (PGV2, DA2) when the coefficients a and b have 
values b = (ln(DA1/DA2))/(ln(PGV1/PGV2)) and a = DA1/(PGV1)b.  A power law of the form 
PND = a(V – PGV)b passes through two data points (PGV1, PND,1) and (PGV2, PND,2) when the 
coefficients a and b have the values b = ln(PND,1/PND,2)/ln((V–PGV1)/(V – PGV2)) and 
a = PND,1/(V-PGV1)b. 
The input data for the damaged area abstractions for waste package-pallet impacts comes from 
three sources:  (i) damage statistics for a single waste package, based on a sampling of vibratory 
ground motions at the 2.44-m/s PGV level (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173500], Table 1), (ii) damage 
statistics for a single waste package, based on a sampling of vibratory ground motions at the 
5.35-m/s PGV level (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173500], Table 2) and (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717] 
Table 6.1-4 for Realization 11), and (iii) damage statistics for a single waste package, based on 
supplemental calculations for vibratory ground motions at the 5.35 m/s, 2.44 m/s, and 1.05-m/s 
PGV levels (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171717], Tables 6.1-4, 6.2-7, and 6.3-6).  The output data from 
each of the worksheets are:  (i) the probability of no damage as a function of PGV-longitudinal, 
(ii) the least squares power law fit to the damaged area as a function of PGV-longitudinal, and 
(iii) the standard deviation of the residuals of the damaged areas relative to the power law fit in 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction  
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 B-3 August 2005 
ln-ln space.  These output data are the basis for the damage abstractions from waste 
package-pallet impacts discussed in Section 6.5.2. 
Detailed Description of Excel Workbooks 
The data for damaged areas for waste package-pallet impacts are listed in columns A through D.  
Columns E through M calculate the statistical parameters for the nonzero damaged areas, 
beginning at row 21.  The power law fit to the nonzero damaged areas is defined graphically in 
cells H1 through K19.  The plot in cells L1 through P19 provides an expanded view of the fit 
near a PGV-longitudinal of 1 m/s.  The plot in cells Q1 through V19 presents the same fit in ln-ln 
space, where the power law is a straight line.  Finally, the plot in cells W1 through AC19 sorts 
the data into two or three classes for evaluating the variability of the standard deviation with 
PGV-longitudinal. 
The comparison of the residuals to a cumulative normal distribution is presented in cells N20 
through U47.  The data for the quantile plot is found in columns AH, AI, and AJ, beginning at 
row 21.  The quantile plot is directly adjacent to column AJ.  Finally, the probability of no 
damage is derived in the upper right hand corner of each worksheet.  The relevant data is in 
cells V21 through X46, and the plot of probability of no damage as a function of 
PGV-longitudinal is adjacent to these cells.   
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Independent Technical Review of the New Waste Package Abstraction 
(Sections 6.5.1-6.5.3 of the Seismic Consequence Abstraction) 
A Report to Bechtel-SAIC 
By Dr. C. Allin Cornell 
July 25, 2005 
1. Introduction 
The net product of the seismic waste package abstraction is a conditional probability 
distribution of the waste package damaged area given a specific level of the vibratory ground 
motion, as a function of that level.  The abstraction provides the link between the 
probabilistic characterization of the ground motion hazard and the TSPA assessment of the 
post-closure repository performance.  The report presents this abstraction and the support for 
it in a clear and concise way.  It is the author’s conclusion that the abstraction is reasonable 
and appropriate for its intended use in the TSPA.   
The input to the waste package damage abstraction is the level of ground motion as specified 
by the peak ground velocity PGV) of a horizontal component of the motion.  The output is a 
probability distribution of the anticipated damaged area (as defined in the abstraction) that a 
representative waste package will suffer given a particular level of the ground motion.  The 
key elements of the abstraction are the representation of the ground motions, the prediction 
of the dynamic response of the engineered barrier system (EBS) to a given sample of a 
seismic ground motion, the determination of the damaged area given the response, and a 
model of the full conditional probability distribution of damaged area as a function of ground 
motion level.  
2. Elements of the Abstraction 
a. Ground motions.  
The representation of the ground motions is described in Section 6.4.  For the current 
purposes the ground motions are scalar-parameterized by the PGV of the longitudinal 
horizontal component of the motion and represented (at each of several PGV levels) 
by samples of approximately 15 representative three-component accelerograms - all 
with common longitudinal PGV.  The range of PGV values used covers that of 
interest as defined on one end by the onset of non-zero damage and at the other by 
PGV values beyond the 10-8 annual probability level.  The review of these ground 
motions and their annual frequencies of exceedance are beyond the scope of this 
letter.  For the purposes of the waste package abstraction, however, samples of such 
three-component accelerograms are precisely what are required to estimate the 
response and damage to the EBS.  Despite the broad variability observed in the 
response and damage the range of PGV and the sample size is sufficient in my view 
to provide an adequate abstraction of the damaged area probability distribution for the 
primary TSPA objective.  As will be elaborated on below I believe the focus should 
be on the mean value of the damaged area as a function of PGV.  Given the 
(conditional) standard deviations of ln (nonzero) damaged areas of about 1 to 1.5 and 
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total sample sizes of about 40, the standard error of estimation of the conditional 
mean of the (nonzero) damaged area is about 15 to 25%.  The sample size may not be 
sufficient to confirm the extreme tails of the damaged area conditional distributions 
but the mean dose estimates are insensitive to these tails. 
b. Dynamic Response of ESB 
The dynamic response computations have now been separated into two approaches, 
one kinematic to captured waste package – waste package (WP-WP) impact statistics 
and one fully deformable to obtain damaged areas for waste package-pallet (WP-P) 
impacts.  The latter (based on the nonlinear analysis of a single waste package on a 
pallet surrounded by non-yielding surfaces) are the same analyses used in the initial 
abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167780], Section 6.5) reviewed previously by 
Dr. Robert Kennedy (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167780], Attachment III) and need not be 
reviewed again here.  This author concurs that they provide a reasonable and 
appropriate representation of the damaged areas due to this portion of the impacts and 
that the inputs and outputs are reasonable.  
The new analyses are the 2D kinematic analyses of multiple waste packages designed 
to estimate the velocities and angles of the end-to-end WP-WP impacts for 
subsequent use in calculating damaged areas.  These new analyses are a major step 
forward in capturing the multi-package effects that were missing from the previous, 
conservative single-package analyses of WP-WP impacts.  While the use of a single 
seven-package, free-end configuration to represent the many cases that will exist in 
the facility is a major simplification, based on various comparisons it appears that the 
particular configuration chosen is a conservative representation of other more realistic 
configurations such as the longer eleven package case presented in I-3.3.2 of 
Attachment I of BSC 2005 ([DIRS 173172]).  For example, the comparative results 
shown in Table I-22 of I-3.3.4 can be shown to imply that the net mean damaged area 
predicted by the chosen seven-package configuration is about 3 times larger at 
2.44 m/s and about 1.5 times larger at 5.35 m/s than the eleven package case.  In 
addition, the significant differences in results between the two modeling efforts 
(LSDYNA and UDEC) underline the difficulty of the mechanical analysis problem, 
its sensitivity to details of the modeling and the current limits to our understanding of 
the finer points of such analyses.  Further sensitivity and comparative studies are 
likely to bring sharper insight into the problem and less uncertainty in the 
conclusions.  The use of weighted results from both LSDYNA and UDEC analyses 
reflects that uncertainty and provides an appropriate and adequate abstraction for the 
present purposes.   
c. Damaged Area Estimates 
As was true in the previous version of the Seismic Consequence Abstraction the 
WP-WP damaged areas are estimated from the list of impacts with their velocities 
and angles using results from fine-mesh studies of a waste package impacting a 
non-yielding flat surface.  This approach has therefore been reviewed and found 
appropriate previously by Dr. Kennedy; this reviewer concurs.  The process has been 
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modified somewhat (and likely made more conservative) by averaging over impact 
angles to remove the low value of damage implied by near-zero angles.  This is an 
improvement.  This reviewer agrees that use of the relative velocity between 
packages is conservative but that failure to capture impacts of WP corners into lids is 
not (Section 6.5.1.3).   
d. Damaged Area Probability Distributions 
The results of multiple samples of damaged areas from the WP-WP and WP-P 
analyses at several PGV levels have been represented by a three-parameter 
probability distribution.  The parameters are the probability of zero damage and the 
mean and standard deviation of the natural log of the nonzero damaged areas.  The 
parameter values are functions of PGV.  The nonzero damages are assumed to follow 
a lognormal probability distribution.  The primary output of the TSPA is the mean 
dose at 10,000 years.  It is physically reasonable that the seismic contribution to this 
mean will be approximately proportional to the mean damaged area (as release from 
the package(s) is similarly likely approximately proportional to damaged area at the 
small percentage areas of interest).  Therefore the mean dose will be comparatively 
insensitive to either the shape of the damaged area distribution or its standard 
deviation.  The product of one minus the probability of zero damage and the mean 
nonzero damage is the mean damaged area (at each PGV value).  The fits of these 
two damaged area parameter values versus PGV seem very reasonable and quite 
appropriate for the TSPA use.   
All together the output - primarily mean damaged area versus PGV - appears to be 
reasonable given the inputs (ground motion samples, EBS models, and response to 
damaged area relationships).  
3. Limitations 
Limitations to the new waste package abstraction include the issues of corner-on-lid WP-WP 
damage characterization and the as-yet un-understood differences between the two sets of 2D 
kinematic analyses mentioned above.  Other limitations include significant conservatisms 
such as the unbounded PGV of the perpendicular component (a factor only in the WP-P 
damage case) and the use of relative package velocities in the estimation of WP-WP 
damaged areas.  Limitations whose impacts are less predictable include the use of only a 2D 
representation of the waste packages kinematics in the WP-WP case, the use of only a single 
waste package in the WP-P case, and the dependence on a single multiple waste package 
configuration.  The report would benefit in Section 6.5.3 from a comparison between the 
damaged areas versus PGV predictions for the WP-WP and WP-P cases.  I believe it would 
be sufficient to show simply the mean damaged area vs. PGV for the two cases. 
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Independent Technical Review of 
Waste Package Damage Abstraction 
Robert P. Kennedy 
June 24, 2005 
1.  Introduction 
I have performed a detailed technical review of the waste package damage abstraction presented 
in Sections 6.5.1 through 6.5.3 of “Seismic Consequence Abstraction” (Ref. 1).  I have reviewed 
both the data presented in these sections and the data documented in the Excel files on the 
compact disk in Appendix H*. 
2.  Review Conclusions 
In my judgement, the current waste package damage abstraction represents the highest quality 
damage abstraction that can be developed from the existing analytical studies of the seismic 
response of the waste packages.  Any further improvements should be concentrated on 
improving the input data as opposed to further development of damage abstractions from the 
existing analytical studies.  It is not clear to me whether any further improvements are necessary.  
However, if further improvements are judged to be warranted, the following areas are candidates 
for improvement: 
1. Develop an improved suite of ground motion time histories anchored to longitudinal peak 
ground velocities PGVL ranging from 1.0 m/sec to 4.2 m/sec.  The current suite of time 
histories appear to contain some unreasonably high vertical PGVV and peak ground 
accelerations PGA for a given longitudinal PGVL.  These limited number of unreasonably 
high ground motion PGVV and PGA values are likely to have introduced some 
conservative bias to the high end of the damage area estimates.  Unfortunately, revising 
the suite of ground motion records would require all of the time-history waste package 
response studies and the damage abstractions to have to be redone.  My judgement is that 
the current damage estimates are conservative and that improving the suite of 
time-history records would lead to such an extensive redo of work that it is probably not 
necessary. 
2. Reinvestigate the catalog of damaged areas for end on impacts.  The current catalog is for 
a single waste package impacting a rigid boundary.  This condition only strictly applies to 
the case of perfectly symmetric impacts between adjacent casks.  This perfectly 
symmetric impact situation is extremely unlikely.  It is much more likely that the corner 
edge of one waste package impacts the lid of the adjacent waste package.  This impact 
situation probably warrants additional study.  If no further study is performed, one should 
continue to use the relative impact velocity between waste packages as opposed to half of 
this velocity when using the current catalog (Table 6.5-4) of damage area as a function of 
impact velocity. 
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Specific comments are presented in the following sections. 
3.  Comment on Kinematic Calculations for End-to-End Impacts 
Section 6.5.1.1 of Ref. 1 discusses two suites of kinematic calculations of end-to-end impacts 
between adjacent waste packages.  In my judgement, both the LS-DYNA and the UDEC 
calculations represent practical high quality computations of the number of impacts and impact 
velocities between adjacent packages. 
I strongly concur with the decision to equally weigh and use both the LS-DYNA and the UDEC 
suite of results in the end-to-end damage abstraction. 
4.  Comment on Catalog of Damaged Areas for End-On Impacts 
The catalog of damaged areas for end-on impacts discussed in Section 6.5.1.2 of Ref. 1 probably 
represents the weakest link in the input data used for developing the waste package damage 
abstraction.  The fundamental problem is that this catalog of damaged areas strictly only applies 
to perfectly symmetric impacts between adjacent waste packages.  Such perfectly symmetric 
impacts are unlikely. 
If the impacts were perfectly symmetric, then the catalog of damaged areas should be entered 
using 50 percent of the relative impact velocity between adjacent packages because of symmetry.  
However, it is much more likely that impacts are not symmetric.  In fact, an impact of a corner 
edge of one package into the lid of the adjacent package might produce more damage than 
indicated from entering the catalog of damaged area using 100 percent of the relative impact 
velocity. 
Given the existing data base, I concur with the use of Table 6.5-2* of Ref. 1 to estimate damaged 
area per impact as a function of the relative impact velocity between adjacent waste packages.  
I would not concur with entering Table 6.5-2* using only 50 percent of the relative impact 
velocity. 
I also concur with the decision to treat the damaged area from each impact independent from the 
damaged area from other impacts so that the damaged area from all impacts are additive. 
In summary, given the available data base, I concur with all decisions discussed in 
Section 6.5.1.3 of Ref. 1 for computing the total damaged area for end-to-end impacts.  There are 
both conservative and possibly unconservative approximations in the defined approach.  
However, estimation of damage area from non-symmetric impacts probably warrants additional 
study. 
5.  Comments on Damaged Area Abstraction for End-to-End Impacts 
The development of the damaged area abstraction for end-to-end impacts is discussed in 
Sections 6.5.1.4 and 6.5.1.5 of Ref. 1. 
I concur with the decision to define the damaged area abstraction in terms of the longitudinal 
PGVL.  Furthermore, I concur with the decision to first estimate the probability of no damage as 
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a function of PGVL.  Next, I concur with the estimation of damaged area for cases with damage 
using a power law fit versus PGVL for the median equation and a lognormal distribution of 
dispersion about this median equation. 
After studying other ways to fit the available damage area versus PGVL data, I could not find any 
improvement over the damage abstraction documented in Ref. 1. 
6.  Comment on Damaged Area Abstraction for WP-Pallet Impacts 
The development of the damaged area abstraction for WP-Pallet impacts is described in 
Section 6.5.2.  The WP-Pallet impacts damaged area is also defined in terms of the longitudinal 
PGVL.  Again, the probability of no damage as a function of PGVL is estimated.  For damage 
cases, a power law fit of median damaged area versus PGVL is obtained and the dispersion of 
damaged area about this median estimate is fit using a lognormal distribution.  I concur 
completely with the approach used and the damage abstraction obtained. 
I could not find any improved way to fit the available damage area versus PGVL data. 
7.  Comment on Presentation of Results 
Using the estimated lognormally distributed dispersions, I recommend that it would be useful to 
plot the 5 percent and 95 percent non-exceedance probability lines on figures 6.5-5*, 6.5-10*, 
and 6.5-11* in order to illustrate better how the damage abstractions fit the available data. 
Reference 
1. Seismic Consequence Abstraction, MDL-WIS-PA-000003, REV 02B, Bechtel SAIC 
Company, April 2005 
*Editorial Notes: The corresponding Figure numbers in the final version of this report are 
Figures 6.5-10, 6.5-16, and 6.5-17, respectively.  Figures 6.5-13 and 6.5-21 
respond to this recommendation.  The corresponding Table number in the final 
version of this report is Table 6.5-4.  The corresponding Appendix in the final 
version of this report is Appendix G. 
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The Excel workbook “Appendix E Rev02.xls” calculates the damage abstraction for fault 
displacement presented in Section 6.7 of this report.  This workbook has two worksheets, 
“Tables”, and “Table 6.7-5 Calculations”.  The “Tables” worksheet documents the calculations 
for Tables 6.7-1 through 6.7-7, for Tables 6.7-9 through 6.7-11, and for Tables 6.7-13 
through 6.7-17 in Section 6.7.  The “Table 6.7-5 Calculations” worksheet documents the fault 
displacements on the various hazard curves at annual exceedance frequencies of 10-4, 10-5, 10-6, 
10-7, and 10-8 per year. 
Formulas, Input Data, and Output Data 
The formulas and input data for the “Tables” worksheet are documented in the notes for each of 
the individual tables.  The primary output data from the “Tables” worksheet is Table 6.7-11, 
which defines the expected number of waste package failures by waste package type as a 
function of annual exceedance frequency.  The secondary output data from the “Tables” 
worksheet is in Tables 6.7-13 through 6.7-17 which support criticality calculations. 
Calculations within the “Table 6.7-5 Calculations” worksheet provide interpolated values of the 
fault displacement at Sites 2, 3, 4, 5, 7a-7d, and 8a-8c for annual exceedance frequencies of 10-4, 
10-5, 10-6, 10-7, and 10-8 per year.  Interpolation is based on a power law of the form λ = a(d)b, 
where d is the fault displacement and λ is the annual exceedance frequency.  Given two points 
(λ1, d1) and (λ2, d2), the coefficients a and b have the values b = (log(λ1/λ2))/(log(d1/d2)) and a = 
λ1/(d1)b.  The displacement, d, corresponding to a given value of λ is then defined by d = (λ/a)1/b. 
The input data for the “Table 6.7-5 Calculations” worksheet are the hazard curves is defined in 
DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962].  Individual input data files are defined in 
Table 4-1 for the various Sites.  The output data from these calculations provide the values listed 
in Table 6.7-5. 
A listing of the information in the “Tables” worksheet follows. 
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Assessment of Waste Package Failure Due To Fault Displacement 
This spreadsheet summarizes the supporting calculations for Section 6.7 of this report. 
Table numbers correspond to the tables in Section 6.7 of this report. 
 
Table 6.7-1 - Drip Shield Clearance Calculation (all units in mm) 
   Reference/Formula 
Empl. drift diameter (Dd)  5500.0 BSC 2005  [DIRS 173498], Figure 1 
Invert thickness (Ti)  863.6 BSC 2004  [DIRS 170074]  
Drip shield height - exterior (Hdse) 2885.62 BSC 2005 [DIRS 173303], Table 1 
Drip shield height - interior (Hdsi) 2716.0 BSC 2004 [DIRS 168489], Figure 1 
Clearance above Drip Shield (Hdsc) 1750.78  = Dd - Hdse - Ti 
 
Table 6.7-2 - Waste Package to Drip Shield Clearance 
Nominal length from BSC (2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1); Outer diameter of outer barrier from drawings referenced in 
BSC (2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1). 
 Outer Nominal  
 Diameter Length Clearance 
Package (mm) (mm) (mm) 
44-BWR 1675.1 5024.4 1041 
24-BWR 1294.1 5024.4 1422 
21-PWR 1637.0 5024.4 1079 
12-PWR 1313.2 5560.4 1403 
Naval-Long 1863.7 5837.4 852 
Naval-Short 1863.7 5202.2 852 
5DHLW/DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel - 
Short 2044.7 3452.8 671 
5DHLW/DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel - 
Long 2044.7 5059.4 671 
2-MCO/2-DHLW 1749.4 5059.4 967 
The formula for calculating the clearance is given by Hdsi - Outer Diameter of Waste Package. 
 
Table 6.7-3 - Maximum Allowable Fault Displacement (in mm) 
Two values are provided with and without drift collapse.  In both cases, the behavior of the invert and pallet is 
approximated by treating the emplacement pallet as collapsed into the invert.  No further collapse of the invert is 
accounted for. 
With drift collapse, max allowable displacement = Hdsi – Outer Diameter of Waste Package. 
Without drift collapse, max allowable displacement = Hdsi – Outer Diameter of Waste Package + Hdsc. 
Package with collapse w/o collapse  
44-BWR 1041 2792  
24-BWR 1422 3173  
21-PWR 1079 2830  
12-PWR 1403 3154  
Naval-Long 852 2603  
Naval-Short 852 2603  
5DHLW/DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel-Short 671 2422  
5DHLW/DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel-Long 671 2422  
2-MCO/2-DHLW 967 2717  
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Table 6.7-4 - Faults Intersecting Drifts 
BSC (2004 [DIRS 168180], Table 9) defines drift intersections with Sever Wash fault, Drill Hole Wash fault, Pagany 
Wash fault, and the western splay off the main Ghost Dance fault (denoted as the West Ghost Dance fault in 
Table 9). 
DTN:  MO0012MWDGFM02.002 [DIRS 153777] defines drift intersections with Sundance fault and the locations of 
geologic units relative to fault traces and emplacement drifts. 
BSC (2004 [DIRS 172801], Figure 1) defines the numbering of drifts and panels. 
Western splay off the main Ghost Dance fault (called the West Ghost Dance in the reference) intersects drifts 2-17 
through 2-27.  Drifts 2-18 through 2-27 are in the contingency area. 
Development is uncertain because this area is in the vicinity of an intensely fractured zone (Albin et al. 1997 
[DIRS 101367], discussion of Third Domain on pp. 69 to 72).  The western splay off the main Ghost Dance fault has 
therefore, not been included in TSPA-LA. 
   
Sundance Fault Lith Zones Nonlith Zones 
 1-6 1-8 
 1-7 2-1 
   
Drill Hole Wash Fault Lith Zones Nonlith Zones 
 4-1 3-10 E 
 4-2 3-11 E 
 3-4 W 3-12 E 
 3-5 W  
 3-6 W  
 3-7 W  
 3-8 W  
 3-9 W  
 3-13 E  
 3-14 E  
 3-15 E  
 3-16 E  
 3-17 E  
   
Pagany Wash Fault Lith Zones Nonlith Zones 
 3-1 W 3-5 E 
 3-1 E 3-6 E 
 3-2 E 3-7 E  
 3-3 E  
 3-4 E  
   
Sevier Wash Fault Lith Zones Nonlith Zones 
 3-2 E  
 3-3 E  
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Table 6.7-5 - Fault Displacement Summary Information (in cm). 
Based on DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962]; data files associated with Sites 2, 3, 4, 5, 7a-7d and 8a-8c 
are listed in Table 4-1 of this report.  Displacements are calculated in the worksheet “Table 6.7-5 Calculations” in the 
file Appendix E Rev02.xls included on the CD in Appendix G.   
Data for Site 8d are based on the observation that the fault displacements for Sites 7a, 7b, and 7c are essentially 
identical with the fault displacements for Sites 8a, 8b, and 8c, respectively.  In this situation, the fault displacements at 
Site 8d are anticipated to be very similar to the fault displacements at Site 7d.  This observation is corroborated by 
information in CRWMS M&O (1998 [DIRS 103731] Section 8.2.1, first paragraph), which indicates that displacements 
at Site 8d are below 0.1 cm down to 10-8 per year annual exceedance frequency. 
  Mean Annual Exceedance Frequency 
 1.00E-04 1.00E-05 1.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-08 
Site Number and Fault Name Displacement (cm) 
2 – Solitario Canyon (60 m offset) <0.1 32.0 190 500 >1000 
3 – Drill Hole Wash <0.1 <0.1 17 80 240 
4 – Ghost Dance <0.1 <0.1 13 58 160 
5 – Sundance <0.1 <0.1 6 42 ~145 
7a – small fault with 2 m offset <0.1 <0.1 2 20 ~75 
7b – shear with 10 cm offset <0.1 <0.1 1 6 9 
7c – fracture with no displacement <0.1 <0.1 0.1 <1 <1 
7d – intact rock <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 
8a – small fault with 2 m offset <0.1 <0.1 2 20 ~75 
8b – shear with 10 cm offset <0.1 <0.1 1 6 9 
8c – fracture with no displacement <0.1 <0.1 0.1 <1 <1 
8d – intact rock <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 
 
Table 6.7-6 – Waste Package Inventory 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1 for nominal length; outside diameter of outer barrier defined In drawings referenced 
in BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1.  Waste package nominal quantity from BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 13. 
Waste Package Configuration 
Waste 
Package 
Length 
(m) 
Waste 
Package 
Diam. (m) 
Nominal 
Quantity   
21-PWR AP 5.0244 1.6370 4299   
21-PWR CR 5.0244 1.6370 95   
12-PWR AP Long 5.5604 1.3132 163   
44-BWR AP 5.0244 1.6751 2831   
24-BWR AP 5.0244 1.2941 84   
5-DHLW Short/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel – Short 3.4528 2.0447 1147   
5-DHLW Long/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel – Long 5.0594 2.0447 1406   
5-DHLW Long/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel – Short 5.0594 2.0447 31   
5 HLW Long Only 5.0594 2.0447 679   
2-MCO/2-HLW 5.0594 1.7494 149   
Naval-Short 5.2022 1.8637 144   
Naval-Long 5.8374 1.8637 156   
BWR = boiling water reactor; DHLW = defense high-level radioactive waste; MCO = multicanister overpack; CR = 
control rod; AP = absorber plate. 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 E-5 August 2005 
Table 6.7-7 – Simplified Inventory 
      
Waste Package Effective Total    
Configuration Length (m) Length (m) # Packages Percent  
PWR 5.0436 22984 4557 42.0%  
BWR 5.0244 14646 2915 26.8%  
Naval 5.5325 1660 300 3.0%  
HLW 4.5193 15420 3412 28.2%  
Total  54709 11184 100%  
where Total Length is given by package length times number of packages, summed over each package 
type in the group. 
Effective length is given by Total length / Total number of packages in group % = Total length for that group 
/ Total length for all groups 
The PWR group includes the 21-PWR AP, 21-PWR CR, and 12-PWR AP Long packages. 
The BWR group includes the 44-BWR AP and the 24-BWR AP packages. 
The Naval group includes the Naval Long and Naval Short packages. 
The HLW ground includes all DHLW packages. 
BWR = boiling water reactor, HLW = high-level radioactive waste, DHLW = defense high-level radioactive 
waste; CR = control rod; AP = absorber plate. 
Table 6.7-9.  Fault Exceedance Probabilities for Waste Package Failure 
Using DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962], along with the maximum allowable fault 
displacements for each simplified waste package group as summarized in Table 6.7-8 of Section 6.7.4, one 
can determine the exceedance probability required to cause failure for each waste package type.  
This is done as follows: 
 - the allowable fault displacement is given by the value from Table 6.7-8 (w/ drift collapse) 
 - using figures 8-4 (Drill Hole Wash) and 8-6 (Sundance), the exceedance probability associated with that 
magnitude of fault displacement is determined from the mean value curve for each waste package group. 
 - note that relative to the accuracy of these figures, the BWR and PWR groups are 
Shown with the same probability. 
 - The Drill Hole Wash results apply to Pagany Wash and Sever Wash 
 
Fault PWR BWR Naval HLW 
Sundance < 2 × 10-8 < 2 × 10-8 < 3 × 10-8 < 5 × 10-8 
Drill Hole Wash < 5 × 10-8 < 5 × 10-8 < 1 × 10-7 < 2 × 10-7 
Pagany Wash < 5 × 10-8 < 5 × 10-8 < 1 × 10-7 < 2 × 10-7 
Sever Wash < 5 × 10-8 < 5 × 10-8 < 1 × 10-7 < 2 × 10-7 
Sites 7a/8a N/A N/A N/A < 2 × 10-8 
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Table 6.7-10 - Expected Number of Waste Packages Emplaced on Faults 
Table 6.7-4 in Section 6.7.2.1 of the main report can be used to determine the total number of waste packages 
impacted by each fault in the lithophysal zones (based on number of fault intersections with each drift).  The results in 
Table 6.7-7 can then be used to calculate the expected number of waste packages in each group that would be on a 
fault.   
These results are summarized below. 
 
 Total PWR BWR Naval HLW 
Sundance 2 0.84 0.54 0.06 0.56 
Drill Hole, etc. 20 8.40 5.35 0.61 5.64 
Sites 7a/8a 119.85 50.3 32.1 3.64 33.8 
 
Table 6.7-11 - Waste Packages Failed Versus Annual Exceedance Probability 
The results of Table 6.7-9 and Table 6.7-10 in Section 6.7.4 of the main report can now be combined to provide the 
expected number of packages failed vs. the annual exceedance probability. 
Expected Number of Waste Package Failures Annual Exceed. 
Prob. (1/yr) PWR BWR Naval HLW Total 
> 2 × 10-7 0 0 0 0 0.00 
1 × 10-7  to 2 × 10-7 0 0 0 5.64 5.64 
5 × 10-8  to 1 × 10-7 0 0 0.61 5.64 6.24 
3 × 10-8  to 5 × 10-8 8.40 5.35 0.61 6.20 20.56 
2 × 10-8  to 3 × 10-8 8.40 5.35 0.67 6.20 20.62 
1 × 10-8  to 2 × 10-8 9.24 5.89 0.67 39.98 55.78 
 
Table 6.7-13 - Parameters for Simplified Inventory for Criticality 
Table 6.7-13 is a modified version of Table 6.7-7 with 10 waste package types 
BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501] Table 1 for nominal length, Table 13 for nominal quantity.  
Waste Package 
Type 
Waste Package 
Length 
(m) 
Nominal Quantity 
(-) 
Total Length for 
Package Type (m) 
Fraction of Waste 
Package (% Total 
Length) 
21-PWR AP 5.0244 4299 21600 39.48% 
21-PWR CR 5.0244 95 477.32 0.87% 
12-PWR AP Long 5.5604 163 906.35 1.66% 
44-BWR AP 5.0244 2831 14224 26.00% 
24-BWR AP 5.0244 84 422.05 0.77% 
5-DHLW Short/1 
DOE Spent Nuclear 
Fuel Short 
3.4528 1147 3960.4 7.24% 
5-DHLW/DOE Long1 5.0594 2116 10706 19.57% 
2 MCO/2 DHLW 5.0594 149 753.85 1.38% 
Naval Short 5.2022 144 749.12 1.37% 
Naval Long 5.8374 156 910.63 1.66% 
TOTALS  11184 54709 100.00% 
1The 5-DHLW/DOE Long category includes the 5-DHLW Long/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel - Long, the 5-DHLW 
Long/1 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel - Short, and the 5 HLW Long Only package types. 
(-)=dimensionless; BWR = boiling water reactor; DHLW = defense high-level radioactive waste; MCO = multicanister 
overpack ; CR = control rod; AP = absorber plate. 
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Table 6.7-14 - Maximum Allowable Displacement With Drift Collapse Before 
Waste Package Is Pinned 
Table 6.7-14 is a modified version of Table 6.7-3.  Outer diameter of outer barrier of waste package defined by 
drawings identified in BSC 2005 [DIRS 173501], Table 1.  Interior height of drip shield is defined in BSC 2004 
[DIRS 168489], Figure 1. 
Waste Package Type 
Waste Package Outer Diameter 
(mm) 
Max. Allowable Displ. With 
Collapse (mm) 
21-PWR AP 1637.0 1079 
21-PWR CR 1637.0 1079 
12-PWR AP Long 1313.2 1403 
44-BWR AP 1675.1 1041 
24-BWR AP 1294.1 1422 
5-DHLW Short/1 DOE Spent Nuclear 
Fuel Short 
2044.7 671 
5-DHLW/DOE Long 2044.7 671 
2 MCO/2 DHLW 1749.4 967 
Naval Short 1863.7 852 
Naval Long 1863.7 852 
MCO = multicanister overpack; PWR = pressurized water reactor; BWR = boiling water reactor; CR = control rod; AP 
= absorber plate. 
Table 6.7-15 - Fault Exceedance Frequencies (Per Year) That Cause Failure in Lithophysal Zones 
Table 6.7-15 is a modified version of Table 6.7-9 with 10 waste package types.  The interpolated values on the fault 
displacement hazard curves for Sites 3, 5, 7a, and 8a are calculated first.   
PSHA displacement hazard curve for Site 5 (Sundance fault) is based on DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 
[DIRS 166962], file: /displ/tot_haz/s5.frac_mean.gz. 
Displacement 
(cm) 
Mean Exceedance 
Frequency 
(1/yr) 
Allowable Displ. (from 
Table 6.7-13) 
(cm) 
Interpolated Exceedance 
Frequency (1/yr) 
1.00E-01 9.54E-06 6.710E+01 4.23E-08 
2.00E-01 8.28E-06 8.520E+01 2.77E-08 
5.00E-01 6.32E-06 9.670E+01 2.21E-08 
1.00E+00 4.34E-06 1.041E+02 1.92E-08 
2.00E+00 2.68E-06 1.079E+02 1.79E-08 
5.00E+00 1.11E-06 1.403E+02 1.06E-08 
1.00E+01 5.40E-07 1.422E+02 1.03E-08 
2.00E+01 2.53E-07   
5.00E+01 7.14E-08   
1.00E+02 2.09E-08   
2.00E+02 5.21E-09   
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PSHA displacement hazard curve for Site 3 (Drill Hole Wash fault) is based on DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 
[DIRS 166962], file: /displ/tot_haz/s3.frac_mean.gz. 
Displacement 
(cm) 
Mean Exceedance 
Frequency 
(1/yr) 
Allowable Displ. 
(from Table 6.7-13) (cm) 
Interpolated Exceedance 
Frequency (1/yr) 
1.00E-01 8.57E-06 6.710E+01 1.21E-07 
2.00E-01 7.86E-06 8.520E+01 7.89E-08 
5.00E-01 6.91E-06 9.670E+01 6.30E-08 
1.00E+00 5.98E-06 1.041E+02 5.49E-08 
2.00E+00 4.87E-06 1.079E+02 5.13E-08 
5.00E+00 3.06E-06 1.403E+02 3.09E-08 
1.00E+01 1.69E-06 1.422E+02 3.01E-08 
2.00E+01 7.38E-07   
5.00E+01 2.03E-07   
1.00E+02 5.94E-08   
2.00E+02 1.56E-08   
    
PSHA displacement hazard curve for Site 7a (100m East of SC, Cum. Displ.=2m) 
DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962], file: /displ/tot_haz/s7a.frac_mean.gz. 
Displacement 
(cm) 
Mean Exceedance 
Frequency (1/yr) 
Allowable Displ. (from 
Table 6.7-13) (cm) 
Interpolated Exceedance 
Frequency (1/yr) 
1.00E-01 7.02E-06 6.710E+01 1.19E-08 
2.00E-01 5.47E-06 8.520E+01 7.44E-09 
5.00E-01 3.11E-06 9.670E+01 5.80E-09 
1.00E+00 1.72E-06 1.041E+02 4.55E-09 
2.00E+00 1.04E-06 1.079E+02 3.89E-09 
5.00E+00 4.58E-07 1.403E+02 1.24E-09 
1.00E+01 2.10E-07 1.422E+02 1.17E-09 
2.00E+01 8.63E-08   
5.00E+01 2.12E-08   
1.00E+02 5.43E-09   
2.00E+02 2.63E-10   
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PSHA displacement hazard curve for Site 8a (Between SC and GD, Cum. Displ.=2m).  
DTN:  MO0401MWDRPSHA.000 [DIRS 166962], file: /displ/tot_haz/s8a.frac_mean.gz. 
Displacement 
(cm) 
Mean Exceedance 
Frequency 
(1/yr) 
Allowable Displ. (from 
Table 6.7-13) (cm) 
Interpolated Exceedance 
Frequency (1/yr) 
1.00E-01 6.72E-06 6.710E+01 1.33E-08 
2.00E-01 5.26E-06 8.520E+01 8.41E-09 
5.00E-01 3.05E-06 9.670E+01 6.59E-09 
1.00E+00 1.70E-06 1.041E+02 5.12E-09 
2.00E+00 1.02E-06 1.079E+02 4.34E-09 
5.00E+00 4.52E-07 1.403E+02 1.28E-09 
1.00E+01 2.09E-07 1.422E+02 1.21E-09 
2.00E+01 8.91E-08   
5.00E+01 2.36E-08   
1.00E+02 6.17E-09   
2.00E+02 2.48E-10   
The interpolated values for exceedance frequency correspond to the maximum allowable fault displacements before 
a waste package type is damaged.  These interpolated values are maximum values for exceedance frequency 
because smaller frequencies have larger fault displacements.  The maximum values of exceedance frequency are 
listed in the following table, rounded up to two significant figures.  The exceedance frequency for Sites 7a/8a is the 
maximum value for the Site 7a and Site 8a hazard curves. 
Waste Package Type Sundance Fault 
Drill Hole Wash, Pagany 
Wash, & Sever Wash 
Faults Sites 7a/8a 
21-PWR AP 1.8E-08 5.2E-08 5.0E-09 
21-PWR CR 1.8E-08 5.2E-08 5.0E-09 
12-PWR AP Long 1.1E-08 3.1E-08 2.0E-09 
44-BWR AP 2.0E-08 5.5E-08 6.0E-09 
24-BWR AP 1.1E-08 3.1E-08 2.0E-09 
5-DHLW Short/1 DOE 
Spent Nuclear Fuel Short 
4.3E-08 1.3E-07 1.4E-08 
5-DHLW/DOE Long 4.3E-08 1.3E-07 1.4E-08 
2 MCO/2 DHLW 2.3E-08 6.4E-08 7.0E-09 
Naval Short 2.8E-08 7.9E-08 9.0E-09 
Naval Long 2.8E-08 7.9E-08 9.0E-09 
PWR = pressurized water reactor; AP = absorber plate; CR = control rod; BWR = boiling water reactor; DHLW = 
defense high-level radioactive waste; MCO = multicanister overpack; DOE = U.S. Department of Energy. 
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Table 6.7-16 - Expected Number of Waste Package Types Emplaced on Faults 
Table 6.7-16 is a modified version of Table 6.7-10 with 10 waste package types.  There are 2 locations and 20 
locations where the Sundance fault and the Drill Hole/Pagany Wash/ Sever Wash faults intersect emplacement drifts 
in the lithophysal zones (Table 6.74).  The number of locations where Sites 7a/8a intersect emplacement drifts are 
rounded up from 119.85 to 120. 
Waste Package Type Sundance Fault 
Drill Hole Wash, Pagany 
Wash, & Sever Wash 
Faults Sites 7a/8a 
21-PWR AP 0.7896 7.8962 47.3774 
21-PWR CR 0.0174 0.1745 1.0470 
12-PWR AP Long 0.0331 0.3313 1.9880 
44-BWR AP 0.5200 5.1999 31.1992 
24-BWR AP 0.0154 0.1543 0.9257 
5-DHLW Short/1 DOE 
Spent Nuclear Fuel Short 
0.1448 1.4478 8.6867 
5-DHLW/DOE Long 0.3914 3.9137 23.4820 
2 MCO/2 DHLW 0.0276 0.2756 1.6535 
Naval Short 0.0274 0.2739 1.6431 
Naval Long 0.0333 0.3329 1.9974 
TOTALS 2.0000 20.0000 120.00 
    
Table 6.7-17 - Failure of Waste Package Types by Annual Exceedance Probability 
Table 6.7-17 is a modified version of Table 6.7-11 with 10 waste package types. 
Waste Package Type > 2×10-7 1×10-7 
to 2×10-7 
6×10-8 
to 1×10-7 
4×10-8 
to 6×10-8 
2×10-8 
to 4×10-8 
1×10-8 
to 2×10-8 
21-PWR AP 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.90 7.90 8.69 
21-PWR CR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.19 
12-PWR AP Long 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.36 
44-BWR AP 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.20 5.20 5.72 
24-BWR AP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.17 
5-DHLW Short/1 DOE Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Short 
0.00 1.45 1.45 1.59 1.59 10.28 
5-DHLW/DOE Long 0.00 3.91 3.91 4.31 4.31 27.79 
2 MCO/2 DHLW 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.30 
Naval Short 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.30 
Naval Long 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.37 
TOTALS 0.00 5.36 6.24 20.05 20.62 54.17 
PWR = pressurized water reactor, AP =absorber plate, CR = control rod; BWR = boiling water reactor; DHLW = 
defense high-level radioactive waste; MCO = multicanister overpack. 
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Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 F-1 August 2005 
The files listed in Table F-1 are provided on CD with this document.  These files provide 
electronic versions of the spreadsheets identified in Appendices A, B, and E of this report. 
Table F-1.  Listing of Electronic Files on CD (Appendix G) 
File Name 
Date & 
Time Size Contents 
End-On Damage Catalog.xls 
8/17/2005 
5:05 PM 37 KB 
Catalog of damaged areas from end-on 
impacts 
LLNL_Impact_Velocities_E-5.xls 2/15/2005 10:09 AM 43 KB 
Results of kinematic calculations with 
LS-DYNA for the 1.05-m/s PGV level 
LLNL_Damage_E-6 with 0.85mps 
Cutoff.xls 
2/16/2005 
12:15 PM 221 KB 
Results of kinematic calculations & damaged 
areas for LS-DYNA at the 2.44-m/s PGV level 
LLNL_Damage_E-7 with 0.85mps 
Cutoff.xls 
2/21/2005 
12:32 PM 227 KB 
Results of kinematic calculations & damaged 
areas for LS-DYNA at the 2.44-m/s PGV level 
21-PWRs 1e-5  damage with 0.85mps 
Cutoff to center left WP.xls 
2/16/2005 
11:02 PM 77 KB 
Results of kinematic calculations & damaged 
areas for UDEC at the 1.05-m/s PGV level 
21- PWRs 1e-5 damage with 0.85mps 
Cutoff to central WP.xls 
2/16/2005 
11:01 PM 79 KB 
Results of kinematic calculations & damaged 
areas for UDEC at the 1.05-m/s PGV level 
21-PWRs 1e-5 damage with 0.85mps 
Cutoff to center right WP.xls 
2/16/2005 
10:58 PM 75 KB 
Results of kinematic calculations & damaged 
areas for UDEC at the 1.05-m/s PGV level 
21-PWRs 1e-6 damage with 0.85mps 
Cutoff to center right WP.xls 
2/16/2005 
7:31 PM 120 KB 
Results of kinematic calculations & damaged 
areas for UDEC at the 2.44-m/s PGV level 
21-PWRs 1e-6 damage with 0.85mps 
Cutoff to center left WP.xls 
2/16/2005 
7:05 PM 126 KB 
Results of kinematic calculations & damaged 
areas for UDEC at the 2.44-m/s PGV level 
21-PWRs 1e-6 damage with 0.85mps 
Cutoff to central WP.xls 
2/16/2005 
6:29 PM 120 KB 
Results of kinematic calculations & damaged 
areas for UDEC at the 2.44-m/s PGV level 
21-PWRs 1e-7 damage with 0.85mps 
cutoff to center left WP.xls 
2/17/2005 
11:17 AM 335 KB 
Results of kinematic calculations & damaged 
areas for UDEC at the 5.35-m/s PGV level 
21-PWRs 1e-7 damage with 0.85mps 
Cutoff to center right WP.xls 
2/17/2005 
10:48 AM 286 KB 
Results of kinematic calculations & damaged 
areas for UDEC at the 5.35-m/s PGV level 
21-PWRs 1e-7 damage with 0.85mps 
Cutoff to central WP.xls 
2/17/2005 
10:23 AM 283 KB 
Results of kinematic calculations & damaged 
areas for UDEC at the 5.35-m/s PGV level 
WP-WP Damage Abstraction with 
0.85mps Cutoff Rev00d.xls 
8/17/2005 
3:31 PM 270 KB 
Four abstractions of damaged areas for 
end-to-end impacts 
WP-Pallet Damage Area Abstraction 
Rev00e.xls 
8/17/2005
3:54 PM 122 KB 
Two abstractions of damaged areas for waste 
package-pallet impacts 
Appendix E Rev02.xls 8/18/200510:11 PM 75 KB 
Electronic version of Appendix E and 
calculations for Table 6.7-5 
Source:  directory of files on CD in Appendix G. 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction 
MDL-WIS-PA-000003  REV 02 F-2 August 2005 
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